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NEW AND EXTENSIVE 



ANALYTICAL EXAMINATION 



OF THE 



ELEMENTS OF MENTAL SCIENCE: 



CONTAINING 

EVIDENCES OF DIFFERENCE. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN 
ELEMENTS OF MIND WHICH LIE AT THE FOUNDA- 
TION OF MENTAL ACTION, AND ELEMENTS 
OF MIND WHICH LIE AT THE FOUN- 
DATION OF MORAL ACTION. 

ABRIDGED. 

DESIGNED FOR STUDENTS, SCHOOLS, SEMINARIES, AND COLLEGES. 

BY 

KEY. MOSES SMITH, A. ML 



"KNOW THYSELF." 






CINCINNATI: 
PRINTED AT THE METHODIST BOOK CONCERN, 

FOR THE AUTHOR. 



R. P. THOMPSON, PRINTER. 
1861. 



<ca 



yy^ 




V 

Entered, according to Act of Cdngress, in €he year 1861, 
BY E. J. SMITH, 

in the Clerk's # Office of the District Court of the United States for the 
- Southern District of Ohio. 



/ o i 



) 






PREFACE. 



■+++- 



The design of laying this work, in abridged 
form, before the public, is to present the Philoso- 
phy of Mind in a clear light, and adapted to the 
demands of the present age. The topics and ar- 
guments are very numerous — the latter, brief, 
plain, and freed from many and long-existing em- 
barrassments. This volume is intended to contain 
at least one-third more items and arguments, im- 
mediately connected with the science, than any 
other work of the same number of pages extant; 
embracing those most important, and in their ap- 
propriate order. The examination, unlike any 
other, embracing the whole field of mental analysis, 
leaves the various powers entirely unincumbered 
by any law of fatality ; and clearly evolves the dif- 
ference between elements lying at the foundation 

of mental action, and those lying at the foundation 

3 



4 PREFACE. 

of moral action; which is indispensable to a cor- 
rect understanding of the science. The arrange- 
ment is convenient for a text-book — adapted to 
general use, and is auxiliary to the investigation 

and knowledge of truth. 

The Author. 



INTRODUCTION. 



-♦♦♦- 



ELEMENTS OF PHYSICAL AND MENTAL SCI- 
ENCES COMPARED— ELEMENTS OF MATE- 
RIALISM CAREFULLY EXAMINED. 

SECTION I. 

1. Man, in the very essence or nature of his being, 
has been left iviihout power to doubt the reality of 
self. Being conscious that self is real, doubt in re- 
gard to such entity is utterly impossible. Positive 
knowledge is the end of all controversy. We know 
that we are not non-existence, for nonentity can 
have no knowledge of reality. 2. If he looks out 
upon the varied and extended creations of God, 
contemplating the reality, amplitude, and grandeur 
of visible existence, or turns perception upon the 
mingling harmony of all the rolling vast of uni- 
versal being, together with the purity and powers 
of imperishable mind, he is compelled to regard 
all as composed only of spirit and matter. These 
constitute the universe, and in regard to the same 
all cogitation, or mental action, is restricted, how- 
ever free in progressive research and power of 
knowledge. 3. He exists, moving with freedom over 



6 MIND AND MATTER. 

the earth; has been called the noblest work of God, 
and lord of this world. He has been styled a com- 
pendium of creation, standing midway the kingdom 
of nature and that of immortal spirits. He studies 
to know every thing below himself — the earth, com- 
pounded of its various qualities, and all appertain- 
ing to it. He desires and labors to comprehend 
all unexplored laws connected with zoology, vegeta- 
tion, and crystallization. Looking abroad upon yon- 
der heavens, he traces the rolling orbs of the vast uni- 
verse — watches tempest and calm, rain and drought, 
heat and cold, seed-time and harvest. Why, then, 
should he not go still higher, and study to know him- 
self? 4. His being is indestructible^ and can never be 
discontinued by annihilation. The very nature and 
action of all" elements of mind are averse to any 
thing like a return to non-existence, or any idea 
that we shall ever cease to be. We can have no 
conception that an all-wise Being could or would 
create us for the purpose of causing our non-exist- 
ence. This conclusion can be sustained by the inde- 
structibility of matter. 5. Matter may be decom- 
posed, the elements united or consolidated ; may have 
the laws of affinity and power of adhesion suspended 
or destroyed; but we have no evidence of any pos- 
sible annihilation of properties. 

SECTION II. 

1. Man is compounded of spirit and matter; these 
united constitute but the one being. The ties of 



MIND AND MATTER, 7 

affection connecting the two natures seem to be so 
arranged, that when severed by death, the soul sus- 
tains no perceptible loss, either of faculties or true 
knowledge. The body without the soul is lifeless 
clay. Therefore, it is incapable of containing any 
power of action or item of knowledge. If the soul 
is possessed of powers and knowledge before death, 
it has them afterward, unless death has annihilating 
power, which is contrary to all evidence. 2. The 
spirit contains the animating principle, or is the prin- 
ciple of life. The science of psychology can not 
be untrue; for the soul is indispensable to life and 
knowledge of self. 3. The soul of man is the intel- 
ligent part of his being. Reason, judgment, and 
knowledge can not be matter, nor a result of mate- 
rial elements. 4. It is an immaterial or spiritual 
existence, as a whole, one and indivisible. It can 
not be inert, neither is it ponderous, or capable of 
annihilation. 5. It is immortal — limitless in dura- 
tion. Its faculties are very numerous, vivid in 
action, and powerful in conception and demonstra- 
tion. 

SECTION III. 

1. Matter is distinct from mind. Anthropology 
can furnish no material element w r hich, in quality or 
essence, can be called mind in whole or in part. 
Matter is divisible, tangible, and ponderous — pos- 
sessing density and extension, with gradations and 
dissimilar organic properties. 2. Matter is said to 
be inanimate when insensible and inactive within 



8 MIND AND MATTER. 

itself. Inert elements act only from impinging 
causes, and in conformity to the law or force of 
gravitation, but they can not possess any self-power 
of action. 3. It is animate when it possesses sensi- 
tive motion or action within itself. But the anima- 
ting principle is not matter; for then all matter would 
be sensitive, and have action and life. Sensitive 
action belongs to that which has life; but matter 
may have motion or action, without having sensation 
or life. 

SECTION IV. 

1. Mind is not matter. It is an internal and in- 
tellectual power. It must either act itself, or act 
from impinging causes. The natural tendency of 
matter is to inactivity, and its nature is to be and 
remain at rest. If moved by any external cause, 
rest is restored so soon as the impinging agent is 
wholly removed. Having no action within itself, 
it is impossible for it either to act or cause action. 
2. But the mind acts independent of remote, contin- 
gent, or intermingling causes. It has power to under- 
stand, conceive, judge, reason, and feel. 3. The 
term mind is applied to a combination of faculties, 
or an internal power, which feels, thinks, reasons, 
and wills. It is known to us by these faculties, 
and they are made known by our consciousness, 
the affirmations of which we can not doubt. 4. The 
essence of mind has been referred to something back 
of these faculties, or forming a still deeper founda- 
tion of their being. We can have no clear concep- 



MIND AND MATTER. 9 

tion or certain knowledge of such occult qualities. 
To advance in search of such elements, would only- 
plunge us into darkness and doubt. All such spec- 
ulations would be uncertain, from our ignorance of 
the subject; therefore, it is useless to try to decide 
upon uncertainties, and such process would add noth- 
ing to true science. 5. Imagine that we remove con- 
secutively all faculties of the mind, and it would be 
very difficult to conceive of some remaining some- 
thing called essence. And if we could, how could 
we analyze it, further than call it the power or in- 
fluence which affinitates, in common, all functions 
constituting the soul? Though this subject has 
been the origin of many speculative arguments, and 
in a way it is not capable of, words can not define or 
make it known to us. It exists in facts or truths 
wholly the objects of consciousness. 

SECTION V. 

1. Knoivledge, the result of reasoning, is not so 
clear, strong, and unerring, as that arising from 
intuition. The latter is the only primary source of 
receiving facts as facts, without either proof or dis- 
proof. In argumentation, an appeal to conscious- 
ness may be the last acknowledged resort, but is 
the most conclusive and certain. Finite objects of 
the external world, which strike the sense, can never 
vie with this internal influence or power, nor be the 
anterior cause of its existence. 2. We feel intui- 
tively a power within entirely distinct from all prop- 



10 MIND AND MATTER. 

erties of materiality. This combination of elements 
or internal power, which feels, thinks, reasons, and 
wills, can not be questioned or doubted. Yet we 
have real knowledge of such elements only by con- 
sciousness. Matter combines properties which are 
solid, ponderous, extended, and divisible. They are 
known to us as such, by our senses. 3. If the power 
constituting the faculties of mind, or of blending 
them together in action, be matter, how could it act 
w r ithin itself in recalling the past, and in contempla- 
ting the future — the events and occurrences of the 
one, and the objects and hopes of the other? And 
how could it act in examining the nature and prop- 
erties of tangible existences, and the design, as evi- 
denced in the symmetry and harmony naturally 
adapting them to the purposes and ends of their 
being ? Could it send out pioneer thoughts through 
unexplored creation and interminable duration? 
How could it examine the properties and laws of 
existences, and reason from nature up to nature's 
God? 4. If the principle within us which thinks 
and acts is matter, we are plunged into total dark- 
ness, and are entirely ignorant as to the power of 
perception, or knowledge of the existence of any 
fact; for that which thinks is known to us only by 
thinking. Matter is known by solidity, weight, and 
extension. The former is known by properties en- 
tirely different from the latter. Matter contains no 
principle by which we love, hate, fear, triumph, re- 
joice, sorrow, and suffer remorse or despair. 



MIND AND MATTER. 11 



SECTION VI. 



1. Matter is not mind. The substances composing 
the material universe are severally ponderous, divisi- 
ble, possessing density and extension; also existing 
in liquids or air form. The principles of these exist- 
ences are known as principles of matter and not of 
mind. All properties of matter are naturally inert. 
There are no elements or atoms belonging to the sci- 
ence of physics which can have action within them- 
selves, or self-action. All action or motion produced 
in them by operative causes, tends to inertness or 
rest at the suspension of the power of those causes. 
2. All material elements tend naturally to rest. And 
rest, or that which is at rest by natural tendency or 
law, can not originate action, neither can it pervade 
with action either rest or a series of entities at rest. 
But mind at rest has power to act within itself, and to 
cause action in insensible bodies, by voluntarily caus- 
ing them to be impinged while at rest, and by accelera- 
ting or counteracting their inertia. 8. The essence of 
matter is difficult to define. That properties exist is 
clearly demonstrable; but to go back of these in 
search of some occult principle or essence, would be 
attended with difficulty, and add confusion to true an- 
alysis. Yet the mind should be tested to its utmost 
power in trying to trace properties back to essence, 
or in discriminating between them by distinguishing 
their inhesive affinity in the union of compounds, 
which, if dissevered and all clustering properties 



12 MIND AND MATTER. 

removed, there is something remaining as unknown 
or imaginary, to which the term essence may be ap- 
plied. But we can have no satisfactory knowledge of 
any thing in physics anterior to, or, more correctly, 
primary than properties. 4. If the ideas of materi- 
alists be true, that there is nothing but matter in the 
vast universe, and that, at farthest, the soul of man 
is only the result of a particular organization of mat- 
ter in the body, we have no reasons favoring the 
knowledge of any existence. 5. For inert properties 
can have no knowledge of their own existence, nor of 
external existences. But we can not conceive of an 
immensity of space filled with nothing. Nonentity 
can have no perception or knowledge of non-exist- 
ence, neither can it have knowledge of entity. Then 
there must be an existence capable of thinking and 
knowing, and something capable of being the object 
of thought and knowledge. 6. If all bodies consist 
of unextended atoms, moved only by some law or in- 
fluence of attraction or resistance, how could we ac- 
count for the existence and action of that law or 
laws ? If law can not think, reason, and act within 
and of itself, it is clear that there can be no power to 
think and act contained in inanimate and inert atoms 
of matter. 7. The non-existence of matter is more 
reasonable than that nothing exists but matter ; for if 
nothing exists but matter, we have seen that there 
could be no knowledge of any reality; and if nothing 
could be apprehended or known, then if there could 
be existences, all knowledge of them would be lost 
in non-existence. 



MIND AND MATTER. 13 

SECTION VII. 

1. If the soul is matter, it has power te think and 
act. Then it follows that all matter has power to 
think and act, which is absurd. If some definite por- 
tion possesses this power, the difference is the result 
of the different modifications, magnitude, figure, or 
motion of some parts in respect to other parts, or to 
the mass, or the power of thinking and acting must 
be given to some systems of it and rejected from oth- 
ers. 2. If all matter is cogitative, it is contrary to 
all experience and knowledge we have of its nature. 
And if so, our senses and faculties are formed only to 
deceive us. A rock possesses no sign or evidence of 
either cogitation or sense. The head is the great bat- 
tery of thought, and there all the ministers of sensa- 
tion make their appeal ; but if all matter be cogitative, 
the feet would contain proportionably as much thought 
as the head, and there would be as much in the 
mountain rock as in either. Matter is not self-oper- 
ative but inert, and is no more than substance ex- 
tended and impenetrable to other matter. 3. Mate- 
rialism, in more recent and modified forms, maintains 
that mind is a result of organization, or a function of 
the brain ; that the physical and mental faculties coin- 
hering the same primary substances, grow, mature, 
decay, and cease together. If the brain is only the 
organ of the mind, it can not be the mind itself. It 
may form the center in which exists that influence on 
which depends sensation and motion. This organ is 



14 MIND AND MATTER. 

delicately connected, to a limited extent, with the 
mind's states and developments. Chemical analysis 
will show that all nervous matter in the entire system 
possesses precisely the same properties as that of the 
brain. Then if mind be matter, or the result of that 
kind of matter, it would be located all through the 
system; and if we could live we could have knowl- 
edge, to a proportionable extent, as well without the 
head as with it, or as well without it as without a hand 
or a foot. 4. The various diseases of the brain often 
modify, impair, or destroy the manifestations of mind. 
This sequence, if uniform, would not make mind to 
be the result of material elements, but would prove 
the brain to be the organ through which the mind 
acts and has access to external things. An object 
reflecting light to a perfect eye can be seen ; but with- 
out light sight would be lost — one of the bodily senses 
is suspended; yet the mind has power still to retain a 
knowledge of the object seen. Therefore, the power 
of the mind to act is not limited to the senses, for it 
can act when they are suspended. 

SECTION VIII. 

1. Mind is independent of matter as to existence, 
and as to properties or essence; but is dependent 
in the origin of its knowledge in regard to them. 
2. Matter can exist and be matter without the power 
to either iliink or act. Mind without these ceases to 
be mind. If we are wholly material, and matter can 
think as matter, then we must continue to think 



MIND AND MATTER. 15 

always, and in proportion to the number and size of 
the particles contained in each compound. Then a 
large body can think more and more powerfully than 
a smaller one; and both must continue to think on 
forever. 3. If matter can not be annihilated, then 
materialists are immortal unawares and contrary to 
their purposes and desires, but in perfect accordance 
with the premises of their own assumption. At least 
they must have a conscious state of being as long as 
there are any elements of the body existing after 
death. Therefore, embalmed and petrified bodies 
must have consciousness, thought, and action for ages 
and cycles of ages unnumbered. 4. If matter thinks 
through the future, it must have always thought in the 
past, and there has been no time of our actual physical 
existence when the mind was not active and thinking. 
5. What principle of materiality can possess sensation 
within itself or in common, or can constitute that 
w^hich loves, fears, joys, and sorrows, and is capable 
of being ecstatic with hope, quickened and excited 
with enthusiasm, or plunged into remorse or despair? 
In perfect health passion, anger, regret, and remorse 
may fill the soul; and peace, tranquillity, and hope 
often possess the mind when the body is suffering in- 
tensely or is even dying. 6. The septennial revolu- 
tions, or renewing of the system by the changes of 
its particles, does not change the identity of self, nor 
the one continued being in which man lives, and which 
he feels and knows to be himself. If self-action, 
self-consciousness, and thinking constitute the ele- 



16 MIND AND MATTER. 

merits of matter, or are essential to them, all elements 
of matter, abstractly or combined in every system 
must contain them ; and then they would be impossi- 
ble to any, for every system of materiality would pos- 
sess self-action and a consciousness of its own exist- 
ence individually in self- thought or thinking; and no 
self-consciousness or thought of an individual prop- 
erty can exist in common with other properties, or of 
the compound. Then no element or atom of matter 
in the vast universe could have knowledge of the ex- 
istence of any thing besides or beyond itself. 7. If 
impressions made upon material organs constitute the 
knowledge of existence, the occurrences of early life 
could not be commanded or recalled in old age ; for 
the particles of the system so often changing, and be- 
ing incapable of self-action, could make no transfer 
of their knowledge to those succeeding them. Then 
all knowledge of the past would cease to be, and we 
could know nothing back of the present moment. 

SECTION IX. 

1. Mind is dissimilar and distinct from matter, or 
even a result of materiality, only so far as matter 
may be the organ of the mind, or through which it 
holds intercourse with the external world. Thinking 
can not arise from the figure, size, or motion of the 
properties which think; for this would only result in 
gradations of size, or as to the appearance and celer- 
ity, which would differ from thinking. 2. The human 
body is incapable of annihilation. So far as we can 



MIND AND MATTER. 17 

analyze and understand, it appears that temporal 
death has no power to annihilate the constitutional 
elements of the body. The earth, air, and water con- 
solidated in the forest oak, may be decomposed or 
separated by fire; yet not one element or particle 
of the primary principles can be utterly destroyed. 
Death sunders the ties of affection connecting the 
soul and body, and the effect of the change in the 
body appears to be no more than the change of the 
arrangements of its essential elements. 3. We have 
no evidence of the annihilation of any existent, and 
our conception of such a result is impossible. There 
is no evidence of such a possibility in physical analy- 
sis, or taught in revelation, and our experience and 
belief are against it. 4. The accumulating weakness 
of age and the very decay of the body indicates no 
annihilation of matter, but a change in the affinity 
and position of its elements, and is an additional proof 
of the continuation of the soul ; for this decay is con- 
tinued existence in change and under a new form or 
abstracted entities. The term resurrection does not 
convey the idea of a new creation, but a resuscitation 
of the very identical body that went down to the 
grave, in the recalling of the primary elements to 
their wonted affinity and order in the new organized 
body; thenceforth their union will be unbroken. 

SECTION X. 

1. Though we do not know matter to be eternal in 

duration, yet we have no evidence to believe that its 

2 



18 MIND AND MATTER. 

properties will ever be annihilated. Then, if matter 
will exist in some way forever, it follows that there is 
something connected with animal life and motion 
which is superior in nature to mere matter, and is of 
a mental character and nature clearly distinct from 
matter, and must be called an immaterial or immortal 
principle; and we have as little or less proof of its 
pending annihilation as we have of the final non- 
existence of matter. 2. The soul is superior to mat- 
ter in the knowledge it has of its own existence, and 
of the existence of matter, and its power of self-action. 
These distinct differences show an immaterial inde- 
pendence, and its states and manifestations are incom- 
prehensible — almost an infinity of meaning within 
itself. There is an internal spiritual dominion or um- 
piracle principle, in which thoughts arise and are 
commanded, and by and from which they are sent 
forth through limitless creation like exploring lights, 
dispersed all abroad. The materialist has this power, 
and is conscious that he can employ his thoughts vol- 
untarily about any business he may choose or desire. 
3. To hear of or to see suffering will naturally move 
the feelings of the soul, and words written often cre- 
ate joy or excite alternately weeping and laughter. 
The self-inactive characters on the paper can not me- 
chanically or naturally move the observer in any way. 
If words are spoken there can be nothing in the sim- 
ple pulsations of the air that can effect matter cre- 
ating self-motion, neither to effect in any way the 
feelings or knowledge. That power which perceives 



MIND AND MATTER. 19 

and apprehends the force and sense of these things 
is far different from any principle of matter. Artic- 
ulated sounds can awake sensibility and arouse the 
soul in feelings or passion; and they can produce 
mirth, tranquillity, or gloomy despair. These results 
can not be the physical effects of the terms used, else 
the effect would be the same and as extensive if not 
understood as though they were. It is wholly the 
sense conveyed, or supposed to be conveyed and 
received, which is immaterial in itself, that excites 
the soul and influences physical action. 4. He who 
believes that matter possessed primarily causation, 
or that it can of itself come out of nonentity into 
self-existence, coalesce its particles and then live, 
think, and act by any process of reduction or ar- 
rangements of elements, possessing figure, or is ex- 
cited to motion by laws of affinity or of repulsion, 
should first discover and define the degree of fine- 
ness existing in a divided hair, and be able to tell 
all the points of intersection, angling the direc- 
tions of their localities respectively. Then should he 
proceed to define the alteration in the situation of the 
particles of matter in which they begin to breathe life 
from naught, live, act, and cogitate. 5. The self- 
power of particles to change to or from each other, or 
in degrees of difference, is impossible; and if they 
could, it would still remain, that form, figure, and 
magnitude are all material accidents. The substance 
is matter, and, in this respect, can not differ in parts 
one from another. Then if one part can think and 



20 MIND AND MATTER. 

act, all matter can think and act. Therefore, all 
particles of matter possess causation and action, 
and must be cogitative. And if there is such a 
thing as matter thinking, that influence or power 
must be superadded which implies a principle differ- 
ing in essence or nature from matter, and can not 
be a result of it, but must have been conferred by 
a superior or an omnipotent cause. 6. No accident 
of matter can produce action or cause cogitation, 
either regularly or irregularly; and it can not super- 
add that influence or power, for matter is divisible, 
and that which thinks must be one, or of parts united, 
so that the action is one. But matter is not one and 
indivisible. However closely the particles adhere to- 
gether, they still exist as particles and without self- 
motion, and &re powerless in adhering to or in pene- 
trating each other. If the power of thought existed 
in those particles, it would exist whether they were in 
contact or remotely located; and if these are divisi- 
ble, or are capable of being sundered and scattered 
abroad, there must be as many minds as there are 
particles in matter. Then the mountain, the globe, 
the sun, moon, and stars are all built of mind, or of a 
combination of innumerable immaterialities, w r hich is 
absurd. 7. On the other hand, if it requires a union 
of the elements of matter in order to constitute a 
power to think and act, there would be no power to 
classify these elements, and it would require all the 
material elements in the vast universe to form one 
mind or souh Should there be some influence or es- 



MIND AND MATTER. 21 

sence in which they unite or center, so their action or 
thoughts may be but one, that influence or power is 
not merely superadded, but is an existent superior to 
and independent of matter. 

SECTION XI. 

1. Matter can not contain abstract ideas of any 
thing, for the particles could not reflect upon what 
passes within themselves, much less contemplate that 
which was beyond ; for within themselves they could 
find nothing but limited material representations or 
impressions, and these could not form ideas, neither 
could they be formed by ideas, abstracting them- 
selves; nor have they self-power to form themselves 
into trains of thought and metaphysical argumenta- 
tion. 2. Matter, within itself, possesses no power 
capable of correcting appearances or impressions. In 
seeing the topsail of a ship, far away at sea, the nat- 
ural idea would be like the appearance, the existence 
of something very small; but as it is, there is some- 
thing within which forms a more correct idea, bring- 
ing into consideration the rotundity of the sea and 
the feebleness of sight. 3. Man is conscious that he 
lives and has liberty of motion, in thought and in 
changing position of place, and by an instantaneous 
thought change his course or purpose, and counteract, 
in some instances, the laws both of capillary attrac- 
tion and gravitation. Inert elements can not of 
themselves voluntarily suspend the operations or ar- 
rest the tendency and action of the laws of nature. 



22 MIND AND MATTER. 

4. The soul is not a faculty of the body, nor a remft 
of matter, but dwells within the body, and governs it 
in whole or in part, as the hands, feet, eyes, and 
tongue. That which governs the body is not the 
body nor particles of it, neither is it a superadded 
materiality or accident, but a superior spiritual power 
or soul. 5. The soul is incapable of annihilation, as 
it is distinct and superior to matter: the latter is im- 
perishable, or its elements can not cease to exist in 
some way. We know nothing of the nature or the 
essence of either mind or matter: and to try to define 
them, or the nature of their mysterious union, would 
be fruitless. 6. We have no evidence that anv c.v- 

t can or will ever pass into )ion-t\vi$fenct\ If 
the elements of matter are imperishable, and the im- 
materiality of the soul is established, which would 
render it more incapable of non-existence, so far as 
our knowledge of its elements and being can extend, 
how can we deny an unwavering belief of its immor- 
tality ? The soul has naturally an indisposition to 
tarry with the present moment and circumstances; 
there is ever a disposition to pass on to the future, 
and a desire for immortality. It can now feel an awe 
of the future and of God. This varies with its shades 
of conscientious rectitude or sense of wrong. We 
look to the future with fear or hope, according to our 
sense of guilt or innocence. 7. Conscience hasjM 

If-action. and is often impinged or influenced to 
action by some unseen cause, both in accordance with 
and contrary to our will and natural desires. lie 



MIND AND MATTER. 23 

who follows its dictations, and he who repels them, 
are both compelled to acknowledge its quickening 
influence and power. In contemplating the infinite 
future, the righteous rejoice while the wicked sink 
under feelings of remorse. 

SECTION XII. 

1. The soul has a conscious knowledge of self with 
its continued being, while in health or in the wane of 
life. There is no condition of helplessness or suffer- 
ing, this side death, while reason remains, but that 
the soul feels its nature and being to be immortal. 
The immortality of the soul is reasonable, from its 
vast capacities and dread of annihilation. It is evi- 
dent from its great improvements, boundless desires, 
natural dissatisfaction with time and things present, 
a desire for the future and for some kind of religion. 
2. The high moral obligations resting upon a rational, 
immaterial, and immortal spirit, are clear and of 
boundless importance; for the real existence of the 
human soul is beyond all possibility of doubt; and in 
the acknowledgment of the great government of an 
infinite Creator, we are necessarily compelled to ac- 
knowledge that all elements and existences should be 
adapted to the claims and purity of the same, and all 
that is impure must be rejected from the limitless pu- 
rity of God in the future w T orld. 3. One great object 
of our being is to cultivate the powers bestowed upon 
us for usefulness, subjecting them all to the will and 
service of God. There are impressions connected 



24 MIND AND MATTER. 

with the consciousness of every rational being, assur- 
ing him that the soul must live forever. We have 
power to deny this, but there is an internal voice ever 
arising from intuitive authority, thundering in affirm- 
ative appeals of truth, reversing all such false as- 
sumptions; and it can never be silenced by any 
confession or avowed faith to the reverse. 4. It is 
more reasonable for an atheist, skeptic, or materialist 
naturally to believe in Revelation, the immortality of 
the soul, and that that immortality of being may be 
pure and holy, than it is to reject them as false. For 
as Revelation is the only system claiming Divine ori- 
gin on earth, should it be false, we can lose nothing 
by believing it, as the same and common lot of man 
will be ours in the future. But if we reject it, and in 
the next world it proves to be true, then we are lost 
forever. 5. As matter belongs to physical science, 
we now close this part of our inquiries, and refer the 
reader to that part of this work devoted more exclu- 
sively to the philosophy of mind, where the powers 
of the student can be fully tested in examining mental 
elements. He should study to define clearly as pos- 
sible the existence and office of the various properties 
of mind. It will increase his confidence in the true 
existence of immaterial elements, the self-power of 
the soul to act, and of its immortality. His belief 
will be established as to the existence and limitless 
power, wisdom and goodness of the great First Cause. 
As standing midway the ascending and descending 
realities ranging two worlds, he should rejoice in try- 



MIND AND MATTER. 25 

ing to contemplate all demonstrable truths. Though 
willingly employed with the majesty of facts and mys- 
teries interwoven with infinite creations, yet duty is 
submission to God, as we wonder and adore, love and 
praise. 



ELEMENTS OF MENTAL SCIENCE. 



-♦♦*- 



PART I. 

THE ELEMENTS OF MIND 



WHICH 



LIE AT THE FOUNDATION OF MENTAL ACTION, 



" THE SOUL SHALL LIVE FOKEVEB." 



ELEMENTS OF MENTAL SCIENCE. 



-♦♦♦- 



DIVISION FIRST. 

»+• 

CHAPTER I. 

PRELIMINARY ARGUMENT. 

SECTION I. 

1. The mind of man is truly and clearly a spir- 
itual existent, immaterial in essence or nature, and 
unending in duration. 2. In the philosophy of mind 
there are elements which may be called mental ele- 
ments. These elements lie at the foundation of such 
philosophy, are the sources of mental action, and 
without their existence such action is inane. 3. If 
moral feelings can exist in the mind, and if moral 
action can proceed from it as an entity, or from its 
states or motion, there must be elements of mind 
connected directly with the origin of moral influ- 
ences, or no moral feelings could ever exist as apper- 
taining to or as a part of self; neither could we 
ever be capable of moral action. 

SECTION II. 

1. Those powers which lie at the foundation of 

moral action, or are connected with the origin of 

29 



30 PRELIMINARY ARGUMENT. 

the moral influences of the soul, may be called 
moral elements of mind. 2. If there is neither 
mental nor moral elements in the mind, there can 
be neither mental nor moral science, which can be 
known to us as such. But mental and moral science 
are acknowledged to exist and to be true; hence, 
there must exist in the philosophy of mind both 
mental and moral powers, when we compare the na- 
ture of the actions which proceed from them; other- 
wise the idea of the power, or the existence of either 
mental or moral action, is absurd; for an effect to 
exist without a foundation or cause is utterly impos- 
sible. 



INTELLECTUAL POWERS. 31 



CHAPTER II. 

INTELLECTUAL OR MENTAL POWERS. 

SECTION I. 

1. There are various orders of mind. Finite 
minds, from the lowest to the highest intelligence, 
are responsible to the authority of the great infinite 
mind and sovereign Ruler over all, to whom we 
should ever be wholly submissive and obedient in 
adoration, service, love, and praise. 2. The inferior 
orders of animated and self-acting beings possess 
something of the phenomena of mind. These prop- 
erties, if they be only called instinct, are proper- 
ties entirely dissimilar to and differing from those of 
matter. 

SECTION II. 

1. Matter has neither conscious sensation nor self- 
motion, but has inertness, which is essential to its 
nature and existence, and without which it ceases to 
be matter. 2. That which is analogous to the states 
and manifestations of mind in beasts, birds, and fish, 
if perceptible at all, may be called instinct; yet in- 
stinct alone is imperishable, from the fact that it is 
distinct from and is superior to matter; and we have 
no evidence to believe that any properties or par- 
ticles of matter will ever cease to be. Hence, the 



32 INTELLECTUAL POWERS. 

intellectual and immortal powers of the human mind 
are now prominently before us, and form the true 
objects of our inquiries. 



EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND. 33 



CHAPTER III. 

OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE AND 
NATURE OF THE HUMAN MIND. 

SECTION I. 

1. Mind is immaterial in nature, and exists in 
essence, or, as to elements, dissimilarly to that of 
matter, and has a continued being, which is inde- 
pendent of any essential loss or elementary destruc- 
tion by temporal disease or death. 2. It is not con- 
stituted by thought, feeling, or any emotion or act, 
but is that which feels, thinks, reasons, and acts. 
Though we examine severally the elements or prop- 
erties of mind, it can not be regarded as divisible, 
but is one in essence or nature, and the union of prop- 
erties in its existence is forever indivisible. 3. Our 
knowledge of the existence of mind or of self, inde- 
pendently of demonstration, falls back upon intui- 
tion, and is knowledge, known to be true, in an 
unerring assurance received and fully tested by self- 
consciousness. If the power of knowing existing 
facts be not referred back to innate elements as 
truths or axioms, which lie at the foundation of the 
philosophy of mind ; and if they be not the primary 
source of the knowledge of all real entities to us, all 
our knowledge would be inane, and all entities non- 
existences. 4. These results, which are of the oper- 



34 EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND. 

ation or motion of the mind, are not the primary 
knowledge of its existence, else the whole mind would 
exist in motion, and motion can not exist where there 
is no power of self-action, or cause capable of mov- 
ing. But the pow T er of knowing all these acts and 
results falls back upon self-consciousness and intui- 
tion. 5. In matter such essences as possess solidity 
and extension, or that which is essential to its entity, 
are called primary properties. But contact with a 
smell or odor awakens a conviction in the mind that 
there is somewhere an unknown cause of this known 
sensation. This, with color, temperature, and taste, 
have been styled secondary properties of matter. 
Yet these are only the effects or results, as proof of 
primary elements. 6. If a knowledge of mind, as 
an entity, iS wholly and only known by its motion, 
then any knowledge of it is an accident; for motion 
or action may or may not exist. 7. Any speculations 
as to the cause of mind are far beyond philosophical 
inquiries. It is not the cause of its own existence, 
neither can entity be a result of non-existence. 8. 
The nature or essence of mind is unknown to us. 
We know nothing of the essence of either matter or 
mind ; yet we are certain of the reality of that mys- 
terious principle within us, w T hich is a permanent 
existent of various phenomena or properties. 

SECTION II. 

1. Philosophers generally agree with Mr. Stewart, 
that "we are not immediately conscious of mind's 



EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND. 35 

existence, but we are conscious of sensation, thought, 
and volition; operations which imply the existence 
of something which feels, thinks, and wills." To 
what extent we are immediately conscious of its 
existence, anterior to the mind's operations, is diffi- 
cult to define with words. But to say that the power 
of self- consciousness can extend no further back, in 
any way, than the consciousness of sensation, thought, 
and volition, and they admitted to be mere operations 
of mind, is absurd. Operations of mind are no more 
than the original power or primary elements in mo- 
tion. It is impossible for those operations, which 
are only sequences or results, to derive no power 
from the primary cause and supporter of such opera- 
tions; otherwise the operations or acts of the mind 
would be the only primary principle or elements of 
its being. Then, whenever the mind was wholly 
inactive it would be annihilated, or, at least, we 
could have no certain knowledge of self, as the mere 
operations of mind may or may not exist; but if 
they can "imply something which feels, thinks, and 
wills," they imply a power which is capable of being 
the origin of the conscious knowledge of all the acts 
of the mind; otherwise an effect must be the origin 
of the cause itself. 2. Axioms, in numerical science, 
may, in some respects, represent axioms in the phi- 
losophy of mind. The whole of mathematical dem- 
onstrations or calculations can not be known to us 
as certainly true or false, were it not for the fact 
that they are based upon self-evident facts or truths 



36 EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND. 

called axioms. We are compelled to admit that things 
which are equal to the same thing, are equal to one 
another. If equals be added to equals the wholes 
are equal. All right-angles are equal to one another. 
A square block is a square block. Two added to 
two make four. We know all these to be truths or 
facts; but it is an absolute impossibility for us, by 
any process of reasoning or demonstration, to prove 
them to be either true or false. And without axioms 
there can be neither mathematical demonstrations nor 
science. 3. How can we know such truths to be 
self-evident facts? No power can receive them as 
facts, independently of all proof, but the intuitive, 
self-evident axioms which are the foundation of the 
philosophy of mind. The innate principles of the 
soul form the final and conclusive source of appeals, 
and are the primary test of the knowledge of facts 
to us. 4. Why may not these self-evident facts, or 
axioms of the mind, have knowledge of their own 
existence? The origin of the power of knowledge 
must exist in and arise from the innate elements of 
mind; otherwise an effect must be the primary or 
antecedent cause of itself. 



EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND. 37 



CHAPTER IV. 

EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND. 
SECTION I. 

1. Our inquiries as to the phenomena of mind are 
more properly confined to properties or elements. 
The origin and nature or essence of mind is beyond 
the limits of philosophical demonstrations. There is 
not so much mastery connected with the examination 
of the elements of mind. 2. The mind is capable of 
a threefold division. (1.) Those which are clearly 
mental elements. (2.) Those which may be called 
moral elements of mind. (3.) The manifestations or 
acts of mind. Mental elements are connected with 
all mental acts, and without their existence mental 
motion or action can not exist. They are the foun- 
dation or origin properly of such action or character 
of action. Moral elements of mind are connected 
with the origin of all moral action, and without such 
for a foundation no moral action can exist. 3. The 
operations or acts of the mind have hitherto been re- 
garded as involving, (1.) Our duties to Grod. (2.) The 
duties we owe to ourselves. (3.) Our duties to one 
another. All these have been claimed as the princi- 
pal embodiment of moral philosophy. 



38 EXISTENCE AN!) NATURE OF MIND. 

SECTION II. 

1. To every philosopher it is clear that the present 
order of works on mental and moral science is incor- 
rect ; for the natural character of the elements of 
mind, according to the books, without any sufficiently 
clear distinction, has been lost sight of from the fact 
that they have been called only mental elements. No 
separate work has been arranged exclusively upon 
mental action, further than is found in connection 
with the examination of the mental elements ; while, 
on the other hand, the action of the mind has been, 
by common consent, called moral action, connected 
with moral duties as contained in moral philosophy. 
But we should bear in mind that there are elements 
of mind which may be called moral elements, growing 
out of their relation to, and influence or position in, 
the mind. 2. The mind, so regularly and naturally 
arranged, contains within itself immediate power to 
know and to extend knowledge by examining ele- 
ments, laws, and affinities of existences. This is the 
comparison of phenomena, and the discovery of their 
agreement and disagreement. Though we can not ar- 
rive at the nature of the essence of mind, yet we are 
certain of something existing within, exhibiting a per- 
manent subject of certain varying phenomena, of 
which we are conscious, and to doubt it would be im- 
possible. 



SENSATION. 39 



CHAPTER V. 

SENSATION. 

SECTION I. 

1. Sensation is the mind's reception of an action 
felt and known to exist, or is an impression made 
upon it. The senses form the medium through which 
such an effect is realized. In another point of light 
it may be regarded as a simple state of the mind, in a 
peculiar way, and connected with action. Abstractly 
it is incapable of self-action, and must be, to a certain 
extent, a result of some influence or impingement, 
which may arise in different ways. 2. It may be con- 
nected with the change or influence of some one or 
more of the organs of sense, or in being closely acces- 
sory to the change of the physical powers. A change 
in the internal state and condition of the body may 
awaken the sensation of fatigue, pain, or heaviness. 
3. Sensation can not be separated from the mind. 
All sensation is in the mind, and is nothing more nor 
less than the mind itself in a certain state. Our 
sensations are diversified and are almost innumerable. 
The body has parts, and can exist with the loss of 
some of its members; but the mind and sensation are 
forever indivisible. 



40 SENSATION. 

SECTION II. 

1. In another shade of meaning sensation is feeling 
awakened by objects of the external world. The 
knowledge it gives of external objects is quite imper- 
fect. It requires a combined action of several facul- 
ties in conveying to us a general idea of real exist- 
ences. The various senses, acting separately, can 
give us no correct idea of existences, nor of the prop- 
erties of compounds. Sensation can convey to us a 
result of a known or unknown existence; but of itself 
can not give us a knowledge of either the essence or 
properties of existences. 2. Sensation may be a state 
of internal feelings , capable of being excited by spir- 
itual influences, or by sensations of humility and awe 
in the presence of the great God. It can be realized 
in the bare remembrance of startling events in the 
past* 3. In receiving impressions from external ob- 
jects, we are to bear in mind that our sensations are 
not the appearance or images of those entities, for the 
true plaee of sensation is in the mind. No external 
property can form any part of sensation, neither can 
it be added. 4. The connection between sensation 
and the physical organs is involved in mystery. Ex- 
ternal objects make an impression or they affect the 
physical organs, and through the medium of the 
senses awake sensations in the mind. To explain the 
change effected in those organs, or to define their con- 
nection with the senses, is impossible. 5. As sensa- 
tion is in the mind, and is the mind, in a certain way, 



SENSATION. 41 

we are compelled to acknowledge its connection with 
the primary elements ; for sensation can not exist only 
in connection with the existence of mind. 



4 



42 SENSE 



CHAPTER VI. 

SENSE. 

SECTION I: 

1. Sense, as connected with the human mind, is 
that principle or faculty which has power to apprehend 
the existence, and, to some extent, the qualities of 
external objects. 2. It appears to hold a midway 
relation between the existence and change of the 
physical organs and the existence of real sensation. 
3. In this position only it is immediately succeeded 
by sensation, being the medium through which im- 
pressions from external objects wake up the power 
of sensation in the mind. 

SECTION II. 

1. Sense, at least, apprehends some of the quali- 
ties of the substances which cause sensations, such as 
possess hardness, extension, and weight, which comes 
in contact with physical organs. 2. Its simple state 
is spontaneous, and its action may be wholly volun- 
tary, as well as a result of either voluntary or invoked 
causes. 3. It may be regarded as the perception of 
the senses, or is that influence or motion immediately 
successive to impressions made upon physical organs 
toward the reality of that which is felt ere sensation 



SENSE. 43 

refers it to the consideration of the mind. 4. It 
may, in another point of light, be regarded as the dis- 
eernment of the senses, which takes place on contact 
with an object, and in relation to the real existence 
of such object, almost at the same time the beginning 
of the impression thus made is realized. 



44 THE SENSES 



CHAPTER VII. 

THE SENSES. 

SECTION I. 

1. The senses connect, in one respect, the sensa- 
tions of the mind with the organs of sense in the 
body, and have power to report to us the existence of 
external things when they come in contact with the 
physical organs, and can convey a knowledge of 
their properties in connection with the action of 
other powers of the mind. 2. The connection ex- 
isting between the senses and the organs of sense in 
the body can not be defined. 3. We are wholly de- 
pendent upon our senses as the medium through 
which we have knowledge of external things. While 
they apprehend external things, and are a source of 
knowledge, as to their real existence, yet we have 
other sources of knowledge; otherwise the senses 
would be the embodiment of all the faculties of the 
mind. 

SECTION II. 

1. We are dependent upon the senses only so far 
as relates to existences in the external world, as the 
primary medium of access in knowing their existence 
to be real. Abstractly, we can not call the senses 
the knowledge of external things. They are only 



THE SENSES. 45 

the knowledge of external things in connection with 
other powers of the mind. 2. The importance of the 
senses as a source of knowledge in regard to ex- 
ternal objects is indispensable. If we were deprived 
of smell, taste, hearing, touch, and sight, it would 
be utterly impossible for us to know any thing of 
external physical existences. 3. Yet the loss of all 
these could not annihilate the mind, neither could 
they deprive it of sensations within itself, nor from 
other spiritual influences or existences. 4. We are 
now about to enter upon the order of the five senses. 
In examining them as they occur in their order, it 
is not intended that we should define their power, 
as they exist in the mind, disconnected with the 
physical organs, but to define, as far as possible, 
their office and power in their mysterious connection 
with the organs of the body. 



46 THE SENSE OF SMELL. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

THE SENSE OF SMELL. 

SECTION I. 

1. The organ of smell is said to consist in the ex- 
tension of nerves to every part of the delicate mu- 
cous membrane, with which the cavities of the nos- 
trils are lined. These are connected to the sinews, 
and extend up to the brain. So that by real phys- 
ical entities, the organ of smell is delicately and 
sensitively connected with the brain, which is re- 
garded as the organ of the mind. 2. The sense of 
smell is clearly connected with the nerves, and can 
not be separated from them only in the destruction 
of the physical organs; then that faculty may re- 
main inactive, so far as it relates to the pow T er of 
apprehending external objects. 3. The substance of 
the nerves contains precisely the same properties 
as that of the brain. That part of any nerve which 
has been severed by disease or violence, loses all 
sensation, and is doomed to perish. If all the nerves 
of the system are sensorial, and are connected in 
some way with the brain, then all physical organs of 
sense are connected with the brain. And the senses 
are inseparably connected with the nervous system. 
4. The nasal nerves, or organ of sense, may be 



THE SENSE OF SMELL. 47 

affected by the odor of a rose, and simultaneously is, 
or exists, the sense of smell. The nerves and the 
sense of smell are not one and the same; yet to 
define the connection is impossible. Sensation is 
immediately successive to the sense of smell, and 
conveys to the mind the impression of external ob- 
jects, apprehended by the organ of sense. 

SECTION II. 

1. The sensations of smell are received by means 
of the organ, which is the mind's primary, yet the 
remote test in apprehending the existence of ex- 
ternal things. 2. The nature and elements of that 
which affects the organ may elude our knowledge, as 
to a correct understanding of the manner of the op- 
eration; yet there is a state of mind produced by it, 
varying, in a great measure, voluntarily with the 
nature and elements of that which produced the 
impression. This peculiar mental affection is inva- 
riably successive to the organic change. And the 
nature of the connection blending the two in one 
action is beyond all explanation. 3. We can not 
classify, but to a limited extent, the sensations re- 
ceived by the sense of smell, for they are numerous 
and diversified. We may use such terms as sweet, 
sour, and musty; but as a general rule, they are 
classed, being distinguished by their connection with 
the object which causes the sensation, as the smell 
of a peach or an apple. The sensations received 
through the organ of smell are naturally pleasant or 



48 THE SENSE OF SMELL. 

disagreeable. Some of the objects which produce 
them throw off an effluvia which is delightfully ex- 
hilarating, and others produce death. 4. The sen- 
sation of smell, through the means of the organ, has 
an important influence upon life and health. It 
aids in the right use of medicines, detecting the 
harmless from the poisonous. It detects poisonous 
odors emitted from objects, or destructive vapors 
in the air. It aids in the selection of the right 
kind of food, as well as to impart to us a knowl- 
edge of thousands of sweet odors wafted upon the 
winds of heaven. 5. It is the properties of exter- 
nal bodies which produce these sensations. Odor- 
iferous effluvia, or small particles, are emitted from 
certain substances, and are diffused through the at- 
mosphere. The air drawn through the nostrils is 
impregnated with these particles, and brings them 
in contact with the organ of the sense of smell 

SECTION III. 

1. The "perceptions of smell" are not in distinc- 
tion from sensation; for perceptions of smell can 
not exist. Smell, within and of itself, is incapable 
of perception. We can have perceptions of that 
which is the object of smell, and we may have 
certain perceptions of or in relation to the condition 
and existence of the organ or sense within or of 
themselves, but not as many writers define percep- 
tions of smell. 2. The argument must differ from 
former writers; for there can be no sense of smell 



THE SENSE OF SMELL. 49 

till that organ has been affected. The action, then, 
which is sensation, conveys the impression to the 
mind. Till that action reaches the mind, there can 
be no perception. If we can have perception of 
smell, then perception must precede sensation, which 
is impossible. There can be no smell, known to us 
as such, till the organ is affected. Then if perception 
precedes sensation, it must act without direction to 
any definite object. Sensation within itself is not 
the perception of itself, or of the cause of its own 
action. 3. We can have perceptions of objects which 
are the cause of the action of the sense of smell, and 
these perceptions are in distinction from sensation. 



50 THE SENSE OF TASTE. 



CHAPTER IX. 

THE SENSE OF TASTE. 

SECTION I. 

1. The organs of taste consist of nervous papillae, 
covering the surface of the tongue, and particularly 
that of the apex and sides. It exists also in the 
mucous membrane, which lines the palate and cavity 
of the mouth. The entrance of the alimentary canal 
is so guarded that the suitableness of every thing 
which enters into the stomach is fully tested by the 
organ of taste. 2. The sense of taste is realized when 
the organ comes in contact with substances of differ- 
ent natures or qualities of properties. These effect 
a change in the organ, which is immediately fol- 
lowed by a corresponding influence of mind. 3. To 
the sense of taste is connected the sensations of taste, 
conveying to the mind, to some extent, something of 
a corresponding impression arising from the quali- 
ties of properties, or from the nature of the external 
motive cause. 4. If any faculty or faculties have 
power to convey to the mind any thing of the qual- 
ities or nature of objects causing sensation, why may 
not sense and sensation influence the mind in regard 
to the cause of sensations, and favorably to appre- 
hending the qualities of the same? for they are by 
nature adapted, as the inlet of the mind, to the real- 



THE SENSE OF TASTE. 51 

ity of such existences, and are designed to be more 
closely connected with such objects than any other 
faculty or power. 5. The doctrine that sense and 
sensation, which are more nearly and more closely 
connected with the causes which affect them than any 
other power, can not influence the mind favorably to 
the qualities and nature of such causes, is too absurd 
to require refuting arguments, and especially so, when 
all ever said to the reverse consists wholly in assump- 
tions. 6. The nature of the sensations of taste are 
known, and are items of experience. The mind hav- 
ing been impressed by sensation, the affections are 
immediately moved in search of some cause. 

SECTION II. 

1. The modifications of taste consist in its power 
to change, or inclination of the organ to adapt itself, or 
to be adapted to the nature of the various qualities of 
sapid objects. There is hardly any quality of objects 
of taste so disagreeable but that use can make them to 
be endured, and, perhaps, finally agreeable. And on 
the other hand the pleasurable may lose its agree- 
ableness by continued use. 2. The properties of 
bodies which give rise to the sensation of taste are 
called effluvia or flavors. The nature of the essence 
of these flavors is unknown to us; yet we know that 
such flavors exist. 3. Immediately upon the sensa- 
tions of taste a state of mind ensues which refers 
them to the external cause, and, in part, correspond- 
ingly to the peculiar quality of some sapid object, 
like unto those which are acrid, sweet, or bitter. 



52 THE SENSE OF HEARING 



CHAPTER X. 

THE SENSE OF HEARING. 

SECTION I. 

1. The ear is the organ of sound or of hearing, 
with location convenient and wisely arranged. Its 
projection forms an external koilon, suitable to the 
gathering of every pulsation of air wafted from every 
direction. The internal cavity consists of circular 
winding passages. These are partitioned or divided 
by the tympanum, which is a delicate membrane, 
called the drum, of the ear, and has a nerve deli- 
cately and beautifully spread out upon its internal 
surface. This is called the auditory nerve, connected 
to the brain. 2. The sense of hearing consists in the 
power or influence which is principally and myste- 
riously connected with the union of the tympanum 
and the auditory nerve. This is affected by the 
action of the atmosphere. The undulations, waves, 
or pulsations of the air move upon or impress the 
tympanum. 3. The sensations of hearing are real- 
ized when the. vibrations of agitated air are trans- 
mitted through the labyrinth, impressing the trans- 
parent membrane or drum, affecting the auditory 
nerve connected with the brain. The sensation is 
almost simultaneously conveyed from the organ, when 



THE SENSE OF HEARING. 53 

affected, to the mind, which is followed by a new 
state, in which we have perception, and an inquiry 
as to the external cause. 

SECTION II. 

1. The varieties of the sensation of sound are 
almost innumerable. It has been said that the ear 
is capable of detecting about five hundred variations 
of tone, and as many variations in strength. We 
are informed that when these are combined they 
number about twenty thousand, varying in simple 
sounds, degrees of strength, and difference of tone. 
Many human voices may sound the tone represented 
by three in the octave or stave, and each one will 
differ from all the rest, though sounding the same 
tone. Fifty different instruments may sound the 
same note and the ear be capable to distinguish a 
difference in all of them. A difference can be de- 
tected which may arise from light or heavy atmos- 
phere, the good or bad repair of the same instru- 
ment; also of the voice in sickness contrasted with 
the same in health, and pleasant with an angry mode, 
or age with youth. 2. The cause of these sensations 
is remotely in the object or agent which produces the 
vibratory state of the atmosphere, as the air has not 
irregular self-motion. A sonorous body, when struck, 
agitates the atmosphere around it; this agitation 
recedes from it in all directions in wave-like undu- 
lations, resembling concentric encircling waves on 
the surface of water at rest when ruptured by a 



54 THE SENSE OF HEARING. 

falling stone. Yet the air in motion may be regarded 
as the operative and impressing cause of the sensa- 
tions of hearing. 3. The knowledge which simple 
sounds convey to the mind is not intuitive. The 
power of sensations of sound belongs to intuition; 
but the knowledge we receive of the existence and 
properties of external objects, as a sequence of 
impressions made by sensations, is aided by other 
faculties in connection with experience. The new 
state of mind consequent upon the action of these 
sensations, is that in which we have perceptions and 
full knowledge of the existing cause. 4. We can 
not tell the direction of sound, neither the distance 
from us, nor the qualities of the cause wholly un- 
aided by other faculties and experience. But in 
gaining a knowledge of the direction, distance, and 
existence of the cause, we can and must depend, 
to a considerable extent, upon the sense of hearing, 
more than experience. 

SECTION III. 

1. To have knowledge of sound it is indispensable 
that we be in the direction and under the influence 
of the waves of air as they strike the ear. The nat- 
ural course and motion of sound is always from the 
cause. There can be no sound without a motion of 
the air, and motion recedes from the cause. If we 
depend upon experience for direction and location, 
we can arrive at them amid high and strong winds as 
though all were calm. But this is absurd. 2. We 



THE SENSE OF HEARING. 55 

gain our knowledge of location principally from the 
direction of the motion of the undulations or pulsa- 
tions of air which strike the ear, producing a corre- 
sponding sensation; also of distance by the peculiar 
modifications of strength or force of such pulsations; 
for if there be nothing in the sensation corresponding 
or agreeing in any way with the properties or nature 
of the cause, then it follows that the mind, in trying 
to determine the true cause by perception, acts with- 
out a guide, and the result is wholly accidental; for 
no faculty is calculated by nature, or has more power 
to give correct direction to the perception of cause 
than sense or sensation affected or created by it. 

3. Further proof that we are in a degree dependent 
upon the peculiar manner and way in which sound 
strikes the ear in determining the cause and its loca- 
tion, is found in the fact that when we have a con- 
fused idea of the direction of sound we intuitively 
turn the head in different directions to get the direc- 
tion of the waves of air on the tympanum, in order 
to know the true direction of the cause, and from 
the peculiar modulations and force of the sound thus 
conveyed we judge of the distance to the object. 

4. The sense of hearing is of great importance. By 
it we are made acquainted with the music of nature, 
the melody in the discordant sounds of instruments 
and of the living voice. Music has charms which are 
exhilarating and soothing. Verbal language is wholly 
dependent upon this sense. Articulated sounds or 
speech in the reciprocal expression of feelings, fears, 



56 THE SENSE OF HEARING. 

and hopes, forms one of the principal mediums and 
sources of human happiness. For such inestimable 
gifts praise should ever redound to the great Creator. 



THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 57 



CHAPTER XI. 

THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 

SECTION I. 

1. The organ of touch may be said to be blended 
-with and exists in the muscles or papillae, extending 
over the whole surface of the body. The hands and 
fingers have been regarded as the principal organ of 
touch ; but it is not clear that there is naturally much 
more minute delicacy or acute sensations in the ten- 
dons, fibers, nerves, muscles, or skin of the hands 
and fingers, than exists internally and over the entire 
surface of the body. Very much depends upon the 
frequent use of the hands and the concentration of 
faculties to their use in realizing sensations. 2. The 
sense of touch is far more extensive than the other 
senses we have just examined; for in one sense }t in- 
cludes them all in itself, possessing the surface of the 
whole physical frame; yet a distinction can be made 
and does naturally exist in the senses. 3. It is not 
the essence of properties which compose the nervous 
system; but is that power or influence of the mind 
mysteriously and inseparably connected with the ten- 
dons, fibers, nerves, and muscles, extending its con- 
nection with them to the very apex of the papillae 
spread over the surface of the body. Here it comes 
in contact with and realizes the existence of external 
objects. 4. The sensations of touch constitute that 



58 THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 

which conveys to the mind impressions of objects 
which affect the physical organs. Consequent upon 
these sensations is a new state of mind which has 
perceptions of the cause. But to define the mysteri- 
ous union of the power of sensations of touch with 
the physical organ, or nerves, is utterly impossible. 

SECTION II. 

1. The extent and variations of the sensations of 
touch differ from those senses we have noticed. By 
the sense of smell we acquire a knowledge of the ef- 
fluvia or odors of external objects. By the tongue 
and palate we gain a knowledge of tastes ; and by the 
ear we hear sounds. The knowledge gained by these 
senses is restricted to the single medium of appropriate 
operation peculiar to each one. But by the sense of 
touch we acquire knowledge of various objects and of 
different qualities, such as solidity, softness, hardness, 
roughness, and smoothness, and such as heat, cold, 
extension, and form. 2. The influence of the qualities 
of external bodies upon the mind, through the me- 
dium of the sense of touch, may and does, to some 
extent, impart a knowledge of those properties cor- 
responding to the peculiar nature of their existence. 
This can be tested by contact with hardness, exten- 
sion, and form, solidity, softness, roughness, smooth- 
ness, and motion. 3. Whether these properties be of 
primary or of secondary knowledge, in whole or in 
part, does not prevent them from producing, when 
brought in contact with the sense of touch, an inter- 



THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 59 

nal sensation or feeling corresponding, to some ex- 
tent, with the peculiar condition, state, or nature of 
the cause. 4. Knowledge in the mind, which arises 
from these sources, can not be perfect, received only 
through the medium of any one of the senses without 
the aid of other faculties. All sensations are in the 
mind ; and the idea that they have no power, when 
produced by external objects, to influence the mind in 
any way or to any degree, as to the nature or prop- 
erties of the affecting cause, is contrary to true analy- 
sis and our conceptions of truth. 5. Connected with 
the sense and sensation of touch is the origin of our 
knowledge of the temperature of bodies. When heat 
and cold affect the organs of the sense of touch, the 
sensation may be capable of a corresponding action 
in the peculiar state, nature, or modulations within 
itself. And with the nature of its action upon the 
mind is the origin of the idea of the qualities causing 
action ; for without the medium of the sense of touch 
we can have no knowledge of either heat or cold. 6. 
The sensation is not within itself the idea or the 
knowledge of the existence of heat or cold; but con- 
nected with the sensation is the origin of the idea of 
such existences; for if the origin of such ideas be 
not connected with the sense of touch, then we can 
have no knowledge of either heat or cold. 

SECTION III. 

1. A sentient being may know that heat and cold 
do exist, but as to the qualities of realities which are 



60 THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 

called heat and cold we know nothing. There is a 
difference between a sensation and an idea. A sensa- 
tion may be immediately antecedent to an idea, and 
we may form an idea of the cause of a sensation after 
the sensation is gone ; yet the origin of the idea may 
be connected with sensation, though that idea or no- 
tion may be matured after it is gone. 2. That the 
origin of the idea of external qualities which affect 
the sense of touch, is connected with the sensation of 
touch, has been acknowledged by all the leading phi- 
losophers of past time ; but many of them contradict 
their assumed premises in the conclusion of their own 
arguments, by denying the origin of our knowledge 
of any external substance as being connected in any 
way with the sensation of touch. They have fallen 
into this error by trying to keep up a logical distinc- 
tion between the elements of mind, severing the affin- 
ity of their united being by wild, abstract analysis. 
3. This sense can not, within itself, convey to us a 
matured knowledge of external existences ; yet the 
sensations may be affected by the qualities of their 
cause, sending them, with various modulations, to the 
mind,' and varying in degrees of strength. How far 
these can impress the mind in regard to the qualities 
of causes we can not tell; but connected with the 
sensations of touch is the origin of our knowledge of 
the cause of such sensations. 



THE SENSE OP SIGHT. 61 



CHAPTER XII. 

THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 

SECTION I. 

1. The eye is the organ of the sense of sight. Its 
location is wisely arranged for convenience and use- 
fulness, and where it can be most readily defended 
from harm or danger. It consists of transparent 
substances. The humors are of various refractive 
powers. They are called the aqueous, crystalline, 
and vitreous humors. The first refraction of the 
rays of light takes pl*ace when they fall upon the 
convexed surface of the cornea of the eye. This 
exterior surface receives the rays of light and trans- 
mits them to the aqueous humor. This transparent 
fluid exists between the cornea and the crystalline 
humor. The pupil is the center of the iris, and is 
the avenue to admit, and is for the transmission of 
the rays of light passing from the aqueous humor to 
the crystalline lens. It is maintained that here they 
are re-refracted and transmitted to the retina, which 
is surrounded by the vitreous humor. 2. The retina 
is a delicate membrane, w T hich lies at the bottom of 
the eye, and contains upon it the expansion of the 
sensitive optic nerve. Rays of light affect the sense 
of vision while passing through the eye, and are un- 



62 THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 

dergoing several refractions ; but they produce upon 
the retina or optic nerve the true image of the object 
which reflects the light. This sensitive organ re- 
ceives the image of the external object impressed 
upon it, and this impression is the origin of vision. 
The primary power of vision is connected with the 
optic nerve, and connected with it is the origin of the 
sensations of sight which report to the mind. 3. The 
importance of the sense of sight to our happiness and 
knowledge is self-evident. We can not fully estimate 
the true value without supposing ourselves to have 
been always deprived of it. Yet in that ease we 
could depend upon others ; therefore we must try to 
imagine the condition of the whole world without the 
power of vision. One glance of vision can survey 
hill and valley, mountain and lake, the verdant plain 
and rock-bound coast, flying clouds and rolling seas. 
In an instant of time it traverses a great variety in 
terrestrial existences — matches the flight of the vast 
globe, then ranges amid the revolving orbs of the 
planetary universe, But in the absence of vision 
these might exist and move, yet all would be night. 

SECTION II. 

1. The mysterious arrangement of the internal 
structure of the eye, in adapting it to the effects pro- 
duced by it, displays a design, skill, and wisdom infi- 
nitely above the power of atheistic arguments; for it 
nclusive evidence of an omnipotent Creator, who 
fashioned it according to his infinite wisdom. The 



THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 63 

rays of light are refracted to a proper point by the 
different coats and humors. The muscular tendons 
command the action of the ball in turning the pupil to 
the desired object. A circular, prominent, and strong 
orbit is set for its defense. It is protected by lids, 
lashes, and glands, secreting tears which promote its 
lubricity, supplying moisture, and, after washing the 
eye, the fluid passes through the outlet into the nose. 
This exquisite, mysterious, and successful arrange- 
ment can not be a result of accident or chance. 
2. The sense of sight must be connected with the re- 
tina or optic nerve. It is not the nerve within itself, 
neither is it the object of vision ; but its origin is with 
the sensitiveness of the optic nerve. 3. When we 
consider the acute sensitiveness of this nerve, if rays 
of light reflected from objects paint or impress it with 
the images of such objects in order to be seen, may 
they not, in part, be felt by the optic nerve when 
seen? 4. The sensations of sight are awakened 
when rays of light from the object affect the retina or 
optic nerve. These sensations impress the mind. A 
state of mind ensues in which we have perception of 
the cause of such sensations. 5. What modern phi- 
losophers mean by " the perceptions of sight" we can 
not understand. If they mean that sight has percep- 
tion of objects within and of itself, we beg leave to 
differ, as that would be utterly impossible. And if 
they mean that we can have perception of the origin 
of sight, by which we see an object, then sight would 
be a sequence of perception, and dependent upon it 



64 THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 

for existence, "which is not true. Therefore, there can 
be no perceptions of sight, but we can have percep- 
tions of the objects of sight. 

SECTION III. 

1. Colors have been regarded as the principal cause 
of the sensations of sight. But as to how they are 
produced, or as to where they have their origin, is left 
in obscurity. They may arise partly in the essence 
or qualities of objects seen, as well as from the vari- 
ous refracted rays of light reflected from those objects, 
and which fall on the power of vision. Some bodies, 
and even some properties, possess power to reflect 
rays more abundantly than others. That light within 
and of itself consists of rays of different colors, unaf- 
fected by contact with other existences, is very doubt- 
ful. Light passing through a glass prism presents 
different colors ; why can Ave not have the same result 
when it passes through prisms of other transparent 
substances? 2. We find, to some extent, that colors 
vary with the essence and qualities of the objects 
refracting and reflecting the rays of light. They may 
possess naturally a difference within themselves, but 
if so we have no knowledge of the fact. It is more 
reasonable to believe that color arises from the nature 
of the objects which reflect the light to the eye, or 
results from a modification of the principles of attrac- 
tion, adhesion, density, or repulsion of such objects. 
3. It is light reflected from external objects which 
affects the fibrous expansion of the sensitive optic 



THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 65 

nerve, and awakens sensations which extend to and 
impress the mind of the existing action of the reflected 
light, together w 7 ith the images of the objects which 
cause such sensations. The modulations or change 
imparted to the rays of light by the objects which re- 
flect and refract them is carried by them to the sense 
of sight, and a corresponding sensation extends to the 
mind. This is reasonable, unless we deny that sensa- 
tions are capable of change or modulations. 

SECTION IV. 

1. We have power to modify or change the rays of 
light which come from visual objects by intervening 
transparent substances, and correspondingly our no- 
tions of those objects. Though light is the primary 
object of sight, yet, in order to see external things, 
there must be objects from which it is reflected, and 
the change and modulations of the reflected rays car- 
rying with them the image of such objects to the power 
of vision, or the eye of coats, humors, and retina, 
or optic nerve. To define the precise office, nature, 
and powers of any or of all these is beyond human 
wisdom or philosophical analysis. 2. The knowledge 
we receive through the sense of sight, can be affected 
by graduated rays of light and shade coming from an 
innumerable variety of objects and qualities. At once 
we see the relative position of bodies, w r ith their mag- 
nitude, figure, distance, and color, aided by percep- 
tion, suggestion, association, and experience. To say 
that the sense of sight, within itself, has power to im- 



66 THE SENSE E SIGHT. 

part to us a full knowledge of visual objects is ab- 
surd. And to say that within itself it has no power 
to aid in arriving at a knowledge of such objects is 
false ; for our knowledge of visual objects, as such, 
has its origin with the sensations of sight. 3. Our 
knowledge of color is derived from the sense of sight, 
and the origin of this knowledge is original with the 
power of vision. No one of the other senses can be 
involved in the primary detection of color. Color may 
be a property inherent in light, consisting in a differ- 
ence or condition in the rays of light and shades, re- 
fracted and reflected, or are so changed, which is a 
result from contact with the bodies the appearance of 
which they present or impress upon the optic nerve. 
If white is not to be called a color, it may be regarded 
as the primary quality from which colors gradate, as 
red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo, and violet. 
These are imparted to the mind by the sensations of 

sight only. 

SECTION V. 

1. The idea of extension as visual is not wholly 
original from sight, but is dependent upon it for self- 
correctness. Light is the primary object of vision, 
but is not the only object of vision. The modu- 
lations and inherent nature of its refracted and re- 
flected rays present the appearance of objects to the 
sense of sight. If the power of vision extends no 
further than the retina of the eye, and that vision 
consists in the first contact of light with it, then when 
the image of an object was impressed upon the optic 



THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 67 

nerve, it would continue to be seen, though the object 
should be intercepted with a cloud or darkness. 2. 
If a solid body can present to the eye nothing but 
colors and light, will that prove that there is no con- 
nection existing in any way between those colors and 
light, and the object which causes them to fall on the 
power of vision? We can see the effect of a strong 
wind, but we can not see the element itself. But it 
is different with a solid body ; it is the cause of a pe- 
culiar light and color as the effect upon the eye; 
these are continuously supported there by the object; 
hence, the light and color either see for us the cause 
which continues their stay, or the eye can see, first, 
the primary objects, light and color, and, secondly, 
by means of these the real objects. If the optic 
nerve has power to feel the action of the rays of 
light and the image impressed upon it, may it not 
have power by means of them to feel the object which 
causes their action upon the nerve, and continues it 
as long as the eye is directed to such objects? 3. 
Our knowledge of objects, through the sense of sight 
only, is limited and confused. It has been ascer- 
tained by removing the cataract from the eyes of 
adult persons, that at first visual objects appeared to 
be touching the eye; and it requires the aid of some 
of the other senses, and of the action of the mind, to 
correct these appearances. But as all our senses and 
faculties are improved by action or use, so is sight, and 
it tends to correct itself in regard to visual objects. 



68 THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 

SECTION VI. 

1. If the sense of sight has no power, in any way, 
or to any degree, of receiving visible extension, 
length, and breadth, we can not tell how we are to 
judge of the real size of objects, as we can do but 
very little in association and in comparing distant ob- 
jects by the sense of touch only. 2. In judging of 
the magnitude of visual objects, we are much influ- 
enced by the peculiar nature and way the modulations 
of light strike the organ of sight, and in comparing 
such objects with other objects, the size of which is 
known. Objects, in a murky atmosphere, often ap- 
pear larger and nearer than they would in clear air. 
This may be caused by their dim appearance, and the 
refraction of the rays of light passing through a 
denser atmosphere. The sun and moon appear larger 
in the horizon than they do in the zenith. The prin- 
cipal cause of this is, that the rays of light coming 
from them strike the atmosphere obliquely, and the 
oblique portion of the atmosphere, which refracts the 
rays, occupies an enlarged space in the field of vision 
and subtends a greater angle at the eye. The refrac- 
tion makes the appearance of the sun and moon 
greater than they really are, and this difference in- 
creases in proportion as the rays pass parallel with 
the earth's surface in the denser part of the air. 3. 
The purer the atmosphere the more accurate is our 
estimation of the distance to objects. And an object 
upon a smooth plain or a ship at sea, where there are 



THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 69 

no intermediate objects, always appear to be nearer 
to us than they really are. 4. Our perceptions of 
distance, through the medium of sight, are principally 
acquired. 5. Though the above position is correct, 
yet we find, by correct analysis, that the primary 
power of our perception of visual objects and of dis- 
tance is original or intuitive. Take a child, before it 
can reason, place a candle near its face, and its hand 
will be but partially extended in order to grasp it. 
But turn its face to the moon or some distant object, 
and intuitively the arm will be extended at full length. 



70 SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SOURCES OF 
KNOWLEDGE. 

SECTION I. 

1. The senses may be regarded as a secondary 
source of knowledge, when compared with knowl- 
edge direct, or imparted to the mind or spirit as 
the result of the mind's own internal action, or is 
received by a superhuman spiritual influence without 
the medium of physical organs. 2. If matter has no 
self-power to impress or move material entities, only 
when connected with spirit, then it follows that self- 
motion belongs to spirit, and that spirit can impress 
or move spirit independently of material organs. 
Therefore, the internal feelings, influences, and im- 
pressions, imparted by the Infinite Spirit to the mind, 
may be regarded as knowledge direct, or that which 
comes to us independently of any feeble, diseased, 
and perishable material organs, which, from their na- 
ture and condition, are liable to deceive us. Then 
that which we experience from imperishable sources 
is not only knowledge direct, but are primary sources 
of knowledge, and worthy of far more confidence and 
belief than any fact or knowledge received through 
the medium of the senses, connected with diseased, 






SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE. 71 

deceptious, and perishing physical organs. 3. Ac- 
cording to the preceding argument the senses may be 
regarded as a secondary source of knowledge. And 
the order of this world is to rely upon the senses in 
testing the reality and nature of external things with 
the highest degree of confidence or belief, while 
knowledge direct to the mind is often disregarded and 
rejected as worthless. 4. The senses can not, in con- 
nection or abstractly, give us a perfect knowledge of 
external things; otherwise each power of the senses 
would be a perfect mind within itself. But they are 
limited in conveying a knowledge of external objects, 
which, however, is perfected when brought under the 
inspection of the mind. The deception exists wholly 
in the nature and condition of the physical organs. 

SECTION II. 

1. Spirit being imperishable, is incapable of dis- 
ease destroying its action or of decay; but the phys- 
ical organs are subject to be enfeebled or rendered 
inactive by disease, or may be entirely destroyed. 
While under the influence of disease we can not 
depend upon them with much certainty. The cor- 
rectness of their reports is accidental, and the mind 
often has great difficulty in correcting wrong impres- 
sions made by them. 2. Our reliance upon the senses, 
and our power to believe in the correctness of their 
reports, does not arise in the existence and nature of 
the senses, but has its origin in connection with an 
internal conviction or consciousness that what they 



72 SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE. 

report is true. But as no one is disposed to doubt 
the testimony of the senses when they are free from 
the power of disease, we will not spend time in 
proving the necessity of greater confidence in them. 
3. The skeptic professes the most positive belief in 
the existence and nature of facts tested by the senses, 
while he rejects internal convictions and moral dem- 
onstrations. A correct knowledge of external facts 
reported to the mind depends upon intuitive power. 
We can have no knowledge of external facts, as such, 
but for the presence of intuition, to which all facto 
may be referred in order to be fully known and the 
mind satisfied. If internal affirmations and convic- 
tions of truth are to be wholly rejected, then it is 
utterly impossible to have knowledge of any existent 
in the external world. 



DIVISION SECOND 



■++< 



CHAPTER I. 

PEECEPTION. 

SECTION I. 

1. Perception* is that faculty of the mind which 
has power of perceiving internal and external changes 
and existences; and in action has power of perceiv- 
ing and of receiving a knowledge of external objects 
by means of the impressions they make on the senses, 
or it leads to the full action of the mind in arriving 
at a knowledge of real existences. 2. Sensation and 
perception are regarded as the properties of mind, 
by which we arrive at a knowledge of external things. 
Sensation refers to the physical organs and their 
mysterious union with the immaterial sensibilities, 
and perception refers to the power and action of 
mental influences and elements. Perception has been 
regarded as an association formed between the im- 
pressions made upon the organs of the senses and 
the external substances which are the cause of such 
impressions. But the acting power of this associa- 
tion is connected with the primary elements of mind. 
3. Perception is immediately successive to the action 

of sensation, or arises with the new state of mind 

7 73 



74 PERCEPTION. 

■which follows the impressions made by sensations. 
Sensation within itself can have no perception of its 
own existence, nor of the cause of such an existence ; 
but impressions made through the medium of sensa- 
tion are followed by a peculiar state of mind, in 
which we have immediate perception of the affecting 
cause. 4. Whether perception is a sequent of im- 
pressions conveyed by sensations to the brain we 
know not. The inlets of the mind, for comprehend- 
ing external things, appear to be mysteriously con- 
nected with the entire nervous system. The nerves 
are connected with the brain, and thence receive their 
influence. But this great medium may not require 
sensations to go from the extremities to the brain 
before there £an be any action of perception. The 
mind may have power to perceive the affecting cause 
upon its action on the organs of senses; but to de- 
termine the precise mode of operation is impossible. 

SECTION II. 

1. Perception may be regarded as a voluntary act 
of the mind. That aggressive influence or power 
which strikes out in maturing a knowledge of exter- 
nal objects, requires an effort in order to a full degree 
of perception which can be retained. 2. Sensation 
is not necessarily followed by perception. We may 
be employed in thought or in conversation, while a 
numerous variety of objects pass through the field of 
vision and none of them be retained in the mind. 
This results from a want of the perception of those 



PERCEPTION. 75 

objects. We may have experienced the sensations, 
but no effort was made in retaining the impressions 
of them; for the mind must attend to what is pass- 
ing in order to a real perception of external objects. 
3. To a limited extent perception may be regarded 
as involuntary. We may open our eyes upon a beau- 
tiful forest; the first tree seen may claim our atten- 
tion till we suddenly turn away; yet we may have 
faint perceptions of other trees which are still re- 
tained in the mind, and were not voluntary objects 
of either sight or perception. If we cast our eyes 
upon a canvas of pictures and fix our mind upon one 
of them, so that all the rest are almost as though 
they did not exist, yet they are unintentionally seen, 
and our perception of them is involuntary. In leav- 
ing our room in eager quest of some object, we pass 
two men in descending the stairway, one small and 
the other large — the perception of the difference in 
their size is wholly involuntary. 4. But voluntary 
perception involves an act of the mind in attending 
to the cause of sensations; and connected with this 
act or action is our perception of external substances 
and qualities. 

SECTION III. 

1. Perception makes us acquainted with external 
things, and has its origin in a peculiar mental state, 
in which the influence or action refers to internal 
affections of the mind, and also to external caus- 
ation. It carries the mind out of or beyond the 



76 PERCEPTION. 

existence of self, and introduces us to the external 
world. It has power to cause external things to 
pass in review. Perception is not the only medium 
through which we are made acquainted with external 
things. Our knowledge of them commences with 
sensation, and sensation is a sequence of the im- 
pingement or of contact with external things; and 
perception following sensation fully presents to the 
inspection of the mind the cause. 2. Our perception 
of primary properties of matter differs from that of 
sensation. Primary properties are essential to the ex- 
istence of all material substances, and are known to 
be such as solidity, extension, figure, and density, with 
divisibility. These qualities belong to all real mate- 
rial bodies ; but as to their essence we know nothing. 
3. Sensation is a result of contact, in some way, with 
external substances, and implies their existence as 
the cause of such influences. Perception refers or 
leads the mind to a knowledge of the cause of a 
known sensation. 4. We have perception of the 
difference between primary and secondary proper- 
ties of matter. The latter are such as hardness, 
softness, roughness, and smoothness, smell, taste, 
heat, cold, sound, and color. These may cause cer- 
tain effects in the mind, or awaken sensations which 
are immediately followed by perception, bringing the 
affecting cause under mental inspection. 



FALSE PERCEPTION. 77 



CHAPTER II. 

FALSE PERCEPTION. 

SECTION I. 

1. False perceptions take place when there are no 
external objects corresponding with, and which are the 
cause of them. When there are no external causes, 
we are left to conclude that false perceptions exist 
within ourselves, and in the mistake which the mind 
makes of its own perceptions. 2. False perceptions 
can arise first in the organs of sense. They can be 
affected in various ways, and the succeeding sensations 
are followed by perception, as to the act of the mind, 
when there are no external substances as cause of 
such sensations, or as objects of perception. These 
organs can be changed or affected so as to produce 
the appearance of realities by disease or by excite- 
ment, fear, or grief. And they change within them- 
selves, affected by age. 3. Again : false perceptions 
may exist in connection with the changes in mental 
states. The mind is capable of an internal error or 
delusion in believing in the existence of objects as 
real when they are not. It can be deceived in its own 
conceptions of real existences. 4. False perceptions, 
which arise in connection with the organs of sense, 
are caused generally by bodily disorders. These per- 



78 FALSE PERCEPTION. 

ceptions may be corrected, as we shall notice in the 
order of the following section. 

SECTION II. 

1. By the concentrated action of the mind, as af- 
fected through the medium of the other senses. Cor- 
responding sensations, resulting from affecting causes 
upon the organs of sense, contribute, in their united 
appeals to the mind, toward correcting false percep- 
tions. 2. False perceptions can be corrected by com- 
paring our perceptions of objects we suppose to exist 
or exist in a different way from their appearance, with 
the perceptions of others in regard to them. The de- 
liberate decision of several persons, by means of the 
same organs^ of sense, while in health, and at the same 
time, will not mislead. 3. A correction can be made 
by a proper exercise of judgment in comparing with 
some known object. 4. If we have perception of two 
or more objects of the same or differing in kind, we can 
turn to some one we know to be single, and if there 
appears to be more than one, we know our perception 
in that respect to be false. But in correcting all false 
perceptions we are dependent upon a correct exercise 
of the judgment. 



PERCEPTION AND THE SENSES. 79 



CHAPTER III. 

PERCEPTION AS CONNECTED WITH SMELL, 
TASTE, HEARING, TOUCH, AND SIGHT. 

SECTION I. 

1. We will now turn attention to our perceptions of 
objects which affect the mind through the medium of 
the sense of smell. The origin of our knowledge of 
the existence and difference in odors commences with 
the sensation of smell. 2. If it is impossible for sen- 
sations to affect the mind in any way corresponding to 
the object and qualities of the cause, then there is no 
connection between the action of sensation and that 
of perception. Then when we receive sensations from 
the smell of a rose or jasmin, we would be as apt to 
have perception of a rock or mountain as the object 
as any other existent; and our perception as to the 
true cause being wholly unguided, would be accidental 
in results. 3. If there is no connection between sen- 
sation and perception, it would be true that when we 
have sensation we may or may not have perception; 
and if, in any case, perception is immediately success- 
ive, it could only be regarded as an accident. Dr. 
Abercrombie mentions a blind philosopher who could 
distinguish a black dress by smell. The origin of this 
knowledge did not commence with perception, but 
with sensation. And the sensation of smell, in this 



80 PERCEPTION AND THE SENSES. 

case, appears to have impressed the mind with a 
knowledge of the object and some of its qualities un- 
aided by the other senses. Mr. Stewart speaks of 
James Mitchel, who was deaf, speechless, and blind, 
yet by smell he could detect the presence of a stran- 
ger and give the direction to him. This knowledge 
commenced with the sensations of smell, and without 
the aid of other senses. In this case the mind must 
have been influenced to correct decisions, in some 
way, by the peculiar nature or character of the sensa- 
tions of smell. 

SECTION II. 

1. Our perception of objects which affect the mind, 
through the medium of the sense of taste, should be 
carefully examined. It has been said that sixteen dif- 
ferent simple tastes exist. In the different combina- 
tions there are almost innumerable modifications, as in 
the degrees of strength, intensity, and weakness, 
quickness, and slowness. The properties of external 
substances which affect the organs of taste, awakening 
sensations, are called flavors. 2. Habit, in relation to 
taste, enables us to distinguish differences by repeated 
or continuous efforts. In this way the epicurean dis- 
tinguishes the flavor and qualities of the luxuries 
of the table to a degree which would pass unnoticed 
by others; and the physician, the difference in 
drugs which are similar in appearance, and also in 
taste, to one not accustomed to them. 3. Under the 
law of habit some wine-dealers distinguish the flavor 
of one wine from that of another, and tell where each 



PERCEPTION AND THE SENSES. 81 

or all were made. 4. The proper direction of the ac- 
tion of perception toward the cause must be, to a lim- 
ited extent, dependent on the nature or modulations 
of the sensation received ; for if there is no connec- 
tion in any way, our perception as to being immedi- 
ately successive to sensation, and in bringing the true 
cause to the attention and inspection of the mind, 
would be w T holly an accident. 

SECTION III. 

1. The perception we have of objects which affect 
the mind through the medium of the sense of hearing 
is worthy a passing notice. The sense of hearing is 
more acute in some persons than in others, yet the 
power of discriminating sounds and the difference 
in tones or modulations may be cultivated. 2. The 
sound of a cannon produces a stronger sensation 
than that of a rifle. Who can say that perception 
receives no influence as to the cause of sensations, 
from the peculiar way they affect the mind? If 
mind was divisible, then this might be impossible. 
But the elements of mind can not be abstracted, 
like blocks of marble, from the same mountain, and 
examined by the rules of superfices and solids, and 
the laws governing inert elements. 3. The appli- 
cation of habit to the sense of hearing renders such 
power more acute as repeated efforts are made. 
There are instances of blind persons who can call the 
names of others from the sound of their voices, 
though they may not have heard them for years. 



82 PERCEPTION AND THE SENSES. 

Others can tell when they are approaching a prec- 
ipice or wall, by the peculiar sound of their feet 
upon the ground. 4. If there is no connection in 
any way between sensations produced by sound and 
our perception of the cause of such sensations, then 
our perception of the true cause may be accidental. 

SECTION IV. 

1. We experience perceptions of objects which af- 
fect the mind through the medium of the sense of 
touch. And in proportion to the increase of the 
exquisite acuteness in detecting and reporting exter- 
nal substances to the mind, is the clearness and 
proper action of our perception in bringing such 
substances before the mind. 2. Blind persons can, 
with greater safety, pass all through a house in a 
dark night than any one who has the power of vision. 
Some of them can tell the distance to a burning fire 
by the action and degree of heat, and also of ap- 
proaching contact with external bodies by the pe- 
culiar action of the air. And by the sense of touch 
they can be taught to read by means of large raised 
letters. 3. Our knowledge of that which affects 
the touch commences with sensations, and is more 
fully developed to the mind by the action and power 
of perception. 

SECTION V. 

1. Our perception of objects which affect the mind 
through the medium of the sense of sight is worthy 
attention. Expansion of surface and color have been 



PERCEPTION AND THE SENSES. 83 

regarded as primary objects of vision, but that of 
distance and magnitude have been rejected. Yet 
it is maintained that we judge of limited distances 
by sight alone. If we can judge of small distances 
by sight alone, why not, to some extent, judge of 
greater distances, aided by the same power? 2. The 
inclination of the axis of vision, which directs both 
eyes to the same object, and the peculiar way in 
which the reflected rays of light fall on the eyes, 
appears to give rise to an influence which affects 
the mind in deciding upon the true distance of such 
an object. To touch any object immediately before 
us with one eye closed is accidental, but certain 
with the aid of both. 3. A child, before it can 
reason or compare, shows an intuitive knowledge 
of distance by sight, in extending its hand no farther 
than the desired object when near, and at full length 
when distant. Our knowledge of the distance and 
magnitude of visual objects commences with sensa- 
tions of sight. 4. Habit, in relation to the power of 
vision, renders it acute in detecting the existence of 
objects. And in proportion as we try to discrim- 
inate, will we have clear perception of objects which 
affect the organs of sight. By continued effort the 
mariner can discover a ship as it nears in the dis- 
tance, when it can not be seen by a person not 
accustomed to maritime observations; and he can 
call its name when nothing more than a blur can 
be seen by the untrained eye upon the surface of 
the ocean. Under the law of habit there is a quick 



84 PERCEPTION AND THE SENSES. 

and vigorous action of the power of vision, and in 
proportion to its improvement is the clearness and 
power of our perception of visual objects. 



DIVISION THIRD 



-♦*♦- 



CHAPTER I. 

OUK KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEFINITE AND 
CONTINGENT PHENOMENA OF THOUGHT. 

SECTION I. 

1. It has been said that the phenomena of mind 
consist of certain thoughts and feelings, and that the 
true inquiry is as to the order in which they arise, 
and of what these elements are constituted. Though 
they are of great importance, yet we can not imagine 
that within themselves they constitute all of mind. 
2. We can not doubt the real existence of thought in 
connection with the mind's states. Of the existence 
and action of thought we can form some idea and 
have a satisfactory knowledge. The nature of ele- 
ments, which have been called the original elements 
of thought, can not be clearly defined, though they 
must have their origin in connection with the exist- 
ence and action of primary mental powers. 3. Thought 
is that which the mind thinks, and may be said to be 
that, in part, which acts in thinking. And it is that 
which is prominent and leads in cogitation, reflection, 
contemplation, and meditation. 

85 



86 PHENOMENA OF THOUGHT. 

SECTION II. 

1, Thought is not only real within and of itself, 
but expresses action, as in thinking. It is the act or 
operation of the mind when attending to any particu- 
lar subject as existent, and in another sense it may 
be regarded as the idea consequent on that operation. 

2. Thought can not exist as a part of the mind if 
separated from it. Hence, our thoughts are nothing 
more than the mind itself in a peculiar way or in dif- 
ferent states ; yet their proper office has been defined. 

3. The importance of thought to our being, knowledge, 
and happiness is forever beyond all power of descrip- 
tion. By continued thought the student ever ex- 
pands the powers of his mind with useful knowledge. 
Think, think, always thinking, is the motto of true 
greatness. It leads to the possession of that true 
eminence where the mind, with triumphant composure, 
scorns the perishable glory of earthly fame. 



IDEAS. 87 



CHAPTER II. 

IDEAS. 

SECTION I. 

1. The term idea, as that of notion, applies to that 
which perceives or observes in the mind; hence the 
form or image of any thing in the mind possessed by 
it for contemplation or inspection. It exists in the 
mind, and can be a result of mental action. 2. Our 
ideas may be said to vary with or correspond to their 
objects in regard to their nature and mode or condi- 
tion of existence. 3. Our idea of physical existences 
may be regarded as contingent, from the fact that it is 
natural for us to have conceptions of them as muta- 
ble, and that it is possible for the power that made 
them to cause them to cease to be. 4. Our idea of 
physical entities may be said to be relative, as the 
very notion of that which has bounds or finity will 
suggest the opposite, which is infinity or non-limita- 
tion. 5. Our idea of duration may be regarded as 
absolute. We know that duration is and must con- 
tinue, and that its annihilation is impossible. 

SECTION II. 

1. Our idea of space has been said to be necessary 
or absolute. To conceive of the annihilation of all 



88 IDEAS. 

physical entities is possible, but to conceive of the 
annihilation of unbounded space is utterly impossible. 
Hence, the idea of space is necessary; for we can 
have conception of the real existence of the object 
of such an idea, and to try to conceive of the non- 
existence of space is beyond our power. 2. Our idea 
of space is absolute, which arises from the condition 
of its existence. We are immediately impressed with 
the fact; and our belief is unwavering that space 
must be, and that it can not cease to be. 3. The idea 
of space implies the absence of limitation. We can 
not conceive of it only as real and infinite. Our ideas 
of material elements, or of the finite, are contingent 
and relative ; and those of space, or of the infinite, 
are necessary and absolute. These exist in the mind, 
and are distinct in their orders. 4. If the idea of 
space and of the infinite is necessary and absolute, so 
may we regard the idea of cause. Therefore, it is 
reasonable for the atheist, when looking on the works 
of nature, which are sequences, to intuitively infer a 
cause of their existence, and to believe that such 
cause is all-powerful and all-wise, from the vastness 
and skill evidenced in visual and tangible existences. 



KNOAVLEDGE WITHOUT TESTIMONY. 89 



CHAPTER III. 

POWER OF KNOWLEDGE WITHOUT TESTI- 
MONY. 

SECTION I. 

1. Tile primary elements of mind may be regarded 
as axioms, or self-evident truths, within themselves, 
which are the foundation of mental philosophy. That 
they have a real existence, and are true within them- 
selves, is knowledge which we have no power to doubt; 
and the primary elements are truths, the reality and 
correctness of which are incapable of either proof or 
disproof. 2. There is no possible way of proving the 
axioms or self-evident truths, which are the founda- 
tion of mathematical science, to be either true or false, 
yet we receive them as truths. The power to do this 
is not contained in those axioms or truths, but lies 
back of all these, and can only exist in the intuitive 
elements. Therefore, it is more reasonable for us to 
regard the primary faculties as self-evident truths ; 
for our knowledge of them, and of all other facts or 
objects, turns upon their intuitive power to know 
them to be true, and to reject that which is false. 
3. The primary elements of mind are truths known to 
be true only from the fact that we know them to be 

such; and all the power we have of knowing any 

8 



90 KNOWLEDGE WITHOUT TESTIMONY. 

thing of their existence, nature, action, or of any 
other truth or fact in the vast universe, arises in con- 
nection with and from the existence, nature, and ac- 
tion of these original elements. 

SECTION II. 

1. We can not arrive at a knowledge of their exist- 
ence by any form of argument or from any external 
testimony. They are their own witnesses, testifying 
within, of, and to themselves, of their own existence, 
which is knowledge. 2. With them is the origin of 
the power to receive within and of themselves the 
knowledge of their own existence. 3. With them is 
the origin of the power to arrive at and to know the 
truth in regard to external things, either without or 
from testimony. 



KNOWLEDGE FROM TESTIMONY. 91 



CHAPTER IV. 

KNOWLEDGE FROM TESTIMONY. 

SECTION I. 

1. We have an intuitive power to arrive at a knowl- 
edge of facts and truth from testimony. The imme- 
diate self-knowledge we have of external things is 
tested by and received through the medium of the 
senses; but the greater part of our knowledge, in re- 
gard to such existences, is obtained from other per- 
sons upon tfre evidence of testimony. 2. Testimony 
is a solemn declaration or attestation made for the 
purpose of establishing or making known some fact. 
It is the declaration of a fact, and evidence is the 
effect of that declaration on the mind, or the degree 
of light imparted by it. Facts are received by us 
from personal observation far more readily than from 
the declaration of others. We must first have confi- 
dence in the ability and veracity of the narrator in 
order to give full credence to the facts revealed. If 
what he says comes true, we believe him more readily 
at another time ; but if once deceived, his future testi- 
mony is apt to be rejected. We can believe the state- 
ments of a tried friend more readily than those of a 
stranger. 3. Our intuitive power, in the reception and 
belief of external facts, is influenced by the corre- 



92 KNOWLEDGE FROM TESTIMONY. 

sponding agreement of such facts with those already- 
known. We should look well to the evidence upon 
which we receive facts, and to the capacity of the nar- 
rator. A weak mind is apt to have boundless credu- 
lity, and seldom ever thinks or reasons for itself. 
The contracted mind is generally captious, skeptical, 
and always inclined to reason from imperfect premises, 
and arrives at false conclusions. An ignorant mind 
or person rejects the testimony of all philosophers. 
He believes the earth to be flat and its position fixed 
immovably. He gives only one foot diameter to the 
sun, and drives him through the heavens. 4. When 
we are limited in our views and requirements, there 
is a tendency to rely on our experience, and to reject 
all knowledge.for which we have not the evidence of 
our senses. A proper understanding of self, and of 
the true method of arriving at a knowledge of exter- 
nal facts, will remedy false perceptions and conclu- 
sions. 

SECTION II. 

1. A well-regulated mind is influenced by the rec- 
ollection of facts, which appeared at first to be decep- 
tions or even false, but subsequently prove and are 
known to be true. Hence the conclusion that there 
may and does exist many elements and facts, decid- 
edly marvelous or appalling to us at first. 2. We 
have power to arrive at a correct knowledge of facts 
from testimony; and have power to discriminate 
credible testimony from that which is not, by contrast- 
ing the manner, the arrangement of parts, or the con- 



KNOWLEDGE FROM TESTIMONY. 93 

dition. When a sufficient amount of the right kind 
of testimony has been received, we feel an internal 
satisfaction in relying upon it without doubt. 3. Infi- 
delity assumes that we can not believe testimony which 
diflers from our uniform experience and the uniform 
course of nature ; but we have seen already that this 
position is false. The influence or power sustaining 
and containing the elements of our belief in regard 
to testimony, has its origin in intuition. To receive 
proper testimony is natural, but to conscientiously 
doubt it is unnatural and impossible. 4. To arrive at 
a distinct belief of a miraculous interposition or act, 
requires something more than to give credence to 
facts which are in accordance with the uniform laws or 
course of nature. 5. Miracle we understand to be 
that which takes place in violation to, or deviating 
from, the established course of nature, and that which 
is contrary to our uniform experience. If miracles 
exist in violation of, or deviating from, the regular 
course of nature, their existence can not be a result 
of this uniform course of nature, nor of the laws gov- 
erning the material universe. Then, if miracles exist, 
the cause of their existence must be distinct from and 
superior to the course of nature. Therefore they ex- 
ist by a direct interposition or act of Divine Power. 
6. Divine Revelation is regarded as a miraculous gift 
of Heaven, and, as a result, clearly demonstrates or 
proves an adequate cause of its existence. All mir- 
acles recorded in the Bible aid in proving the exist- 
ence of Deity and his power to establish laws and 



94 KNOWLEDGE FROM TESTIMONY. 

suspend them at pleasure. If he has power to order 

and arrange common events, which are called natural, 

he has power and does order uncommon events, called 

miracles. 

SECTION III. 

1. Infidels assume that events happening contrary 
to the course of nature and our experience should be 
rejected, and that it is more reasonable for men to lie, 
and that several concur in propagating the same lie, 
than that a miracle should take place, according to 
their testimony, which would be a result contrary to 
the course of nature and experience. The rejecters 
of the Christian system hold and teach that the uni- 
form course of nature is true, and that it is the uner- 
ring truth of the universe. 2. Mr. Hume says, in 
regard to the resurrection of Christ, " I must admit 
one of two things — either that twelve men agreed to 
tell a lie, or that a man arose from the dead. It is 
more probable that men should lie, than that one 
should return to life again." That is, if Christ rose 
it would be contrary to the uniform course of nature, 
which course of nature he regarded as infallible truth. 
He then asserts that it is more reasonable for men to 
lie than that Christ should arise from the dead. Ac- 
cording to his own premises, arguments, and belief, 
such a lie could not be a part of the course of nature, 
which is truth, neither a result of it in any possible 
way. Hence, such a lie being contrary to truth, is 
contrary to the uniform course of nature, which is 
truth. Then, according to his own creed and belief, 



KNOWLEDGE FROM TESTIMONY. 95 

this lie would be a miracle ; yet lie regards it as that 
which is the most reasonable, and adopts it as the 
foundation of his faith and future hope. He then tries 
to disprove the miracle of Christ's resurrection by as- 
suming, in lieu thereof, the existence of another mir- 
acle, according to his own faith and teachings, which 
miracle, he says, is more reasonable, though he ac- 
knowledges it to be a lie. And, of course, if in this 
respect the foundation of his faith or belief be a lie, 
all arguments and conclusions drawn from it must 
be wholly and forever untrue. 3. And as this is the 
only argument which has ever been referred to, which 
can have any claims to be an argument against the 
resurrection of Christ, it is, therefore, true, that 
Christ rose from the dead, and the truthfulness of our 
holy Christianity is forever incontrovertible, notwith- 
standing the great and celebrated argument of Mr. 
Hume. 



DIVISION FOURTH 



CHAPTER I. 

CONCEPTION. 
SECTION I. 

1. Conceptions exist in connection with peculiar 
states and operations of the mind, by and in which 
they appear to arise. 2. Conception of and within 
itself is the power ', and acting is the act of conceiving 
and of receiving, or of admitting facts to the inspec- 
tion of the mind. It is closely connected with our 
sensations and perceptions. When we have concep- 
tions they are revived and followed by certain mental 
states, in which present or past ideas, sensations, or 
impressions can be and are examined. 3. In a cer- 
tain sense we may have conceptions of ideas, images, 
sentiments, and thoughts. And in another sense it 
may apply to re-occurring facts and to re-existing 
emotions and sensations, which we, at one time, had 
realized. The mind, in the peculiar states with which 
they are connected, is moved and influenced in refer- 
ence to both external facts and internal feelings and 
sensations of the soul. 

SECTION II. 
1. Conceptions in nature and action appear to dif- 
fer from sensations and perceptions. Perception is 
96 



CONCEPTION. 97 

characterized by an egressive action, or by its striking 
out in apprehending objects, while conception is more 
passive, with internal power to be revived or awak- 
ened as an inlet to the mind of existing facts, and of 
the re-occurring of facts, feelings, and ideas which 
had been real in the experience of the past. 2. Con- 
ception differs from memory and from the action and 
objects of remembrance. The causes and objects of 
conceptions are absent, which is not true with sensa- 
tions and perceptions. Sensation and perception act 
from and in reference to their causes and objects; 
but we have conceptions of truths in the remembrance 
of past feelings and ideas, when the causes and ob- 
jects are not taken into the account. In this way we 
may have conceptions of any thing within the control 
of memory, independently of time, condition, or place. 
Our conceptions of past occurrences take no account 
of the time when their causes were present; and the 
regulation of them is influenced by the power and 
laws of association, and can arise under the action 
and controlling power of volition. 3. Conception is 
not confined to our impressions of past time, but can 
be connected with our feelings in regard to present 
existences. We can not only haye conceptions of 
present and real existences, but we can have them in 
connection with peculiar mental states or conditions, 
upon which depends the peculiarities of illusions, 
dreaming, and partial insanity, though they may be 
piisguided or be entirely false. 

9 



98 MEMORY 



CHAPTER II. 

MEMORY. 
SECTION I. 

1. Memory is that faculty of the mind by which we 
retain the knowledge of past events, or ideas which 
are past. It is the power of retaining impressions, 
facts, or events ; and remembrance, or recollection, is 
the act of recalling them, and of presenting them, by 
a voluntary effort, to the mind for inspection. By 
conception we recall perceptions or the impressions 
of scenes or events without reference to time, causes, 
or objects, but memory retains past ideas or events 
with but little effort in connection with time, causes, 
and objects. Ideas, facts, and events seem to be 
spontaneous or abiding realities in the existence of 
memory; but remembrance, or the act of recalling 
past events or ideas, is controlled by an effort of the 
will. 2. Memory is that power or susceptibility of 
the mind which contains and retains ideas or events 
without any special, voluntary, or involuntary action. 
Within itself its capacity or power contains facts in 
connection with either active or inactive states of 
mind. It is the retentive power of events or realities 
which become the objects of thought and of knowl- 
edge. This power, in vigorous and voluntary action, 



MEMORY. 99 

calling up past events or truths, is remembrance, or 
recollection. Memory is not the origin of knowledge, 
but is a source of knowledge, in connection with other 
mental pow T ers, and is essential in forming ideas of 
realities. 3. The existence, nature, and power of 
memory are closely connected with those of concep- 
tion, perception, suggestion, association, and imag- 
ination. 4. When we speak of an object of memory, 
we have immediate conceptions of its appearance and 
qualities. 5. In remembering objects which afflicted 
us in the past there is an immediate recalling of per- 
ceptions or impressions, in regard to which we have 
perceptions of the relation of past time. 6. It is 
common for us to say, when we think of a fact within 
the compass of memory, that it suggests to us another 
fact, perhaps from the similarity or their nearness in 
the order of time. 7. Memory has been called a de- 
partment of association, or, under and within the ex- 
tent of its power, there is an affinity of ideas or 
events, forming a chain or association, in which they 
naturally recall each other. 8. Imagination is de- 
pendent on memory in forming new combinations of 
ideas from materials stored up in the memory. 

SECTION II. 

1. There appears to be original differences in the 
power of memory. Some persons have remarkably 
strong and retentive memories, which are essential to 
a rapid and extensive acquisition of knowledge ; but 
when memory is very prominent or predominant, it is 



100 MEMORY. 

seldom connected with a properly-balanced and well- 
regulated mind. The strength of the endowment of 
such minds depends principally upon what has been 
seen and heard, as they are apt to be very much lim- 
ited in originality, yet quick and untiring in the pur- 
suit of an object, with but little caution or judgment. 
Some have been known to repeat almost any number 
of words they had heard without any connection or 
meaning. One writer speaks of a man who could re- 
peat the entire contents of a newspaper, and of an- 
other who could retain words spoken to the number 
of six thousand, while their other intellectual powers 
were of an inferior order, though this is not univer- 
sally true with persons of such remarkable memories. 
2. Memory founded upon and embracing real analo- 
gies is an element of mind more important to true 
mental cultivation and the acquisition of knowledge, 
than that which remembers facts only in the order in 
which they occurred. The former is an important 
auxiliary in forming and arriving at intellectual at- 
tainments and character, while the latter is connected 
with but little judgment; yet appears to be more 
sprightly, attended with show, and embraces that 
class of facts in common demand. 3. We have em- 
braced and implied, in the nature and power of mem- 
ory, in its peculiar connection with the action of the 
intellectual principle, (1.) A sensitive impression, or 
a certain mental state, resulting from contact with 
some previous existent, and synchronizing with the 
perception of the cause recalled. (2.) The involun- 



MEMORY. 101 

tary recurring of internal impressions and feelings, 
or of those which may arise from their similarity to 
some existent of present knowledge. (3.) An invol- 
untary recurrence in the mind of some previous ex- 
istent related to the object or cause apprehended in 
close affinity or order of time. 4. It not only implies 
suggestion, but conception of past events with the 
perceptions of epochs in past time. 

SECTION III. 

1. Local memory, which refers to and has power 
over local entities or facts once known, existence 
either in matter or mind, is generally combined with 
but little caution and judgment. It merely remem- 
bers facts or events in the order of their occurrence, 
resting upon local or incidental relations, especially 
in regard to place, order of priority, and aposteri- 
ority. 2. Memory contributes to true knowledge and 
the belief of truth. If its power to retain and re- 
member facts be removed, our knowledge of past 
events is swept away. 3. There are degrees in the 
power of memory in different persons. There are 
some who can not retain facts in the mind for any 
length of time when compared with others. Some 
recollect that which they have seen, but soon forget 
that which they have heard. Others recollect that 
which they have read or heard, but can not remember 
objects of sight. Some of the greatest and most 
affecting orators known in history could write in two 
hours more than they could memorize in a week. It 



102 MEMORY. 

is true that some persons can give a long chain of 
facts narrated by an author, only in the author's 
words ; while others can give all the facts, only in 
their own language. 4. Philosophic memory em- 
braces general principles and universal truths. Gen- 
eral principles are of more importance than minor 
items, and also the facts appertaining to and which 
are explanatory of such principles. This description 
of memory is sustained principally by the relations 
of cause and effect, resemblance and contrast. Thus, 
our inquiries extend to the nature and origin of ex- 
istences, scanning their analogies and oppositions, 
causes and results. 

SECTION IV: 

1. A ready memory embraces qualities, resem- 
blances, and rules of progression with ease, and with- 
out any special process of exploring and of under- 
standing the truths or facts illustrative of general 
principles. 2. A retentive memory is connected with 
that species of memory called philosophic. It is sup- 
ported by facts and realities, connected with general 
principles, and in remembering any fact the action is 
apt to be prolonged by recalling the general princi- 
ples with which it is connected. Though it may be 
slow, yet it is generally progressive and irresistible in 
conquest. 3. Artificial memory is cultivated and at- 
tained by connecting things easily remembered with 
those not so readily recalled. This operation is con- 
nected with and is dependent, to some extent, upon 



MEMORY. 103 

suggestion in a modified form. The whole system of 
mnemonics principally depends upon suggestion, as 
when in recalling two synchronizing objects, with one 
and the same state of mind, the object of easiest rec- 
ollection exciting the mind in recalling the other of 
more difficult remembrance. 4. An efficient memory 
has power to retain facts, with vividness of action in 
recalling them. There is an acuteness and peculiar 
quickness of retentive power connected with the 
memory of some persons which is not exercised by 
others. A good memory is not only tenacious and 
quick in the reception of facts, but retains impres- 
sions or ideas with a great degree of freshness and 
vividness amid the crumbling of mutable elements 
and the blight of time. 

SECTION V. 

1. The memory of persons at advanced age is not 
efficient as in earlier life. There is an apparent 
weakness in the retentive power, and an inability to 
recall ideas and facts. The loss of this power and 
activity can not be regarded as w T holly arising within 
and of itself, but is principally attributable to the 
state or condition of the medium through which it 
acts. 2. It is dependent upon perception for facts 
with which it is stored, only so far as perception aids 
in such bestowment. But it can not be regarded as 
dependent upon it for retentive power, nor for its ac- 
tion in the recalling of ideas or facts. 3. Memory 
may be weakened by defects in attention from its 



104 MEMORY. 

close connection with it; for with attention there is 
an emotion of interest which is not so acute and 
tenacious in old persons; yet it is necessary to im- 
plant facts upon the mind so as to be readily remem- 
bered. 4. The faculty or power of memory, in aged 
persons, is not capable of any diminution or loss 
within and of itself. The defect is attributable to the 
change and enfeebledness of the organs or medium 
through which its manifestations are realized. Other- 
wise the mind of an aged person would be annihilated 
in proportion as it ceases to be developed. But this 
is contrary to experience and knowledge. The mem- 
ory of the aged can retain the events of early life so 
that they can be correctly rehearsed, while present 
events or truths are forgotten by them in an hour. 
This shows that the original power within itself has 
suffered no elementary loss, and is free from any anni- 
hilation. 5. He who fears to trust memory will always 
feel embarrassed in delivering what he knows. In 
order to conquer and feel at home on any or all sub- 
jects, we must make memory responsible, and freely 
throw ourselves upon it. 6. It should be constantly 
exercised and burdened only with the most important 
facts. 7. We should receive the impressions of 
things to be remembered in their natural order — from 
premises to relations and results, from elements to 
manifestations, and from causes to effects. 



DURATION OF MEMORY. 105 



CHAPTER III. 

REMEMBRANCE, RECOLLECTION, AND THE 
DURATION OF MEMORY. 

SECTION I. 

1. Remembrance is the retaining or the continuing 
in the mind ideas or facts which have been present at 
various mental states, or it is an idea or impression 
previously received from some object recurring to the 
mind at a subsequent period without the presence of 
its cause. 2. Remembrance implies the occurring of 
ideas or facts to the mind spontaneously, or with but 
little mental effort. 3. The ease, distinctness, and 
readiness with which we remember an impression or 
fact, is proportionably to the tenacity with which they 
are received. Deep impressions are lasting, and are 
continued as property of the mind without any spe- 
cial voluntary mental effort. 

SECTION II. 

1. Recollection is the act of recalling impressions or 
facts which have been the objects of memory at some 
former time. 2. Remembrance differs from recollection. 
The former implies that an idea or impression occurs to 
the mind spontaneously or with but little voluntary ex- 
ertion. The latter implies not only the power, but it is 



106 DURATION OF MEMORY. 

the act of recalling ideas or facts which do not spon- 
taneously recur to the mind, and with seemingly vol- 
untary efforts. 3. Recollection, in one sense, is vol- 
untary, and in another sense it is not. We can not 
remember because we merely choose to remember. 
To will to remember any fact or facts, implies that 
such facts were once the objects of memory, and that 
they are still in the reach and subject to the power 
and the act which recalls them. 4. Memory may be 
said to be the power which receives and retains ideas 
or facts. Remembrance appears to preserve facts once 
known from passing away from the mind so as to be 
utterly beyond recovery. Recollection is the act of 
recalling facts, once the objects of memory, for the 
inspection and* use of the mind. 

SECTION III. 

1. The duration of memory is clearly evidenced in 
its power to recall and present to the mind the events 
of its past experience. Memory, within itself, is ab- 
solutely imperishable, and thoughts which are the ob- 
jects of memory are indestructible. If the impres- 
sion is revived with which any thought in time past 
was connected, the thought itself can be reproduced. 
The reviving of any impression once realized necessa- 
rily involves the presence and the action of a power 
which can affect the recalling of thoughts coexisting 
with it. 2. Thoughts and feelings, which have been 
forgotten for years, often recur unexpectedly. It is 
believed by some that the mind possesses within itself 



DURATION OF MEMORY. 107 

power in its different states, and while affected altern- 
ately by innumerable existences and influences, to 
recall, at different periods, all the events and feelings 
which have ever been the objects of memory. 3. It 
can be and is affected by the physical organs, when 
those organs are under the power and influence of 
disease. There is a connection between the mind and 
the physical organs, in which each exercises a recip- 
rocal influence. The action of the mind may be in- 
creased or diminished in proportion to the manner and 
intensity of the influence of disease upon the body. 
Accordingly as the body is affected the mind may be 
retarded or quickened in action. 4. Memory may be 
impaired from injuries of the head or affections of the 
brain. An Englishman has been mentioned w T ho was 
in a state of stupor, the result of an injury of the 
head, who, when reviving, spoke only in Welsh. He 
had been thirty years from his native country, and 
previous to the injury had forgotten his native lan- 
guage, and when restored to health he recovered the 
English language again and could not recollect Welsh. 
This was evidence that the power of memory had not 
been destroyed, and that its inactivity in recalling facts 
can not be attributed to any defect within and of itself. 
A Frenchman on going to England when quite young, 
lost the power of speaking French; but while suffer- 
ing from an injury of the head he spoke only French. 
5. When the body is affected in different ivays the ef- 
fect upon memory differs. A boy has been mentioned 
who seemed to be insensible under the operation of 



108 DURATION OF MEMORY. 

trepan for fracture of the skull, and when he was re- 
stored to health had no recollection of it ; but during 
the delirium of a fever eleven years after, he gave a 
correct description of the operation, and of the per- 
sons present. An Italian gentleman, when first at- 
tacked with disease of the brain, spoke English; as 
the disease progressed he spoke French, and for some 
time before his death spoke only Italian. These facts, 
with many others, show that diseased organs have an 
influence over memory, and also that memory must be 
imperishable. 6. Often when the mind appears to be 
in an inactive state of coma, the result of violent fever, 
the powers and action of memory are not wholly sus- 
pended. There are instances of persons thus affected, 
and supposed to be perfectly unconscious, who, on re- 
covery, have had a perfect recollection of the events 
and conversation which took place. 7. Truths, which 
are the first objects of memory with the young, are 
those which are of most importance. Though they 
are the first received, yet they are the last forgotten. 
Those things which we learn first are generally closely 
connected with our education, and they greatly influ- 
ence our course in life, and aid in forming our char- 
acters for eternity. 8. In view of the judgment of 
the great day, what manner of persons ought we to 
be ? Memory will then and there present to the mind 
all the impressions, ideas, feelings, and acts of our 
whole lives. All, all will be remembered. 



ATTENTION. 109 



CHAPTER IV. 

ATTENTION. 

SECTION I. 

1. Attention is that faculty of the mind which 
has power to attend to or heed any reality. 2. By 
general consent it has been defined to be the action 
in, or the act of attending to objects or facts. 3. If 
it has power to act, or be acted upon, then it is a real 
entity. And if real, it must be capable of being 
called an element of the mind. 4, If an element of 
mind, it can not be a result of any other element or 
elements. 5. The strong efforts made by some to 
prove that it is not an original power, has convinced 
us that the reverse is true, from the fact their 
conclusions failed for want of correct arguments. 
6. Attention expresses not only the state of mind, 
but the act by which it is directed to any object or 
fact, to the exclusion, for the time, of all other con- 
siderations. Though closely connected with percep- 
tion, yet we may have perceptions of objects, to some 
extent, before the attention is directed to them. The 
musician can perceive the order of the bass of a piece 
of music which he is playing on an instrument, while 
his attention is at the same time upon the air he is 
singing. When our attention is steadily fixed upon an 



110 ATTENTION. 

object, other objects may pass within the field of vi- 
sion unheeded till our attention is withdrawn; then, 
without difficulty, the mind can be directed to the ob- 
ject which had received no previous notice. 

SECTION II. 

1. Attention is said to be voluntary when under 
the power and action of the will. An object may 
have our attention so as to lead to a general exam- 
ination of its appearance ; but we can determine to 
attend to the nature or elements of such object or 
objects, upon which a penetrating investigation takes 
place. 2. It is said to be involuntary when suddenly 
arrested and turned to an unexpected object before 
the consent of the will is obtained to forsake an ob- 
ject of previous pursuit or investigation. 3. Intense 
and successful attention depends upon our determina- 
tion to thoroughly investigate and understand the ob- 
jects or facts to which the mind is directed. 4. 
Memory is dependent upon attention. In proportion 
as our attention to facts is intense or slight, so is our 
remembrance vivid and of long continuance, or brief 
and imperfect. That which receives our undivided 
attention becomes the object of remembrance. If 
the peculiarities of a tree in the midst of the grove 
receives our undivided attention, it will be remem- 
bered, while all those which surround it, with equal 
peculiarities and within the field of vision, if remem- 
bered at all will be as almost indistinct entities. 5. 
Bodily diseases, in most cases, seem to affect this fac- 



ATTENTION. Ill 

ulty of the mind first. And as disease advances its 
victim becomes so far incapable of exercising atten- 
tion that present occurrences can not be remembered. 
When the mind is so much affected by disease that 
we are incapable of receiving correct impressions 
from external objects, and we begin to regard the ob- 
jects of our thoughts as real existences, we are in 
the first degree or state of delirium. 6. Fever, in- 
temperance, and old age so affect the body, that in 
the majority of cases attention can not be concentrated 
upon a long chain of arguments, neither can it be 
fixed for a long time upon any one object, yet the 
power of attending to facts is in the mind, and is in- 
capable of any essential destruction or annihilation 
within and of itself. 



112 ASSOCIATION. 



CHAPTER V. 

ASSOCIATION. 

SECTION I. 

1. The power of association is in the mind. This 
power has its origin in connection with consciousness, 
original and relative suggestion, and by it the objects 
of their action seem to be blended for the inspection 
and use of the mind. Its action is the associating of 
ideas where two or more constantly or naturally fol- 
low each other.in the mind, so that one almost infalli- 
bly produces the other. 2. The act of associating is 
sustained by a remarkable tendency, in which facts or 
conceptions, having been contemplated together or in 
immediate succession, become so connected in the dif- 
ferent mental states, that one of them, at a subse- 
quent period, recalls the others, or introduces a train 
of thoughts which succeed each other in the order of 
their original association. 3. Association may be 
regarded as voluntary, to a certain extent. There 
can be a mental effort made in calling up ideas or 
facts which have been associated with those which are 
clearly the objects of volitive action. 4. But we are 
led to regard association principally as involuntary. 
It is spontaneous when any fact present to the mind 
suggests another resembling or having some kind of 



ASSOCIATION, 113 

affinity to itself; this may suggest a third, and so on 
till many arise. 

SECTION II. 

1. If association consists only in the adhering, 
natural affinity and the blending of our ideas, or 
thoughts, or feelings, then philosophers have argued 
cogently and effectually. But if " resemblance, con- 
trast, contiguity, in time and place, and cause and 
effect" are primary laws of association, we can not 
understand their undefined definition of the primary 
power of association. If there is a power in the 
mind capable of associating ideas, that power lies 
back of the act of associating them; and if the act is 
acknowledged, the cause of that act belongs to and, is 
in the mind. It is impossible for the original power 
of association to be a result of the action of one or 
more elements of mind. No primary element has 
power to form itself, and consequently can not, by 
mere action, form a power which fills the office of a 
mental faculty. 2. It is not contended that the asso- 
ciating of ideas or facts, as a result, is an original 
element of mind, nor that it is any thing more than 
an ultimate existent in mental phenomena, but that 
the power which acts is in the mind. 3. Association 
is furnished with materials in the occurrences and 
facts which are connected with the laws of cause and 
effect, resemblance, contrast, and contiguity in time 
and place. 

30 



114 ASSOCIATION 



SECTION III 



1. Objects which are connected, or those which 
sustain to each other the relation, to any degree, of 
cause and effect, do suggest each other as objects of 
the power of association. 2. Resemblance, in the 
form or qualities of objects, will mutually suggest 
each other to the mind, and the objects of facts thus 
presented are the property of the power of associa- 
tion. 3. Contrast appears to contribute to associa- 
tion. A very large man suggests the idea of a dwarf, 
the rivulet a river, and a lake the ocean. 4. Associ- 
ation is aided by facts connected with the law of con- 
tiguity of time and place. The nearness of time in 
which facts occurred or feelings existed, and the close 
connection of localities or places aids the power of 
suggestion and contributes to association. Some par- 
ents can always tell the ages of their neighbors' chil- 
dren by recalling the birthdays of their own, which 
are near, in time. When we think of the cities of 
London and Paris, we immediately think of the coun- 
tries where they are located. 5. Natural association 
takes place when any fact, which is the object of at- 
tention, is by the mind associated with some fact of 
previous knowledge to which it has a resemblance or 
relation. In this way associations may be formed. 
The referring of facts to some principle or subject, 
which they are calculated to illustrate, fixes them in 
the mind, and the association is easy and natural. 



ASSOCIATION. 115 

SECTION IV. 

1. The calling up of facts is voluntary when we 
direct the mind to a particular train of truths or 
thoughts best calculated to lead to those who wish to 
command. We may have an impression of some 
item of knowledge which we have been in the pos- 
session of, and from the present knowledge of a por- 
tion of facts belonging to a certain class, be enabled 
to recall all others of the same association. 2. Asso- 
ciations recur involuntarily when the mind is turned 
to some subject which is calculated, in nature, or by 
its elementary existence or tendency, to lead to them. 
The mind can pursue trains of thought without any 
volitive effort, and often without any consciousness of 
its action, till some object arrests the attention. 3. 
Casual associations are formed only in connection 
with persons, incidents, or place. An idea or thought 
is associated with the source it was received from; 
the person, the book, or the place, of whom, or of 
which, or where we came in possession of any truth 
or fact. Such truths or facts are recalled in the mind 
whenever the source is thought of, seen, or men- 
tioned. If we think of a certain city where we have 
been, the mind is immediately presented with direct 
facts, incidents, or occurrences in connection with it 
to almost an innumerable extent. 4. Facts or occur- 
rences associated with places or localities are revived 
when we think of or visit them. The Christian loves 
to revisit the place where his manner of life was 



116 ASSOCIATION. 

changed, and think of and review the associations 
connected with it. And on the other hand, the mur- 
derer dreads to think of or revisit places of his dark 
criminal deeds, and shudders in dwelling upon the as- 
sociations which there arise as portentous of wretch- 
edness and woe. 5. Associations formed in connec- 
tion with localities seem to impress the mind with 
facts almost independent of memory. In some in- 
stances occurrences, which have been experienced in 
connection with certain locations, have been entirely- 
forgotten till the place or places were . revisited, when 
the facts associated with them were revived and re- 
called. 

SECTION V. 

1. Intentional association involves a volitive men- 
tal action. The truths associated are not connected 
so much by the external relation they sustain to each 
other as that existing in the states and action of the 
mind. We can establish a connection between the 
thing we wish to remember and some other known 
object, which may have no relation to that which is 
to be remembered. 2. Often, when persons go in the 
pursuit of two or more objects, and fearing that some 
one will be forgotten, they select some familiar phrase, 
carry something in their hand or pocket, only as 
realities, to prevent forgetting the object desired. 3. 
The principle of intentional association is further 
illustrated by the way in which the mind is affected 
in regard to the real existence of the Christian sys- 
tem and the truths connected with it. Infidels who 



ASSOCIATION. 117 

have urged that the common course of nature is the 
only truth universal and infallible, have, on the other 
hand, denied that human testimony is sufficient to 
establish the events connected with our holy religion. 
Though this is a sophism, yet it should be met. If 
we had no means or way to judge of the lapse of 
time, or of the remote ages of the world, than the 
testimony of inert elements as found on the face of 
the globe, or those which are now regarded as being 
contained in the stratified archives of its own periods 
and ages, we would as readily infer that the existence 
of the earth was an accident of recent occurrence as 
to have any other supposition. 4. A proper belief in 
the arrangements and occurrences of such facts de- 
pends upon human testimony and experience in rela- 
tion to the chain of associated truths in the past. By 
means of traditional and written testimony we are led 
to the belief that the earth is more than five thousand 
years old; but without this testimony it would all be 
in the confusion of uncertainty, and in darkness. 5. 
The commemorative rites or periodical observances, 
can be transmitted from age to age by traditional 
testimony, or that which has been written by many in- 
dividuals, and at different times, during the lapse of 
thousands of years ; yet there is the regular return 
of the fact, the occasion and the day associated with 
them, the unbroken series which carry us back to the 
time of the original events, and the persons who wit- 
nessed them. Hence, we have as much faith or belief 
in the real existence of such facts as we have in the 



118 ASSOCIATION. 

series of years which have marked the course of time 
and the existence of the globe. 6. By the association 
of events and facts connected with these observances 
we are freed from every impression of false testimony, 
from the fact that we are conducted back by regular 
steps and periods to the time of the original events. 
An impostor can not fabricate a system of theology 
which can be even the object of investigation till it is 
marked with rites, periods, and events ; then the har- 
mony and regular occurrence of them would be of the 
utmost importance. But such a system as this, bear- 
ing sufficient resemblance to the Bible to be believed, 
has never been known; while the Bible has them in 
series of facts extending through the past and de- 
scribed as pending in the unbounded future to a de- 
gree and extent infinitely beyond all other books, 
systems, or facts ever known. 

SECTION VI. 

1. The true analysis of language will not allow the 
terms " law or laws " to be applied to the principle of 
association, nor to those principles or existences closely 
connected with it, only as such connected entities 
are clearly contingent in nature or relationship. 2. 
Truths may sustain such relations to one another as to 
mutually suggest each other; this relationship can 
not reveal the law or laws of the principle of associa- 
tion, but is that by which objects suggest each other 
upon the ground of a common influence or impression 
made by them upon the mind. 8. A variation of the 



ASSOCIATION. 119 

associating principle may be found in, and in connec- 
tion with, the original difference in mental powers. 
It may arise from the difference in primary elements 
and their action, all of which may affect the associa- 
ting principle. One mind may differ from another by 
possessing one or more faculties of a higher order 
than those corresponding to them in the other mind. 
The action of many minds differ, and these differences 
influence the associating principle. Three men of 
equal minds in strength journey together; one is nat- 
urally inclined to notice the face of the country, a 
second the road and internal improvements, and a 
third the manners and customs of the people. All 
these different objects give rise to corresponding asso- 
ciations. 4. The associating principle varies with the 
energy and strength of the emotions. Objects which 
cause or have in connection with them realities, giving 
rise to intense feelings of sorrow, are readily recalled; 
as permanent columns, amid ruins, they stand out, the 
enduring objects of memory, while facts connected 
with slight emotions are soon numbered with things 
that were. 5. The influence of the lapse of time af- 
fects the existence and action of the associating prin- 
ciple. Facts occurring last evening can be recalled 
with clearness and far more readily than those of 
many years' standing, from the fact that there is no 
perceptible loss in the strength of the connection by 
which the facts thus associated revive and restore 
each other. 6. Mental associations may be under a 
direct volitive power and action. By voluntary action 



120 ASSOCIATION. 

we can not create associations nor the facts entering 
into such combinations. And we can not will the ex- 
istence of truths to be associated without first having 
some idea or perception of those things we wish to 
have exist; but we can will that facts or trains of 
thought may be present with and under the full in- 
spection of the mind ; and we have volitive power to 
retain them as objects of such inspection. And on 
the sudden perception of some unpleasant reality we 
can instantly divert the attention and refuse to con- 
template it, or the facts which may be associated with 
it. 7. Associations can be and often are under indi- 
rect voluntary power. A volitive power may be re- 
garded as incapable of creating, by direct action, 
either mental associations or the facts thus connected. 
The skill and design interwoven and connected with 
the works of nature lead us to think of the great First 
Cause. Here we pause as though we would wish to 
comprehend the infinity of such power or Being; yet 
the regular course of such thought is no sooner 
checked, than silvery trains of innumerable rolling 
worlds he has made, fly through the field of mental 
contemplation, ever burning with the glow of imper- 
ishable light. 

SECTION VII. 

1. The influence of association upon our ideas of 
correct taste is worthy of notice. Great care should 
be observed in receiving truths according to the rules 
of correct taste. Orators famed for wisdom, a ready 
and forcible delivery, often indulge in imperfections 



ASSOCIATION. 121 

as to language, gestures, or manner of delivery, which 
would be regarded as revolting and disgusting but for 
the influence associated with the speaker. Though 
such defects are noticed at first without pleasure upon 
the part of admirers, yet in course of time such de- 
fects, being associated with the man and his zeal, are 
regarded as marks of great distinction. Hence, such 
defects are copied and imitated, while traits of true 
excellence pass unnoticed. 2. Our ideas of fashion 
vary with the influence of association. The odd in- 
signia or the peculiarity of the escutcheon upon which 
is emblazoned the glory of some great warrior, how- 
ever ludicrous they may appear within themselves, are 
soon regarded as tasteful and glorious from their con- 
nection with such personage. This is true, to some 
extent, in regard to almost every extravagance in 
dress. 3. That which would be abhorred, if intro- 
duced by common persons, can be introduced by oth- 
ers, and be extolled by almost universal consent, only 
from its association with such persons. When the 
multitude lay aside any extravagance, should any one 
perpetuate it they are regarded as being destitute of 
refinement. It w T ould appear that any person ever 
conforming to the rules of a correct taste and fashion, 
independently of the varying influence of association, 
would be regarded as a wonder in the earth, being un- 
worthy of imitation. 4. The tendency and effects of 
improper associations are worthy of notice. They 
may descend in degrees from those of simple error to 
those of vicious and malicious tendencies and results. 

n 



122 ASSOCIATION. 

Many descriptive writers associate with wicked tend- 
encies, deeds, and events, language full of imagery, 
exciting the feelings w T ith sublimity, beauty, grandeur, 
and delight, till that which is sinful can be contem- 
plated without any feelings of abhorrence, and the 
mind becomes inclined to crime. This course once 
entered, without almost a miraculous interposition of 
Divine power, the immortal soul is soon entangled and 
black with crimes, attracting the electricity of unend- 
ing wrath. 5. We here close with the tendency and 
results of correct associations. That which is pure 
within itself becomes the object of pure mental action. 
A pure mind appears naturally so corelated to objects 
that if some were not of a high order of purity, yet 
the associations, if permitted to be formed, would be 
pure and harmless. 6. He who wishes to succeed in 
any branch of science must know that he has first 
correctly fixed the primary principles, and then asso- 
ciate Avith them those truths which are naturally 
adapted to and are connected with their existence, in 
order to arrive at and clearly comprehend correct 
results. We can not speak of all the endlessly- 
diversified applications of the associating principle, 
yet their existence is indispensable in the acquisition 
of knowledge. 



DIVISION FIFTH 



•♦♦♦- 



CHAPTER I. 

MENTAL STATES. 

SECTION I. 

1. A simple mental state may be regarded as only 
expressing the presence of one thought or object, 
which appears to be disconnected and indivisible. 
Such state of mind seems to be natural; for a simple 
notion, feeling, or idea is indivisible; yet they can be 
the object or objects of mental states. 2. If two or 
more elements or existences, collected or connected 
together, enter into mental states, such states are not 
simple, but complex. 3. Though simple mental states 
can not be defined, yet, like axioms, they may be re- 
garded as self-evident truths, always to be known as 
real entities within themselves. 4. Our belief in and 
reliance upon them as real may be with boundless 
confidence ; for there can be no imaginary existent in 
a single idea, feeling, or fact abstracted and indivis- 
ible. Here is natural truth, in which we can trust 
without fear of deception. 5. Simple mental states 
may be regarded as preceding those which are com- 
plex. A simple idea, feeling, or fact must first enter 

into mental states and be known, in order to the 

123 



124 MENTAL STATES. 

knowledge of the relationship of many truths in the 
existence of complex states. 

SECTION II. 

1. The existence of complex mental states may be 
regarded as affected with the presence of a collection, 
assemblage, or a complication of ideas, feelings, or 
realities. If we think of any external existence, as 
a tree, mountain, lake, or river, there are properties 
and qualities embraced in the action of the mind in 
relation to each or all of them. 2. Our thoughts and 
feelings may arise from many objects or causes, but 
all unite in the soul under the immediate inspection 
of the mind, which can take into the account the one- 
ness severally in their origin. 3. Our mental states 
are complex in contemplating external objects. We 
form an idea of the existence of ice from its proper- 
ties, and we describe it only by giving those proper- 
ties weight, friability, color, and hardness. Similar 
complexness exists in regard to any other combina- 
tion of properties. 4. Complex mental states may 
exist in relation to that which is connected with ex- 
ternal objects, differing from abstract elements. In 
connection with qualities there may be presented to 
the mind tendencies, appearances, and influences. 
And we may be ready to acknowledge an essence or 
foundation without being able to define it. The only 
way we can study the existence and nature or essence 
of material compounds, is by their elements and in- 
ertness. And the only way that we can study the 



MENTAL STATES. 



125 



nature or essence of mind, is by its elements and ac- 
tion. 5. Complex states of mind are often the result 
of internal influences or realities. As a lake receives 
from tributary streams, on every hand, so the mind 
may be regarded as the receptacle of knowledge, be- 
ing affected by almost innumerable influences and im- 
pressions. We can judge of these as correctly as we 
can of those arising from external existences. 



126 ABSTRACTION 



CHAPTER II. 

ABSTRACTION. 
SECTION I. 

1. Abstraction is the act or operation by which 
elements are separated from each other and examined 
individually. The original power of such action, and 
by which it is known to exist, is in the mind. It may 
take place when the mind is occupied with separated 
facts, or when we contemplate some particular part or 
property of a # compound, or of a complex object, as 
disconnected from other existences of such combina- 
tions. 2. By the mental exercise or the acting power 
of abstraction, we can examine many objects, select- 
ing definite properties in which they agree and can 
be classified. And it can be still more comprehen- 
sive in selecting a property or fact which is common 
to an extensive collection of adhering or complex en- 
tities. 3. An abstract notion or thought may arise 
upon the ground of detected resemblance and differ- 
ence in objects or properties, and in the special notice 
or attention given to them individually. In the pres- 
ence of compounds we can have conceptions of den- 
sity, form, or friability without the introduction of 
other properties. Properties may be so separated 
from the combination as to be the objects of abstract 



ABSTRACTION. 127 

thought, and any element may be so contemplated in 
its separation as to be the object of special observa- 
tion. If I say this apple is red, the color only may 
be the object of abstract thought. 4. Mental opera- 
tions in separating facts, or in abstracting certain 
ideas, is worthy of a passing notice. The power of 
abstraction is in the mind. If the mind has the 
power of motion, and if it does act, we must admit 
that notions or ideas arise in connection with or in 
such action. In the origin of our ideas they may be 
simple, or may exist separated from each other. 
There appears to be a natural tendency uniting 
them, giving rise to complex mental states. If this 
union is formed of many simple ideas or truths, the 
power in the mind, or that is connected with mental 
operations, which is capable of separating these united 
facts, in whole or in part, may be called abstraction. 
The union of ideas forming complex mental states 
may be either intentional or involuntary; but the sep- 
arating or abstracting of them appears to be volun- 
tary. 5. We may be said to have particular abstract 
ideas on the presentation of an object to us having 
color, fragrance, form, density, and extension, when 
the mind is so entirely occupied with some one of 
these qualities as to be almost insensible to the exist- 
ence of the others. The particular abstraction takes 
place when the action of the mind is limited to one 
quality. When any object or quality existing in a 
state of combination is separated by a mental process 
for inspection, the idea we form of it may be said to 



128 ABSTRACTION. 

be of particular abstraction. This may take place in 
the mind either with or without a real separation of 
the combined entities. 

SECTION II. 

1. Gfeneral abstraction may apply to classification 
when we examine one class of objects separate and 
apart from other classes. Objects classified under 
the terms of genera and species, may be contemplated 
or examined under the law of general abstraction. 
When a variety of objects are before us, it is easy 
and almost natural for the properties or qualities of 
agreement and disagreement to be presented to the 
mind, giving rise to associations or classes. These 
classes of many -objects may be represented by a sin- 
gle term, and any one of them become the object of 
mental action separate or abstracted from the others. 
2. General abstract ideas will apply to almost innu- 
merable classes of objects — the different orders or 
classes in zoology, ornithology, vegetation, and crys- 
tallization. 3. The process of abstraction is essential 
to a well-regulated mind. Without it we can not 
proceed correctly in analyzing the qualities or ele- 
ments of objects; and we could not control the atten- 
tion, concentrating the action of the mental powers 
in the examination of any one object separated from 
the thousands bestudding the field of vision, or that 
are present with and are contained in the mind. 4. 
It is influenced and affected by the power of dis- 
ease, and can be so impaired or weakened, as disease 



ABSTRACTION 



129 



increases, that all objects are in a state of confusion 
to the mind, and it naturally varies as to degrees 
of acuteness and power in different minds. 



130 IMAGINATION. 



CHAPTER III. 

IMAGINATION. 
SECTION I. 

1. Imagination is that power or faculty by the ac- 
tion or exercise of which we form new T combinations 
within the mind, gathered from real elements, scenes, 
or facts. It is that which forms new associations of 
ideas from the truths which are the property of mem- 
ory, being subject to its power. From the materials 
stored up in the memory it produces new combina- 
tions, on the one hand, more pleasing, more brilliant, 
or more sublime, or, on the other, more awful, more 
terrible, or more horrible. 2. Imagination has been 
regarded as an ulterior element of mind, or that it is 
a result of certain primary elements when in action. 
If its origin and existence wholly depends upon the 
action of certain primary elements, then when those 
elements are inactive the power and action of imag- 
ination would be annihilated; and if ever its being 
and action are recalled they would exist by the crea- 
tive action of those primary elements. That primary 
elements have such creative power is absurd. 3. Im- 
agination is closely connected with the power of the 
understanding and our conceptions and perceptions 
of objects and facts. Under its influence and action 



IMAGINATION. 131 

we are enabled to combine objects and qualities of 
which we have conceptions, and extend our thoughts 
to the contemplation of similar ones, or of other facts 
as real, though unknown to us before, and we can 
imagine such existences as being more pleasing or 
awful than any fact of real existence in nature. In 
some instances we can pursue and describe them to a 
greater degree of clearness, beauty, and grandeur 
than is contained in any similar fact or object of ma- 
teriality. 4. Imagination may extend to the opera- 
tions of apprehending and contemplating the arrange- 
ments, qualities, resemblances, or influences connected 
with objects of mental action, and the extension of 
our thoughts in the formation of new ideas beyond 
those which may be regarded as primary ones, to- 
gether with the relative position and influence of the 
same to and upon each other, and to the original 
ideas. It recombines our ideas of the relative condi- 
tion of things, and influences mental states in relation 
to the beautiful, grand, and sublime, which transcends 
the original ideas as our thoughts pass beyond them 
and ascend higher. 5. It influences mental states, in 
and by which the mind conceives and forms ideas 
within itself, and of real and supposed external ob- 
jects. It assembles images and paints them upon our 
minds and on the minds of others. By it we can go 
beyond all these in adding ideas and thoughts to those 
already in the mind, and in adding any image or real- 
ity necessary to fill or complete the scene or process 
of apprehending till the mind is satisfied, or there is 



132 IMAGINATION. 

a suspension of further action. 6. Imagination leads 
in blending elements of diverse existences. Those 
which belong to widely-diversified scenes can be com- 
bined into one beautiful conception, presenting to the 
mind that which is beautiful, grand, or partakes of 
true sublimity. 

SECTION II. 

1. The operations or exercise of imagination may 
be said to be involuntary, when there is action without 
any volitive effort, and such action can take place 
when we are not immediately conscious of the fact till 
some object or fact arrests our attention, and we recall 
beautiful combinations. 2. Intentional imagination 
involves artificial combinations, by means of which the 
mind acting pass'es on, while extended thoughts and 
facts arise, forming new objects of contemplation. 

3. Fictitious delineations are dependent upon imagin- 
ation for transactions, scenes, and imaginary facts. 

4. Productions of the imagination are chaste and of 
a high moral character in proportion to the moral 
principle, taste, and habits of the author. 5. The 
combinations of images, elements, or facts which are 
produced by the imagination being vile, demoralizing, 
and destructive in their nature and tendency, corre- 
spond with the bad motives, the corrupt principles, and 
the perverted habit of the author. 6. Imagination 
differs from fancy in forming new combinations from 
the materials stored up in the memory, graduating 
them from the beautiful to the sublime, or from the 
awful to the more terrible. Fancy is that by which 



IMAGINATION. 133 

the mind forms images or representations of facts or 
existences, while imagination is the power of combining 
and increasing, or of diminishing the interest of men- 
tal states. 7. Imagination differs from admiration ; 
for the latter is no more than wonder mingled with 
emotions of love or veneration, or of that which is 
novel or great. 8. It differs from fictions in the re- 
sults of its action. Fictions can only be regarded as 
fictions ; but imagination blends elements of beauty, 
grandeur, and sublimity into one grand conception. 
9. There is a difference between the imagination and 
bombast. The former may command, combine, and 
blend elements into forms of beauty, grandeur, and 
sublimity, w T hile the latter consists in high-sounding 
words in an inflated style. A speaker, while enforc- 
ing the truthfulness and claims of his theme, had 
moved his audience with a general feeling of excite- 
ment under his thrilling eloquence, and closed with 
great applause and triumph in the following manner : 
" Now, my audience, if I had power I would plant one 
foot upon the Andes and the other upon the Rocky 
Mountains; thrusting my tongue into the thunder's 
mouth, I would proclaim these truths to the ends of 
the world." Subsequently a young speaker attempted 
to use the same while delivering a discourse in a loud 
tone of voice and with great confidence : " Now, my 
audience, if I had power I would plant one foot upon 
the Andes and the other upon the Rocky Mountains, 
and I would thrust my tongue into the thunder's 
mouth, and I ? d, I Id, I 'd howl like a wolf." Here is 



134 IMAGINATION. 

evidence that the action of the imagination was imper- 
fect, and that at first he had but a meager conception 
of what he wished to say. Bombast is without a cor- 
rect blending of the beautiful, and without the proper 
presence and arrangement of ideas and thoughts. 

SECTION III. 

1. Imagination differs very much in nature and ac- 
tion from that of burlesque. The solemn thoughtful- 
ness or real nature of the latter is only feigned for 
the purpose of exciting amusement or laughter by lu- 
dicrous images or representations. 2. Imagination 
differs from sarcasm. The latter may abound with 
imagery or beautiful language, but at the same time 
there is an ironical signification or expression. Though 
there is a granting of the claims of any person or 
people, yet there may be a keen, reproachful expres- 
sion or satirical remark, with an influence, expres- 
sion, or feeling of scorn, while imagination must be 
regarded as free from such peculiarities. 3. Feelings 
of sympathy are not wholly dependent upon imagin- 
ation, though they may be aided by it. Though sym- 
pathy can and does not originate with or from it, yet 
a quick, active, and powerful imagination can and does 
combine images of suffering, gloom, and despair. A 
man whose moral sensibilities are still alive to action 
always has sympathy intuitively on the presentation 
of any object of suffering. But his feelings are much 
increased when he begins to imagine himself in like 
condition. 4. The imagination can be exercised in 



IMAGINATION. 135 

works of fiction without injury only when such fiction 
is immediately connected with truths or facts in nature, 
and possessing the high moral character which Infinite 
Wisdom has connected with all he has made. 5. The 
influence of fictitious writings upon an active imagin- 
ation is decidedly injurious. It weakens mental ac- 
tion in the examination of real and important truths, 
tends to fickleness and whimsicalness of mind, insta- 
bility of character, and often leads to certain ruin. 
The Divine Being has filled an infinite space with an 
eternal range of existences or facts, so that the immor- 
tal mind can dwell on real facts or truths without num- 
ber, and to endless ages increasing in majesty and 
glory. 6. The utility and importance of the imagin- 
ation must be regarded as of no ordinary character. 
In neglecting the cultivation of this noble and import- 
ant faculty of the mind, is to impede the power and 
action of the whole mind. 7. A vigorous and active 
imagination, in conveying our thoughts, or in describ- 
ing facts in writing, is of great importance. To pre- 
sent imagery, or to correctly delineate scenes, facts, 
or transactions, or to paint them in their combinations 
and qualities, is effected principally under its control 
and action. 8. An active imagination is essential to 
true oratory. To conceive of a speaker's power to 
excite, move, and thrill an audience without such aid, 
is utterly impossible. True, affecting, and exciting 
eloquence can never exist in connection with that 
mind destitute of an active imagination. Under its 
combinations and blendings, derived from the language 



IMAGINATION. 

of trope and metaphor, the orator may launch thun- 
der-peals, startling the feelings or emotions of all 
around him. 9. The combinations, blendings, descrip- 
tions, and painting of the poet are without air 

it unless the action of the mind is pervaded 

ub active imagination. 10. The sculptor's chisel 
can not trace upon the marble the living and desired 
expression or features of a friend if destitute of its 

er. It is this which enables him to render every 
form graceful and beautiful. And it is this faculty 
which causes others to admire the work when com- 
pleted. 

SECTION IV. 

1. The d lent or impn :t of the imagin- 

ation can be secured by attending to the manner of 
its exercise or action, by continued efforts to extend 
its power and influence. 2. The influence of dm 

the imagination: its action maybe directed 
in improper object or in a wrong channel. 3. It 
can lead as md improper action un- 

less controlled by reason, motive, and virtue. We are 
apt to imagine that great warriors or statesmen, who 
have left the world, have died happy and are gone to 
heaven, when they have not. at any time, given one 
clear and conclusive evidence of such result, as re- 
quired by the Gospel law. 4. It will lead to 

. if allowed to wander uncontrolled amid myriads 
of imaginary beings, or scenes of wealth and pleasure. 
It soon tends to abstract the mind from real exist- 
ences, and causes it to dwell on the beautiful forms 



IMAGINATION. 137 

of fancy, which are false, and upon the most whim- 
sical speculations. It ceases to contemplate real ex- 
istences at hand as worthy attention. It soon with- 
draws from all objects of worth and dwells in a world 
of conjecture. When the mind advances to this point 
it is midway from a rational state to that of insanity. 
5. A continued love of and an untiring pursuit of fic- 
tion often diseases and sends out the entire desires of 
the mind upon the wing of supposition — feasting such 
desires with inaccessible enjoyments and perishable 
glory. Finally the mind becomes wearied with the 
staleness of all demonstrable truths, and fictions ap- 
pear as realities. The sympathies and affections of 
the heart become cold and die for want of real and 
accessible objects upon which they can act. Often 
false opinions and lies become the dreams of life, an 
additional gloom in death, and the bitterness of eter- 
nal remorse. It would be far better to suffer, if pos- 
sible, a thousand temporal deaths, than for the immor- 
tal soul to perish with invoked madness. Never dwell 
too long upon only one and the same idea if you 
would be sane on all points. 

12 



DIVISION SIXTH 



CHAPTER I. 

INTELLECTUAL STATES OF EXTERNAL OB- 

IGIN AND INTELLECTUAL STATES 

OF INTERNAL ORIGIN. 

SECTION I. 

1. The powers of mind arranged under the preced- 
ing divisions x>f this work, or the greater number of 
them, have, by common consent of many writers, been 
arranged under the general heading of "intellectual 
states of external origin" and faculties, the defining 
of which we are now commencing, have been arranged 
under the heading of intellectual states of internal 
origin. In this arrangement there appears to be a 
distinction without a philosophical difference. 2. We 
object to the doctrine of intellectual states of external 
origin. They may exist as results of external causes ; 
but for intellectual states to arise in the external 
world, or out of or beyond the limits of the mind 
itself, is clearly incorrect, and this is a philosophical 
deduction from the heading referred to. 3. If it is 
impossible for intellectual states to have external ori- 
gin, then it is more absurd to regard the faculties or 

powers of the mind couched under such heading, as 
138 



ORIGIN OF INTELLECTUAL STATES. 139 

having their origin externally or in the external world. 
There are external causes of mental states ; but mental 
states and faculties can not have external origin till 
they arise out of the mind, which is impossible. 4. If 
we should say that any element or power of mind was 
of external origin, as to either its existence or action, 
would it not convey the idea that the origin, or com- 
mencement of its being was in connection with some 
inert element or existences of the external world? 
5. If we say that any mental state is of external ori- 
gin, would it not convey the idea that external phys- 
ical elements have self-action, which action must first 
take place in order to affect the mind, which is at rest, 
creating new mental states ? 

SECTION II. 

1. There can be no impropriety in saying that there 
are intellectual states of internal origin ; for, although 
external objects may affect the mind through the me- 
dium of the senses, yet the mental state which follows 
must be wholty of and within the mind. And this 
state, though it follows an external cause, can not of it- 
self be said to be of external origin. 2. The origin of all 
knowledge known to us, as such, is in the mind. The 
true study of psychology is of boundless importance. 
The undying soul may be said to contain within itself 
an eternity of meaning, being, and destiny. Through 
the medium of the senses we become acquainted with the 
realities, beauty, and grandeur of the external world; 
but by means of internal powers we can and do have 



140 ORIGIN OF INTELLECTUAL STATES. 

knowledge independent of material entities. 3. The 
most ulterior origin of knowledge in regard to exter- 
nal things, must begin with sensation. This knowl- 
edge only can embrace the fact that a sensation has 
been received, and that we have the presence of such 
an existent. 4. The action of sensation affecting the 
mind is immediately followed by a new mental state, 
which is the result of a reviving influence or action 
of the internal power of the soul. 5. The existence 
of simple thoughts and ideas must arise by and within 
the action of the internal power of the soul. The ad- 
vancing of these from simple to complex, and the 
blending of them into combination, is real knowledge. 
Thinking, believing, hoping, and doubting have their 
origin wholly and only in the active internal power of 
the soul. 



SUGGESTION. 141 



CHAPTER II. 

SUGGESTION. 

SECTION I. 

1. Suggestion appears to be the presentation of an 
idea to the mind without the immediate aid of the 
senses. It has power within and by its own ac- 
tion to give rise to thoughts. We have notions, 
thoughts, and ideas which appear to be inspired, and 
arise from the internal action of the immaterial con- 
stitution. 2. Simple suggestions may be regarded as 
primary and natural. They have been regarded as 
a spontaneous result of intuitive power, or that they 
arise in the action of internal emotions or sensations. 
3. From this internal action or states of the mind is 
suggested the notion of self, or of mind as real, and 
the cause and reality of change. That w r hich sug- 
gests the idea of our being, or the notion of duration, 
is independent of the power and action of the senses 
or of sensation as to its origin. Such suggestions 
appear to arise from intuitive pow r er and become the 
objects of consciousness, and such intimations appear 
to be essential to the nature of mind. 4. The idea 
of self-existence can not be tested by the senses. We 
can not see, hear, taste, or smell such an idea or fact, 
neither can we feel to originate the same, but it arises 



142 SUGGESTION. 

from the mind itself. It is suggested spontaneously, 
from the very nature of the mind, as constituted by 
its sovereign Creator. 5. The origin of the idea of 
mind, as an existent, can not commence with the 
senses; for the senses are properly affected by exter- 
nal things, and no idea of mind can result abstractly 
from the existence of materiality. The origin of the 
notion is suggested by and from the nature of the 
mind within itself. 6. The origin of the notion or 
idea of personal identity is with the internal power 
of the soul. The beginning of such an idea is con- 
nected with the power of suggestion, and may be re- 
garded as a simple idea, forever undefinable. But an 
idea or thought implies and is action; therefore, the 
self-acting power is of and within the mind itself. 

SECTION II. 

1. Suggestion is involuntary when thoughts arise 
in connection with other thoughts which are not at 
the time the special objects of the attention or of 
mental action. 2. This power may be said to be vol- 
untary when we, by intentional cogitation, use certain 
thoughts, feelings, or bearings of facts in order to 
trace out other or similar things of which we have 
had no clear perception before. The discovery of 
each new fact suggests the idea of something as real 
still beyond. 3. The origin of the idea of material 
existences may be imparted to us through the medium 
of the senses, but we could not, from sight or touch 
alone, judge of the qualities or properties of a com- 



SUGGESTION. 143 

pound beyond the surface which is seen or felt. But 
that which is tested by contact with the senses can 
and does suggest an idea of those properties which 
exist within or beyond the outer surface. 4. We are 
principally dependent upon suggestion as to the ori- 
gin of our idea of motion. We can test the abstract 
existence and qualities of objects which are in motion, 
but there is a difference between that which moves 
and motion itself. Our idea of that which changes 
the relative position or order of things must be sug- 
gested ; for motion can not be regarded as a real ob- 
ject of the sense; hence, the idea or notion of it can 
not arise from the power of the senses, but is sug- 
gested in the change and relative position of things. 
5. We are dependent, in an important sense, upon 
suggestive power for our notion or idea of the relation 
of effect to its cause. The character of an effect may 
suggest the cause, guided in part by the presence and 
action of the senses ; but the origin of the idea of 
the cause is wholly of suggestion. If it requires 
strength to raise a small stone from the earth, the 
thought of lifting a larger one naturally suggests the 
idea of additional power; hence, the presence of the 
vast globe naturally suggests a First Cause, or omnip- 
otent power. 

SECTION III. 

1. The origin of the idea of time is connected with 
the suggestive power. Time is duration measured by 
the revolutions of the heavenly bodies. We can not 
have clear conceptions of duration existing in succes- 



144 SUGGESTION. 

sion, though we can have of duration which can be 
measured. The events which take place in time, and 
the relative positions in the flight of the orbs which 
measure it, can not give us a satisfactory idea of time; 
hence, such an idea arises from an internal suggestive 
power. 2. If duration measured can be called time, 
then duration without being measured, or being unfin- 
ished, may be called eternity. 3. We can not recall 
the time when we first received an idea of space. It 
appears to have arisen spontaneously, or is a result 
of an intuitive suggestive power. There is no way 
to represent space to the senses; it is without form, 
figure, or bounds. 4. Resemblance may be regarded 
as an ulterior law of suggestion. The primary power 
of suggestion is connected with the intuitive powers 
of the mind, as the previous argument will show. 
The mutual or reciprocal resemblance of objects often 
suggest each other, and is the occasion of recalling 
past existences by means of the suggestive power 
and its action. The house of a stranger may replace 
in the mind clear or vivid conceptions of the old 
homestead. The appearance of yonder grove, or the 
banks of that rolling river instantly revives the place 
of my childhood sports, and where my little brother 
and sister sleep peacefully waiting the sound of the 
last trump. The peculiar voice of a stranger may 
recall, as from the grave, that of my father. 5. The 
internal action of the suggestive power is aided by 
the contrast involved in the nature and existence of 
objects. The presence of the dead body of a cele- 



SUGGESTION. 145 

brated warrior, statesman, or divine is almost in- 
stantly followed by their appearance when living and 
in their glory. 6. The extremes of conditions, in ex- 
istences, suggest their opposites. In connection with 
the idea of a suffering beggar is suggested the thought 
of prosperity and happiness. The prairie which has 
smiled under the rays of a thousand summer's suns 
only affects the mind by the introduction of the 
thought or idea of dark, silent groves, or majestic for- 
ests waving in the living emerald of beauty and 
grandeur. 7. In thinking of some one of cotempora- 
neous existences often others of the same epoch are 
suggested. If objects distinct from each other, yet 
united by an invariable connection, as the batteries at 
the extremities of a telegraphic wire, the thought of 
the one often suggests the other. 8. The activity of 
the suggestive power depends much upon the habit or 
manner in which it is exercised. It should be tested 
and exerted with care and with repeated egressive 
efforts in presenting the mind with new and delightful 
truths or facts. In the contemplating of these natu- 
ral truths the mind rises, admiring the power and 
goodness of Him who reared the forest, commands 
the storm, rolls the ocean, and eliminated, as from the 
uncreated light of Lights, the planetary lamps which 

move in boundless space around us. 

13 



146 RELATIVE SUGGESTION. 



CHAPTER III. 

RELATIVE SUGGESTION. 

SECTION I. 

1. In contemplating objects the mind is capable of 
receiving impressions, or of being influenced in re- 
gard to certain relations which such objects mutually 
sustain to each other. That which awakens a feeling 
or mental state in regard to the natural relationship 
of objects is called relative suggestion. Without 
doubt the mind is capable of such an influence, but 
it is difficult to clearly define its office, as it appears 
to be midway between the nature or character of sim- 
ple suggestion and that of the judgment. Yet sug- 
gestive power, in any way or to any degree of strength, 
is clearly distinct from that of the judgment. 2. The 
mind is capable of experiencing certain influences, 
which are affected by a peculiar relationship of objects 
of similar or dissimilar coordinate properties or qual- 
ities, which give rise to a new class of feelings and 
mental states. 3. Influences of relation may arise 
and be suggested, or experienced by the mind, in the 
notice or contemplation of a great variety of realities 
or facts. The degrees of difference which glow in 
the emerald hues of a summer forest, are the occa- 
sions of giving rise to the first apprehensions, or per- 



RELATIVE SUGGESTION. 147 

ceptions, of the different kinds of trees composing 
that forest, and other relative facts. In the sound of 
the national band, one instrument is loud, and another 
soft; in touching frozen mercury and cotton, or in 
tasting different kinds of fruit, there are natural dif- 
ferences, the relations of which affect or influence the 
mind in regard to them. 4. Terms of correlative 
character may involve and express that which is in- 
tended to be explained. The mere mention of them 
involves the relation they sustain to other objects. 
In the use of the terms father, mother, governor, or 
commander, the relations are the more direct causes 
of a full mental action. 

SECTION II. 

1. Relative suggestion does not depend upon the 
power of the senses for its existence, else brutes and 
birds would have it as fully developed as man ; for 
they can see and hear as well as we can; but as to 
their power of suggestion, or their perception of rela- 
tions being well developed is very doubtful. The idea 
of the tallness of a tree could not be conveyed to us 
by sight only ; for if no tree of any kind existed save 
that one, it would, doubtless, appear neither tall nor 
short; but if we know that tall and short trees are 
before us, it is evident that their relation has been sug- 
gested to the mind, and has been an object of mental 
action. 2. We are not dependent upon the action of 
the senses in recognizing, and in realizing the mutual 
relationship of hope and expectation, love and joy, or 



148 RELATIVE SUGGESTION. 

that joy and grief are opposites; yet these relations 
give rise to mental influences and new states of mind. 
The number of relations which affect or cause action 
of the suggestive power, in consequence of which new 
mental states are experienced, or take place, are al- 
most as the stars of heaven for number. What a lim- 
itless variety of objects and facts contribute to the 
action and resources of the mind ! What must mind 
be contemplated in the perfection of its powers! 
What an eternity of duration, and infinity of feeling, 
memory, knowledge, action, and being within itself! 
Imperishable gem, assert the power of immortal fac- 
ulties ; for living thou shalt never cease to be. 3. The 
extent of this power, and the number of objects and 
facts involved in its action, can not readily be defined. 
Its action is connected with relations of coexistence, 
resemblance, diversity, degree, and position. With 
more than lightning speed it sends forth pioneer 
thoughts upon the road of interminable duration, with- 
out ever arriving at the ulterior bounds of its domin- 
ion. 4. Who can define and contemplate the soul 
perfected in its departure from earth? Progressive 
flight ! when millions of rising series in knowledge 
have been numbered, comprehended, and passed, still 
onward in knowing more, and still more, of the in- 
comprehensible fullness, love, and goodness of that 
Being to whom it owes its existence ! 



THE JUDGMENT. 149 



CHAPTER IV. 

THE JUDGMENT. 
SECTION I. 

1. The faculty of the human mind called judgment 
has often been acknowledged, while something else 
has been defined in lieu of it. Its existence can not 
but be acknowledged, for it is a real faculty, and as 
such should be defined. 2. It is that faculty of the 
mind by which we are enabled to compare ideas or 
thoughts, and to determine upon the evidence as to 
preferences, or that which is right or wrong. By it 
we not only compare ideas and thoughts, but we ad- 
vance to compare the relations of terms, of proposi- 
tions, and of arguments; also to determine upon that 
which is correct. 3. It is that which may be called 
the determination of the mind, in which we become 
satisfied from the evidence and influence received in 
comparing the relations of ideas, thoughts, proposi- 
tions, and arguments. 4. It is not only the act of 
judging, but is the power by which such process or 
action is concluded. And if it has power to examine 
the agreement or disagreement of things in order to 
arrive at the truth, it has power to determine or de- 
cide upon that truth after it is found or defined. It 
not only has power to examine and determine upon 



150 THE JUDGMENT. 

relations, and the correct stages of argumentation, 
but is the concluding action of the mind in regard to 
determining the truthfulness of objects or entities, 
and of determining the mind favorably to truths, 
whether casual or substantial. 5. The faculty of 
judgment is a particular power within itself; it is not 
to be taught in order to have being ; its origin is con- 
nected with the existence and action of the primary 
elements. It is not originated by education, but ex- 
ists only to be exercised. If it is naturally deficient, 
there is no process of instruction that can supply the 
defect. The understanding may be naturally perfect, 
and the same may be true of suggestion, or other 
powers ; but if* the judgment is deficient, the mind 
generally acts hastily and at the first intention. 
6. The judgment has not only power to determine an 
action, concluding, or of finishing that which may be 
called a mental process satisfactorily, but can analyze, 
abstract, classify, and generalize. By it we can class 
an individual existent under a general notion in the af- 
firmation, as that is an animal of a certain kind, or that 
is a tree of a special kind, or from a certain mountain. 

SECTION II. 

1. A naturally-defective faculty of judgment is at- 
tended with great uncertainty and much confusion, 
as to a proper discrimination and action in regard to 
what is right or wrong. Such minds may desire to" 
do right and act conscientiously in all things, but 
there is plainly a want of proper and safe decisions. 



THE JUDGMENT. 151 

They should share of the charity of others rather than 
suffer severe penalties in case of wrong acts. 2. The 
judgment presupposes the understanding. The latter 
may exist without the former, but the judgment can 
not exist with any special manifestation without the 
understanding. The latter furnishes the materials or 
facts upon which the former acts. It furnishes to the 
judgment that which is capable of being analyzed, 
abstracted, classified, or generalized. 3. The under- 
standing only knows objects as they really exist, and 
as they are presented to the mind ; but the judgment 
must discriminate by arranging them together, and by 
evolving those things which agree or disagree ; and it 
depends upon this power to give a decision accord- 
ingly and correctly. 4. The action of the faculty of 
judgment is so closely connected with reason, that 
reference to the one may aid in explaining the other. 
Reason embraces the ground of an opinion, or the 
premises of an argument upon, and from which the 
argument is based, and carefully carried through to the 
conclusion. The judgment appears to inspect this 
process, and weighs the facts presented in the different 
objects so as to decide upon them, or the correctness 
of the conclusion of an argument, by deciding upon 
all the facts involved in the argument, even to the cor- 
rectness of the premises, unless such premises be free 
from confusion or doubt, and then the judgment must 
approve the same. That the judgment is really and 
only reason is absurd. Reason, unaided by judgment, 
does not appear to know any thing but the premises 



152 THE JUDGMENT. 

and conclusion, with the regular argument, or success- 
ive steps in going from the one to the other, while 
the judgment appears to decide upon the truthfulness 
and the amount of weight that should be attached to 
all the facts, together with the justness of the con- 
clusion. 

SECTION III. 

1. We may readily decompose a compound, but it 
requires the presence of the judgment in attending to 
the agreement or disagreement of the properties and 
the relations of resemblances — the natural adaptation 
and agreement of the parts to each other and to the 
whole. It is the work of the judgment to clearly 
discriminate these facts, and to so satisfy the mind in 
regard to them. 2. The truthfulness of axioms, and 
the relations of angles and propositions, are objects 
of the judgment. If we say that all axioms which 
lie at the foundation of mathematical science are self- 
evident truths, incapable of either proof or disproof, 
it requires the exercise of the judgment in order to 
receive them as such free from doubt. 3. The skill 
and success of a physician greatly depends upon this 
faculty, or mental power. He must be able to judge 
of the symptoms by which a disease may be known, 
though they may resemble those of other diseases, as 
well as the effect of certain remedies upon disease, 
and upon different physical constitutions. 4. Deci- 
sions may be true or false, in proportion to the clear- 
ness and distinctness with which we judge in weigh- 
ing all the facts and influences connected with the 



THE JUDGMENT. 153 

premises, argument, and conclusion. He who arrives 
at conclusions upon slight, partial, or imperfect evi- 
dence, and is unwilling to admit corrective facts, will 
be almost invariably wrong in his decisions. If, w T ith 
pure motive, he attempts to regulate his own conduct, 
and is not guided by a proper judgment, he is liable 
to be led, by the most hasty impressions or feelings, 
to quick and rash conclusions ; therefore, we should 
form our opinions w T ith care, properly judging all the 
facts which w T ould naturally lead to sound results. 

SECTION IV. 

1. The faculty or power of judging differs from 
that of the understanding. The understanding seems 
to know notions or objects as they appear, but it re- 
quires the exercise of judgment to abstract or classify 
according to natural principles and differences, so we 
can have clear and real knowledge of their existence. 
That which is the object of the understanding is that 
which is decided upon by a well-developed judgment. 
If the power of the understanding be vigorous and 
well developed, and that of the judgment radically 
deficient, the mind will have experienced the presence 
of many facts without the power of combining them, 
so as to have distinct and decisive use of them: hence 
the knowledge of many things, but the control of al- 
most none to advantage. 2. The power of judging is 
closely connected with that of suggestion. The latter 
consists in the first intimation, or presentation, of a 
fact or ideas to the mind, but the former has decisive 



154 THE JUDGMENT. 

power in regard to them, which proceeds upon the 
notice of, and the influence or weight of all the differ- 
ences compared and balanced. The action of the 
power of judging is clearly different and distinct from 
that of suggestion. 3. The power and action of rela- 
tive suggestion is not one and the same with that of 
judgment. The former takes place when the mind 
experiences the first effects, or influences, which arise 
out of certain relations that different objects mutually 
sustain to each other. The making known to the 
mind, merely, the first intimations of mutual relation- 
ship may be called relative suggestion, but it requires 
an act of judgment to decide upon the causes of these 
relations, and the importance that should be attached 
to each, or all the facts connected ; and we can not 
have clear conceptions and a distinctive command 
over them, only as it is given by the correct exercise 
of judgment. That the judgment only acts under 
the controlling influence of suggestion, or that of rel- 
ative suggestion, is absurd; but it has the natural 
right, and does act upon and in regard to all facts or 
influences which are the objects of mental action, be- 
ing embraced in the power of suggestion, or of rela- 
tive suggestion. And it is clearly and unquestiona- 
bly true that it differs from them both as to its nature 
and office in the mind. 4. The importance of a well- 
developed and active judgment is incalculable. The 
acquisition of knowledge, and right use of it, in 
adding to our own happiness and to the happiness 
of others, depends upon it. If we are deficient in 



THE JUDGMENT. 155 

regard to the power of this faculty, we never can act 
with that degree of prudence and discretion that the 
laws of propriety and right require; but with a mature 
and well-regulated judgment we are furnished with 
facts from all sources, together with an unshaken be- 
lief in, and command of them, upon which we can 
depend with the utmost confidence, and can arrange 
either to hide from the dangers and storms of earth, 
or triumph over and beyond their power. 



DIVISION SEVENTH 



-♦♦♦- 



CHAPTER I. 

EEASON. 

SECTION I. 

1. Reason is a faculty of the mind, having power 
to act, or of remaining at rest. It is connected with 
the intuitive elements of our being, and can be culti- 
vated so as to increase its power of vividness in ac- 
tion, but it is impossible for its origin to be the result 
of education. It is that principle of the mind by 
which it distinguishes truth from error, and good 
from evil. In the exercise of this function other fac- 
ulties appear to harmonize, and can be called into ac- 
tion as auxiliaries in the investigation of truth, and in 
distinguishing between that which is correct and that 
which is false. 2. This principle enables us to allege 
or assert, w r ith confidence, the ground or cause of 
opinion upon which is to be built the elements of 
argumentation, or facts leading from the cause to the 
conclusion. 3. Ratiocination can not exist without a 
power competent to be the foundation of such action. 
It is this power which enables us to arrive at a knowl- 
edge of the process of demonstration, both as to the 

facts involved and the correctness of the process. 4. 
156 



REASON. 157 

Reason is not only a power existing in the mind, but 
is capable of action. It is a faculty capable of act- 
ing, and such action is reasoning when appropriate 
facts are involved as materials of argumentation, and 
influences and results are correctly deducted from the 
premises. Reason, as to its natural and real exist- 
ence, is correct, and so we may regard it when in ac- 
tion; for we can not have conceptions of incorrect 
reasoning. The judgment will admit of degrees, but 
the moment reason is incorrect it ceases to be reason. 
The chain of facts is broken, or the relation of effect 
to cause, or of cause to effect, is unjointed, and the 
action of reason being intercepted, ceases to be either 
reason or reasonable. 5. Reason differs from the un- 
derstanding. The latter is that which apprehends 
and embraces things presented to it, but reason pro- 
ceeds, in the investigation, to the certain knowledge 
of their real existence and character. Notions may 
arise with, or be given by the understanding, but rea- 
son enables the mind to investigate the truthfulness 
of them, or to know that which is true and that which 
is false. 

SECTION II. 

1. The power of reason exists in the mind, and is 
connected with its intuitive faculties. Its origin is 
neither the result of habit nor of education, and the ob- 
jects of its action can not be numbered. 2. There are 
certain intuitive facts, and self-evident truths, which 
can not be tested by reason. Such self-evident ex- 
istences are in the mind, and lie at the foundation of 



158 REASON. 

rationality. 3. Self-evident truths may be divided 
into two classes: (1.) Those truths which lie at the 
foundation of the philosophy of mind; and, (2.) 
Those truths which belong to, and are connected with, 
the science which appertains to external things. The 
axioms, or self-evident truths, upon which the whole 
of mathematical science stands, or is based, are inca- 
pable of either proof or disproof; yet we are com- 
pelled to receive them, as facts, independently of any 
pow T er of reason; therefore, what power is capable of 
receiving the primary, self-evident facts which lie at 
the foundation of all external science or knowledge, 
but the intuitive, self-evident elements which lie at 
the foundation of the philosophy of mind? 4. These 
intuitive principles are the foundation and origin of 
all knowledge to us : hence intuitive internal facts, or 
elements, with our feelings and experience, are to be 
depended upon as true with more absolute certainty 
than the knowledge of all external things; for the 
latter are tested by and through the medium of the 
senses, which may deceive us by reason of their con- 
nection, often, with diseased physical nerves, while 
internal feelings, or facts, are objects of direct knowl- 
edge, without the interception of physical elements. 
5. A knowledge of our own existence arises in con- 
nection with the power and action of the primary 
elements of the mind. Self-evident truths, which are 
the foundation of the philosophy of mind, have power 
to affirm and know our own existence; and in their 
existence and power we have knowledge of all other 



REASON. 159 

facts within the bounds of mental action. With them 
arises the conviction of our own existence ; and being 
identified with their being and nature, it is utterly im- 
possible for us to avoid the knowledge of our real 
entity. With the same powers arises the conviction 
as to the distinct nature of the mind from the body, 
and that the mind is capable of thinking and acting 
without the aid of the material organs. Knowledge 
implies a power capable of knowing, and objects ca- 
pable of being known. Those elements which are 
capable of experiencing a conviction of their own ex- 
istence, and that of other existences, may be regarded 
as primary, self-evident principles. 

SECTION III. 

1. In connection with the power of reason is our 
confidence in the uniformity of the laws of nature, 
The cognizance of the exactness, or uniform manner 
in the succession of phenomena, evolving the relations 
of sequences and antecedents, of effect and cause, 
gives rise to a conviction and notion of their order 
and obedience to law, all of which enters into 
our experience and knowledge. The origin of such 
conviction is connected with intuitive power. Ex- 
perience, guided by reason, enables us to apply 
it to the proper objects, or process, in success- 
ive events. 2. Our immediate confidence in the uni- 
formity of phenomena gives origin to the notion 
of causation. The regular tendency of one event to 
follow another, becoming or affecting an abiding expe- 



160 REASON. 

rience, gives rise to the conviction that the former is 
that of cause, and the latter is the result or effect. 
We then regard the cause as adequate to the effect. 
The next item is, to notice the character or nature of 
both cause and effect, and if these uniformly harmo- 
nize, we come to the conclusion that the same cause, 
under the same laws, will invariably produce the same 
effect. 3. The conduct of all persons shows their be- 
lief in the existence of primary truths, whether they 
acknowledge or deny such existences. No skeptical 
philosopher can proceed in the investigation of any 
fact without involving a reference, and clear evidence 
of his belief in their existence, though he may deny 
the same at every step or degree of his argument. 
If he is in quest of some primary truth, the absence 
of which would soon involve him in sufferings or 
death, it would be revolting to all his feelings to be 
informed that there was no such thing in existence ; 
and his dismay would be augmented if he should be 
reminded that to prove such an existent, is that he 
own his own existence to be utterly impossible. How 
can he prove origin to self-knowledge, or the begin- 
ning in which he knows his own existence to be real ? 
Without confidence in such settled facts, how could he 
contemplate that which, from the regular chain of such 
truths, will affect his interest or happiness in the fu- 
ture, or be certain that the pain he had received, in 
time past, was experienced by the same person, called 
by his name, and which he now thinks to be himself? 
4. If he looks upon a beautifully-finished tower, it is 



REASON. 161 

natural for the mind to run back to the beginning, at 
the foundation, and to inquire as to the process of 
building, and also as to who the builder was. Not- 
withstanding he is assured by thousands that it exists 
without a cause, builder, or beginning, which would 
accord with his avowed faith, yet an internal, intuitive 
conviction would appeal to his understanding, and 
thunder the perpetual lie to such defective assertions. 
In all cases, those who labor to deny first truths are 
wholly dependent upon them for facts by which they 
are rendered capable of doubting or of denying the 
very truths which are the foundation of all the knowl- 
edge their minds are capable of. 5. There is a differ- 
ence between the process of argumentation and the 
mere action of the reasoning power, in arriving at 
primary truths. The mind, which is capable of cor- 
rect argumentation, has power to evolve facts by bas- 
ing one upon another, or by connecting them in a cor- 
rect chain from the first to the final result. It is nat- 
ural and easy for us to believe that an effect must 
have an adequate cause. When we look on the trem- 
bling fires of yonder heavens, we believe in a great 
First Cause, and see the power and design of Deity 
as written in the existing flower, rustling leaf, burning 
sun, or flying orbs. 6. Reason differs from conscious- 
ness, the latter being the knowledge of mental opera- 
tions and of sensations, or that act of the mind which 
makes known internal objects or feelings. The former 
evolves and connects facts in arriving at results, and 

apprehends truths necessary, absolute, and universal. 

14 



162 REASON. 

7. Its power differs from that of the senses. The lat- 
ter may be regarded as the medium through which 
sensations make their appeal to the mind; but the 
former commands the energies of the mind in ampli- 
fying its research, and in extending its knowledge. 

8. It differs from the judgment. It appertains to the 
latter to discriminate, combine, and decide upon the 
truthfulness of that which is used in argumentation, 
and also the relations of facts and the correctness of 
the state, and each position of the argument; but it 
requires the presence and action of reason to prop- 
erly connect this chain, and in forming a correct proc- 
ess and conclusion. 9. Reason differs, also, from 
the understanding. The latter apprehends the real 
state of that which is presented to it, or is the power 
of believing ; while the former leads to a satisfactory 
result, or certain knowledge. 10. In connection with 
the power of reason arises convictions in relation to 
right and wrong. The mind is capable of being influ- 
enced, and has intuitive power to act in reference to, 
and in distinguishing between good or bad, right or 
wrong. An intuitive influence affects the mind favor- 
ably in regard to right, and deters it in relation to 
evil. 11. In connection with the power of reason, we 
may experience, or have, to some extent, ideas of that 
which is beautiful or sublime. Many objects of the 
same class may differ in degree of beauty; that in 
each which approaches nearest the most perfect one, 
or to our conceptions of a perfect model, requires the 
presence and action of reason, in arriving to a correct 



REASON. 163 

equilibrium, or balancing of them, and to just conclu- 
sions. The descriptions of an orator may surpass the 
perfections of that which forms the object. The 
painter may surpass the natural beauties of the land- 
scape, or the graphic sublimity of some occurrence or 
reality. The arrangement and regularity of these 
must require the presence and action of reason. 



164 REASONING. 



CHAPTER II. 

BEASONING. 

SECTION I. 

1. Reasoning is the power of reason in action. It 
is the act or process of exercising the faculty of rea- 
son, in and by which new or unknown propositions or 
facts are deduced from previous ones, and previous 
facts are established from the relation and character 
of their results or effects. 2. The correct exercise of 
reason is destructive to atheism or the foundation of 
infidelity. We know that an effect can not exist 
without a cause, and we can not believe in a cause 
that is inadequate to the effect which follows it. Uni- 
versal existences all around us confirm our belief in 
the existence of a great First Cause; and the idea of 
such cause, or Being, is a first truth of reason. 3. 
Two modes of argumentation will settle and confirm 
our belief. The first evidence or proofs are drawn 
from the necessity that such a being must exist inde- 
pendently of the evidences which are every-where 
written upon his works. The second embraces proofs 
or evidences of his being and perfections as given in 
his works. We now proceed to examine these two 
modes of argumentation. 



REASONING. 165 

SECTION II. 

1. If there be no one being in infinite space but 
such as might possibly not have had a being, it would 
follow that there might possibly have never been any 
existent; hence the possibility that such an entity 
might have arisen from nonentity. This is impossi- 
ble. Then it is impossible that there might have 
been no existence in any way; therefore, an impossi- 
bility of not existing must be true, and there must 
have been a being whose non-existence is impossible, 
otherwise the truthfulness of all reason and knowl- 
edge would be reversed. 2. All the essence and at- 
tributes of an unoriginated being must be unorigin- 
ated, and necessarily self- existent. Such an essence, 
or being, can not give origin to its own attributes, un- 
less it had power to act before it existed, which would 
be impossible. Such a being must be real, absolute, 
self-existing, and eternal ; for any thing finite, or con- 
tingent, must have a cause which would be anterior, 
and show that such finity, or contingent, could not be 
causation nor eternal. 8. The attributes of an un- 
originated being must be absolute and limitless, other- 
wise they would be imperfect or limited, and that 
would involve a modifying cause ; but no such cause 
can be acknowledged, as such cause would be imper- 
fect. But the cause of which we speak, being per- 
fect, lies back of all things, and may be styled the 
cause of causes, being infinite or eternal. No modi- 
fying cause can be allowed, as such could not be 



166 REASONING. 

absolute in perfection, and could not be eternal; and 
all imperfect attributes, or any attribute which is not 
infinitely perfect within itself, is finite to some degree, 
and must be capable of greater perfection by im- 
provement, exercise, and experience. This would 
prove imperfection in an unoriginated being, and that 
he was perfecting his attributes and existence by self- 
action, experience, and further acquaintance with his 
own works. His being, and each attribute, must be 
perfect and unoriginated. 4. Such an unoriginated 
and infinite being must exist every-where, in the same 
way and manner he does any where, otherwise there 
must be a cause by which his existence and presence 
is limited. But there is and can be no cause limiting 
the existence, action, or presence of Deity ; for there 
can be but one first cause, which cause, from neces- 
sity, must be unoriginated, self-existent, infinite, and 
eternal. It is utterly impossible for us to have con- 
ception of more than one infinite space, and beyond 
this thought can not travel ; neither can w T e have any 
idea of any out border, or limitation to the innumer- 
able worlds which are the result of a cause lying still 
back of their origin and motion. Then if there is 
only one infinite space, it can contain only one infinite 
series of points in that limitless space; therefore, 
that reality which is capable of filling each point in 
infinite space must be indivisible, one, and infinite. 
As two or more infinite beings can not occupy one 
and the same infinite space, filled with only one series 
of infinite points, without being one and the same 



REASONING. 167 

being, therefore there is one, and only one unorigin- 
ated, self-existent, infinite, and eternal cause and Gov- 
ernor of the universe. 

SECTION III. 

1. This unoriginated being must be a reality, pre- 
cisely the same in every place, not consisting of parts, 
as they would naturally exist independently; nor of 
whole, for that would imply a combination of parts; 
nor of degree, as that would signify imperfection and 
quantity with comparison ; therefore, this being is one 
and omnipresent, without any thing like degrees, 
comparison, or limitation. 2. Such a being can not 
be materiality, for this would come under the laws 
which govern it, and would have density, divisibility, 
form with limitation. Nonentity can not give origin 
to matter; and matter which is limited can not give 
origin to matter, for it contains no power of self- 
action; much less could it produce an existent with 
self-cogitative power, being within and of itself un- 
thinking ; and if a portion of matter was eternal, it 
could not originate other inert elements, much less 
give origin to self-acting and cogitative intelligences. 
8. If matter and motion were both eternal, and could 
be connected together, yet they never could pro- 
duce a cogitative mind. Matter and motion, though 
changed or varied in any possible way, yet the parti- 
cles could only meet, impel, and resist each other. 
Then, if nothing were eternal, matter could never 
have had origin, as it could not result from nothing. 
If matter without motion were eternal, then motion 



168 REASONING. 

could never have a beginning ; for matter has no self- 
motion. If only matter and motion are eternal, then 
thought or intellectual action could never have be- 
ing ; for matter, either at rest or in motion, can not 
originate cogitation and knowledge ; neither is it ca- 
pable, abstractly, within and of itself, to act and feel 
joy, pleasure, or grief. Then the first being must be 
infinite, and must have self-power to act, think, fore- 
see, and arrange the beginning and real existence of 
all finite things ; and that which is first of all things 
must really possess, of necessity, absolute perfections, 
as nothing which is essential to such an existent could 
ever be added ; for that w r hich was added would be 
finite, and in this respect imperfect, and would be 
created. 4. Such a being must possess wisdom and 
power without limitation, and all other attributes must 
be, within themselves, absolutely perfect. 5. The ex- 
istence of more than one unoriginated being in the 
universe, or the same infinite space, is utterly impos- 
sible. Such a being is possessed of infinite attributes, 
and must, of necessity, be present in every point in 
infinity. A second unoriginated being must be equal 
to the first in every respect, as both must, necessarily, 
be eternal, from the fact that they are unoriginated ; 
therefore, as there can be only one infinity to be oc- 
cupied or filled by them, that infinity can be no more 
than perfectly filled; and those two unoriginated and 
infinite beings must, necessarily, be the same in es- 
sence or nature, every-where present, incapable of 
any distinction or dissimilarity, and, of absolute ne- 
cessity, they would have to be one and the same. 6. 



REASONING. 169 

The absolute omnipotent power of Deity does not 
make his acts either arbitrary or of necessity. They 
are free in their nature and power, and are with effort, 
otherwise such acts would be of necessity, which 
necessity would be the cause, and not the free power 
of absolute perfection in unison. What he willeth he 
can do, yet nothing is done by him only that which is 
right. He is too wise to err, and too good to be 
unkind. 7. His omnipotence does not necessitate his 
knowledge; yet he knows all things, and there is 
nothing hid from him. Necessity would imply some- 
thing that was, or is yet to be explored by him; 
whereas, if there is any thing which he would not 
choose to know, as contingent or otherwise, it would 
imply that he must first know what that is before he 
would choose not to know it. 8. From reason we 
may infer that the object of man's existence was to 
share of the endless goodness of God; his duty was 
to glorify his Creator ; and that the performance of 
this duty wholly depends upon volition ; therefore, he 
must be created free to serve and glorify God. If 
such service was of necessity, or by requisition, then 
such requisition would be the agent in rendering 
glory, while man would be passive: hence, the object 
of our being would have been cut off by law, and, of 
course, our existence would have been impossible. 

SECTION IV 

1. We now proceed to the second mode of reason- 
ing, which is to establish or prove the existence of 

15 



170 REASONING. 

Deity, by arguing from effect to cause. 2. Our con- 
ceptions of a being of infinite power and wisdom 
would naturally lead us to suppose such power and 
wisdom would be evidenced in the variety, multi- 
plicity, agreement, dependence, mystery, and design 
which exist in, and in connection with all his works. 
That which we can comprehend, and those things 
which we can not comprehend, are alike characteristic 
of his power and wisdom, and are evidences of his 
being. 3. There is evidence of the wisdom and 
power of Deity in the different systems of innumer- 
able orbs which glow in the heavens. The order, dis- 
tances, velocity, gravitation, and centripetal forces ; 
the diurnal and orbitual motions, all of these are con- 
clusive evidences of the wisdom, power, and existence 
of God; for these things are neither of self-origin 
nor accidental. 4. The earth contains, in its own 
structure, evidences of the presence and power of an 
infinite Creator. Its internal order contains the arch- 
ives of its own periods and ages. Vegetation upon 
its surface is mysteriously promoted by the circula- 
tion of nutritious properties elevated by capillary in- 
fluences, forming ligneous fibers, or is consolidated in 
trunks, boughs, and leaves. The delicate fibers and 
glowing tints of almost an endless variety of flowers, 
can only be regarded as so many evidences of the 
wisdom and goodness of the great Creator. 5. There 
is evidence of the existence of Deity in the order of 
providence, which meets the demands of all animated 
or self-moving beings — the regular return of the sea- 



REASONING. 171 

sons, the descending rain, and warming sun, each year 
yielding a sufficiency, and not too much. 6. Life, 
sleep, vision, and muscular action are evidences, and 
furnish positive proof of the existence of Deity. It 
is utterly impossible for any finite existence or influ- 
ence to originate, and keep in regular action, the ex- 
pansion and contraction of the intercostal nerves, by 
which, in part, the lungs are enabled to inhale the at- 
mospheric air, receive the oxygen, and throw off the 
carbon from the blood. We have no self-power to 
keep up this process, yet it goes on whether we sleep 
or wake. Reason, together with the facts in the case, 
teaches us that this process is arranged and continued 
by the wisdom and constant presence of a merciful 
Creator, and the very moment the influence of his 
presence is withdrawn from these nerves our breath is 
paused forever. 7. Another source of evidence may 
be found in connection with the circulation of the 
blood. It is stated that in health the heart, in one 
minute of time, makes eighty pulsations, and a little 
over two ounces of blood are expelled into the aorta 
at each pulsation — about nine thousand six hundred 
ounces every hour, and about one thousand four hun- 
dred and forty pounds per day! It is also stated 
that each pulsation of the heart propels the blood 
eight inches, making fifty feet in one minute ! The 
average quantity of blood in each human body is 
about thirty pounds, and is said to pass through the 
heart twenty-three times in one hour. In calculating 
the velocity, and the force necessary to effect action 



172 REASONING. 

to the remotest extremities of the arteries, or where 
their anastomosis with the veins take place, and the 
mysterious counteraction of the blood in the veins to 
the heart again, would require the heart, in its legiti- 
mate office and action, to possess the astonishing 
power of four hundred pounds. Who is prepared to 
acknowledge that the realities and processes of action 
are the result of inert materiality, or of chance or 

accident? 

SECTION V, 

1. But how are we to account for the irregular, yet 
continuous, expansion and contraction of the muscles 
and cords of the heart, which gives motion to the 
blood, upon which depends the perpetuity of life? 
These muscles and cords, being matter, have no self- 
power to move or act, and the suspension of such 
action is death. Human knowledge has never at- 
tempted to solve the mystery, but in one way that 
had the least appearance of reason ; that is, that the 
pulsations of the heart are caused by the stimulating 
nature of the blood. 2. This has been disproved by 
the following experiments: (1.) If we apply a stim- 
ulus to the muscles of the heart of an animal after it 
is emptied, it will dilate and contract as if it were 
full. (2.) If all the large vessels of the heart be en- 
tirely emptied, the dilations and contractions will 
continue for some time, in the entire absence of the 
blood, and it will be discovered that the dilations are 
as forcible as are the contractions. 3. The continued 
and unwearied action of the heart is evidence, of the 



REASONING. 173 

infinite wisdom and presence of its Creator. That 
which exhausts all other muscles of the body increases 
the power and action of the heart. This action is 
wholly involuntary, and the muscles and delicate cords 
of the heart, unlike any other physical powers, may 
act incessantly, and without weariness, for a hundred 
years. Natural laws can never explain this. 4. Rea- 
son may be regarded, in a certain sense, to be the 
power, and reasoning the action, or process, of de- 
ducing conclusions from premises. This process adds 
a second step to that which has been used, and a 
third to the second, and so on to the last, or the con- 
clusion. In other words, it may be regarded as that 
process of action which connects a chain of facts, or 
a train of reasoning, involving them as a whole, and, 
in their legitimate order, or appropriate fitness, as 
parts most naturally adapted to the nature of the 
premises or proposition. Reasoning is the continued 
exercise of reason, in the demonstration or investiga- 
tion of subjects, or series of facts, tracing their rela- 
tions, arriving at and establishing legitimate conclu- 
sions. 5. Reasoning is a source of specific and certain 
knowledge, giving the mind a controlling power over 
the different steps, degrees, or relations of things, or 
realities, which would be too complicated and obscure 
to be known to us in any other way. It enables the 
mind to penetrate the unexplored mysteries of nature, 
and its action is the occasion of the origin of new 
ideas and new series of interwoven facts, or change 
of propositions. 



174 REASONING 



SECTION VI. 



1. When effect is the object of a reasoning process, 
its cause is implied; for such an object, first known to 
us as a result, or effect, would involve reasons as to 
w T hy it is thus characterized, and an investigation 
would employ the power of reason in tracing back- 
ward each step to a cause, and such a cause as would 
be adequate to the effect, and corresponding in nature 
or qualities* 2. Reasoning a priori deduces conse- 
quences or results from definitions formed, or facts 
assumed, or infers effects from causes previously 
known ; and is that process, or kind of reasoning, by 
which an effect' or result is proved from a cause. 
From the nature and relation of combined facts, or 
propositions, we can readily assume results corre- 
sponding to the legitimate tendency of such antece- 
dents or causes. That general adaptation or fitness, 
blending and harmonizing existences, naturally leads 
us to infer or believe in other corresponding realities. 
This kind of reasoning is common, whether in the 
mind abstractly, or carried on in relation to external 
things through the medium of the senses. 3. Reason- 
ing a posteriori is drawn or proceeds from effect, facts, 
or results. We might say that reasoning a priori is 
from cause to effect; but reasoning a posteriori is from 
effect to cause; yet both methods can be varied in ac- 
cordance with different varieties of facts or proposi- 
tions. A process of reasoning may commence with 
an effect or result, and extend back to a cause, or to 



REASONING. 175 

something of anterior existence. 4. In every correct 
process of reasoning there are three things which must 
claim our attention. (1.) We must know the prem- 
ises to be correct or true. If not, we can not proceed 
correctly ; and if there is any doubt in regard to this, 
we should prove the premises true, if susceptible of 
proof. (2.) The truthfulness of the premises being 
established, the chain of reasoning, it may be, consist- 
ing of numerous distinct facts, arguments, proposi- 
tions, or steps, must all be true within themselves, and 
correspond in respect to the same premises, and so 
connected that one step in the argument becomes an 
essential part of the premises of the subsequent one, 
till the entire argument is completed. All interme- 
diate steps, from the premises to the conclusion, must 
be carefully examined and known to be correct. (3.) 
With caution in the preceding steps, the conclusion or 
result will be easy and natural; but we must know 
that such conclusion is a legitimate result of the pre- 
ceding argument, corresponding to the correct force, 
natural existence, condition, or influence of the truths 
which have compelled such a result or conclusion. 
5. The power of correct reasoning depends very much 
upon attention and the judgment. Progressive reason- 
ing evolves new facts, attention places them under the 
inspection of the mind. The judgment discriminates 
and decides upon their appropriateness and truthful- 
ness. 

SECTION VII. 

1. Mathematical reasoning has been regarded as 
being superior to mental reasoning, from the fact that 



176 REASONING. 

there are fewer intermingling or connected contin- 
gencies, and we have not so many things to assume. 
This, in part, is true ; but we are not prepared to ad- 
mit that mathematical propositions or demonstrations 
are worthy of as much confidence or belief as those 
which are mental or moral. 2. If, in numerical rea- 
soning, nothing is assumed or taken for granted, in 
regard to the truthfulness and existence of premises, 
upon which the reasoning is founded ; and if all nec- 
essary assumptions are few, contingent, and easily 
freed from intricacy, yet the power of knowing and 
of receiving these as true realities, is found connected 
with and in the intuitive power of the mind* 3. No 
fact, tested by the power, or received through the me- 
dium of the senses, can be known as real and true 
only as the internal, intuitive poiver of the primary 
elements of the mind enables us to receive and know 
them to be such. It is this power alone which ena- 
bles us to know that the axioms which are the founda- 
tion of all mathematical calculations and demonstra- 
tions, are self-evident truths. 4. Internal mental or 
moral reasoning can not be said to be of remote ori- 
gin, and received, in whole or in part, through inter- 
cepting mediums ; but our knowledge of such is di- 
rect, present, and experimental. 5. Demonstrative 
reasoning is used to probably a greater extent among 
the masses than any other, progressing from cause to 
effect, or from premises to the conclusion, showing, or 
proving, by clear and certain evidence, the result. 
6. Investigative reasoning is that kind of disquisition 



REASONING. 177 

which involves the idea of vivid, keen, and penetra- 
ting mental action ; and is that kind of progressive 
mental action which forces its way into hidden fields 
of realities. It searches minutely, bringing to light 
new facts, which may evolve others connecting, or add- 
ing them into appropriate incursive chains, rendering 
such dormant treasures the conquest of research and 
imperishable knowledge. 7. False investigative rea- 
soning may take place or exist when the acknowledged 
primary facts are untrue, either in whole or in part, 
or in their conditioned combination or relation. 8. 
False reasoning may take place by assuming premises 
or propositions which are incorrect within themselves, 
or which are not naturally adapted to the conclusion 
desired. (1.) By assuming a proposition asserted to 
be a conclusion of some previous process of reason- 
ing, without examining such former process, or know- 
ing it to have existed, and to be true or correct. (2.) 
By confusing the distinctiveness of each step in the 
connected links or chain of reasoning, thoroughly 
rendering a change in position possible, and without 
detection. (3.) By commencing the argument at some 
point far removed from the premises. (4.) By petitio 
principii, or begging the question in assuming a prin- 
ciple which amounts to the same thing to be proved, 
or which may vary slightly in some almost impercep- 
tible way. (5.) By assuming a principle, and then 
wandering off, reasoning on many contingent things, 
till they can be combined together, from which the 
reasoning commences, without any connection with 



178 REASONING. 

the first assumed principle ; or by reasoning in a cir- 
cle, in assuming a principle, and employing it to es- 
tablish some other reality or facts, which fact or facts 
are used to prove the first assumed principle. (6.) 
False reasoning may arise by means of the sophisti- 
cal use of terms and analogies in principles assumed, 
all of which can be corrected by careful examination. 
9. Reasoning may be influenced improperly by an 
impure motive. This will so bias the efforts of the 
mind as to cause more than a due proportion of atten- 
tion to be bestowed upon those things most intimately 
connected with some conclusion designed or desired, 
while real facts, naturally adapted to the argument, 
receive such a. slight proportion of attention as to 
be finally lost from the argument, or have no special 
influence. 10. Prejudice will affect reasoning so as 
to distract or destroy its accuracy; for in this way 
opinions are formed before the subject has been inves- 
tigated or examined. Reader, if you would start 
right, and continue in a right course, never prejudge 
the subject of your inquiries, and never dare to act 
according to or with an improper or vitiated motive ! 
Let motive be pure forever. 






DIVISION EIGHTH 



^♦^ 



CHAPTER I . 

D R E A M I N G 
SECTION I. 

1. Dreaming is having thoughts, notions, or ideas 
in or during sleep. They may arise in connection 
with only one subject, or we may experience a series 
of thoughts or moral impressions. Under the above 
heading we shall define that which may be called 
mental dreaming; and, in another place, we will de- 
fine moral dreaming, as there are two kinds clearly 
distinct in nature. 2. It may be regarded as wholly 
involuntary ; for we often experience impressions, or 
ideas, which arise in the mind, of an unpleasant na- 
ture, or those which are revolting to us, but have no 
power to divert our notice of them, though we experi- 
ence an effort to effect such change. 3. Dream- 
ing is common to all persons ; yet some dream much 
more frequently than others. But very few have ever 
asserted that they have never experienced any thing 
of the kind. Those who think so, may have dreamed 
and be unable to recall them in waking hours. 4. 
Mental dreaming, as a general rule, arises in the 
mind, or is one of those states which take place in 

179 



180 BREAMING. 

sleep, immediately following and corresponding with 
those facts, or subjects, which were the objects of 
mental action previous to the slumber in which such 
ideas arise. 5. Mental states of mind, which take 
place under the influence of dreams, are not to be de- 
pended upon as true preludes of things to come. 
They are mere circumstantial or casual states, which 
can not be regarded as positive evidence that those 
things made known in dreams will ever occur, or that 
their opposites will come true. 6. Dreaming may, in 
some degree, be caused by physical debilitation. On 
careful observation it has been ascertained that dreams 
are pleasant or revolting in proportion to the strength 
and health of the body. In good health the occur- 
rences experienced in the mind, while under the influ- 
ence of slumber, are apt to be of an agreeable or 
pleasant character ; and if we are verging to an attack 
of disease, we are apt to rest imperfectly in sleep, and 
our dreams are oppressive and generally of a disa- 
greeable character. 

SECTION II. 

1. There is no fixed law of conformity or of agree- 
ment in relation to dreams ; for there is great disa- 
greement and contradiction in them. Such thoughts 
are often disconnected and desultory. These irregu- 
larities are not corrected by reason, judgment, and 
the exercise of the senses, in regard to definite truths 
and settled laws in external things; and those mental 
powers which have a correcting control over the mind 



DREAMING. 181 

are partially suspended. 2. We are now prepared to 
go still further, and say that we may have facts re- 
vealed to us in dreams of which we have never had 
any conclusive knowledge. Students have been known 
to work late at night at propositions in mathematics, 
and retired to rest without solving them ; but solved 
the difficulty in a dream, and, on waking, with joy 
placed all the work on paper correctly, and without 
trouble. 3. Our conceptions of the length of time oc- 
cupied in dreaming appears of very long duration, 
when, in fact, it can only extend to a few minutes. 
A chain of events may pass through the mind in one 
dream which would require many*days in reviewing, 
but on waking we discover that it has been the work 
of a few minutes. 4. Dreaming conceptions are not 
confined to old conceptions. Under the influence of 
slumber, poets have composed parts of poems, and, 
in waking hours, have written out the same. The 
logician has unraveled mysterious things, and con- 
cluded his argument correctly; the mathematician has 
concluded his demonstration; and the linguist seen 
how to translate a difficult passage. 5. It is useless 
trying to define the causes of dreams. The best we 
can do is to regard them as varying with the many 
and mysterious influences connected with the phe- 
nomena of mind. Each person can best determine 
the cause of mental influences, or states, by carefully 
attending to his own experience in regard to them. 
All facts connected with the phenomena of dreaming 
are evidences that mind is ever active and imperishable. 



182 CLAIRVOYANCE. 



CHAPTER II. 

CLAIRVOYANCE. 

SECTION I. 

V 

1. Clairvoyance does not properly belong to this 
work, and should not receive this brief notice, were 
it not that it has been regarded, by many, as being 
an essential part of the phenomena of mind. 2. It 
is the clear-sightedness of the mind in perceiving, or 
in apprehending facts or events, without the aid of 
the senses, as a medium in arriving at a knowledge 
of such facts, or events. This is, in reality, closely 
connected with dreaming, though it appears to take 
place further removed from any internal controlling 
power governing it. This ulterior process appears to 
occur when we are under the deepest influence of 
Somnus, and the senses entirely inactive to external 
affecting causes, so far as can be determined. 3. It 
is a power attributed to persons in a mesmeric state, 
of perceiving, or discriminating objects or realities 
not present with, nor objects of the action of the 
senses. 4. Such power does not appear to be com- 
mon or naturally connected with earthly intelligence, 
in the proper existence and relationship which char- 
acterizes them. However natural it may be to the 
action of spirit within itself, abstracted from bodily 



CLAIRVOYANCE. 183 

organs, yet such action is not common to the masses, 
or, if so, we are unable to recall such action in wak- 
ing hours. 

SECTION II. 

1. If such power does really exist in connection 
with some minds when unknown to others, or to the 
great majority of persons, we can not account for its 
existence as an essential element of spirit, or any 
thing superadded to one that is withheld from an- 
other; therefore, the only rational way of meeting 
the subject is, that such differences depend upon some 
peculiarity in the nervous constitution, connected 
with the mind's developments. The nerves connected 
with the brain are so inseparably connected with the 
sensations experienced, that mental states may be af- 
fected by them; and we know not how far such states 
may vary or correspond to the peculiar sensitiveness, 
condition, or influence of the nervous system. 2. 
How far or to what extent the doctrine of clairvoy- 
ance is true, we shall not determine ; but too much 
faith or belief in such things is deceptious, danger- 
ous, and adds no essential truths to knowledge. 3. 
That a simple state of clairvoyance may be experi- 
enced by some minds connected with a peculiar nerv- 
ous constitution, is neither unnatural nor new in sci- 
entific research. Such persons are so naturally con- 
stituted that they can be affected by mesmerism, 
anxiety of mind, fatigue, or disease, so as to have 
some kind of stupor over the action of the senses, 
and, at the same time, experience some kind of per- 



184 CLAIRVOYANCE. 

ception of things which can be the objects of mental 
action. This is no new theory, either in reality or in 
the investigations of science. It is as old as this 
kind of peculiar nervous constitutions. It is natural 
with the nervous sensitiveness of some persons, though 
the perverted use often made of it, in the necromancy 
and feats performed in the world, is deceptious, tend- 
ing to absurdities and ruin. 4. So far as any person 
has a natural disposition and tendency to such mental 
states as may be included under the meaning of clair- 
voyance, it is innocent; but when an intentional per- 
version takes place, it becomes wickedly absurd. No 
one can be so operated on by another as to reveal 
facts of the spirit-world beyond the limits of personal 
identity, or mental resources and action. 



SOMNAMBULISM. 185 



CHAPTER III. 

SOMNAMBULISM. 
SECTION I. 

1. This is the act or practice of walking in sleep. 
In dreaming the mind acts, but the somnambulist 
walks abroad, or has power voluntarily to move from 
place to place while under the influence of sleep. 
This singular affection differs from dreaming. Simple 
dreaming involves only the action of the mind, while 
somnambulism includes the affection and action of the 
physical powers in connection with mental inclinations 
and action. 2. It differs from dreaming as to the ex- 
ercise of the mind. The mind may be fixed upon its 
own impressions, or ideas, which are passing under its 
inspection, but there appears to be less power in recall- 
ing such exercise in our waking hours than to recall the 
substance of dreams. There are but few if any som- 
nambulists who can ever recall the fact of walking in 
sleep. As a general thing they never have the slight- 
est knowledge, in their waking hours, that ever such 
occurrence took place. 3. The same appears true in 
regard to talking in sleep. There is, perhaps, not one 
case out of a thousand where persons in the habit of 
talking in sleep, ever have the slightest knowledge of 
such fact from any action of their own minds, though 



186 SOMNAMBULISM. 

highly probable they are dreaming, or the mind is act- 
ing in some way all the time. 4. The first degree of 
somnambulism, with some persons, is an inclination to 
talk in sleep, though others are not known to talk. 
The former often rehearse what is passing in the mind, 
and frequently that which was not intended to be 
known. If this propensity increases, we may expect 
them to walk during sleep. A friend of mine lodged 
in the same room with a man who was in the habit of 
walking during sleep, intending to follow him. About 
midnight the somnambulist arose, walked down stairs, 
passed out at the door, took a path across the field, 
crossed a water-course on a high log, not touching the 
hand-pole, and without either stooping or pausing. 
In this way he could not pass over in waking hours by 
daylight, yet he passed on without any difficulty; 
then turning into a dark valley, ascended and seated 
himself upon drift wood ; in a few moments returned 
by the same way, to his room and bed, and knew 
nothing of the. occurrence next morning. 

SECTION II. 

1. Somnambulism differs from dreaming, in the 
power which the action of the mind has over the mus- 
cles and nervous system, whether such mental action 
or volitions can be recalled in our waking hours or 
not. Dreams appear to be real in the mind, and the 
same appears true in regard to that which is passing 
in the mind of the somnambulist. The additional 
power is added by which he can and does put his 






SOMNAMBULISM. 187 

physical powers in motion. A servant in the South, 
during sleep, often responds to his master's call, takes 
his horse, waters him, puts him in the stable, feeds 
him and fastens the door, returns to bed, and knows 
nothing of the transaction next morning. 2. Another 
peculiarity is, that in sleep the senses and muscles ap- 
pear powerless and inactive; but in somnambulism the 
latter are active, while the former are inactive. This can 
not be defined unless it exists in connection with that 
peculiar sensitive class of nerves connected with the 
muscles, and not with the senses, being affected in 
some way and manner as to invoke or induce an effort 
of the muscular powers under the influence of mental 
volitions. 3. The absence of fear is another peculi- 
arity connected with somnambulism. The somnam- 
bulist can go where he could not in his waking state 
without fear or loss of life. They have been known 
to pass out of windows and climb up on the tops of 
houses, and, in an erect posture, walk narrow joists or 
beams from twenty to forty feet above the ground. 

4. A very singular phenomenon is sometimes wit- 
nessed in the presence of paroxysms, which come on 
in daytime as well as at night. At times they are 
preluded by a singular sensation or noise in the head, 
but frequently are experienced without warning. The 
mind seems abstracted from external impressions, yet 
there is no apparent difficulty in conversing about 
that which is passing through the mind at the time. 

5. Some persons are totally unconscious of any exter- 
nal thing; others can hear and answer questions. 



188 SOMNAMBULISM. 

There have been instances given where persons have, 
while under the paroxysm, conversed readily in Latin, 
which they could not do at other times. 6. A contin- 
gent feature of this affection has been referred to as 
being produced by an attack of somnolency. In re- 
covering from one attack, persons have lost all literary 
knowledge ; but in recovering from the second, all lost 
attainments have been restored, and thus alternating 
for years. 7. It would almost appear that, under 
such paroxysms, the mind or spirit has sight and per- 
ception independently of the senses. Philosophers 
have given instances of persons who have had 'their 
eyes closed while under the paroxysm, and bandaged 
with many thicknesses of black silk; yet they could 
read and answer questions in regard to distinct objects 
correctly, and in regard to some things which they 
had never seen before. We know of no way to ex- 
plain this, unless in proportion as the soul is ab- 
stracted from the bodily organs, the more perfectly 
its powers are developed. 8. Whatever there may be 
that is strange or novel in this chapter, yet it should 
be borne in mind that all these facts go to show that 
mind can act without the body, from which it is rea- 
sonable to believe in its superiority, and to infer its 
imperishable nature or eternal duration. 



MESMERISM. 189 



CHAPTER IV. 

MESMERISM. 

SECTION I. 

1. By mesmerism we understand animal magnetism, 
or the existence of a peculiar kind of sleep, in which 
the mind is active, though the mesmerized person ap- 
pears unconscious of external objects. 2. The act of 
mesmerizing is that of affecting the body in different 
ways, so as to produce a species or kind of sleep, 
while the mind retains its activity and power. This 
is no new discovery in scientific research and knowl- 
edge. Long has it been known, and it has and does 
exist, in reality, in the very natural constitution of 
some persons. 3. A constitution capable of being 
mesmerized is almost the same as those which come 
under the influence of somnambulism. The mesmeric 
susceptibility is connected with a peculiar condition or 
nature of the nervous system, and never can be im- 
parted to one who has it not; yet the influence or 
power of disease might effect such change, or condi- 
tion of the nerves, as to render a person capable of 
being mesmerized who had no natural disposition to 
it. This constitutional or natural affinity to mesmeric 
affection, or influence, can be affected or produced by 
external agencies or causes, neither marvelous nor 



190 MESMERISM. 

uncommon. 4. There are but very few persons, if 
any, who are in the habit of talking or walking in 
sleep, while in health, but can be mesmerized; yet 
this can not be done contrary to the will or permission 
of the subject. 5. Some subjects, under the influence 
of mesmerism, are wholly unconscious of external 
things, while others are not, but have no immediate 
power to break the influence. Mesmerizers claim that 
the former class can be operated upon by will, in com- 
manding them to do as they please, while the latter 
can resist only in part. It may be that persons, being 
mesmerized, go into that state with the mind entirely 
directed to the .operator, and when stupor comes over 
the power of the senses, the mind still having liberty 
to act, and the operator being the object of the mind, 
he may have more controlling power over it than any 
other person, and more than would seem natural; but 
there is far more contained in the assertions of such 
agents than in facts as they are. 

SECTION II. 

1. In this way the truthfulness of phrenology has 
been established by the action of mesmerized persons 
corresponding to the nature of the organ touched by 
the operator: but this is no proof, if what the mes- 
merizer claims is true, that subjects can be oper- 
ated upon by will; for he knows what organ he is 
touching, and the kind of action he expects. This 
being fixed in his mind would be that which he would 
will : hence, the action of the subject would correspond 



MESMERISM. 191 

to the will of the operator. With all the obscurity 
and doubt of the correctness of this conclusion, yet 
that spirit can thus operate upon spirit is far more 
reasonable than to believe a mere physical organ of 
the head can possess within itself spiritual rationality 
sufficient to act. If spirit can act as spirit, why may 
it not act without involving the inert medium of the 
skull. The truthfulness of phrenology can not be 
established by mesmerism w T hile mind and matter are 
dissimilar and divisible. 2. If the somnambulist be- 
comes lost to every thing but that upon which his 
mind is intently fixed, and if he has power to walk 
abroad in obedience to any internal inclination, may 
not a person, on being mesmerized, become uncon- 
scious of every thing in regard to the action of the 
senses, yet controlled by the thoughts of the mind, 
w r hich still cluster around the existence and will of the 
operator, so as to be thus influenced in some w T ay? 
But deceptions in regard to these things are far more 
probable than conjectures in favor of such mysteries. 
3. Some persons, who, under mesmeric influences, are 
partially sensible of what is passing, are unable to 
move from any position placed in, though they try to 
do so. By a well-tried effort, some have succeeded in 
breaking the influence. 4. There is another class 
which appears unconscious of every thing, yet they 
will respond to questions, or walk, if ordered to do so. 
This may be accounted for upon the same principle 
that a person continues to converse with another in 
sleep; they will answer almost any question asked. 



192 MESMERISM. 

In this way confidential truths have been revealed. 
But to fully explain such phenomena must be the 
work of each one who thinks upon the subject. 5. 
Though this constitutional or natural tendency to, or 
susceptibility of mesmeric states can not be defined, 
yet we can but believe, to some extent, in its mysteri- 
ous existence; but, when properly viewed, it contains 
no more mystery than dreaming or somnambulism. 
This far we may go in safety ; but the idea that men 
send the spirits of others to distant worlds, or have 
the facts of the spirit-world revealed by them, is not 
only absurd, but tends to ruin. Finity has no such 
power. 



PHRENOLOGY. 193 



CHAPTER V. 

PHRENOLOGY. 

SECTION I. 

1. Phrenology proceeds upon the supposition that 
the brain is the organ of thought and passion ; that 
the science of the human mind is inseparably con- 
nected with this supposed organ; and that the differ- 
ent powers may be determined principally by the size 
and shape of the head, together with the undulations 
of the skull, embracing the position and condition of 
such undulations. As to the general features, or out- 
line of phrenology, we file no very special objections; 
but when w T e come to define and settle the divisions 
of the organ, we are plunged into darkness and con- 
fusion. 2. The size and the general appearance of 
the head, together w r ith the expression of the eye and 
countenance, are important in forming a correct judg- 
ment in regard to the mind. Doubtless more is indi- 
cated by physiognomy than by phrenology. The 
expression of the countenance, as a general thing, is 
more important in deciding upon the strength and 
character of the mind, than all that can be gathered 
from the different sections in craniology. 3. There 
are several important points to be settled, and ac- 
knowledged as true, before the philosophy of mind, 

17 



194 PHRENOLOGY. 

with its well-tried chain of truths, can be supplanted 
by it. We do not regard the doctrine of phrenology 
as being sufficiently interwoven with mental science 
to require an extensive analysis: hence, we shall 
refer briefly to only a few connected facts. 4. The 
truths which support the doctrine of phrenology must 
be sufficiently clear and strong to show that it is, in 
fact, a science; but no two writers have agreed, in 
every respect, in regard to the localities of different 
organs, as indicated by the peculiar shape of the 
skull, which, according to phrenology, is essential to 
such theory or doctrine. 5. It must be demonstrated 
without doubt, that the brain is, wholly, the organ of 
the mind, otherwise the cranium might deceive us; 
and as all nervous matter in the entire system is of 
the very same properties as that of the brain, and is, 
to some extent, connected with it, there might be 
some difficulty involved in locating the organ of the 
mind. 6. Phrenologists should first prove that the 
brain is the organ of the mind, and then they must 
agree in locating the different powers or faculties ac- 
cording to the exterior surface of the skull, and 
especially those locations should be made and defined 
without doubt, which have so long been the objects of 
doubt and contention among different writers. An 
intelligent world will expect these questions to be set- 
tled before they will consent to regard such system, 
as a whole, consistent with reason, or science. 7. It 
must be clearly shown how the skull bone, which is 
inert, is better adapted to the development of the 



PHRENOLOGY. 195 

various influences and powers of an immaterial nature, 
than such nature would be to develop its own powers 
and action. 8. If we adhere to the exactness of 
phrenological claims, it must be demonstrated, accord- 
ing to general uniformity, that each undulation on 
the external surface of the skull has a concavity cor- 
responding on the inner surface, answering to the 
different lobes of the brain, which lobes have been 
assumed as being the basis respectively from which 
the action of the various powers of the mind are elim- 
inated; but this is impossible. 9. There should be a 
clear showing, or proof, that the brain does really 
contain lobes, or protuberances, as assumed, and just 
a sufficient number to correspond with the different 
powers and affections of the mind; but the almost 
imperceptible waves of the brain can not be called 
lobes, as is set forth in the doctrine of phrenology. 

SECTION II. 

1. Should such lobes exist as organs of the differ- 
ent powers of the mind, it would appear that they 
exist in immediate contact with the skull, so that the 
external surface would indicate the size and strength 
of such organs thus manifested; therefore, no vacuum, 
or space, could exist between the brain and the skull 
without confusing the definite location and action of 
the various mental powers. But there is a vacuum 
between the brain and skull which severs the connec- 
tion between the two, and renders it impossible to 
trace the connection between the external surface of 



196 PHRENOLOGY. 

the skull and brain at any time, without taking into 
the account the changes under different circumstances. 
2. Philosophers agree that the brain may be regarded 
as the organ of the mind by reason of the wise order 
in the arrangement of Infinite Wisdom, and not from 
its peculiar essence, or natural qualities ; for in this 
case the whole nervous system would be the organ of 
the mind, as it is connected with the brain, and con- 
tains precisely the same essence, or properties. 3. 
The idea that the mind is wholly dependent upon the 
nature and condition of the physical organs, in order 
to be manifested, or for the character of its action, is 
dbsurd ; for we have already seen that mind can act 
without the bodily organs, and when the senses are 
locked up, or their power is suspended by sleep. 4. 
The doctrine of phrenology, not sufficiently guarded, 
often misleads the mind. In some instances it has 
given origin to tendencies which have resulted in the 
worst forms of infidelity, by and in which it has been 
assumed that all sufferings of both body and mind are 
the results of imperfect physical organization, and 
that the fall of man affects only the physical powers, 
by and through which mind acts. If this be true, 
and it is possible for us to have any consciousness of 
guilt or sin, then that which tests this fact must be 
matter, and when the body dies all our consciousness 
of guilt must perish with it. This would result in the 
doctrine or idea of annihilation, which is false. 5. 
The physical organs, being inert within themselves 
have no power to comprehend the knowledge of suf- 



PHRENOLOGY. 197 

fering, and report the same to the mind, in order 
to be known. Matter can never originate intuitive 
mental convictions and feelings of our lost estate ; for 
it is by the existence, and self-action of innate mental 
elements that we can have any knowledge of the ca- 
pability of the body to suffer, or that it ever has 
experienced pain. 6. Injuries received upon the 
head often affect some power, and an injury received 
upon a certain organ affects one mind very differently 
from the result the same cause would produce upon 
another. The same organ in kind may be affected on 
different heads, and the results are not similar; but, 
in most instances, very different. The same organ in. 
the same head may be affected by a blow, at different 
times, without producing similar effects upon the 
mind; therefore, it is impossible to locate the differ- 
ent organs from the similarity in the effects realized. 
7. Different portions of the brain may be diseased 
without affecting the mind corresponding to the office, 
nature, and action of the organs thus affected. A 
lady has been mentioned, one-half of whose brain 
was completely paralyzed by disease, yet the faculties 
of her mind were perfect. A man has been men- 
tioned who retained the right use of all his faculties 
up to the moment of his sudden death, and on open- 
ing his head it was discovered that suppuration had 
destroyed the whole right hemisphere of his brain. 
Though one-half of his cerebral organs were de- 
stroyed, yet his mind was not affected. Operators 
testify that they have removed, in a similar way, as 



198 PHRENOLOGY. 

much as a half pound of matter found in the brain, 
when the mind did not appear to have been affected 
up to the time of death. 8. We learn, from different 
experiments, that large portions of the brain have 
been often removed without destroying the exercise 
of the mental faculties. A man has been mentioned, 
whose head had been so injured that a large portion 
of the right wing of the os frontis w r as removed, sup- 
puration had taken place, while at each dressing, for 
over two months, the matter discharged brought with 
it large quantities of the brain ; yet he retained the 
right use of all his faculties to the time of his death. 
9. Instances have been given, in cases of fracture of 
the skull, when large portions of the brain have been 
removed without the slightest injury to the minds of 
the persons thus suffering. These facts are conclu- 
sive evidences that different organs in the brain can 
be entirely destroyed without marring the correct ac- 
tion of the mind. 10. How can this be accounted for 
upon the principles of phrenology? There is only 
one way of escape; that is, when the organs on one 
side of the head are destroyed, we have to assume 
that there are double organs, and those on the other 
side correspond to those lost. But this is only as- 
sumption, as it can not be based upon any primary 
principle of phrenology. 11. While the general prin- 
ciples of phrenology may be regarded as true, we are 
unprepared to adopt it in lieu of mental philosophy, 
as the latter has been long established upon correct 
principles, attested by almost any amount of experi- 
ments and facts known to be true. 



DIVISION NINTH. 



++- 



CHAPTER I. 

BEFLECTION. 

SECTION I. 

1. Reflection is the act or operation of the mind 
by which it turns its views, or thoughts, back upon 
itself or its operations. 2. By this power our 
thoughts may be thrown back upon the past, or 
upon that which is absent. In this way the field of 
past events can be entered, and diligent search insti- 
tuted, in regard to facts which are desired to be used 
by the mind in forming combinations, or in tracing 
relations and associations of truths. 3. Reflection is 
involuntary when it takes place without any willing 
or intentional effort. 4. It is voluntary when we 
pause the action of the mental powers, and throw 
back our thoughts in search of some express object, 
or for some special purpose. 5. It is connected with 
the power of reason, but more intimately with the 
power of remembering past perceptions, and past 
mental acts or processes, so that they can be com- 
pared with present facts, feelings, and inclinations as 
experienced by the same sentient being. It traces 
the laws by which the processes of mental action are 

governed, regulated, and known. 

199 



200 REFLECTION. 



SECTION II 



1. While the mind, by the power of reflection, is 
canvassing and considering past events or realities, 
there is called into action the power of memory, com- 
parison, and judgment, which give rise to new states 
of mind, and new trains of thought. 2. In connec- 
tion with these, there arises certain internal convic- 
tions, and the exercise of an intuitive belief in exter- 
nal and internal realities. 3. Under the process of 
reflecting, we experience an internal conviction and 
belief that we are real existences, and that we possess 
cogitative minds, with powers superior to materiality. 

4. While the aption of the mind is paused to give 
place to mature and deliberate reflection, there arises, 
in connection with the mind's intuitions, a conviction 
of the truthfulness of the report of the senses, and 
the power to believe in the reality of external things. 

5. The importance of reflection is invaluable. It 
leads to the safest and most effectual preventives of 
evil, and enables us to take, in due time, the necessary 
steps to avoid danger and ruin. 



APPARITIONS. 201 



CHAPTER II. 

APPARITIONS. 

SECTION I. 

1. Apparitions are only another source of evidence 
showing the connection and influence which physical 
organs have over mental states. Such visibilities 
are mere appearances, and are opposed to reality. 
Persons often speak of seeing angels, or individuals 
who are absent from them. Others suppose they see 
ghosts or spirits of departed friends. 2. These may 
be caused by the effect and influence of disease upon 
the eye. All that enters into the composition of the 
eye is more or less affected by disease. The transpar- 
ent properties are liable to change, so as to present 
the appearance of objects which do not exist. 

SECTION II. 

1. The effect produced upon the retina, or optic 
nerve, is the greatest cause of deception, giving rise 
to perceptions of objects as real, which do not exist. 
The organ of the visual sense is far more perfect in 
health than when diseased, and it is not a difficult task 
to mark the variations of its power passing under the 
influence of different kinds of disease. 2. Internal 
mental excitement may have power to change, in some 



202 APPARITIONS. 

way, the retina, or optic nerve, in whole or in part, 
so as to give origin to perceptions of existences which 
have no present or real being. This would suppose 
self-power with nervous constitutions to affect the op- 
tic nerve, by sudden alarm or excitement, so as to 
give origin to the notion of entities where they do not 
exist; and as such changes belong to the physical 
system, and as such perceptions, through the medium 
of the visual sense, are not intentional or voluntary, 
that which is seen and thought to be real, but has no 
existence, is at first received with the utmost confi- 
dence, and often requires a strict exercise of reason 
in correcting the perceptions arising in this way. 



SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 203 



CHAPTER III. 

SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 

SECTION I. 

1. Spectral illusions may be regarded as being of 
more importance than is proper or right. Those who 
are accustomed to such illusions have, as a general 
thing, the utmost confidence that the beings they see 
are real. 2. An instance has been recorded of a man 
advanced in life, possessed of a sound mind, and hav- 
ing enjoyed good health, in the latter years of his life, 
who had almost daily visitations from spectral forms. 
These forms or figures generally appeared as human 
beings. The forms often varied, but the countenances 
appeared to be the same. He could see them at dif- 
ferent times, and with his eyes either opened or closed. 
By pressure on his eyes, they disappeared ; yet, when 
present, their appearance was pleasant, and features 
clear and distinct. Any stimulant or excitement in- 
creased the number of those visitors. By examining 
this history, we have no difficulty in accounting for 
this, as any thing which excited him produced the 
presence of those existences. His constitution was 
so easily affected that the optic nerve was influenced, 
and forms appeared which had no existence. 3. Im- 
ages or persons, which seem to appear to individuals 



204 SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 

influenced out of the ordinary way, either physically, 
or by the effect of excited minds upon physical or- 
gans, seldom speak or answer any questions; but, in 
some instances, they are reported as having conversed. 
There is a case recorded, where a man, mourning over 
the loss of his wife, who had been the victim of sud- 
den death, realized, as he thought, while in deep 
study, the door of his room open. The form of his 
wife reappeared, and informed him that she had en- 
tered into rest, and desired him to prepare for 
the same happiness in the future. The specter could 
have been the result of a change in the visual organs, 
while the language he thought she spoke might have 
originated in a dream of which he was not sensible, 
the mind being intensely exercised at the time. 4. A 
case has been given, and attested as true, of a man 
seated in a worshiping congregation, who suddenly 
shrieked out with great intrepidation, rising to his 
feet, steadily looking toward the stand, and exclaimed, 
" Do you not see the minister clothed in a shroud ?" 
In a few minutes, the minister, who had not yet ar- 
rived, came, entered the stand, and preached. Before 
the next Sabbath he was dead, and in his grave. 

SECTION II. 

1. Nyctalopia, in its various forms, exerts no an- 
nihilating power over the mental elements, but exhib- 
its a peculiar acuteness and power of the visual organ, 
by which the sensibility of the optic nerve must be 
very much increased. This is only another evidence 



SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 205 

that it is capable of various changes, and that the 
presence of spectral illusions depends upon certain 
influences affecting the retina or optic nerve. If the 
eye was perfect in all its parts, and free from the 
power of disease, it would be relieved of phantoms, 
or specters. 2. Those who are approaching epilejrtic 
fits, often are troubled with the appearing of phan- 
toms or specters. The evidence of a man has been 
recorded, who says that the prelude to the paroxysm 
was, the appearing of a peculiar-looking human being, 
who struck him on the head ; then the paroxysm com- 
menced. This specter was, no doubt, caused by the 
effect the approaching attack had upon the brain and 
eyes. 3. The influence of febrile diseases upon the pe- 
culiar sensitiveness of some constitutions, may be re- 
garded as occasions of the origin of spectral illusions. 
A case has been given, where a man thus affected, 
while under the influence of a violent pain in the head, 
distinctly saw his family in the room, who were, at 
that time, three thousand miles distant. A lady has 
been mentioned, who, under the influence of severe 
illness, saw her father, at different times, come into 
her room, and speak in his natural tone of voice, 
though he had not been there at any time. 4. A too 
highly-excited imagination may lead to a belief in ex- 
istences as real when they are not. An excitable 
mind, when aroused, can imagine fearful sounds, or 
the footsteps of an enemy approaching. They see 
something in the distance, which appears nearing, and 
enlarges with more perfect form, till the beholder is 



206 SPECTKAL ILLUSIONS. 

terrified, awed, or overcome -with fear. 5. All these 
facts show that our knowledge, which we receive 
through the medium of the senses, can be rendered 
uncertain, as the organs can be so easily affected by 
disease ; but our internal knowledge of the existence 
of self can not be doubted, as we do not depend upon 
any physical elements in arriving at the certainty of 
such knowledge, or in knowing that we do really ex- 
ist. 



SPIRIT-RAPPING. 207 



CHAPTER IV. 

SPIRIT-RAPPING. 

SECTION I. 

1. Necromancy, though not intimately or closely- 
connected with mental science, has been involved with 
mental phenomena, for the purpose of adding import- 
ance to the office of modern teachers, or those who 
would be gifted in enchantment or conjuring. It is 
styled, or called, the art of revealing future facts or 
events. There is a pretended medium of communi- 
cation w T ith the dead, or minds disembodied. 2. 
S}ririt-rapping may be called a delusion. That some 
peculiar nervous constitutions may be affected in a 
w r ay mysterious to the individuals themselves, and to 
others, is perfectly correct; but that such physical 
constitutions are, or can be, the medium of other finite 
spirits in communicating facts to us from the spirit- 
world, is contrary to the laws of both mind and mat- 
ter, and must be absurd. 3. Persons who style 
themselves mediums may be sincere in not under- 
standing why the physical organs have an involuntary 
action, and often contrary to their wish. The delu- 
sion is not in the fact that such action takes place, but 
exists in that their excited minds refer the cause of 
such action to spirits, when it is natural to their pecu- 



208 SPIRIT-RAPPING. 

liar nervous constitutions. That palsied man can not 
tell why he shakes contrary to his will. He might 
attribute such action to spirits with as much propriety 
as a medium can refer to them — the motion by which 
his hand writes. The mere turning of the mind of a 
nervous person to the thought that they are moved by 
spirits, will startle them, and cause involuntary action. 
If they can keep their own excited spirits from rap- 
ping out thoughts by accidental marks, or their own 
intentional thoughts, they will not be troubled by the 
spirits of others. 4. If it is right for finite spirits to 
communicate future events to us after they have left 
the world, why done in such an obscure way, and with 
so much doubt or imperfection? It is reasonable to 
suppose that such knowledge is perfect, and that it 
should be conveyed correctly; then why should they 
move a nervous arm to write it with irregular or acci- 
dental motions? If it is right they should send im- 
portant messages to earth, it has always been so; 
then why have the spirits of dear departed friends 
been so idle and careless in this respect, during the 
past ages of the world? 5. That disembodied spirits 
can reveal facts, or ideas to us, must be either true or 
false. If false, further argument would be useless; 
but if true, then those privileges and communications 
must be either right or wrong. If right, they are not 
only permitted, but take place according to the will 
and purposes of Deity. If these things are ordered 
of Heaven, they must be right, and arranged for the 
good and happiness of this world's inhabitants. All 



SPIKIT-RAPPING. 209 

means employed by Infinite "Wisdom for our happi- 
ness, are adapted to all ages and all circumstances 
connected with our race; therefore, such messages 
would not have been delayed for the discoveries of 
modern mediums, and without regard to the moral 
character of such agents. 6. If these things be or- 
dered and sent by the Divine Being, the object must 
be pure and holy, and all connected influences and 
operations must correspond in purity and holiness. 
Then, none but holy beings can reveal such messages, 
or be mediums for pure spirits. None but good mes- 
sages can be sent, and such as are calculated to do good 
to man, and cause him to glorify God. 7. Therefore, 
according to all our ideas of infinite purity, and the 
holiness of good spirits, it would be utterly impossible 
for such finities to communicate to any on earth but 
pure and holy mediums. 8. The character of all such 
messages must not only be pure, but must correspond 
with truth as evidenced in the works of nature; and 
must agree with the volume of Revelation, and in no 
case deviate from its truths. 

SECTION II. 

1. But if the tidings thus revealed be impure, or 
contrary to these sources of truth, we have a right to 
suspect the medium is bad, or vile ; and if this be 
true, the spirit which moves or influences such an un- 
holy medium, must be vile or wicked within itself. 2. 
If such spirit is from Satan, or from under his influ- 
ence, we have a right to question its declarations, as 

18 



210 SPIRIT-RAPPING. 

he would not have any truth published to us, as that 
would thwart his own interests and purposes. Then, 
if such tidings be from an evil source, and calculated 
to lead to delusion and misery, the less we have of 
such news the better for the world. We have a right 
to doubt the correctness and truthfulness of such 
things, as we have no evidence that the Lord ever in- 
tended to instruct the world in this way. 3. This 
view of the subject would compel us to believe in, and 
to be much influenced by what has been called demon- 
ology. This would comport with the intimations of 
some alchemists of England, who profess to have bor- 
rowed much of their skill, in turning common metals 
into silver and gold, from Satan. We know not what 
or how much power Satan may have over wicked men, 
in regard to such things, but one thing appears cer- 
tain, that tidings calculated to do good, and from a 
pure source, never could come from an unholy me- 
dium. If spirit-rappings be true, we have no evi- 
dence that they could be either ordered or blessed of 
Heaven. 4. As these things have been improperly 
connected with mental phenomena by many writers, 
we can only add that philosophy knows no principle 
or action of mind, abstracted from the peculiar sensi- 
tiveness of physical organs, capable of forming a 
basis for such spiritual revelations. 



CONCEPTIONS BORDERING ON INSANITY. 211 



CHAPTER V. 

EXCITED CONCEPTIONS BORDERING ON 
INSANITY. 

SECTION I. 

1. We understand by excited conceptions those 
which arise, or take place, in connection with an ex- 
cited nervous system and vivid or highly-wrought 
mental states. An unnatural excitement depends 
very much upon the proper organization and health 
of the physical powers. 2. A mind w T ith unusual 
power of action, connected with a frail, nervous sys- 
tem, gradually sinking by disease, may overpower the 
strength of the physical organs, with which its action 
is connected, and become bewildered with excited con- 
ceptions till the system becomes paralyzed, and the 
mind either inactive or incapable of rational life. 
3. The strong physical constitution may retain its 
strength, while some organ essential to the right use 
of reason may become diseased or prostrated by some 
extraordinary mental effort, leaving the mind to wan- 
der amid the wildness of excited conceptions and im- 
aginations of things that exist only in phantom. 4. 
General debility, caused by disease, often produces 
excited conceptions, or wildness of thought, which 
disqualifies the mind for usefulness; yet it seldom 



212 CONCEPTIONS BORDERING ON INSANITY. 

affects all the organs of sense in the same way, or 
to the same degree. 

SECTION II. 

1. We can not conceive that the mind, abstractly, 
or within and of itself, is capable of either excited 
conceptions or of delirium; for these affections can 
exist only in its connection with the body, otherwise 
delirium or idiocy might exist on forever, which is 
absurd. 2. The excitement of great joy often gives 
rise to excited conceptions, and we see things very 
differently, for a short length of time, from what we 
do ordinarily. 3. The effect produced by grief or 
despair appears'to almost hang the earth in mourning. 
Under such influences we have conceptions only of ■ 
scenes or facts, like those we have just witnessed; 
and as thoughts pioneer the road of misfortune, we 
have vivid conceptions of series of calamities, which 
become the principal objects of mental action. 4. 
Though the principal cause of excited conceptions 
may be found in the effect and influence which dis- 
ease exerts upon the visual organ and the brain, an 
instance is recorded of a man, whose physical organs 
were so affected, that for months, in his waking hours, 
he saw passing through the field of vision the forms 
of men, women, animals, and birds. Under all such 
exciting influences, the mind is only advancing to a 
midway condition between a rational state and that of 
insanity. 5. The last general cause we shall notice 
is, that which exists in febrile influences upon the 






CONCEPTIONS BORDERING ON INSANITY. 213 

physical organs. This influence is not only general 
upon the system, but the exciting effect it produces 
upon the nervous system, and the brain in particu- 
lar, causes singular and strange excited irregularities 
in the action of the mental powers. 



214 PARTIAL INSANITY 



CHAPTER VI. 

PARTIAL INSANITY. 

SECTION I. 

1. The mind, under the influence of partial insan- 
ity, is disqualified for healthy action; though perfectly- 
sane or correct on some subjects, it is the reverse on 
other topics. . Often, when such mind is employed on 
subjects foreign from those upon which it is wild, all 
appears right and reasonable ; but when we speak of 
any thing which has a relevancy or connection with 
that upon which its action is imperfect, there is an 
immediate change in the excitability of the mental 
state or action, and from this the chain of thoughts 
begins to disconnect, and the mind wanders. There is 
an instance recorded, where a man brought before the 
court for examination gave no evidence of insanity. 
When the man was about to be dismissed, an intimate 
friend proposed that he be asked when he was going 
to judge the world. He was instantly excited, and 
assumed the character of the judge of the universe. 
2. The mind may be called partially insane when it 
gives evidence of wildness upon certain topics only 
periodically. There are such persons who, at times, 
and in their deliberate moments, appear reasonable 
and mild in their feelings or disposition, but, at other 



PARTIAL INSANITY. 215 

times, can not control the action of their mental pow- 
ers. 3. Another class of individuals appear to be 
sane on all the events or occurrences of early life, 
but can not converse, in a connected way, upon recent 
facts or events. This change is clearly the effect of 
physical debility. 4. This affection may exist in the 
unhealthy state or defective action of one or more 
faculties, though the mind may act correctly, with the 
exception of the affected element or department. 

SECTION II. 

1. The influence of insanity can exist in connec- 
tion with the judgment. When there is no healthy 
action of this faculty we lose the correct power of 
perceiving relations, and of rightly discriminating dif- 
ferences ; it can not confidently decide upon the same, 
or in relation to them ; and when decisions are thus 
made, they are as likely to be absurd as correct, or 
they are almost certain to be wrong in some way. 
The mind appears to arrive at conclusions accident- 
ally, and to abandon them at pleasure; so action is 
like a log floating upon the waves of the sea, and its 
decisions can not be depended upon. 2. Partial insan- 
ity may be connected with the imperfect action of 
original suggestion. The ideas and convictions which 
arise in connection with this power must be objects 
of belief or unwavering confidence. We must be- 
lieve that we exist, and have personal identity, and 
that the objects of belief remain unchanged; for with- 
out this we can not be sane. 3. The power of associ- 



216 PARTIAL INSANITY. 

ation may act so imperfectly that decisions can not be 
regarded as correct. When the power of associating 
ideas or facts is defective, there is evidence of great 
recklessness in the arrangement of facts. The 
thoughts fly in every direction, and words are apt to be 
used without number, and without any special force, 
unless to weary those to whom they are addressed. 
Minds of this character seldom ever retain the objects 
of conversation for any length of time. All it dwells 
upon seems to be visionary and like the morning 
cloud or early dew. 4. The physical organs connected 
with the senses may, under the influence of disease, 
cause deception in the character of sensations experi- 
enced, and a s^ate of partial insanity ensue. This 
brings us to the general cause of insanity, the effect 
of material organs upon the action of the mind, which 
are imperfect within themselves, or paralyzed in some 
way by disease. 



TOTAL INSANITY, 217 



CHAPTER VII. 

TOTAL INSANITY. 
SECTION I. 

1. We understand by insanity a deranged mind or 
intellect. When the judgment is dethroned, or reason 
broken, the trains of thought suspended, so we can not 
go from the premises to the conclusion, the mind is 
insane without the destruction of other faculties. But 
we now come to that state of delirium which is a total 
disorganization of mind, or of correct mental action. 
The power of reasoning is wholly in ruins. 2. In- 
sanity destroys the healthy action of the mind and the 
power it has over its own mental states, of connecting 
and directing the chains of thoughts, fixing the atten- 
tion on internal realities, or upon those of the exter- 
ternal world. 3. The potver of mental action may 
cease in regard to all subjects only in a wild and ut- 
terly-confused manner. There may be an indistinct 
apprehending of things, but without any rational con- 
ception of order, classification, or law. 4. The mind 
may be influenced by only one impression, without any 
power of varying from it, or of dismissing it from the 
most intense excitement. There is an instance re- 
corded of a man who became insane; he always moved 
as though in great haste. The only answer he ever 

19 



218 TOTAL INSANITY. 

gave to any inquiry was, " I am going home," though 
it could not be discovered that any thing had the 
slightest degree of his attention. The melancholy 
case of a young minister has been recorded, who, by 
a fall, was deranged, while on his way to be married. 
Never afterward was he known to pay attention to 
any thing ; and never was he known to speak of any 
thing but his expected marriage. 5. Mania may be 
regarded as varying in degree of mental range or ac- 
tion from certain limited abstract impressions to a wild, 
amplified view of imaginary realities. Though such a 
mind may glance at real truths, yet there can be no ex- 
ercise of reason in relation to them. 6. The halluci- 
nations of a maniac can not be corrected, as the dis- 
ordered action of the principal mental faculties is so 
extensive that there is no way or means of correcting 
that which is wrong. The maniac will continue to 
fancy himself a king or ruler of this world, having a 
right to command and to force obedience to his author- 
ity. Though such persons may be of the lowest de- 
gree of obscurity, still they appear to have concep- 
tions of great honor and power, and that all the world 
contributes to their glory. 7. A common character- 
istic of maniacs is evidenced in the fact that some im- 
pression or idea has taken possession of them, and 
upon the oneness of the theme the mind acts, without 
being corrected by truths, which would produce an 
equilibrium of the intensity of mental action, and re- 
lieve wrong impressions. Whenever the mind is per- 
mitted to act upon some one idea, excluding all other 



TOTAL INSANITY. 219 

facts which would be examined in connection with it, 
such action will become intense, and the longer we 
dwell upon one thought the more excited the concen- 
trated action will become, and the tendency to lose 
all power of reason or control in relation to the exist- 
ence of real facts will be increased. 8. In total in- 
sanity the mind is incapable of correct reasoning on 
either correct or false premises. The connection of 
thoughts or facts in argumentation is broken and so 
confused that no correct steps can be taken in pursu- 
ing any subject; all is confusion and uncertainty. 

SECTION II. 

1. Mental hallucinations may suspend or dismiss 
the impressions which have been of abiding experi- 
ence, and, after a long interval, they may be suddenly 
revived, which can not be accounted for, unless attrib- 
utable to some change in the physical constitution, 
either in regard to increased degrees of maturity, or 
the diminishing power of disease, so that the mind 
can be more vigorously exerted. Instances are given 
of persons, when doing a certain piece of work, sud- 
denly struck with insanity; and, after the lapse of 
years, on being restored, the first thing of their in- 
quiries was in regard to the work in which they were 
employed when they went into insanity, while all the 
time and events which had intervened were entirely 
lost. It has been stated that persons who are addicted 
to periodical paroxysms of delirium, have been known 
to resume the conversation on their recovery precisely 



220 TOTAL INSANITY. 

at the place where they left- off when the paroxysm 
came on, without any knowledge of what transpired 
in the interim ; and it has been stated that some of 
these persons, when the paroxysm reappeared, com- 
menced with that part or subject of their hallucination 
precisely where they left off when reason returned; 
but, as a general thing, there is not such uniformity. 
It is more generally characterized by a fearful erratic 
wildness. 2. The extremes and modulations which 
characterize the feelings, and the deportment or acts, 
of maniacs, may be accounted for, in part, as corre- 
sponding to the different temperaments connected 
with each constitution; and they may arise, in part, 
from the uncultivated viciousness of the one and the 
guarded mildness of the other. They may vary again 
with the mind that had been under religious influence, 
contrasted with the mind which had always been 
vicious and revengeful. 3. Insanity, as it exists in 
the case of the maniac, is apt to be of a restless and 
turbulent character. Great excitement generally pre- 
vails over, and is connected with the entire mental 
powers. There appears to be a constant disposition 
to keep moving or to be traveling from place to place. 
This is not the kind of derangement, under the influ- 
ence of which the person loathes life and seeks death; 
for persons under the influence of this kind of de- 
rangement are always suspecting danger, and are fly- 
ing from it with feelings of appalling frenzy or dread. 
4. The general character of mental derangement is 
that which has connected with it a fearful apprehen- 



TOTAL INSANITY. 221 

• 

sion of danger or death; and such persons are always 
trying to escape from harm. Such persons are gen- 
erally harmless, and have no disposition to inflict inju- 
ries upon their fellow-beings, though the care of such 
is attended with great trouble. 5. There is another 
class of insane persons, who are malicious in feelings, 
and are always seeking revenge. It is not unfre- 
quently the case that they imagine they are expressly 
ordered to take the life of some fellow-being ; and, as 
a general thing, those w T ho are selected to be tortured 
or put to death are the nearest and dearest friends. 



/ 



222 INSANITY — MELANCHOLIA 



CHAPTER VIII. 

INSANITY — MELANCHOLIA. 
SECTION I. 

1. That kind of mental depression called melan* 
cJiolia may be regarded as a result of some kind of 
disease upon the physical constitution, or it may have 
its origin in connection with repeated and excited 
mental exertion, prostrating the power of the organs 
through which mind acts. There is a difference be- 
tween real mania and melancholia. The former is 
connected with the presence of hallucination, under 
the influence of which the individual appears carried 
away with excited conceptions of his condition in life, 
and does not appear to be under any sense of want, 
or that such a state of things could be possible. The 
latter condition is connected with those who are de- 
pressed in feeling, and may arise from the influence 
of lingering disease, or with trouble of mind, which 
prostrates the bodily powers, rendering them subject 
to disease. This gloomy or melancholy state may in- 
crease till maniacal excitement takes place ; but mel- 
ancholia generally continues in a state of mental 
depression. 2. A very peculiar difference between 
melancholia and mania is, that a person under the in- 
fluence of the former has power to reason more accu- 



INSANITY — MELANCHOLIA. 223 

rately, and the mind evinces stronger features of 
reason than in the latter state; yet, the impres- 
sions of such mind can be changed with far greater 
difficulty than those of the maniac. 3. Melancholia 
differs in a peculiar manner from mania, in the tend- 
ency of minds, under such influence, to commit sui- 
cide. Real maniacal insanity seldom ever gives rise 
to any feeling or inclination which would lead to such 
an act or horrible result. It is very common, when 
suicide is committed, to say that the person was 
totally insane, or devoid of all reason ; but there is no 
instance recorded of totally-deranged persons, or one 
devoid of all reason, ever being guilty of suicide. 4. 
A raving maniac has never been known to commit 
suicide. All their feelings and manifested inclina- 
tions are averse to any thing of the kind. When 
they possess any traits of reason, or conscientious 
thought, they evince the utmost degree of excitement 
and horror in regard to any thing like danger or 
death, and are ever flying from their own apprehen- 
sions of danger in seeking safety. 5. It is depression 
or melancholia which leads to suicide, and that, too, 
before reason has entirely left the mind. We are 
forced to the gloomy acknowledgment that all persons 
who commit this horrible act have sufficient amount 
of reason remaining to know what they are about to 
do when they use the weapons of death; otherwise, 
the act could not and would not be perpetrated. 6. 
All persons who commit suicide do so of their own 
individual and voluntary choice. It is impossible for 



224 IX SAN ITT — MELANCHOLIA. 

any totally deranged to have the control of their 
mental . or thoughts, long enough to carry such 

intention into effect. By the most accurate examina- 
tion, no feeling or tenden<; uicide can be discov- 
ered in minds devoid of reason. 7. He who takes his 
own life has the rigid n*e of r 

\ to know what poisonous drug, or weapon of 
death, will effect the work ; the amount necessar 
be taken, or the manner of applying the deadly 
weapon, requires some degree of rationality and judg- 
ment. 8. Another proof that such persons are not 

Uj insane is manifested in their conduct. With 
what tenacity they keep such intentions from being 
known to othe: \ ! See th :. shrewd, artful, and cun- 
ning management, avoiding detection in obtaining 
that which will take life, often securing it under false 
pretense ! How carefully they I a time and place 

.ble to avoid all detection, so their design and 
plans may be carried into effect ! All these facts 
show that such persons are not totally deranged. 9. 
are compelled to the conclusion, that all who de- 
liberately commit suicide have a sufficient amount of 

on to know what they are going to do, and how 
they are going to effect the work ; also, what the re- 
sult will be, otherwise they would not have presence 
and control of mind to determine upon such a com 
and if they had, the mind would k -uch 

arrangement before they could arrive at the final 
suit. If a person must be totally devoid of reason, 
in order to commit suicide, then he would have no 



INSANITY — MELANCHOLIA. 225 

inclination to do so; for a child, before it has the right 
exercise of reason, never manifests any inclination to 
destroy its own existence. The same fact is true in 
relation to idiots. If persons could commit suicide 
totally ignorant of what they were doing, then it 
would be innocent; but if they know what they are 
doing, in laying violent hands on their own lives, they 
are guilty of sin, and will be held accountable for 

such offenses. 

SECTION II. 

1. The hallucination which takes place under the 
influence of melancholia, or depression, becomes the 
only object of mental action. All other impressions, 
or facts, naturally connected, which would correct any 
excited perception in regard to supposed realities, can 
not become the object of attention, The mind be- 
comes bewildered and overwhelmed with hopeless 
misery, and, being unable to contemplate any future 
relief, the whole soul appears plunged into a cloud 
of augmented gloom. Many persons, under such 
circumstances, are apt to begin to imagine that all 
their friends have forsaken them, and then begin to 
lose confidence in every person. The very appear- 
ance of nature is gloomy and mournful. They 
begin to feel that life is a burden, and commence 
forming conclusions to leave the world. When such 
resolutions are once formed, then the mind acts 
upon them exclusively, by connecting with such pur- 
poses the most effectual way to accomplish the dread- 
ful act; which act becomes more harmless, in their 



226 INSANITY — MELANCHOLIA. 

opinion, as the mind, under great excitement, dwells 
upon it. 2. Such purposes can he and have been 
abandoned when the mind has been suddenly arrested 
by some new and alarming object of thought. A 
man has been mentioned, who left home at night for 
the purpose of drowning himself; but, on being sud- 
denly attacked by robbers, fled for refuge, where he 
soon realized that all inclination to suicide was gone. 
3. There is an impression of insanity, connected with 
the idea of suicide, which the mind appears to possess 
while there is the least manifestation of reason re- 
maining; and it is certainly true, that when the mind 
is totally lost to all reason, it is incapable of determ- 
ining upon suicide. 4. Another hallucination often 
arises in connection with the impression of the crimi- 
nality of suicicLe. Persons have been known, in the 
history of the past, to commit murder for the sole 
purpose of rendering their lives up to the require- 
ments of the law of the land, and thereby die by the 
requirements of justice. This they seem to have sup- 
posed frees them from the sin of suicide. Many have 
avowed their intention of murdering some one, with- 
out having the first improper feeling toward them ; 
and often such selections were made of some one 
whom they loved more than any other. They have 
confessed, on some occasions, that they only wished 
to commit murder in order that they themselves might 
die by the just sentence of the law; and have been 
known to go still farther, by selecting a child, which 
they believed would be happy after death, and console 



INSANITY — MELANCHOLIA. 227 

themselves that it would be no special injury to the 
child to take its life, and then they could themselves 
die by the hand of justice. The right exercise of rea- 
son is lost with such persons, and it would appear that 
their long-cherished desire to die had always been 
checked by connection with the exceeding sinfulness 
of suicide: hence, the resolve on the death of some 
innocent person was favorably entertained from the 
thought that such persons would be happy after death, 
and it would give themselves the opportunity of dying 
according to justice. 



228 idiocy 



CHAPTER IX. 

IDIOCY. 
SECTION I. 

1. The term idiocy conveys to the mind the idea of 
natural defect of the understanding. The degrees 
which have been acknowledged to exist in idiocy are 
not well defined, as any thing like partial idiocy is 
only another department of partial insanity; yet 
there are some distinctions by which a difference 
may be discriminated. 2. Fatuity includes that kind 
of mental weakness which differs from the turbulence 
and fierceness of the maniac, on the one hand, and 
that of a desponding state of insanity on the other. 
In the latter case or state, part of the faculties may 
retain power of healthy action; but, under fatuitous 
influences, the mind appears to suffer a general sus- 
pension of healthy action in all its departments. 3. 
Cretinism, as it was anciently understood among the 
valleys of the Alps, contained an amplitude of signifi- 
cation, which will not philosophically apply to a cor- 
rect idea of idiocy. The cretins were classified so as 
to convey an idea of the strength and action of the 
mind. The intellectual action of the first class was 
not far removed from animal life, having no language 
to convey thoughts, or judgment in seeking happi- 



idiocy. 229 

ness, or in avoiding danger. 4. There is another 
class, which evinces some signs of intellectual action, 
with occasional traces of rationality; but the whole 
mental powers are so inactive that, ift looking on such 
countenance, we have conceptions of the presence of 
a form, while the mind or soul appears to have taken 
its departure. 5. An idiot is one who has ever been 
under the influence of mental imbecility, so that the 
mind can not be said to have been, at any time, sound 
or rational. The mind of such person has alivays 
been in ruins. 6. Idiocy is incurable in this life, 
from the fact that the cause, which is principally de- 
formity, can not be removed by remedies which re- 
move the power and influence of disease. We can 
have no conception that the essence called mind can 
be naturally deformed, or that it can be, within and 
of itself, under the influence and power of idiocy ; for 
such conclusion would be without proof; therefore, all 
our ideas of idiocy have their origin in connection 
with the deformities and imperfections which we be- 
lieve to exist in the physical nature. 7. We can have 
no conceptions of the mind, or spiritual existent nat- 
urally defective in faculties, or without the right use 
of them ; for if such defects exist wholly in the mind, 
then it must suffer such defects forever, as we have 
no promise of any new creations in the future. To 
suppose the existence of a mind naturally imperfect 
in its immaterial nature, or as to the existence of some 
or all of its faculties, and that it can and will main- 
tain such imperfect existence in the spirit-world, is to 



230 IDIOCY. 

suppose an absurdity, and reflect dishonor upon the 
wisdom and goodness of its Creator. Then it will 
follow, as an irresistible conclusion, that if the soul 
can be or always has been totally insane, or idiotic, it 
has violated no law or rule of right, and must be sane 
in heaven. An idiot in heaven can never fulfill the 
design of a gracious Creator, in glorifying and prais- 
ing the Author of all good. The idiot will be saved, 
but will leave his idiocy with the deformity of his 
body in the grave, while his rational and exalted spirit 
will ever move the harp of eternity. 

SECTION II. 

1. We have evidence of the destructive influence of 
the physical organs over the power of memory in the 
aged. An active and retentive memory often loses its 
power of action as we advance in age. If we say 
this loss of power is wholly in the mind, then it would 
follow that it is capable of losing its faculties, and it 
would be reasonable to suppose that they were entirely 
destroyed by temporal death. But this is absurd; for 
when aged persons are unable to recollect the occur- 
rences of one. hour past, yet, if their attention is di- 
rected to what took place in the early part of their 
lives, they can narrate that which transpired, and con- 
nect facts and events together, without any hesitancy. 
This is conclusive proof that the power of memory is 
not lost, nor can it cease to be. 2. That the physical 
nature curtails the power of hearing, is clearly demon- 
strated in the example of those who are far advanced 



IDIOCY. 231 

in age. Such persons often become deaf; and if this 
defect was abstractly in the mind, then we could con- 
clude that the mind, in this respect, was becoming 
annihilated ; but when the ear-trumpet is applied the 
hearing is restored ; hence the power is not gone nor 
destroyed, but is ever living in the nature and essence 
of the imperishable mind. 3. The same evidence is 
true in regard to the organ of sight. The eye be- 
comes affected as persons advance to old age, so they 
dimly see, but when an optic is applied, the sight is 
restored. The power is still there, and the whole dif- 
ficulty must exist in the physical organs. 4. Then 
we are forced to the conclusion that the cause of idi- 
ocy is wholly connected with the bodily powers. 
5. If sin, either directly or indirectly, can cause idi- 
ocy, then it follows that the remedial plan, in destroy- 
ing such power and influence, will reveal rationality 
as inherent in the very nature of those elements which 
were locked up during the existence of the body; 
therefore, we are led to believe, that when the soul of 
an idiot is released from his sin-diseased body, it will 
be possessed of rational powers and knowledge, in 
the enjoyment of which it will flourish in immortality. 



DIVISION TENTH 



CHAPTER I . 

INTERNAL ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 

SECTION I. 

1. The soul has knowledge in itself, and its power 
to know and retain knowledge is wisely arranged by 
the great Author. It has internally perception, think- 
ing, reasoning, believing, doubting, knowing, with va- 
rious mental operations, or acts, which are experi- 
enced, and we are conscious of their real existence, 
in connection with which w T e receive distinct ideas of 
them, or in relation to them, without traveling beyond 
the internal being and action of mind, and unaided by 
the power of the senses as a medium of knowledge in 
regard to external things. 2. The mind has power 
of knowledge within itself which power is connected 
with the existence and action of intuitive mental ele- 
ments. The mind is not capable of receiving or pos- 
sessing knowledge of external things unless it has 
knowledge of purely-internal origin; for all knowl- 
edge of external facts is unknown to us only as we 
have internal power to receive them as such. And 
if those elements connected with the origin of intui- 
tions, have internal power to receive external exist- 
232 



INTERNAL ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 233 

ences as facts, they have power within themselves to 
know thoughts of internal origin, and to have ideas 
of interior operations or mental action. 3. The pri- 
mary power of knowledge is not material, but mental, 
and has its origin in connection with the internal men- 
tal elements. Connected with these is the self-power 
of knowing existing truths, and with them is the ori- 
gin of all our knowledge. 4. Knowledge received 
through the medium of the senses from the external 
world, and in regard to external things, may be re- 
garded as of secondary order, or of an ulterior nature, 
when compared with that of internal origin. 5. The 
internal action of the mind, by which items of knowl- 
edge are apprehended, is so connected with such an 
immaterial essence, or being, that rational force and 
vigor are derived from it; yet the soul employs mate- 
rial elements or organs to aid in the acquisition and 
perfecting of knowledge in regard to the external 
universe of materialities. 

SECTION II. 

1. Knoivledge is of internal origin, though it may 

be said to begin in the senses ; yet only so far as 

sensations through the medium of the senses, being 

caused by external things, are necessarily followed by 

new mental states. But knowledge does not and can 

not begin with the senses, unless sensation within 

itself can be called knowledge ere it makes its report 

to the mind ; otherwise, we can have no knowledge of 

external things, till sensation is followed by percep- 

20 



234 INTERNAL ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 

tion of the cause or causes, and the mind decides 
upon them. 2. Ideas of internal origin may be read- 
ily and clearly defined. The origin of the idea ex- 
pressed by the terms thinking, willing, and believing, 
can not be traced to the power or action of the senses; 
for they are not the objects of the test or action of 
any of the senses. Neither can we say that the ideas 
of cause and effect, right and wrong, space or infin- 
ity, order, truth, and power can have their origin in 
the senses. The internal operations of the mind can 
exist and be known to us as primary sources of knowl- 
edge. 3. The primary origin of knowledge can not 
be said, philosophically, to commence with any ulte- 
rior faculty or medium of mental action, but must be 
connected with the power of intuition. Intuitions 
appear to be spontaneous, and when they are brought 
under the power and action of reason and the judg- 
ment, may be known as ideas or notions. 4. This 
may be extended by noticing complex ideas of internal 
origin. Such ideas are composed of elementary facts, 
and these parts are simple or individual entities. The 
process of combining these ideas may be carried on 
without reference to external things, and may be en- 
tirely an internal action or mental operation. 



EXTENT OF MENTAL INTIMATIONS. 235 



CHAPTER II. - 

THE DOCTRINE OF PSYCHOLOGY AND AN- 
THROPOLOGY CONTRASTED IN THE EX- 
AMINATION OF THAT WHICH RE- 
SEMBLES MIND IN BRUTES. 

SECTION I. 

1. We do not introduce all the contents of this 
chapter as properly belonging to the analysis of mind, 
yet it contains many things which should be studied. 
That mind or spirit exists can not be doubted; and 
almost the next inquiry is in regard to the extent of 
mental or spiritual existence. Can any order or form 
of physical existence below that of man possess any 
thing which in nature is similar, in any respect, to the 
human soul. 2. A portion of clay may lie in the 
earth for thousands of years, without any increase or 
diminution, or change, so far as we can determine; 
but there are evidences which indicate and even estab- 
lish the fact that other combinations increase in size, 
or grow with, seemingly, no cessation or interruption. 
Petrifactions are conclusive of the beginning and ad- 
vancement of the work of change. The formation 
and growth of rock can not be doubted. This process 
of advancement or growth, which characterizes the 
various degrees or conditions of such inert existences, 
has been called inanimate life in contradistinction to 



236 EXTENT OE MENTAL INTIMATIONS. 

those existences which contain no real or contingent 
evidences of change. If the advancement or change 
indicated in maturing petrifactions, crystallization, and 
enlargement of rocks can be called life, it is certainly 
the lowest order of life of which the mind can have 
any conception. We will simply say that no geolo- 
gist, lapidarian, or mineralogist, will dissent from the 
fact that such life, or change, is very different from, 
and is of a lower degree or order than the life of tim- 
ber or vegetation. The latter is periodical, and de- 
pends upon the change and condition of the seasons, 
while the former appears to be continuous and of an 
inherent nature, independent of the influence of the 
vernal sun, summer solstice, or tropical shadow; but 
in connection with this change, there is no evidence 
of mind or spirit. 3. That kind of inanimate life in 
the growth of timber or vegetation, is of a higher 
order than that to which our attention has just been 
called. The growth of vegetation depends upon cer- 
tain influences immediately connected, such as the 
warming and invigorating power of the sun, and the 
reviving effect and motion of the atmosphere; but a 
sufficient cause can destroy the emerald hues of the 
summer forest, yet there is not any thing which indi- 
cates the presence of mental or spiritual influences. 
4. Animated existences, or animal life, is very differ- 
ent from that of inanimate realities. Animals or 
brutes are classed in a higher order or scale of beings, 
and we are forced to the conclusion that beasts, birds, 
and fish possess something more than is or can be 



EXTENT OF MENTAL INTIMATIONS. 237 

contained only in material elements or existences. 
5. Brutes exist either wholly of material elements, or 
that influence or power which is connected with such 
elements differing from them, must be superadded or 
is superior to any essence or elements of matter. 

SECTION II. 

1. Brutes differ from inert existences in being pos- 
sessed of life with sensitiveness, or are capable of expe- 
riencing sensations; and they can not experience sen- 
sations without having internal power to realize such 
influences ; and if they are capable of realizing or ex- 
periencing sensations, that internal power by which 
such sensations are tested is different from crude mat- 
ter, and is superior to it. 2. Brutes have poiver of self - 
action, which is perfectly opposed to the nature of 
matter, and contradictory to all laws governing mate- 
rial elements or existences. 3. To a certain extent 
brutes see, feel, taste, smell, and hear. Some of these 
powers are more acute than they are in connection 
with the human body, yet they are not connected with 
a mind that can reason or that is capable of moral 
influences. 4. This internal and superior natural 
and motive power possessed by brutes has been called 
instinct ; but what is instinct with the lowest degree 
of meaning that can be properly attached to it, but 
mind? 5. Volition, to some extent, is evidenced in 
the freedom of animal action. This can be noticed 
in the manner of their movements. If escaping from 
danger, there is care manifested in selecting the safest 



238 EXTENT OF MENTAL INTIMATIONS. 

and quickest way; they never choose the direction of 
danger or of their foe. 6. Brutes appear to have 
naturally a knowledge of courses, and have but little 
confusion in determining and in pursuing the proper 
direction to any place where they have ever been, and 
often are seen moving from one section of the globe 
to a more plentiful region, though they may have 
never passed that way before. Bears, in times of 
great scarcity, have traveled from their native woods 
through cultivated parts of the country for hundreds 
of miles, on a direct course to a new wilderness 
abounding with supplies. And with what exactness 
and certainty do the different kinds of birds direct 
their course in the heavens, alternating with the sea- 
sons in going from one climate to another! 7. The 
horse and dog know their masters by sight, and by the 
sound of their voice. They are capable of being 
trained to move in different ways by certain motions 
or sounds of the voice. 8. The power of judgment 
and comparison appear to be evidenced to some de- 
gree. A fox was once observed to run down into 
water, and gradually sink under, holding a lock of 
wool in his mouth. On drawing his head under the 
water, the wool floated off', which was found full of 
fleas. Another instance is given of a fox that was 
observed in a field, playing round a group of pigs as 
though the large swine were objects of terror. The 
fox suddenly caught up a piece of wood about the 
size of a pig, and running toward the fence, jumped 
through a large crack; then dropped the wood, re- 



EXTENT OF MENTAL INTIMATIONS. 239 

turned to the swine, seized a pig, and ran through the 
fence with it at the very same place. He compared 
the pig with the size of the wood, in order to judge 
of the chance to escape with his prey. All these 
traits of mind or spirit can not be the result of insen- 
sible matter. 

SECTION III. 

1. There is a great dissimilarity existing between 
the powers of man and that of the brute. The former 
is naturally constituted with superior powers, and has 
control of them in the examination of any subject. 
The brute may be said to have perceptions of external 
things, and may move in the direction of some object 
of sight; yet there is no power to combine facts or 
reason in regard to them. 2. The human mind, from 
the nature of its structure and action, is really scien- 
tific in research. The brute appears to act from what 
he sees, hears, and feels, without any reference to the 
cause, or as to why such cause or causes exist. 3. 
The human mind is capable of progressive improve- 
ment, and its rising efforts and conquests in scientific 
knowledge appear to be bounded only by the feeble- 
ness or paralyzing weakness of physical organs. 
Brute intelligence appears to be susceptible of im- 
provement, in some instances, to a very limited ex- 
tent, but can not pass beyond certain limits or bounds. 
They may be said to remain in their generations in 
the same limitations of instinctive action ; but the im- 
perishable mind of man, limitless in research, sends 
out exploring thoughts, like a burning sun radiates its 



240 EXTENT OF MENTAL INTIMATIONS. 

million beams of light, filling the universe with the 
brilliancy of effulgent day. Man is possessed of a 
conscience, and feels himself to be a moral agent, and 
accountable to God; but the brute is without any in- 
nate moral principle. 4. The human mind can not 
become familiar with scientific research, and arrive at 
true knowledge, without the presence and action of 
self -consciousness j reason, original suggestion, the un- 
derstanding, and the judgment. These appear to be 
absent in the manifestations of brute intelligence. 5. 
Man is a moral agent, subject to moral feelings, his 
conscience constituting the great court of appeal; 
and, in connection with it, the moral sensibilities, 
emotions, and feelings appear to harmonize. Here 
intuitive convictions arise in regard to right and 
wrong ; but the brute, being totally destitute of all 
these, must hold a lower position in the scale of 

beings. 

SECTION IV. 

1. The dog can be taught to go errands for his 
master, and look for game in any direction, by the 
motion of the hand. If he is commanded to watch at 
any certain place, he will remain there till released 
by his master. The sound of two words will change 
alternately the course of a horse. 2. Animals have 
been learned to dance at the sound of music. This 
has been thought to arise from the fact they were 
trained upon hot plates of iron in the first place, and 
that ever afterward, on hearing music similar to that 
played while they were dancing on hot iron, they 



EXTENT OF MENTAL INTIMATIONS. 241 

would begin to dance; "and that the associations 
which had been established between the sound of 
music and the mere animal sensibilities reproduced 
dancing." If this is true, and proves any thing, it 
proves too much; for then the brute must have power 
to distinguish such associations of music from other 
associations, or sounds, in order to know when to 
dance ; and, in the next place, it proves that the brute 
has power of memory in calling up the associations 
connected with music and circumstances long since 
past. 3. A horse can recollect the road in returning 
to his home from a distant country. We have an ac- 
count of a horse, owned by an itinerant minister in 
this country. In one part of his circuit he always 
turned off from the highway, along a path at a certain 
tree. After the lapse of seven years, returning along 
the same highway, he came to the same tree, and 
the horse turned off with enlivened speed; it was 
with difficulty he could be turned back to the 
road. 4. The term ruach, as used in the Hebrew 
Bible, when applied to human beings, means the soul; 
but the same term is used in Scripture in regard to 
beasts, and means, without doubt, the spirit, or soul. 
But there are other terms which define the great dif- 
ference which exists between the human soul and the 
soul of the beast. It is clear that, from the meaning 
of the term, men have souls, and that beasts have 
souls. 5. If the brute has a spirit, or soul, will it not 
exist forever ? We may base an argument on this 

position upon the indestructibility of matter; we have 

21 



242 EXTENT OF MENTAL INTIMATIONS, 

no proof that any property of matter can or will ever 
cease to be. If this be true, it is reasonable to infer 
that the spirit of brutes, which we have seen differs 
from, and to be superior to matter, will exist forever, 
and that, in connection w T ith their bodies, immortal- 
ized in the restoration of all things. 6. Does it not 
appear reasonable, that if beasts existed before the 
fall of man, they were pure in nature and free from 
servitude ; and that they were designed to be happy 
forever? If their sufferings and death were brought 
upon them by man, and are the results of sin, what 
can be their condition when sin and its effects are 
wholly removed, but that of happiness and life? If 
the brute suffers innocently it is only reasonable to 
suppose that they will be restored. 7. It is impossi- 
ble to conceive that an All-Wise Being would create 
beasts for the purpose of annihilating them at some 
future time. If they had been created suffering and 
dying before the fall, then we might have room to 
doubt ; but as they were originally pure and happy, it 
is reasonable to suppose that such will be their condi- 
tion in the final restoration. 



INTUITIONS. 243 



CHAPTER III. 

INTUITIONS. 

SECTION I. 

1. By mental intuition is understood a natural in- 
ternal power which acts in perceiving realities. It is 
the act by which the mind perceives the agreement or 
disagreement of two or more ideas, or real facts or 
truths, the moment they are presented. It is the 
power of perceiving facts immediately, without the 
intervention of reason, arguments, or testimony. It 
presents truths to the mind on bare inspection, and 
this simple inspection is knowledge. 2. This intui- 
tive power has its origin in connection with the pri- 
mary elements. Here philosophical inquiries must 
pause, as we can go no further back than original 
elements. 3. Several of the primary elements of 
mind may be regarded as intuition faculties ; but no 
powers of our being are more closely connected with 
the origin of intuitions than consciousness and con- 
science. 4. In the reciprocal relations of intuitions 
it is impossible for them to be opposed to each other. 
They appear to arise as perfect spontaneities of em- 
pirical order. They are simple in their origin, being 
free from all contingent influences which may follow ; 
as there can be nothing in the philosophy of mind 



244 INTUITIONS. 

anterior to those primary elements which lie at the 
foundation of mind. 5. Ideas arise in the mind in 
connection with the nature and power of original ele- 
ments. When intuitions arise they are immediately 
followed by the action of the judgment, in discrim- 
inating difference and resemblance, which presupposes 
the presence of consciousness, and afterward they are 
embraced by the understanding and reason. 6. Sim- 
ple ideas arise without natural classification. It re- 
quires a special action of mind in evolving them as 
objects of reason, and in combining or eliminating 
from the original, simple concrete. 7. Greneral ideas, 
or notions, may arise in connection with simple or 
even eliminated ones. We may, in the first instance, 
have the perception of a tree without any general 
idea of more at.first than a specific tree ; but the per- 
ception of a second tree is succeeded by the sugges- 
tion of a third or more, till the judgment, discrim- 
inating, causes the mind to be led in contemplating an 
extended number of trees. 

SECTION II. 

1. Spontaneous action, or developments of the in- 
telligence, are those which exist in the mind anterior 
to attention and a full apprehension of them ; but a 
correct and distinct apprehension of objects depends 
upon attention, in which they become the objects of 
reason and judgment. 2. When spontaneous devel- 
opments are sufficiently apprehended to secure atten- 
tion, then the full apprehension of them, in connection 



INTUITIONS 



245 



"with which they are conditioned and decided upon, is 
voluntary as well as the exercise of those other pow- 
ers in receiving them as knowledge. 3. In connec- 
tion with the action of these internal spontaneous af- 
firmations is the intuitive conviction of self, and by 
reason of such action is the mind revealed to itself, 
and its real existence becomes knowledge. 4. Though 
a knowledge of self is revealed by reason of these 
spontaneities, acting out or from natural intuitive 
power, yet the character of self must begin with ap- 
prehension, attention, reflection, and consideration. 



246 COMMON-SENSE 



CHAPTER IV. 

COMMON-SENSE. 
SECTION I. 

1. Common-sense may be regarded as the process 
or power of practical judgment. In character it is 
regarded as that which is sound and safe, and is effi- 
cient in directing us in proper deportment and to cor- 
rect action. 2. It may be defined as the immediate 
or instantaneous decision of correct reason. It is 
universally appealed to as a correct guide in detecting 
falsehood, and testing that which is true. 3. Mental 
affirmations, which arise in connection with the same 
order or classes of truths common to all minds, being 
a result of unaffected reason, forms the peculiar con- 
dition and sound mental action, inspecting and pre- 
senting to us those events or facts which we immedi- 
ately depend on and receive as true. 4. The vivid 
and correct exercise of this mental power, which is 
not really a faculty, is of the utmost importance in 
constituting a well-regulated mind. Some minds are 
capable of being called great and overwhelming in 
that which might be called uncommon sense, while 
they are almost entirely destitute of common-sense. 
The former is attended with strong, hasty, and ill- 
timed efforts or action, while the latter is character- 



COMMON-SENSE. 247 

ized with prudence and successful efforts with increas- 
ing influence. 5. The mental action or power called 
common-sense is manifested by no appeal to casualties 
or assumption, but commences with the real affirma- 
tions of the mind. The origin of its action is not 
with external objects, but commences wholly within 
the mind, in connection with truths apprehended, and 
the immediate action of reason. 6. The reality of 
common-sense involves a general understanding of 
facts, notions, and feelings evident in themselves, 
which are the objects of the judgment, giving 
strength to the belief and direction to our action. 
In the very nature of this power there appears to 
be a healthy action of the various faculties concen- 
trating in a common consent to, and a correct under- 
standing of that which is true of the thousands of 
facts and events which are present. 

SECTION II. 

1. If common-sense be affirmations common to all 
minds, and that these are immediately connected 
with the exercise of reason and judgment, then it can 
not be absent in any mind, or such mind must act 
almost by accident, and always appear unsettled and 
unhappy in the midst of contentions, or when sur- 
rounded by storms. 2. Common-sense directs in cor- 
rect investigations, and is a guide to truth. Its aid 
in the detection of error is of the utmost importance. 
An appeal may be made to this power with full assur- 
ance, and with confidence of certain success. 3. This 



248 COMMON- SENSE. 

power, so indispensably connected with a well-regu- 
lated mind, may be cultivated and rendered more 
efficient in directing to proper conclusions. This may 
be done by carefully attending to the process or rea- 
soning, and the true and correct discriminating power 
of the judgment. It is an invaluable treasure of the 
soul, and wherever it exists the mind is capacitated 
for undisturbed happiness and great usefulness in the 
world. 



DIVISION ELEVENTH 



■♦♦♦- 



CHAPTER I. 

VOLITION. 

SECTION I. 

1. Volition has been regarded as the power of 
willing or of determining. It is essential to the ex- 
istence of sentient beings of high moral destiny. 
This power is very closely connected with the exist- 
ence and nature of the entire faculties of the mind, 
or soul. 2. It is also to be the act of willing and the 
act of determining choice, or of forming purposes to 
be carried out by the action of the w T hole mind. 3. 
The president of a college, favorably and extensively 
known, defined volition, in a baccalaureate address, as 
follows : u Volition in man is that power which moves 
his body. That it has, in whole or in part, any power 
or influence over the mind, is a doctrine we think 
long since lost in oblivion." If volition has power to 
move matter, and has no power or influence over 
mind, then it is neither matter nor immaterial in na- 
ture. If matter it would be inert, and if of mind it 
would act with the mental powers, and have influence, 
otherwise it would not have power to move the body. 

4. Volition is, in nature, freedom within itself It 

249 



250 VOLITION. 

has power to act or refuse to act. This is implied in 
the use of the very term, its meaning and nature. 
5. There is or there is not such power as volition. If 
there is no such power, then all arguments about it 
are unmeaning ; but the existence of such faculty or 
power has been acknowledged by general consent. 
If there is such mental power, it is characterized by 
its nature, office, and relation to other faculties. 6. 
The doctrine that volition is only and simply the 
" act " of the will, or that the " will is the mental 
power or susceptibility by which we put forth voli- 
tions,' 5 and admit such volitions to be simple action, 
can not be clearly sustained ; for action is only action ; 
and if we say the will has power to act, then volition 
would be lost in the same action, unless it was a sec- 
ondary or double action in one. But this would be 
absurd; therefore, there is a more extensive and 
deeper meaning to be attributed to volition than sim- 
ple will-act or will-action. 7. If volition be only sim- 
ple action, such action may be applied to the action 
of water, or atmosphere, with as much propriety as to 
the action of the will, if its reality is wholly depend- 
ent upon the action of the will. 8. Volition can not 
be any thing more or less than an internal power ex- 
isting naturally of self-freedom in action. 

SECTION II. 

1. Volitions differ from volition only in the plural- 
ity of their various actions, or the almost simultane- 
ous eliminations of spontaneous motion, correspond- 



VOLITION. 251 

ing to various qualities of objects, or those entities 
closely combined. 2. It is impossible to give a true 
definition of the nature of volition or of volitions. It 
is not proper to say they are simple states of mind, 
or that they are either mental determinations or con- 
clusions ; for they are still more important, and lie 
back of all these. The moment we appeal to con- 
science and our experience, we are satisfied as to the 
existence of the power and action of volition, though 
the nature of either or both can not be defined. 3. 
Volition may exist in reference to some object or ob- 
jects, and also without any object. The belief that it 
can not exist without some object, is contrary to all 
our conceptions of its nature and office. If it only 
exists with an object, then its existence is either an 
accident, as an object may or may not exist, or the 
object is the cause of its existence ; therefore, such 
an existence has its origin wholly in connection with 
the object which may be inert; but this is absurd. 
4. If volition can not exist only in relation to or with 
an object, then it follows that, if there is no object 
present, volition is non-existence. 5. It is utterly 
impossible for volition to consist only and wholly in 
the action of any faculty or faculties of mind ; for then 
its existence would be an accident, as such faculty or 
faculties may or may not act ; and if such action was 
not put forth, volition could not be called up from 
nonentity, which would be natural to it ; and if it 
could, then each appearing would be a new creation, 
which is absurd, as no element of the mind has power 



252 VOLITION. 

to create another element or faculty. 6. Volition 
can and does exist of and within its own essential na- 
ture ; and such real existence is independent of all 
contingent entities. It exists either with reference 
or without any reference to what we believe to be in our 
power. The latter consideration, which may be the 
object of belief, can neither create nor annihilate the 
abstract existence of volition as belonging to and ex- 
isting in the mind ; and the action of belief has noth- 
ing to do in originating this internal power. 7. The 
exercise or action of volition can exist either in refer- 
ence to or without any reference to what we believe 
to be in our power. 8. Volition is one thing, and 
volitive action is another. The former is an abiding 
power and the latter may or may not exist. The 
former may exist -without the latter, but the latter can 
not exist without the former. No man believes that 
he can fly, yet he has power to desire to do so. We 
are not to understand, therefore, that volition implies 
that the act desired is actually performed in order to 
constitute volitive action ; for, in that case, it would 
appear that the action must first be completed, in or- 
der to know that we have had volitive action. 

SECTION III. 

1. Volition and desire are not one and the same. 
The former may exist in nature independent of the 
latter, and may act in reference to an object, or refuse 
to act. It can also act in relation to inaccessible ob- 
jects, or those we do not expect to obtain ; yet such 



VOLITION. 253 

action is soon suspended on the clear apprehending 
of intervening impossibilities; but desire, in many 
instances, seems to be undying in nature. When we 
have fondly cherished desires for some object, though 
there is not the slightest possibility of realizing 
such object, yet we can not totally suppress our 
desires. 2. A difference between desire and volition 
can be tested by consciousness. We can experience 
an internal discovery and decision of the two exist- 
ences w T ith a conviction of the reality of that which is 
peculiar to the nature or character of each as clearly 
distinct. If from consciousness and experience we 
can have knowledge of such pow T ers, with their dissim- 
ilar characteristics, then it is impossible for us to ever 
have conceptions of them as one and the same. These 
differences have already been discussed to a sufficient 
length. We know that we often have volitions, and 
act entirely contrary to our desires. Persons may 
desire to participate in some luxury, pleasure, or gain 
of earth, fraught, to some extent, with evil, while the 
strength of such desires is overruled by the volitive 
power, in determining and in pursuing a high and 
holy Christian course. 3. Volition differs from de- 
sire in its power of sudden change, and its controlling 
power over or in counteracting it, while the latter can 
not readily change, and can only affect the action of 
the former by a mild influence, inducing action. Vo- 
litions can be changed with the rapidity of thought, 
till such changes may number thousands in a few 
hours. So rapid is this process, that we have only 



254 VOLITION. 

to appeal to the action of this power as experienced 
in each mind, as proof or knowledge of the fact; but 
desire, though attended with joy or heaviness of 
spirit, can not be easily changed under certain cir- 
cumstances. The traveler from home may desire to 
return, but he voluntarily conquers its power by pur- 
suing his lonely journey, while his eyes give vent to 
his feelings in a flood of tears. That man who has 
been exposed to the storms of maritime life can not 
change his desires to see his loved friends at home, 
having been long absent from them. No person 
rocked on ocean waves, in returning from some trans- 
marine country, can cease to cherish a thrilling desire 
to see his home and dearest friends in his native land. 
4. If the power of volition necessarily acted in con- 
formity with om: highest or strongest desire, we would 
be destitute of any rule of morality capable of re- 
straining from any evil a depraved nature could wish ; 
but conscience furnishes correction to evil desires by 
dictating that which is right and should be done. In 
this way conscience furnishes motive to volition, but 
in no case can it command or control it. 5. Intel- 
lectual and moral beings are capable of being led by 
pure motive, and such motive is furnished by those 
mental powers which lie at the foundation of moral 
action. Without the development of these powers, 
man would be like the brute, led by desires which 
correspond to and act in conformity with mere animal 
nature; but, possessed of moral susceptibilities, we 
have light to act correctly, and if we refuse, guilt is 



VOLITION. 255 

the result. And when we voluntarily act in reference 
to any object, we have an immediate, internal convic- 
tion as to whether it be right or wrong. 

SECTION IV. 

1. The volitive power is manifested with various 
degrees of strength. Like other powers, it may be 
strongly or vigorously developed in some minds, while 
others appear to possess not so much strength or de- 
grees of power. 2. The same degrees of difference 
may be applied to the force of action of the volitive 
power. Action may be either weak or strong, and 
the force must, necessarily, depend upon the original 
power to act; for without such power action would be 
wholly an accident, if it could possibly have an exist- 
ence. 3. Volition differs from feeling. The former 
is the power of free or liberty-action, and its leading 
characteristic is motion, and not emotion or feeling: 
hence, it is not necessitated by preference, feeling, or 
desire. 4. Volition relates to self-action, both of 
body and mind. The body may move voluntarily or 
involuntarily, yet it can be made to move. We may 
determine to put forth action of the bodily powers 
instantaneously, or that it shall be done at a certain 
epoch in the future. The mind can act in arranging 
any process of future or contemplated events or facts. 
It is difficult to express the liberty and limitlessness 
of this power. It is peculiar in nature to itself, and 
can not be arbitrarily trammeled by preference, de- 
sires, or motive. 5. We have seen, by the preceding 



256 VOLITION. 

argument, that volition, in nature, embraces more 
than mere action, being a power capable of action, 
and at liberty to act in any way independently of 
other powers. We have demonstrated that mere ac- 
tion can not exist if there is nothing capable of act- 
ing. 6. Volition differs from choice. If our liberty 
consists wholly and only in acting according to choice, 
then choice must invariably precede action, and be 
the cause of such action ; therefore, we can not com- 
mit crime till we first choose to do so, neither can we 
do a righteous act till we choose so to do ; but when a 
variety of objects are presented to us at the same 
time, we can have no voluntary mental action of any 
kind in comparing the properties or preferable quali- 
ties of them, in order to choose which we prefer, till 
we first choose to know that we can apprehend differ- 
ences, and that we can choose to originate mental ac- 
tion in apprehending their existence at all. This is 
absurd. 7. Volitive liberty is, within itself, the power 
of acting or not acting, and that either with or with- 
out choice. Choice has no creative power by which 
volition is a mandatory result. 

SECTION V. 

1. Volition is anterior to choice; for choice, in its 
very nature, implies the possibility of a different or 
opposite selection to that which is made. Then if a 
different selection could have been made, the power 
and liberty of such selecting must necessarily exist 
anterior to choice, and the selection made ; therefore, 



VOLITION. 257 

choice can not exist till we have volitive action, at 
least, in connection with apprehending the presence 
of objects of choice. 2. There is an antecedent voli- 
tive power, in which there is always an alternative to 
that which the mind decides on, with the conscious- 
ness that we can choose either. This liberty we can 
not doubt. If many objects are presented to the 
mind, we are in possession of the same liberty to 
choose or not to choose any one or class of them ; 
and to deny this is to disorganize the rational mind. 
3. Then it follows that our choice, or act of choosing, 
is free, being opposed to any thing like an unchang- 
ing necessity. Volitions can exist as opposed to the 
laws over matter and natural causation, and even the 
laws of instinct. Thus, the mind has power to choose, 
in which alternatives are disposed of without respect 
to any natural relationship, elements, or cause and 
effect. 4. Volition is possessed either of self-freedom 
or is under the law of fatal necessity. If governed 
by choice, and choice is an effect of our constitutional 
organization, then the whole mind is under the law of 
necessity, whether it be regarded in a primary or a 
secondary point of light. It has been asserted that 
we are free, or are at liberty to act according to 
choice; but we have seen that volition is anterior to 
choice, and that choice is dependent on it for exist- 
ence, The wheels of an extensive manufactory tend 
to rest, but they can all be thrown into motion by the 
great water-wheel, which yields to the weight of water, 

according to the law of gravitation. The force of 

22 



258 VOLITION. 

this law is the cause or necessity of action. If man 
acts only under the law of necessity, then it is the 
law which is accountable for either good or bad deeds. 
5. Another false proposition is, that "motives are 
causes, of which volitions are effects." It is again 
asserted that "every volition has a motive, and if the 
motive be single, which operates upon the will, such 
motive will determine it; but if there are several op- 
erating upon it at the same time, the strongest one 
will determine the will-action." It would appear that 
no proposition, or propositions, could be much more 
unreasonable or absurd. 6. Motive may be regarded 
as that which has power to invoke will- action ; and 
when we speak of it, in connection with volition, we 
do not say motive is action, but it is that which in- 
vokes action of the volitive power; otherwise, motive 
and volitive action would be one and the same. If 
motive is not volition, then it can only influence the 
mind to action in a secondary way; for it can not act 
either as or for volition, but is rather a contingent in- 
fluence inducing volitions. Then, in all cases, volitive 
power must exist anterior to motive, and motive can 
invoke volitive action, which may be granted or re- 
fused at the pleasure of the will. 7. The origin and 
arrangement of motives, presuppose and prove the 
pre-existence and action of the volitive power. If 
we can pre-arrange motives to produce in the mind 
certain volitions, then the determining to make such 
pre-arrangements is a volition, which must exist pre- 
vious to motive, as its being is a prelude to the origin 



VOLITION. 259 

and arrangement of motive. It can exist, in the or- 
der of time, after, but can never precede and give 
origin, to the power of volition. 8. Volitions are 
spontaneous, and can exist independent of motive, 
and, in many instances, without being influenced by it 
in the slightest degree. We know, from the pre- 
ceding argument, that motive can only have a sec- 
ondary or an ulterior influence upon volition. The 
relation of cause and effect, when referred to the acts 
of the Divine Being, destroys all law of motive-con- 
trol. Such law, then, could not exist unless by Divine 
volition. Then, if he could act once without motive- 
influence, he could continue doing so forever. 

SECTION VI. 

1. Motive can not control the Divine Mind. Dr. 
Edwards, in trying to sustain the doctrine of motive, 
gives us to understand that the "energy of motives 
exists in the nature of things anterior to the will of 
God." Mr. Upham says that "the Supreme Being is 
inevitably governed, in all his doings, by what, in the 
range of events, is wisest and best." Thus, he is in- 
evitably subordinate to that which is superior in con- 
trol, and which governs him; therefore, motive is 
superior and governs all beings in the vast universe. 
If the above propositions be true, the Sovereign Ruler 
of universal being is the energy of motives. This 
conclusion, if true, or if we could believe it true, 
would compel us to adopt atheism as an inevitable 
result; but we have seen already the absurdity of 



260 VOLITION. 

such statements, in the fact that volition in mind any 
where is anterior to motive. 2. Such high motive- 
law leads to materialism; for the mind could not 
move only as it was influenced by motive, and in the 
same direction, and to the same degree. Then, if the 
volitions of the mind should be operated upon by two 
or more motives of the same or equal importance in 
every way, the mind must cease to act, and remain at 
rest forever; therefore, mind would become inert, and 
if so it would become insensible, as sensation would 
imply action, and action could not take place. Deity 
in wisdom placed fixed laws over the material uni- 
verse, but he has placed self-moving and imperishable 
minds under very different laws. 3. It is utterly im- 
possible to establish a conclusion that motive governs 
volition, without reasoning in a circle. If we ask 
certain philosophers what controls and determines 
the volitions, they answer, the strongest motive. But 
what constitutes the strongest motive? They say, 
that which determines the volitions. And they can 
not, neither dare travel beyond this circle ; otherwise, 
this high law of motive is broken or severed forever. 
4. That volitions are authoritatively controlled and 
determined by either motive or choice is directly op- 
posed to the consciousness of mankind. Of nothing 
are we more competent to judge, or are we more 
thoroughly prepared to decide, than that the volitive 
power lies back of both motive and choice ; and noth- 
ing do we know with more absolute certainty than in 
regard to the action of the volitive power, as to 



VOLITION. 261 

whether it is necessitated or free. Evidence, reported 
to the mind through the medium of the senses, may 
deceive us, from the fact that the physical organs 
connected with the senses may be affected or even 
paralyzed by disease; but an appeal to consciousness 
is an end to all controversy or doubt. Its evidence 
can not be increased within itself, and its testimony is 
direct without the frailty of intervening material 
nerves, tending to paralysis and decay. If it be un- 
reasonable to doubt evidence or testimony from exter- 
nal objects, it is infinitely more unreasonable and ab- 
surd to doubt our consciousness or its evidence. Its 
voice is without contingencies, or the possibility of 
deception, and to doubt its unerring truthfulness is to 
be coerced into universal doubt and skepticism. 5. 
In the unerring truthfulness of consciousness, we feel 
and know that our action in choice, and even in the 
selection of correct motive from evil, is not arbitrary, 
but free; and we can no more doubt it than we can 
the consciousness of self as a reality. In calling up 
our past acts which were evil, we feel that we were 
free at the time to have acted differently: hence the 
responsibility and accountability, a sense of which we 
could not feel if our acts were necessitated. If we 
intend to do wrong, at a certain time in the future, 
we feel that it is positively in our power to avoid such 
an act, and consequently we feel and know we shall 
incur guilt, a sense of which we could not have if our 
volitions were controlled and determined by either 
choice or motives. 6. The untrammeled liberty of 



262 VOLITION. 

our volitions is clearly established, from the fact that 
the existence of consciousness in man prevents him 
from being effectually reasoned out of a sense of his 
accountability. They who have faithfully tried to ex- 
tinguish this internal light, have found it to be like 
smuggling subterraneous fires, the accumulation of 
which suddenly rends every obstruction with the 
throes of an earthquake. The reason is plain. We 
are more absolutely conscious of the liberty of our 
volitions in acting right or wrong, than we can be of 
any law of motives or even as to whether they can 
have any existence at all. We can have no sense of 
remorse for any act, however bad, without conscious- 
ness. While we feel that our evil acts are freely our 
own, we experience condemnation; but if our acts are 
not wholly voluntary, it is impossible to feel that 
we have done wrong. 

SECTION VII. 

1. We are more vividly conscious of the sensations 
or feelings we experience in voluntarily choosing mo- 
tive, than we can be even of the real objects of choice. 
When many motives influence the. mind, such influ- 
ence implies a previous voluntary action, which must 
take place in apprehending the presence or existence 
of such motives. The strongest among many motives 
can not be determined till a previous voluntary action 
takes place: first, in apprehending them; and, sec- 
ondly, in comparing them, in order to determine upon 
the preferable or strongest one; otherwise, the 



VOLITION. 263 

strongest could never be known to the mind, as such 
motive or motives have not self-power to make them- 
selves known. 2. There is a difference between re- 
solving to act according to the strongest motive, after 
it is voluntarily discovered, and acting from fatal 
necessity. In the very act of yielding to the strong- 
est motive, after voluntarily determined, we distinctly 
feel, in the resolving to conform to it, that, at the 
same time, we are entirely able and free to resolve on 
a different course. While standing on the projecting 
rocks of Niagara Falls, I may determine not to throw 
myself over, and, at the same moment, feel that I am 
able and can leap over into the abyss below. 3. The 
strongest motive affecting the mind is embraced in the 
law of self -preservation ; yet we feel and know that it 
depends upon ourselves whether we may adhere to 
such law or not. It is, with us, to become obedient 
to the rules or laws of health, or to be intentionally 
reckless of them, or we are at liberty to destroy life 
by violence ; but if we were compelled to this by mo- 
tive, the act would be perfectly harmless, as we have 
seen. 4. The law of motive-necessity is contrary to 
the conscious feeling and acts of mankind in general. 
All claim to refer, in some way, to right and wrong, 
reward and punishment, merit and demerit. There is 
a universal feeling prompting to reward him who does 
right, and to punish the transgressor. This universal 
conformity of belief, conduct, and actions, which are 
regulated according to an internal conscious feeling 
of liberty, in which we know that they can be correct 



264 VOLITION. 

or the reverse, according to the freedom of the voli- 
tive power, forever destroys any necessitated restric- 
tions upon our spontaneous volitions. 5. The re- 
membrance of past acts is attended with a conviction 
or consciousness the most positive, that, in the same 
condition, or under identically the same circumstances, 
our volition and acts might have been precisely the 
reverse of what they were. In the recalling of any 
act, the consciousness of our power to have volunta- 
rily determined and acted differently will be distinctly 
recalled in connection with the act, and the one is as 
clearly vivid as the other. 6. In deciding upon the 
acts of others, we have a conscious sense of that 
which is right or wrong. These convictions arise 
from a consciousness of mental liberty. We have an 
unerring conviction that all offenders might act differ- 
ently if they would : hence their condemnation ; for 
if we could feel and believe that their acts were neces- 
sitated, it would be impossible to censure them for 
any wrong. 

SECTION VIII. 

1. This conscious sense of liberty is evidenced in 
regard to acts of present time. If a variety of ob- 
jects are presented to the mind, we know that we have 
power to collect any one of them, or any class ; and 
by this volition the object or motive is distinguished 
and selected, in connection with which we can act, con- 
tinue to act, or refuse to act at any time. 2. The doc- 
trine that " motive produces volition, and that volition 
produces the act, and all the circumstances taken to- 



VOLITION. 265 

gether constitute the motive," is only favored with 
words and confusion of thought. It is a specimen of 
that continuous, argumentative circle which is adopted 
by all who vindicate the laws of fatality. 3. The 
ground of our accountability exists in the possession of 
a liberty-power to do right, and to refrain from evil 
or wrong. No where can we find the ground of ac- 
countability beyond the fact and nature of voluntari- 
ness. We are satisfied that man is accountable for 
all his voluntary acts, and we are equally as well sat- 
isfied that he is not accountable for any thing beyond 
this. 4. Man naturally possesses volition, and he is 
capable of volitive action, or of putting forth volitions. 
If he is not capable of voluntary action, then it is 
needless to exhort him to do right; for he has no 
power to act. 5. Mr. Stewart says that "will prop- 
erly expresses that power of the mind of which voli- 
tion is the act." If volition is only the act of the 
will, why call it volition? for the act of the will is the 
act of the will, and no more or less. If will has real 
action, it would be foolish to say that volition was the 
same action, and only the same, yet this would be the 
case if volition is the action of the will ; but this is 
false. Then, if volition be only the action of the 
will, and is dependent upon such action for its origin, 
and can not be the action of the will, as the will is 
acknowledged to have its own action, it must be an 
accidental and superadded action, which may have a 
casual being, and then sink into annihilation ; but this 

is absurd. 6. Then we must come to a more rational 

23 



266 VOLITION. 

conclusion that volition can not exist only as action, 
unless there is something capable of moving. The 
very idea of action implies a power capable of acting. 
7. Mr. Upham says the will is "the mental power or 
susceptibility, by which we put forth volitions." This 
amounts to about the same thing as that given by Mr. 
Stewart. But it would stand thus: that volition, or 
the act of the will, is that which puts forth the act of 
the will. 8. Volition and the will are not distinct 
powers of the mind, neither are they co-ordinate 
branches of any mental power. One can not give 
rise to the other, nor are they dependent upon each 
other for existence. The two terms refer the mind to 
the different conditions and degrees of strength nat- 
urally connected with and contained in the one intel- 
lectual power. (1.) The term volition refers the mind 
to the natural liberty-power, essentially free to act in 
any way or manner corresponding to the nature of 
such freedom. (2.) The term will refers the mind to 
the same mental power of action, embracing not only 
its primary spontaneity, but involves an idea of its 
higher degrees of strength, authoritative and manda- 
tory power, not only in giving origin to action, but in 
continuing, counteracting, and in compelling action. 
All the difference that need be referred to in this 
place, in the meaning of the two terms, is embraced 
in the nature of the condition of the one power in its 
varied manifestations. We now enter upon the anal- 
ysis of the will in its more extensive manifestations, 
and will define, in brief form, its relation to other fac- 
ulties of the mind. 



THE WILL. 267 



CHAPTER II. 

THE WILL. 

SECTION I. 

1. The will is that faculty of the mind by which we 
determine either to do or forbear an action. It is an 
inherent power or faculty which we exercise in decid- 
ing among two or more objects, as to which we shall 
choose or pursue. 2. The will, in its very nature, is 
the liberty-poiver of the mind. The peculiar condi- 
tion of its essential being is self-freedom and self- 
power of action. 3. It is not only free in its very 
nature, but has determining power, deciding in the 
mind that something shall be done or forborne. 4. 
The will is closely connected with the judgment, and 
is often influenced by it; yet, while the latter can dis- 
criminate and decide upon realities or facts, it requires 
the presence of the former in determining or in com- 
pelling action. The judgment can only act in rela- 
tion to truths ; and when it decides, such decision is 
knowledge ; but the mind is wholly free to act or to 
forbear action. But when we will to secure that which 
is the object of decision, the powers of the mind are 
directed to the work necessary to be accomplished. 
5. The understanding can not control the will. It has 
power to contain or embrace all that is necessary to 



268 THE WILL. 

be brought under the inspection of the mind, and can 
go no further than to invoke volitive action. 6. 
Reason may connect the different steps, or chain of 
facts, from the premises to the result, but has no au- 
thority over the will in causing action. Its power is 
under the control of the will, by which its action can 
be continued or suspended at pleasure. 

SECTION II. 

1. We object to the order of the " classification of 
the mental powers," according to the arrangement of 
some writers, upon the nature of the will. A fine 
specimen of seemingly-unintentional, though inten- 
tional, design may be detected in the assumption, that 
"a knowledge *of the will implies a preliminary knowl- 
edge of the intellect;" and that such " knowledge 
implies a preliminary knowledge of the sensibilities." 
This arrangement will claim that we have knowledge 
of the existence and action of several faculties as an- 
terior to our knowledge of the will, thereby fixing a 
previous basis containing laws governing the will. 
The absurdity of this arrangement will be clearly de- 
fined hereafter. 2. To define the relation of the will 
to other faculties, or to all of them combined, in or- 
der to find some or combined influence as a law or 
laws of the will, by which it may be and is governed, 
is wholly unnecessary, as the very nature and relation 
of the will to all other powers of the mind will for- 
ever preclude any idea of the correctness of such con- 
fused argumentation. 3. Feeling, thinking, and will- 



THE WILL. 269 

ing are three faculties distinct from each other. They 
have been known as the sensibility, intellect, and the 
will. All sensitive states and feelings are referred to 
the first; all intellectual operations are referred to the 
second; all mental determinations are referred to the 
third. It is improper to call an act of the will either 
a thought or feeling. 4. We object to "laws of the 
will." No material element, or elements, anterior to 
the existence of will in the human mind, can, within 
themselves, contain any "law or laws" possessing ac- 
tion; and if inertness would be essential to the nature 
of such existences, they could have no power over the 
will. 5. If they intend, by the "laws of the will/' to 
say that the laws which Deity has fixed over the ma- 
terial universe have power to control the will, then 
mind is matter, and the will is inert; but this is false. 
6. It can not be possible that they refer to the exist- 
ence and controlling power of the Divine Being ; for 
they could not call such existence the "laws of the 
will," and if they do, it would follow that he is the 
action of our wills, and we are both passive and not 
accountable. 7. It can not be that they refer to any 
other faculty of the same finite mind ; for it would be 
just as improper for any faculty to have volitive 
power to act in the place of and for the will, as it 
would be for the will to act for itself 

SECTION III. 

1. We have already seen that " laws of the ivill" 
as contained in some works on mental philosophy, can 



270 THE WILL. 

not exist, or, the human mind is incapable of having 
any satisfactory knowledge of them. 2. The will is 
governed by its own law, and from its nature it is im- 
possible that any other faculty or faculties should con- 
trol it. 3. " Contingent action of the will" implies 
the continued being and power of action as possessed 
by other faculties of the mind, and that volitive ac- 
tion is accidental. If the action of the will is wholly 
accidental, then there is no abiding or real principle 
capable of being called the will. Then, if the will is 
contingent, or only exists in action, it follows that, 
when such action is suspended, it is annihilated; but 
contingent volitive action, as taught by many, is false, 
and is resorted to only for the purpose of destroying 
liberty-power. "4. If the mind has power to act within 
and of itself, the condition of such power is freedom, 
or liberty; otherwise, no action could take place with- 
out an impinging cause. And if action is compelled, 
in any way, or by any pow T er, beyond the identity of 
self, it is caused by such influence. Then that which 
causes mental action is that which acts while the mind 
is passive or wholly inactive; but if the mind has 
self-power to act, it is reasonable to suppose that it 
possesses some faculty capable of acting, or of determ- 
ining action. It is just as reasonable to suppose 
that the will possesses such volitive power as to refer 
such power to any other faculty or influence. 5. The 
doctrine that the " will has its laivs preliminary to that 
of its freedom" as taught by Mr. Upham, and others, 
is clearly incorrect. Under this proposition, it is as- 



THE WILL. 271 

sumed that "the will is subject to laws." An argu- 
ment to prove this is drawn from the fact that all 
things in the universe are subject to law, and that the 
mind of man can not be regarded as an exception. 
This general blending is very objectionable. Why 
was there not a distinction made between the laws 
governing the inert part of the universe, and the laws 
governing the intellectual and immortal soul ? If an 
uplifted rock is ponderous, and naturally gravitate to 
the earth, is that conclusive proof that the soul is 
ponderous, and must naturally and always obey the 
same law? If so we are undone forever. 6. The 
decision having been made, that " the will is subject 
to laws" then they make this deduction: " The free- 
dom of the will, ivhatever may be its nature, mast ac- 
commodate itself to this preliminary fact" Here we 
have at least the will fatalized. 7. The argument 
seems to stand thus: The will is subject to and is gov- 
erned by laws, and that the freedom of the will is the 
"liberty of acting" under and according to the na- 
ture and requirements of such laws. These laws are 
regarded as being infinite, and all they require is of 
infinite necessity. This system of philosophy teaches 
and enforces the doctrine of free will, which is our 
"freedom or liberty" to act according to necessity. 
8. We have already seen that the will is not subject to 
such laws; and it will be remembered that "laws of 
the will" have been assumed without any attempt to 
define them, or any one of them. The first position 
assumed was, that a knowledge of the will implied a 



272 THE WILL. 

" previous knowledge of other powers of the mind." 
If that be true, it does not follow that those previ- 
ously-known powers were laws governing the will; 
for the very nature of those powers, as specified, 
would forever refute such a position. The next gen- 
eral position is, that " the will has its laws preliminary 
to that of its freedom." Here "laws" are assumed 
without telling us what they are. We will now pro- 
ceed to notice those things which have been specific- 
ally mentioned and pointed out by them as governing 

the will. 

SECTION IV. 

1. The ivill may he influenced by desire, but can 
never be controlled by it, only in a subordinate w r ay. 
Desire is no moVe than a mere emotion or excitement 
of the mind, directed to the attainment of an object. 
It is an inclination or wish for something to be en- 
joyed. That which w 7 e wish for or desire may become 
the object of the determining power of the will, or we 
may determine to pay no attention to it, though the 
strength of such desires may remain unchanged. In 
traveling from home and friends, we may often desire 
to return ; yet we have volitive power to continue our 
onw T ard course to some far-off and perhaps uninter- 
esting part of the world. 2. Desires may arise vol- 
untarily and involuntarily. We have volitive power 
to turn our attention to an object, or class of objects, 
till such object, or something connected, becomes the 
object of desire; and, in connection with some pecu- 
liar condition or fitness, which claims our voluntary 



THE WILL. 273 

attention, may arise a desire to have the same in our 
possession. In this way desire may be successive to 
volition, if not a result of volitive action. They may 
be involuntary, though the will has power to cross or 
counteract the strength of such desires, and, by re- 
peated efforts, diminish and destroy them. 3. An- 
other position assumed by many writers, to enslave 
the will, is, that it is positively controlled by choice. 
The liberty of the will consists in the power of acting 
according to choice ; therefore, our liberty is wholly 
embraced in obeying choice. If choice has mandatory 
control of the will, it would follow that, when it is ex- 
ercised by any inert object, such object governs 
choice, which controls the will. 4. The very nature 
of choice implies the possibility of a different selec- 
tion to that which is made. We intuitively feel that 
there is always an alternative to that which we choose 
or decide on; and as we compare different objects to- 
gether, we have an abiding consciousness that we are 
at liberty to choose any one under our inspection. 
We know that we have volitive power to choose or 
not to choose. When two or more objects are pre- 
sented to the mind, we feel that we have power to 
choose any one of them, or refuse making any choice. 
If choice can not be controlled in any way by the 
-will, and is the result of some anterior constitutional 
determination, then it would follow that choice is in- 
evitable, and that it can only take place as effect fol- 
lows its cause. Then, it could never take place only 
in an involuntary way. 5. We know that choice does 



274 THE WILL. 

exist ; then its origin must be caused by the laws of 
natural necessity, or the mind has natural and volitive 
power to decide between alternatives. Choice can 
never be free if it be produced by the laws of neces- 
sity. Our freedom to act according to such necessity 
is bondage. If choice is produced by laws of natural 
necessity, it can never be free ; but it implies liberty 
or freedom, and without this it ceases to be choice. 
6. The position of some writers is, that choice controls 
the will, and is the effect of the laws of natural neces- 
sity. Then, for the effect of a natural cause to gov- 
ern the manner, qualities, or condition of itself is 

impossible. 

SECTION V. 

1. Another assumption is, that the will is governed 
by motive. Mr. Upham says that "the will acts in 
view of the strongest motive, and necessarily so acts" 
If such action is necessitated, it could not be other- 
wise. 2. Motive is that which incites to action, having 
only subordinate influence upon the will. The very 
nature of motive implies no mandatory power over its 
own origin and action; and if it possesses no self- 
power of government, it would be impossible for it to 
govern the will or any other faculty in a positive way. 
3. The only way for motive to govern the will is, that 
its action be anterior, in the order of time, to the ori- 
gin of the action of the will. It is utterly impossible 
to prove that the action of motive in the mind is an- 
terior to the origin of the action of the will; and if it 
could be done, it would be no evidence that motive- 



THE WILL. 275 

action could control the will. 4. If motive has power 
to act, and such action can only be induced by the 
presence of an object, then the object controls the 
motive, and the motive controls the will. Then it 
would follow, that when the object was inert it would 
control the mind. 5. It has been maintained by 
many writers, that motive governs mind in general; 
that it governs volitions in the human mind ; and that 
in the same way it applies to the Divine Mind. Mr. 
Upham says, " Our condition, in this respect, seems 
to be essentially the same with that of the Supreme 
Being himself. He is inevitably governed, in all his 
doings, by what, in the great range of events, is wis- 
est and best;" therefore, the Divine Being is "inevita- 
bly" governed by a superior. We understand Dr. 
Edwards, that the " energy of motives " existed, in the 
nature of things, anterior to the will of God. In this 
way, many writers take the ground that motive gov- 
erns the will of man, and the will of Deity, being an- 
terior to it : hence, we are driven to the conclusion 
that motive governs all beings, and that it must be, 
of necessity, supreme. 6. Motive, in the Divine 
Mind, is subordinate to volitions. If "motive" or 
any " certain fixed and irresistible influences" control 
the acts of Deity, such controlling power could not 
have been originated and arranged by him ; for, in that 
case, he must have willed the existence and arrange- 
ment of such pre-existing and controlling power. 
Then it follows, that such controlling pow T er must 
either be anterior to any act of Deity, and thereby 



276 THE WILL. 

superior to him, or such an assumed controlling power 
could not have existed till the Divine volition willed it 
into real being; and if it could only exist by the will 
of Deity, he had power to act independent of such 
supposed influence. If he had power to act once in- 
dependently of this motive, or natural irresistible in- 
fluence, he has power to act on independently of such 
supposed influences forever : so, farewell to the eter- 
nal sovereignty of motive ! 7. We are as conscious 
of the existence of spiritual-self, as we can be of the 
reality of matter. Then if such finite spirit can exist 
somewhere, it is reasonable to suppose that an Infinite 
Spirit may exist every-where. And if a finite spirit 
can know some things, an Infinite Spirit may know all 
things, being evcry-where present. If the former can 
know some things as they come to pass, and such 
knowledge not the necessity of their being, then the 
latter may know all things coming to pass, and such 
knowledge be not the necessity of such existences. 
Deity foresaw that man, in his essential liberty, would 
voluntarily depart from right, and not that he should. 
There could be no necessity for the latter, in causing 
the very thing he had already seen coming to pass. 
8. We have already seen that motive has no power to 
control the volitive power in the human mind. It may 
have subordinate influence in inducing volitive action, 
but nothing more ; for, in order to control the will, it 
must be proved, without doubt, that it exists anterior 
to the action of the will, and has volitive power to act 
in causing the will to act ; but, from its very nature, 



THE WILL. 277 

it can not have such power ; and if it could, it would 
be just as fatal to the law of necessity as to refer 
such power to the will where it belongs. 9. Another 
position assumed and strongly argued by Mr. Ed- 
wards, is, that "the will always is as the greatest ap- 
parent good;" but he explains this by admitting that 
the "will is determined by the greatest apparent 
good." To blend the will with the intellect is absurd; 
for we can not say that it is a thought; and it is 
equally as incorrect to blend it with the sensibilities, 
for it is not a feeling. And if motive can induce vol- 
itive action, under the law of necessity, then it would 
follow that when an inert existence was the object of 
motive; that as the object controlled the motive, so 
would such object control the will: hence, we would 
be compelled to serve material elements and laws in 
common with every thing else possessed with power 
to influence motive ; but this is false. 10. That the 
will is untramrneled is in perfect accordance with the 
consciousness of mankind. Of nothing are we more 
positively certain than in regard to our acts, whether 
they be voluntary or of necessity. Knowledge re- 
ceived through the senses, connected with diseased 
and perishing physical organs, may deceive us; but 
consciousness, possessed of its own evidence, is knowl- 
edge, without demanding an increase of testimony 
from the senses. It is of and within its own ex- 
istence and nature the end of all controversy or 
doubt. To doubt its power is to doubt the reality 
of all things. Our consciousness of self-action as 



278 THE WILL. 

to whether such action is of infinite necessity, or 
is free, equals our consciousness of existence it- 
self; and we can no more doubt this than we can 
doubt the existence of self and that of every thing 
else. When we contemplate future action in regard to 
many objects, we feel and know that we have natural 
volitive power, or ability, to choose any one, or to de- 
termine on any course we please in relation to one 
or all of them ; and we are perfectly confident that 
we have power to refuse action contrary to either mo- 
tive or the power of choice. When we reflect upon a 
wrong act in the past, we feel an internal conviction 
that we were free to have done differently: hence our 
deep regret or sense of sin ; for without this conscious 
liberty, we couH never regret the imperfections of the 
past, or feel that we had ever sinned. As long as we 
feel that we are accountable for our acts, we feel a 
consciousness of liberty in acting. If a conscious- 
ness of liberty could be removed from the mind, just 
as long as such sense was gone, we would be incapa- 
ble of any regret or remorse. However much we 
may dread the results, yet if we do not feel an intui- 
tive liberty, we never can experience any thing like 
regret or remorse in regard to any past act. Just 
as long as we could feel that we had no conscious lib- 
erty, we would be compelled to feel our acts were not 
our own. 



LIBERTY OF THE WILL. 279 



CHAPTER III. 

LIBERTY OF THE WILL. 
SECTION I. 

1. The expression "free will" is, to some extent, 
objectionable, as it would seem to imply the opposite, 
or that there could be such a thing as the will en- 
slaved under a law of infinite necessity, which we 
have seen to be incorrect. Witt, in its very essence, 
or nature, is a free principle. Liberty is its essential 
condition or law. Free will is as incorrect as hound 
will. Liberty is essential to its nature, and it is not 
will if it be not free; and if it be bound, it ceases to 
be will. Volitive power of action is essential to the 
being of the soul, and to all rational, intellectual, and 
accountable beings. Action and self-action are essen- 
tial differences between matter and spirit. Spirit has 
self-power of choice; matter has not. Ratiocination 
is essential to intellect, and can not take place without 
action. Connected with these, volition is forever in- 
separable ; therefore, mind can not exist without self- 
liberty of action. 2. The will, in its acts and de- 
terminations, is subject to the law of self-liberty in 
opposition to the law of necessity. We have seen 
already that the will can not fall under the law of in- 
finite necessity; therefore, it must fall under that of 



280 LIBERTY OF THE WILL. 

liberty, as opposed to necessity. If we know that we 
are under the law of necessity, then we have the 
same power of knowing that we are not accountable. 
To suppose and believe that our actions are neces- 
sary, and that we are accountable for such actions, is 
to suppose and believe an absurdity ; for we never 
can experience remorse for any act, or acts, which are 
not wholly voluntary, either by intention or permis- 
sion. 3. The doctrine of liberty is clearly established 
by consciousness, in which there is a universal convic- 
tion that our past acts, even under the same circum- 
stances, might have been very different. Such con- 
viction could not exist only in spontaneous origin or 
liberty. 4. In connection with the presence of many 
objects of choice, we have a positive consciousness 
that two or more acts of the will may be put forth, or 
that we may will to refuse them all, and that contrary 
to motive, desire, or choice. This truth can be tested 
by any one, at this moment, in regard to the very 
next act of the mind. The consciousness of liberty 
we now have, can no more be doubted than we can 
doubt our own existence. 5. We objected wholly to 
" laws of the will/ 5 as used by different writers. The 
will knows no law only that of liberty, which liberty 
may be regarded as absolute, being entirely and for- 
ever opposed to any law or laws of necessity. 6. I 
may determine to go to London, and while this determ- 
ination remains unchanged, all other powers of the mind 
must be subject to the will. This determination may 
be continued or suspended only by the will. 7. The 



LIBERTY OF THE WILL. 281 

effort to sustain the law of necessity has involved rea- 
soning in a circle. Necessitarians have assumed that 
the "action of the will is always in the direction of 
the strongest motive." In defining the strongest mo- 
tive, they say it is the motive in the direction of which 
the will does act. They have no way to define the 
strongest motive, but wait till the will acts, and then 
assume that the motive, in the direction of its action, 
is the strongest. 

SECTION II. 

1. The spirit of dependence can not exist under the 
law of necessity. The conviction that we are lost 
without an interest in the merit of Christ, is common 
to all; but to properly feel our dependence implies a 
voluntary act, in which we humbly and confidently 
rest all our hope upon Divine assistance. 2. But the 
doctrine of necessity can not naturally tend to mellow 
the exercise of the heart, and enkindle, with holy awe, 
the spirit of fervent love to the great Donor of all 
good. 3. If the doctrine of liberty be true, Deity 
does not preside over the myriads of earth's popula- 
tion for the purpose of executing the laws of stern and 
infinite fate ; for such laws could need no additional 
power to enforce their claims, as such claims have 
been executed and enforced from all eternity. From 
the very necessity in their natural existence, no new 
claim or arrangement can ever take place, or ever has 
legally taken place. Such laws must either be self- 
existent and eternal, or there must have been a point 

24 



282 LIBERTY OF THE WILL. 

somewhere in the range of duration when they took 
place, or became real. Necessitarians can not admit 
that they were created by Deity; for he would have 
willed their existence. Then they must have had an 
existence anterior to any volitions in the Divine Mind : 
hence, the existence and claims of the laws of fate 
were all arranged before they came to the knowledge 
of the Divine Being ; and, of course, he is subordi- 
nate to their control. Such a conclusion is worse 
than atheism. 4. A design in the creation of man 
was, that he might voluntarily serve God; and with- 
out such power, he could never glorify his Creator. 
Doubtless, without natural liberty to glorify God, the 
design of our being would have been destroyed, and 
this would havfi prevented our existence at all. Man 
must exist free to serve his Creator, or service would 
not be acceptable to God. And if it is necessary to 
have natural liberty, in order to glorify his Creator, 
then he is free to pervert the exercise o*r action of 
such liberty-power, and voluntarily fall from the favor 
of God, as in the case of our federal head. The 
mind is free, and, under this power, we may aim at 
the sun, step the silent paths of innumerable worlds, 
shout to their eternal flight; we may will the approach 
of heaven, the possession of its joys, and the full 
glory of endless day. 

SECTION III. 

1. It is difficult to define the difference between the 
liberty and the power of the will. Some have thought 



LIBERTY OF THE WILL. 283 

that power was capable of degrees, while liberty re- 
mains the same. Whether there be naturally degrees 
in the power of the will, is not easily decided; for the 
apparent difference may be caused, to a considerable 
extent, by imperfect or diseased physical organs ; yet 
it would appear that liberty, in all orders of mind, 
was essentially the same. The partially-developed 
mind, or that of a child, as well as the strong mind, 
enjoys the same liberty. The power of the will, as to 
the quality of its essential nature, can not admit of 
degrees; but it differs in different minds as to the 
degrees of vigor, vividness, and strength in its man- 
datory action. While liberty may be regarded as ab- 
solute, being opposed to every thing like infinite 
necessity, power may be regarded as more dependent. 
Liberty is without any compulsatory infringement in 
any possible way; yet power is often incumbered by 
many contingencies. Liberty does not appear to be 
capable of being increased; but power, by repeated 
efforts, can become more vigorous and irresistible. 2. 
The power and freedom of the will is clearly evi- 
denced in self-preservation. If I were in a boat, 
peacefully floating on the silvery waters of Niagara, 
above the Falls, I feel distinctly that life depends 
upon the efforts of myself, and only upon myself. I 
feel as conscious as I can of any thing, that I have 
power either to determine to row to the shore, or to 
go over the Falls without any effort. 3. The will has 
self- determining power. It is not a matter of aston- 
ishment that necessitarians should doubt the self- 



284 LIBERTY OF THE WILL. 

determining power of the will ; but they acknowledge 
that the mind, as a whole, has self-determining power. 
We hold that the will, in its nature and office, presides 
over all other faculties, and determines all the proc- 
esses and acts of the mind. No event, object, or fact 
can be made the subject of knowledge only by the 
self-determining power of the mind; for nothing can 
be brought under the inspection of the mind without 
mental action, and such action is in the mind, and is 
a result of its self-determining power. 4. Mr. Up- 
ham says, "If by the phrase self-determining power 
of the will be merely meant that the will itself, that 
distinct susceptibility of the mind which we thus de- 
nominate, has power of action, we grant that it is so ;" 
that is, the will- can act, but not authoritatively — it 
can only act under the control of law or the strongest 
motive. The freedom of such action is in conforming 
to necessity. But again: "The will acts, and with 
such freedom and such power as to lay the basis of 
accountability/' That is, " It is free to act according 
to the law of necessity." This is the substance, and 
amounts to the fact that such action is coerced by the 
law of fate. 5. Mr. Edwards says, "If the will de- 
termines the willy then choice orders and determines 
choice." If the will can determine the mind, it cer- 
tainly can determine the will; for the will is a faculty 
of the mind, and the self-determining power of the 
mind has been acknowledged to be true. We have 
already seen that no faculty or faculties can determ- 
ine the mind except the will. 



LIBERTY OF THE WILL. 285 

SECTION IV. 

1. The superior power of the will is that peculiar 
power by which it is not only distinguished from other 
faculties, but determines the action of the mental pow- 
ers as a whole. 2. The ground of offense in the sight 
of God, is not only our power to perceive the differ- 
ence between right and wrong, and an abiding convic- 
tion as to what we should do, but is embraced in the 
fact that we possess the power to do that which is 
right, and to refuse to do that which is contrary to the 
Divine will. 3. Connected with voluntariness is the 
ground of all accountability. Take this away, and it 
is utterly impossible for us ever to be called to an ac- 
count for any thought or act. We can neither be ap- 
plauded nor blamed. 4. The will possesses mandatory 
power. The mind certainly has self-determining 
power, by the consent of philosophers, and in the very 
nature of its being and operations. By general con- 
sent, and true analysis, this power has not been de- 
fined as being diffused through the nature and power 
of all the faculties, separately or combined; but the de- 
termining power has been referred to some one faculty. 
No faculty, from its essential nature, can possess man- 
datory power but the will. 5. The will appears to pre- 
side over the combined action of the other faculties, 
and has power to control mental action. 6. Some 
necessitarians have erred in trying to confound the 
will with the sensibilities, and refused to appeal to 
special and universal consciousness. 7. Another evi- 



286 LIBERTY OF THE WILL. 

dence of the independence and controlling power of 
the will, is contained in the fact that we can will to 
perform impossibilities ; that is, we can will the real- 
ity of an impossibility. The atheist may be pos- 
sessed of such horrible dread of the truths of the 
Bible, that, with all his soul, he may will its annihila- 
tion; yet he knows, at the same time, that this is impos- 
sible. 8. Such is the will, the free liberty -power of the 
imperishable mind. Under its vivid power and man- 
datory control, minds of the high and the lowly, en- 
kindling with feelings of lofty and holy aspirations, 
assert their right to triumph over all embarrassments 
and storms, the mere results of physical tendencies, 
or the requirements of their laws, mind, intellectual 
and immortal, may determine upon the advance of in- 
finite happiness, and the interminable progression of 
imperishable knowledge. How can we define the true 
character of the soul, when perfected in its separation 
from the decay of physical organs which trammeled 
its manifestations in time ? Possessed of all the facts 
and knowledge of the past, its thoughts freely range 
all through the boundless future; but infinitely higher 
to our conceptions must be the character of that soul 
perfected in the knowledge, favor, and love of God ! 
With holy triumph and increasing joy, burn on, thou 
spirit of endless day ! As the accelerated travel of a 
star, range the progressive series of heavenly knowl- 
edge. Endowed with angelic reach of thought and 
gaze of fire, a bright immortality of universal being 
only extends the raptures of increasing delight, 



LIBERTY OF THE WILL. 287 

whether paused amid brilliant perceptions of sur- 
rounding good and grandeur, or, contemplating the 
glow and varied motion of distant rolling worlds, 
tracing the mysterious vast of great eternity. 



ELEMENTS OF MENTAL SCIENCE. 



PART II. 

THE ELEMENTS OF MIND 



WHICH 



LIE AT THE FOUNDATION OF MORAL ACTION. 



THERE IS A SPIRIT IN MAN ; AND THE INSPIRATION OP THE 
ALMIGHTY GIVETH THEM UNDERSTANDING." 



25 



ELEMENTS OF MENTAL SCIENCE. 



-»♦♦- 



DIVISION FIRST 



CHAPTER I . 

MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND. 

SECTION I. 

1. Our attention will be directed, in the second part 
of these philosophical inquiries, to the analysis of 
moral elements of mind. The first part of this work 
contains the analysis of those faculties which lie at 
the foundation of mental action. 2. The present ob- 
ject is to define the real existence, inherent powers and 
office of elements which lie at the foundation of moral 
action, without which Such action could not exist. 

SECTION II. 

1. A correct understanding of the intellectual and 
moral elements of mind, with a desire to know and 
properly appreciate their merited worth, vies in import- 
ance with all relative finities, or the dearest pleasures 
of invoked attainments. A correct knowledge of 
mind gives a conscious satisfaction in regard to self, 
and serves as head-light radiance, thrown on the way 

of rapid and illimitable progression. As the scintil- 

291 



292 MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND. 

lated travel of a star, so should the transit of a per- 
fect soul on the disk of departing time reflect intel- 
lectual and moral light. Such living traces of great- 
ness and sublimity, with moral beauty and worth, are 
pioneer sentiments guarding the way of triumph, and 
pointing out the opening future, every-where subtend- 
ed with the glorious reversions of vast eternity. 2. 
Though the human mind, in relative contrast, be re- 
garded as a mere atom, yet its being and knowledge 
is unending. Such finity is real in infinity, of bounded 
identity, but sustained by omnipotence. The true 
study of mind, embracing purity of mental and moral 
action, should be regarded as the great science of 
earth. It hangs the golden clouds of another life, 
high and glowing, around the setting sun of this ! 
Then enter this spiritual domain burdened with a 
sense of immortal destiny. 



MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND. 293 



CHAPTER II. 

REAL EXISTENCE OF MORAL ELEMENTS OF 

MIND. 

SECTION I. 

1. The existence of moral powers is evident. Ef- 
fect can not exist without a cause. Neither can a 
beginning or change take place without a cause. 
Conscious convictions of the impossibility of inert 
causation, move us to look for a cause equal to the 
known effect. Of nothing are we more certain than 
that moral influences exist in the soul, and that we 
are capable of moral action; for such action, as a 
result, can not arise from non-existence. 2. As the 
mind matures from childhood, there is evidence of 
internal moral powers. When the attention is ar- 
rested by either sad or joyful news, the feelings will 
naturally correspond to either extreme; and there 
will be an intuitive approval or disapproval, as the 
case may be. 

SECTION II. 

1. We have conscious belief in moral faculties. 
When inspecting internal emotions and feelings, we 
have self-evident consciousness in regard to what is 
right or wrong, sanctioning or condemning, approv- 
ing or disapproving. 2. Revelation appeals to the 



294 MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND. 

moral nature of the soul with positive certainty; 
then man is capable of knowing right from wrong, 
and can feel obligations upon him to do right. 3. 
The Almighty has often called upon man to decide 
upon the deportment of others of our race, as to 
whether they be right or wrong, and as to the char- 
acter of acquittal or degree of punishment. This is 
evidence of a moral nature with liberty of correct 
self-action. 



NATURE OF THE MORAL POWERS. 295 



CHAPTER III. 

NATURE OF THE MORAL POWERS. 

SECTION I. 

1. The nature and condition of moral faculties 
can be determined by reference to our consciousness 
of their being, and comparing them with elements 
purely mental. The affections, or influences of the 
soul enable us to form correct conclusions in regard 
to the power of the elements to which they corre- 
spond and by which supported. A pure conscience is 
connected with right motive and happy mind; but 
when the moral powers are connected with an evil 
conscience, the whole mind is gloomy and miserable. 
2. The moral nature is evidenced by the purity or 
impurity of motive. The vicious and lawless of earth 
are looked upon only to be dreaded, and feelings of 
horror are spontaneous in reviewing their acts. On 
the other hand, kindness and merciful acts are ap- 
plauded by the warm hearts of thousands. 3. The 
harmony and peace pervading civil government, is 
evidence of moral powers and influences stronger 
than that arising from impure and vicious minds. 
Had we no moral nature capable of being influenced 
by moral suasion, the whole earth would be confu- 
sion and scenes of blood. 4. Our capability and 



296 NATURE OF THE MORAL POWERS. 

enjoyment of happiness in the performance of duty, 
and remorse in doing wrong, prove the existence of 
a moral nature, with its character, 

SECTION II. 

1. The relative existence of the moral powers to 
the whole mind refers us, (1.) To the relative claims 
of the two classes of elements. The states of the 
intellect differ from the feelings and emotions con- 
nected with such states. The former is free to 
enforce investigative thought, regardless of conse- 
quences; while the latter has a feeling of caution, 
awe, and dependence. (2.) The action of the mental 
powers appears to be in the direction of the desirable : 
apprehending and contemplating the wisdom, sub- 
limity, and grandeur of universal realities; while that 
of the moral powers looks to the good, the right; 
and that which is happy under the Divine approval. 



DIVISION SECOND 



■♦♦♦- 



CHAPTER I. 

CONSCIENCE. 

SECTION I. 

1. Conscience is a primary or intuitive power of 
the soul. Its origin is not a result of education, but 
exists and remains to be exercised. It was created 
by Infinite Wisdom, with superior power and influ- 
ence in connection with the original elements of our 
spiritual being. 2. Connected with it is the power to 
know self; such reality can not be fully known, with- 
out the response, approval, and affirmation of con- 
science. 3. The real existence of external facts can 
be traced to this faculty, as a connected primary 
power in the knowledge of such realities. Millions 
of entities may crowd space around us, but a satis- 
factory knowledge of them is impossible till we ex- 
perience a conscious feeling or sense that they are 
real. 4. Things mentally apprehended become ob- 
jects of belief, and are received as true when we feel 
a conscious affirmation or satisfaction in regard to 
them. Then only is the mind at rest. 5. The Scrip- 
ture evidence of the existence and nature of con- 
science is conclusive. Though all other sources were 

297 



298 CONSCIENCE. 

silent, Revelation, internal experience, and self-con- 
scious knowledge would render unbelief impossible. 
6. The Bible teaches the positive existence of our 
moral nature, and that such nature centers in that 
which is called conscience, and by this name our 
moral nature is influenced, addressed, and commanded. 
The commands of Heaven show that we have power 
to know right from wrong, and that conscience influ- 
ences and moves us to pursue the right. 7. The ex- 
istence, nature, power, and laivs of conscience may be 
learned from the following expressions : " Testimony 
of conscience. A good conscience. Commend our- 
selves to every man's conscience. Are a law unto 
themselves ; which show the work of the law written 
in their hearts, their conscience also bearing wit- 
ness/' We pause; this is enough. 

SECTION II. 

1. Belief in the existence and power of conscience 
is the inevitable result of an intuition which is a part 
of self; and into this belief we are driven by a thou- 
sand realities from which mind can never be withheld, 
and there can be no belief, except intuitive. 2. This 
power of our moral constitution possesses an inde- 
pendence and importance among the moral ele- 
ments and emotions too generally denied. It is called 
by the world-renowned critic, a the great master- 
power, the sovereign-regulator of the moral system 
in man, and placed there by God himself for this 
specific purpose." It is the superior faculty of the 



CONSCIENCE. 299 

moral elements, rightfully claiming persuasive and 
dictatorial sovereignty, when exercised properly in its 
heaven-invested influence and power. 3. Mankind, 
by a general concurrence of feeling and action, inde- 
pendent of either denied or acknowledged belief,* 
have awarded to conscience such high jurisdiction. 
Though it may be the last court of appeal, yet it is 
the final and conclusive test to that certainty in knowl- 
edge, where a tendency to belief is wholly undis- 
turbed. Its righteous dictates should alwavs rule. 



300 LAWS OF CONSCIENCE. 



CHAPTER II. 

CONSTITUTIONAL AND EELATIVE LAWS OF 
CONSCIENCE. 

SECTION I. 

1. It is not the business of conscience to say what 
is right or wrong existing anterior to self, separate or 
abstractly, for the real existence or nature of either 
is beyond its legislation. 2. Neither does it attempt 
to settle the origin of the law of self-being; but it can 
be, and is, in part, a witness or evidence in the origin 
of the knowledge of self-reality. 3. It is within the 
power and is the business of conscience to decide on 
our own right or wrong, involving our relation either 
to innocence or guilt. 4. It does not settle, but as- 
sumes as settled, the great principles of moral recti- 
tude, and its influence over our feelings and actions 
corresponds accordingly. 5. It is a primary prerog- 
ative, or constitutional law of conscience to lead in 
deciding on self-right or wrong, to approve or disap- 
prove. And its voice, under the influence of the Di- 
vine Spirit, should never be silenced, while all other 
powers should submit to its righteous dictation. 6. It 
is a law to man. Notwithstanding the near relation of 
the understanding, emotions, and will, its natural right 
is to reign supreme in impressive and dictatorial influ- 



LAWS OF CONSCIENCE. 301 

ence of the moral powers, and should be untrameled 
by either the will or; heart. 7. As the condition and 
action of our moral nature is essential to happiness in 
time and eternity, the light of heaven should guide 
conscience in all we do. 

SECTION II. 

1. If conscience be not a real power, and is, as as- 
serted by a great mind, to be only " a general princi- 
ple of moral approbation or disapprobation" then, 
when the mind is not influenced either way, conscience 
would be non-existence ; and if so, we could have no 
knowledge of it again without a new creation. It is 
not another faculty under change, neither can other 
faculties originate it; therefore, if, at any time, we are 
capable of experiencing moral influence, called con- 
science, there must be a cause which is abiding and 
part of self. Though a superhuman influence be 
added to mind, yet that would neither be an element 
or part of self. 2. It has self-power and intuitive 
right to lead or influence in deciding on right or 
wrong, the merit or demerit of our own actions, feel- 
ings, and affections. 8. Conscience-conception refers 
to the peculiar natural susceptibility, in its central 
moral position and condition to receive, possess, and 
retain the first intimations of influences or impressions 
in regard to the great principles of moral rectitude, 
subject to the will and approval of the Divine Being. 
4. Conscience-perception may refer to its natural and 
peculiar spontaneous acuteness and action, in appre- 



302 LAWS OF CONSCIENCE. 

tending and receiving the first influences by which 
it is affected, moving the mind to action, and constitu- 
tionally serving as a moral check against the aliena- 
tion of other powers from right. 5. The moral con- 
dition and ulterior laws of conscience are of the ut- 
most importance. (1.) A right conscience exists in 
the mind connected with a uniform pure motive and 
freedom from guilt, approved of God, and tenacious 
of the interests and happiness of self and our fellow- 
beings. (2.) A pure conscience is possessed of the 
renewing and hallowed power of Divine grace, by 
which it is free from the control of sin, and all the 
emotions and feelings tranquilized with peace and 
happiness. (3.) Such conscience is under the influ- 
ence of pure love to God and all mankind. 6. It is 
said to be evil when it ceases to correctly influence 
the mind in regard to right and wrong. 7. It is de- 
scribed as being "seared" when it possesses no pain 
or misgivings, as the mind reflects upon wickedness 
or contemplates wrong. Then the soul is ruined. 
Yet it may return to illimitable love and the purity 
of immortal thought, transcendent in beauty, grand- 
eur, and sublimity on the one hand, with sweet, efful- 
gent glory and grace on the other, spreading soothing 
and mellowing light, as upon the despair of the almost 
lost. 



CONSCIOUSNESS. 303 



CHAPTER III. 

CONSCIOUSNESS. 

SECTION I. 

1. Conscience exists at the foundation of the 
soul's moral nature, with power to influence and 
move the same; while consciousness is more closely 
connected with the states, action, and conclusions of 
the intellectual distinctions and decisions. 2. Con- 
sciousness, in one sense, is conscience in action. Its 
moral condition and influence appears to be connected 
with the existence and influence of conscience, and 
extends its adjudicatorial prerogatives over mental 
operations and sensations of external and internal 
origin. 3. It is an internal sense or decision from 
observation or experience resulting in real knowl- 
edge. 4. In another sense, it may be called a per- 
ception of what is passing in the mind, while con- 
science, by intuitive power and right, extends to all 
our actions, physical and mental. Consciousness is 
properly the knowledge of the existence; and con- 
science, of the moral nature of actions. The former 
is busied with, and more naturally appertains to, met- 
aphysics; and the latter, with morality. 5. Conscious- 
ness is self-evident in the philosophy of mind, known 
to be true, independently of either proof or disproof. 



304 CONSCIOUSNESS. 

By it we are positively aware that self is real, and in 
opposition to non-existence; or, that I am not, or 
am not myself. Doubt is impossible, unless we could 
first cease to be ; then there would be nothing capable 
of doubting. 6. Self- consciousness is sustained by 
conscience, and from the very natural laws of being 
neither of them can ever be doubted. 7. Conscious- 
ness is self-recognition, not only of the processes 
and emotions of the mind, but is also the mind know- 
ing itself in these. 8. Self-consciousness, in the very 
nature of its existence, implies, (1.) An inherent 
knowledge of self-reality as absolute. (2.) That self- 
reality and action are its subjects. (3.) And that 
which is beyond self-finity, is its object or objects 
of ulterior knowledge. 

SECTION II. 

1. Consciousness is not only real, but is conditioned 
by a spontaneous constitutional law of intellectual be- 
ing — evidenced, from its influence and action ; results 
known to exist in the experience of persons gener- 
ally, but no result can take place with sufficient caus- 
ative power. 2. It can not be a result of other 
faculties. Could any one of them, or all combined, 
create this power, then the original or first one may 
have created itself, which is absurd. 3. In the orig- 
inal spontaneity of consciousness there is decisive 
power in regard to mental phenomena. Belief in the 
testimony and decisions of consciousness and con- 
science can not be doubted till we know self to be 



CONSCIOUSNESS. 305 

non-existence, but this is impossible. 4. A knowl- 
edge of personal identity begins with conscience and 
is matured more fully by consciousness. But belief 
in the uniformity of such identity is dependent upon 
memory and reason. Memory calls up past mental 
feelings and states; reason connects them in one 
chain up to the present conscious mental state, in 
w r hich the conviction is irresistible that they all be- 
longed to the same sentient being. 5. It has direct 
respect to the present; as we can not be said to be 
conscious, abstractly, of any thing which does not 
exist at the present time* We may have conscious 
remembrance of past events and a conscious con- 
templation of that which is future ; but this involves, 
in part, the presence of other faculties. 6. Con- 
sciousness is not a " second source of internal knowl- 
edge." Neither can the organs of sense be a " pri- 
mary source" of knowledge. It is not made known 
"by suggestion" That a "knowledge of self" does 
not have its origin in connection with consciousness 
and conscience, is absurd. Suggestion has no self- 
power to originate it, nor abstractly its own existence. 
The doctrine that " impressions from external objects 
must be experienced, in order to give origin to the 
idea of self," is untrue, unless mind is derived from 
matter. 7. All degrees of belief are matters of con- 
sciousness, and there is no belief but intuitive. It is 
a source of knowledge, including emotions of the 
beautiful, the grand, and the sublime : then descends 

to the ludicrous and those of horror. It includes feel- 

26 



306 CONSCIOUSNESS. 

ings of pleasure, hope, joy, and happiness; and on 
the other hand, those of pain, despondency, and re- 
morse. 8. When we experience feelings of friend- 
ship, sympathy, gratitude, aifeetion, and love; or those 
of hatred, anger, jealousy, revenge, and envy, we 
have conscious knowledge that they are real and be- 
long to ourselves. 

SECTION III. 

1. Consciousness , as well as conscience, is a pri- 
mary source of knowledge. It has power to witness 
of, and to self, in the origin of self-knowledge. In- 
tuitive knowledge of self-identity is the (1.) or pri- 
mary — the origin and the highest source of knowl- 
edge. The (2.) source is that which our spirits 
receive from the Divine Spirit in the evidence of par- 
don impressed or witnessed to our spirits, which is 
knowledge direct, being independent of any aid or 
hinderance from our abstract physical nature. Con- 
scious experience can not be doubted. (3.) An ulte- 
rior source of knowledge is that from the external 
world derived through the medium of the senses. 2. 
Consciousness includes and is the test of all moral and 
religious emotions and feelings. Convictions, repent- 
ance, humility, adoration, dependence, forgiveness, 
the influence of pardon and the experimental evi- 
dence of salvation, together with approval, disap- 
proval, or remorse, all are subject to the state, condi- 
tion, and power of conscience and consciousness. 3. 
Then a conscious and heart-felt religion is the only effi- 



CONSCIOUSNESS. 307 

cient and effectual known to man. Affecting the 
moral elements of the soul, it is, therefore, both rea- 
sonable and scientific, from the glow of its first dawn 
on earth to the infinity of its perfectness in heaven. 
It neither destroys nor creates faculties, but changes 
their condition and moral relation: giving spiritual 
freedom from bondage, joy for heaviness, peace for 
trouble, light for darkness, love for hatred, and happi- 
ness boundless — directing to safety and triumph, 
when the last trump shall sound, the seas dry up, and 
mountains dissolve. 4. If the revolt of a single star 
from its orbit shakes the earth, if not all worlds, then 
may not the revolt of a rational soul, priceless in pur- 
chase, all price beyond, move the moral universe ? Its 
condition and action may affect either hell or heaven ; 
deepening the wail of the one, or inspiring the song 
of the other. Look constantly to moral purity. 
Though the lamps of night's outer temple cease to 
burn, yet the soul shall live forever. 



308 THE HEART 



CHAPTER IV. 

THE HEART. 
SECTION I. 

1. The heart is a muscular or nervous viscus, situ- 
ated in the thorax. It originates the blood's motion 
through the arteries to the different parts of the body. 
It is the great center or seat of animal life. As it is 
the center of the physical organization, and has, by 
natural right, # a mandatory control over all physical 
powers, so has the heart in our spiritual nature been 
regarded as the central power of the soul. 2. It is 
natural for all physical powers to become weary, ex- 
cept the nerves and cords connected with the contin- 
ued action of the heart and lungs. We have no way 
to account for this, unless such unwearied action is 
caused by the continued presence of Divine power. 
3. This feature of unweariedness very fitly represents 
the untiring vivacity and action of the soul. But we 
now confine our thoughts to the heart, as referred to 
our spiritual nature. ■ 4. It is not an element of mind, 
but appears to be the central influence, or power, 
where all the elements of the soul concentrate, and 
by which they appear to be connected in unison of 
feeling, decision, and action. 5. In nature, condition, 
and position, it appears to be midway and modulating 



THE HEART. 309 

the ulterior natural distinction of conscience, the tvill, 
and the understanding. 6. The heart, correlatively, 
within itself, possesses central power and influence 
with and over all mental faculties, emotions, and affec- 
tions, and is the disposition of the mind. (1.) The 
judgment not only informs the heart, but has influ- 
ence in presenting its decisions with correct distinc- 
tions of realities and worth. Yet the heart, with in- 
herent power, often blinds the judgment till error 
and ruin are the results. (2.) The will has power 
over the heart, but the latter, filled with perverseness, 
often induces improper volitive action. (3.) Memory 
furnishes the heart with treasured realities in experi- 
ence, yet the latter often refuses those facts putting 
out the light of hope. 

SECTION II. 

1. The heart is influenced by moral elements of 
mind. (1.) Conscience connects it with Divine influ- 
ences, restraining from evil and directing to grace 
and pardon, but its impurities often rend all such re- 
strictions. (2.) It is the seat of affections, and by 
the strength of these may its relation to evil or good 
be tested. (3.) In proportion as the heart is under 
the influence of love, is it controlled by it. Could 
there be a heart naturally incapable of pure love, the 
wandering Arab might humbly beg to be saved from 
its tender mercies. A true, loving heart, with pure 
motive, lives near heaven, and should never be broken 
of imperceptible companionship with angels. But 



310 THE HEART. 

the heart can resist all the charms of love. In it the 
consuming fires of sin and depravity may burn, or 
upon it the dews of grace may distill, mellowing in 
the breaking light of eternal day. 2. We now turn 
to the Scripture testimony and descriptions of the 
heart. It is said to be " dilated with joy, contracted 
and depressed with sadness, broken by sorrow, and 
hardened by prosperity. It is desolate in affliction 
and melts under discouragements." There is "an 
honest and a good heart, a broken and a clean heart, 
a liberal and an evil heart." 3. A depraved heart is 
said to be " deceitful above all things and desperately 
wicked." And it requires Divine power to renovate 
it. "And I will give them an heart to know me : they 
shall return unto me with their whole heart." 4. 
Hardness of heart takes place under sin when the Di- 
vine Spirit withdraws from it. 5. A pure heart is 
constituted such by Divine grace. " His Spirit bear- 
eth witness with our spirit. Whosoever is born of 
God sinneth not. Love one another with a pure 
heart. Perfect love casteth out all fear." Keep thy 
heart pure and God will keep thee forever. 

SECTION III. 

1. The heart is the central power of the soul, cor- 
relating mental elements, either in natural existence 
or relative influences in action. It lies back of the 
power of association. The hill and valley, mountain 
and sea, flying clouds and blooming flowers, all pre- 
sent varied trains of thought with crowding images; 



THE HEART. 311 

beautiful or mean, grand or revolting, corresponding 
with previous trains of thought, chiefly dependent on, 
conditioned and sustained by the heart. 2. It may 
be restrained by grace. The understanding, will, and 
conscience serve as its checks and modifiers, yet it 
may resist them all. 3. True eloquence never can 
proceed from a cold, unfeeling heart. It must feel 
the burden of its message till the deep internal fires 
of excited genius and energy thrill every active prin- 
ciple and emotion of the soul, all concentrating in the 
power and quickening throes of the great, the mighty 
heart. Then is realized the lightning and the storm, 
the thunder and the bolt ! 4. It bears up and onward 
the full burden of the soul. What we feel we can 
make known and cause others to feel. It can not 
make thought, but is susceptible, and carries, in ap- 
proximation, a greater infinity of thought and mean- 
ing than the inert bosom of a thousand moving worlds. 
5. Love, pure and holy, should ever rule the vivid 
energies of such internal power, stupendous in re- 
search, feeling, and joy, and majestic in imperishabil- 
ity. 



DIVISION THIRD. 



-♦♦♦- 



CHAPTER I. 

INTERNAL MORAL POWER IN THE OR- 
IGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 

SECTION I. 

1. The original powers of mind apprehend the re- 
ality of self, and are self- witnesses to, and of, self- 
reality. Such power of knowledge, abstractly, can 
neither be increased nor diminished, without varying 
the natural identity and essence of such faculties ; 
for we can have no knowledge of abstract, relative 
self-elementary degrees. 2. Such elements have nat- 
ural 'power to know the reality of self-being. And 
with them is the power to know facts beyond self. 
3. Primary mental and moral elements are the foun- 
dation and source of all knowledge. 4. The moral 
element enters into and constitutes, perhaps, the most 
extensive part of this original basis in apprehending 
facts. 

SECTION II. 

1. Conscience is connected with this original power 
to know realities. Spontaneous intuitions and convic- 
tions in regard to entities can not be separated from 

conscience. And the mind is only satisfied in refer- 

312 



INTERNAL POWER OF KNOWLEDGE. 313 

ence to such truths in experiencing a conscious feel- 
ing of their truthfulness. 2. With the nature and 
essence of such faculties is the only origin of real 
knowledge. 3. Internal ideas or notions may and do 
arise in connection with intuitive power, and no where 
else. If the soul had no power of knowledge in 
itself, it could have none beyond self. 

27 



314 SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE. 



CHAPTER II. 

THE SOUL HAS ONLY THREE GENERAL 
SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE: 1. INHER- 
ENT. 2. DIRECT. 3. ULTERIOR. 

SECTION I. 

1. Inherent knowledge is contained in, and is in- 
separably connected with original faculties. Such 
elements are not only the natural power, but the 
foundation of our capability to know facts. 2. Then 
the power and 'origin of knowledge must be ever and 
inseparably connected with the primary mental facul- 
ties. 3. Therefore inherent knowledge is identified 
■with the very nature of original elements, and consti- 
tutes the first and most absolute source of self- 
knowledge. 

SECTION II. 

1. Knowledge direct is that which is immediately 
and spiritually imparted or impressed, by the Divine 
Spirit, upon our spirits, without, and independently 
of, any aid from physical organs. 2. If our immate- 
rial nature is capable of animating the physical or- 
gans of sense, so as to capacitate them to receive 
sensations by contact with external things, then it has 
power to receive spiritual impressions and knowledge 
without the inertness of such organs. 8. The soul 



SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE. 315 

has spiritual perception, sight, light, and knowledge. 
Any conscious-felt fact is knowledge, and can not be 
doubted. 4. The soul is immaterial, and its knowl- 
edge is immaterial; hence influences and truths im- 
parted to it by the Divine Spirit are true, and form 
the second source of knowledge, being direct and in- 
dependent of all physical entities or laws. 

SECTION III. 

1. Knowledge by means of the physical organs of 
the senses is not absolute in perfection. This is the 
third and ulterior source of knowledge. 2. The phys- 
ical organs have neither perfection nor natural ability 
to act, only as imparted by the connected immaterial 
nature. As inertness, decay, and death belong to 
them, our knowledge from such source is both ulterior 
and deceptious. 3. But the soul contains an internal 
world of positive and imperishable reality. The vivid 
celerity of thought makes the sluggish lightning 
flash. Sacred joy rising, swells upon the distant 
limits of possibility, certifying us of a happy infinity 
beyond. 



316 CHRISTIANITY AND INFIDELITY 



CHAPTER III. 

RELATIVE CLAIMS OF CHKISTI ANI TY AND 

INFIDELITY — HOW TESTED BY THE 

MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND — THE 

POWER AND ORIGIN OF BELIEF. 

SECTION I. 

1. The relative claims of Christianity and infidelity 
can only be fully tested by the moral elements of 
mind. Positive confidence can not exist without the 
approval of our moral nature. 2. Infidelity is either 
true or false. If true, it should be approved; but if 
false, such delusion is ruinous and fatal. 3. To be a 
consistent infidel, we must have always been one con- 
stitutionally or in nature. Our conscious intuitions, 
convictions, and emotions must have always been in- 
fidel in nature. Then belief must have always of 
necessity corresponded, and we never could have 
doubted infidelity. But the moral nature is univers- 
ally opposed to such credence. Faith in infidelity is 
by effort, hence unnatural. 

SECTION II. 

1. There are three general classes of evidence es- 
tablishing the truthfulness of Christianity, all tested 
by the moral powers. (1.) External evidence, as 
found in the existence, designs, and laws of nature, 



CHRISTIANITY AND INFIDELITY. 317 

and evidenced in history; the power and reality of 
miracle; the existence and correctness of prophetic 
fulfillment; together with the existence, harmony, and 
wonderful preservation of the Scriptures — all may 
affect the mind through the medium of the senses; 
yet neither that nor sensation has self-power to know 
them to be true. The test is with the intuitive ele- 
ments of the mind. (2.) The internal evidence con- 
taining the harmony of the several parts of Revela- 
tion, written by some fifty different persons, without 
concert, ranging about fifteen hundred years. The 
chain is unbroken, harmonizing with itself, the light 
of nature, and the internal convictions and feelings 
of the soul. (3.) Experimental evidence is the high- 
est, and far more convincing than the other classes, 
becoming a part of conscious knowledge. 



318 MORAL REASONING. 



CHAPTER IV. 

RELATIVE CLAIMS OF CHRISTIANITY AND IN- 
FIDELITY— EVIDENCE OF SPIRITUAL IN- 
FLUENCE AND PARDON— CONSCIOUS AND 
POSITIVE KNOWLEDGE AS DERIVED 
FROM THREE SOURCES: 1. INHER- 
ENT. 2. DIRECT. 3. ULTERIOR. 

SECTION I. 

1. Inherent knowledge is connected with the nat- 
ural power and action of original faculties. What I 
feel I am conscious of; and I am conscious of nothing 
but what I fe'el. If I am conscious of sensations of 
happiness or joy, it is only because I feel them. If 
conscious of pain, I know it only because I feel it. 
Conscience is connected with the origin of conscious 
feeling. 2. Consciousness is an original suscepti- 
bility of mind, coexisting with thought and feeling. 
Thought is known to the thinking principle, and feel- 
ing is a sensitive change affecting the original powers, 
and can only be known because felt. To talk of 
thought and feeling not felt, is unmeaning and utter 
foolishness. 3. If I feel, I am as sensible of the ex- 
istence of the feeling I or self as I can be of the 
emotion felt. If all thought, feeling, and self are 
felt, in order to be known, then spirit can influence 
spirit, and the conscious evidence of pardon can equal 
a knowledge of self. 



MORAL REASONING. 319 

SECTION II. 

1. Knowledge direct, involves the power, action, 
and affecting influence of spirit upon spirit. This we 
know to exist, and believe with confidence. (1.) Spirit, 
in its immaterial nature, is adapted to spirit, and to 
doubt such fact would equal a denial of self. (2.) We 
have knowledge of any conscious change affecting our 
spirits. The pardon of sins is known to be true, and 
when fully realized can not be questioned or rejected. 
2. The third or ulterior source of knowledge, by 
means of the physical organs of the senses, may de- 
ceive us. (1.) From the inert nature of the organs of 
sense. (2.) In being affected by the paralyzing effect 
of disease. But a conscious knowledge of salvation 
from sin destroys the power of death, presenting the 
glories of eternal life to the soul in its fearless travel 
to the future. Therefore, the origin of all positive 
knowledge, whether of a mental or moral character, 
is in connection with the primary elements of the 
mind ; and physical elements can not add strength to 
the decisions of this internal court. Hence, knowl- 
edge inherent in powers certifying self-reality is 
independent of doubt. And the influence of the 
Infinite Spirit upon such immaterialities is direct, 
independent of physical organs, and without decep- 
tion. The power of this intuitive court lies back 
of all materiality and infidelity — the uncertainty and 
deception of both are measured by it and left in 
total ruins. 



DIVISION FOURTH. 



CHAPTER I. 

THE CONDITION AND PECULIAR STATES OF 
THE MORAL NATURE OF MIND. 

SECTION I. 

1. If God in the creation of the soul always pur- 
posed that it should live forever, then its immortality 
is natural and of necessity. For such purpose would 
be a law of hi& being extending to immortality, and 
securing the indestructibility of the soul. And in 
this purpose he created us with a conscious feeling, 
sense, and ever-anxious aspirings for the future, a 
natural longing after immortality and happiness. It 
is contrary to the purity of his being that we should 
be thus constituted only to be disappointed. 2. Con- 
science lies at the foundation of our moral nature, and 
such nature is established from consciousness. That 
which we experience in regard to right or wrong, ap- 
proval or disapproval, is found only in such nature. 
3. Faith, in one sense, is natural to mind, and con- 
nected with our moral nature. (1.) The faith of cre- 
dence, by which we accredit testimony or receive facts, 
is natural and universal. Angels and men have it, and 

even devils believe and tremble. (2.) The faith of 
320 



MORAL DREAMING. 321 

reliance is of higher order, and involves action of 
the moral powers under Divine influences. It is pos- 
sessed by the true penitent. (3.) The faith of assur- 
ance is that by which a penitent soul is adopted into 
the favor of God, and realizes a renewing change of 
its moral nature. 

SECTION II. 

1. Moral dreaming refers to that condition of mind 
in which we have thoughts in sleep, yet it differs in 
nature or character from mental dreaming. 2. Mere 
mental dreaming is only evidence of the ever-active 
nature of mind, but thoughts thus arising are not to 
be depended upon as true; they may or may not 
come to pass. 3. But moral dreaming is closely con- 
nected with the moral powers, and generally arises 
from impressions made upon them by Divine Good- 
ness, which influence the mind and are lasting. 
They should be cherished, as they are always given 
for some good purpose. 4. These impressions are 
made upon the conscience or heart. " God speaketh 
in a dream, in a vision of the night, when deep sleep 
falleth upon men ; then he openeth the ears of men 
and sealeth their instruction, that he may withdraw 
man from his purpose." 



322 RELATION OF THE WILL. 



CHAPTER II. 

RELATION OF THE WILL TO THE MORAL NA- 
TURE OR ELEMENTS OF MIND. 

SECTION I. 

1. The will has power over the moral faculties or 
nature ; though such powers have a persuasive attrac- 
tion or invoking influence upon the will, yet they can 
not command or force it to act. 2. The very term 
will implies freedom, and is liberty in self-nature. 
The expression "free will is objectionable, as it would 
imply hound will. If it be not free in essential na- 
ture, it can not be called will ; and if it be bound, it 
ceases to be will. Therefore, self -liberty is essential 
to its nature and being. And if we are conscious that 
it is now a free principle, it has always been so. 3. 
Man is fallen. The act of falling was either free or 
of necessity, by a perverted act of self-liberty or Di- 
vine decree. If by the latter, there was an epoch in 
eternity when such decree took place, and such act 
must sustain a certain relation to his foreknowledge. 
Three positions will cover the whole ground. (1.) 
The act took place after his foreknowledge; or, (2.) 
It must proceed with and be in essence his foreknowl- 
edge; or, (3.) The act must have taken place before 
his foreknowledge. We will examine these positions. 



RELATION OF THE WILL. 323 

SECTION II. 

1. If the decree took place after foreknowledge it 
would involve an absurdity. We must admit that 
Deity foreknew all things, and nothing was hid from 
him. Then it would be wholly useless, seeing that 
man would fall, to decree that he should. A bird 
flies through my window, but I did not compel it to do 
so. Man was made free to act, and this was essential 
to his being. God saw that in the exercise of this 
liberty he would fall, and not that he should, for he 
was cautioned and entreated not to transgress. There- 
fore a decree of such fall could not, in the order of 
time, follow foreknowledge. 2. If foreknowledge 
and the decreeing act are one in essence or nature, 
then such nature would be a part of or enter into the 
Divine existence, implying imperfection, and our 
fall by the motion of Infinite perfection. This is re- 
volting. Perfect holiness can not cause such ruin. 
Foreknowledge and the will or act of Deity are divis- 
ible and distinct. I know that I have power to raise 
my hand to my head, but not willing to do so, it re- 
mains inactive. If our fall was decreed, it took place 
before foreknowledge. 3. For such decree to take 
place before the existence of foreknowledge, is ab- 
surd. But if true, then Deity knew not that man 
would fall till his decree revealed the fact. Then all 
men are innocent, having only and necessarily obeyed 
the law of infinite fate, and if recovered must be 
saved by the same. But this is absurd. 4. Angels 



324 RELATION OF THE WILL. 

were made free, and some of them " kept not their 
first estate, but left their own habitation/' This was 
their own voluntary act. 5. Man was created with 
liberty of voluntary service to God, but in this essen- 
tial freedom he departed, which separation was ruinous. 
6. That mind is free to voluntary action, is without 
doubt. And upon this rests the soul's destiny. Sin 
filled the heavens with thick clouds, and made turbid 
the moral night of earth; yet hope dawned with im- 
perishable light, spread over distant hills and mount- 
ains of God, and penetrated the gloomy valley of death 
with the glow of immortality. 



DIVISION FIFTH 



-♦♦♦- 



CHAPTER I. 

PRIMARY EMOTIONS IMMEDIATELY CON- 
NECTED WITH THE MORAL ELE- 
MENTS OF MIND. 

SECTION I. 

1. Emotions refer to an internal motion, agitation, 
or excitement of the mind, which may increase slowly 
or rapidly, and pass away without desire; for if fol- 
lowed by desire it is called passion. 2. They arise 
in connection with the nature of mental and moral 
elements. But from experience, their conditioned 
distinctions evolve a more intimate dependence upon 
the moral powers. 3. Conscience enters into the 
basis supporting emotions with power to realize or 
have conscious cognizance of such influences. 4. 
Emotions differ from desires. The former arise, 
move, swell, and diminish, like waves of the sea. The 
latter may follow, and in common be based upon emo- 
tions, but differ in nature. They are realized subse- 
quent to the mind's perceptive and cognitive acts, 
and more remotely than emotions. But perception, 
apprehension, and cognition can not lay the founda- 
tion, nor give origin to desires. The object of such 

325 



326 MORAL EMOTIONS. 

acts might be revolting, and nothing but that which 
excites pleasing emotions can be desired. In this 
respect desires follow and are dependent upon emo- 
tions. 5. Emotions are said to be natural when they 
arise between the action of the moral elements and 
our conscious feelings of moral rectitude or obliga- 
tion. But they must follow perception, as we can 
not experience emotions in regard to any thing of 
which we have had no conscience-perception or feeling. 

SECTION II. 

1. The character of moral emotions changes in as- 
similation, or conformity to that of our moral percep- 
tion or apprehension of realities adapted to our moral 
nature. 2. The order of succession is, (1.) mental 
states; (2.) emotions, and, (3.) desires. But such 
states are distinguished or conditioned by the moral 
influences or acts of our moral nature. Emotions are 
known only because felt; and they vary with the con- 
dition or character of that which causes their exist- 
ence, whether in the intellectual or moral world. 



ORAL EMOTIONS, 327 



CHAPTER II. 

PRIMARY MORAL EMOTIONS, OR EMOTIONS OF 
MORAL APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL. 

SECTION I. 

1. Primary moral emotions refer us to that class 
more immediately connected with the existence and 
influence of the moral powers. 2. Such emotions of 
approval and disapproval have their origin in connec- 
tion with conscience and consciousness. They are 
capable of degrees of excitement, swelling higher, like 
waves on the silvery surface of a lake before the 
rising breeze ; then retiring back to undisturbed re- 
pose. 3. That there are no moral emotions except 
those of " approval and disapproval" is absurd. 
Without moral elements, we can experience no con- 
scious-felt emotion in regard to any fact. 4. They 
are experienced immediately successive to the action 
and first influence of the moral elements, and follow 
perception. But perception morally has a twofold 
power of action. (1.) In regard to objects of the 
external world, reported through the medium of the 
senses. (2.) And the internal moral powers of the 
soul have spiritual perception in regard to character, 
right and wrong. 5. That we can have " no moral 
emotions without antecedent perceptions" of external 



328 MORAL EMOTIONS. 

things, is false; for emotions of moral approval and 
disapproval can exist in mind without reference to ex- 
ternal things. 6. Emotions of moral approval and 
disapproval are not "the basis of the subsequent feel- 
ings of moral obligation ;" but they are connected 
with conscience, consciousness, and the heart, which 
constitutes the true basis of obligatory feelings, and 
where they arise in reference to right and wrong. 

SECTION II. 

1. Moral emotions change corresponding with the 
condition, in change, of antecedent perceptions. If 
a friend saves me from sudden death, my emotions 
instantly approve the act. But here is a case of 
murder; my emotions instantly change to positive dis- 
approval. 2. Conscience-perception of internal spirit- 
ual influences is more positive than those of external 
realities, and are worthy of full confidence. 3. Con- 
science gives law to emotions of approval and disap- 
proval, and without it we could not have knowledge 
of such realities. Though, like ocean-waves, they 
wake from the slumber of the deep, subject to the 
changes of a thousand wrecking storms, yet, as the 
w T aves of ocean tell the direction and condition of 
passing tempests, so moral emotions approve or 
disapprove, while conscience is the final court of ap- 
peal in correct decisions. Emotions may appear and 
retire, but conscience, true to its heaven-endowed pre- 
rogatives, holds to right. 4. It is absurd to say that 
the basis of " the emotions of approval which we ex- 



MORAL EMOTIONS. 329 

ercise toward an object, lies, in all probability, upon 
the extreme boundaries of human knowledge." This 
is beyond our comprehension, as all the reports of 
spiritual self must be made to intuitive powers of our 
being, in order to real knowledge. 5. An act of 
kindness is approved, because our emotions in regard 
to it are agreeable and sanctioned by conscience. 6. 
A vicious act is rejected, being opposed to the nature 
of our moral emotions and the decisions of a righteous 

conscience. 

28 



330 OBJECTS OF MORAL EMOTIONS 



CHAPTER III. 

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY OBJECTS OF 
MORAL APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL. 

SECTION I. 

1. The primary objects of the emotions of moral 
approval and disapproval are moral agents. (1.) 
Such agents must have power of self-action. (2.) 
They must be endowed with the power of self-cogita- 
tion. (3.) They must possess a moral nature or con- 
science. 2. None but such agents can have conscious 
knowledge of moral action or of what constitutes 
moral rectitude. 

SECTION II. 

1. Secondary objects of the emotions of moral ap- 
proval and disapproval may embrace, (1.) All objects 
of self-action, possessing animate life, below the ra- 
tional mind of man, which evidence in their nature 
arid actions any thing of passion or calm, rage or 
mildness. For we have seen that all self-moving ani- 
mate beings have spirits or souls, and any manifesta- 
tion of the same which agrees or disagrees with a 
uniform moral rectitude is an ulterior object of emo- 
tions of approval or disapproval. Though no such 
deviations can be regarded as involving guilt in such 



OBJECTS OF MORAL EMOTIONS. 331 

beings, yet we can not withhold the action of our 
emotions in regard to such extremes of conduct, often 
associating such acts with moral agents while our 
emotions are experienced beyond doubt. (2.) Deport- 
ment is subject to emotions of approval or disapproval 
in proportion as they conform to, or deviate from true 
rectitude. (3.) Expressions or sentiments delivered 
of a moral or immoral nature excite emotions of ap- 
proval or disapproval. (4.) Moral or immoral senti- 
ments written give origin to emotions of moral ap- 
proval or disapproval. 



332 SIMPLE MORAL EMOTIONS 



CHAPTER IV. 

SIMPLE PRIMARY MORAL EMOTIONS. 
SECTION I. 

1. Simple emotions are very numerous, yet we shall 
speak in reference to only those more important. 
(1.) Joy enlivens the spirit and is excited in the mind 
in the accomplishment or reception of some good. 
(2.) It is a strojiger emotion, and more uniform in its 
deep abiding nature than either goodness or cheer- 
fulness. (3.) Regard is a primary, simple, moral 
emotion. It may be called a motion of the moral 
powers in reference to any thing exciting high admi- 
ration. (4.) Reverence is realized when the moral 
faculties have been exercised in regard to combina- 
tions of superior excellences and moral worth, con- 
trasted with the deep wretchedness and worthlessness 
of beings. When thoughts arise from a pure heart, 
in contemplating the perfections of the Divine Being, 
we experience what is called adoration. (5.) Sur- 
prise is experienced when some unexpected moral 
reality or revelation is made known. (6.) Astonishment 
is a strong, vigorous, and decided emotion in regard 
to sudden realities of surprise. 



SIMPLE MORAL EMOTIONS. 333 

SECTION II. 

1. Emotions of melancholy exist in connection with 
the moral faculties, which may be much influenced by 
diseased bodily powers. (1.) We experience dissatis- 
faction. (2.) Distrust in regard to others. (3.) De- 
pression and weariness of life. 2. Sorrow is experi- 
enced when the spirit is sad or heart-broken. 3. 
Grief arises in reference to the misfortunes and re- 
grets of the past. 4. Dissatisfaction takes place, 
having endured a diversity of disappointments, and 
nothing contemplated with pleasure or certainty. 5. 
An emotion of displeasure is experienced when the 
mind strongly disapproves any object or measure. 6. 
A conscious emotion of disgust for any thing mean is 
common. 7. An emotion of wonder is experienced 
when many seemingly-moral traits, yet conflicting in 
ultimate tendencies, are presented suddenly to the 
mind. 8. The emotion of delight is closely connected 
with cheerfulness, but is stronger. 9. The emotion 
of gladness is more closely connected with the moral 
nature than delight. 10. The emotion of modesty is 
lovely within itself, and heavenly in its influence and 
tendency. 11. The emotion of shame is experienced 
when we are involved in wrong. The soul, with pure 
motive, and always under happy emotions, travels with 
triumph over all of sin ; its spiritual course sweeps the 
fiery w T ake of departing time, unharmed by any war 
of elements or crash of worlds. 



DIVISION SIXTH. 



-++— 



CHAPTER I. 

SECONDABY MOKAL EMOTIONS. 
SECTION I. 

1. Emotions of moral beauty arise in connection 
with the existence and condition of moral elements? 
and the primary moral emotions are regarded as being 
more closely connected with such elements, while sec- 
ondary emotions are more remote. 2. Mental emo- 
tions are not "natural," while moral ones are subor- 
dinate, inferior, or unnatural. For the latter is as 
natural to the mind as the former. 3. The objects of 
the emotions of moral beauty may exist within the 
mind's states in meditation, reflection, and contempla- 
tion. 4. The affirmation of moral beauty implies a 
negative, which is tested by experience. The strength 
and vividness of moral emotions of beauty vary with 
the constitutional aptness of different minds to readily 
apprehend moral objects involving the lustral attrac- 
tions of purity. 5. The perception of that which ex- 
cites emotions of moral beauty is a source of happi- 
ness. 6. The contemplation of the virtue and benev- 
olent acts of others gives origin to emotions of moral 

beauty, imparting real happiness. 7. The contem- 
334 



EMOTIONS OF MORAL BEAUTY. 335 

plation of a pure act or heart adorned with the sweet 
graces of heaven never fails to awake emotions of 
moral beauty, and increases the happiness of the soul. 

SECTION II. 

1. A pure mind can not contemplate the holy na- 
ture of angels with their acts of love without experi- 
encing emotions of moral beauty. 2. Moral leauty is 
made known to the mind by moral emotions, or only 
by them can it be fully known as a source of happi- 
ness. 3. These emotions of pleasure are as a celestial 
fountain of joy and light, swelling in proportion to 
the degree of its purity and brightness, elevating the 
soul, while all objects of earth recede and fade in the 
evening of temporal life. 4. We experience such 
emotions in contemplating the character of the Divine 
Being. (1.) By the internal vision, perception, or 
feeling of the soul. The love of God, revealed to the 
heart of a sinner saved, gives origin to emotions which 
flow as a river, or roll as waves of the sea. (2.) In 
contemplating Divine wisdom and goodness, as im- 
pressed and typed in the works of creation, and made 
known through the medium of the senses, we experi- 
ence emotions of moral beauty. The devout soul can 
not look abroad upon the verdant earth, range the 
silent paths, or watch the flight of innumerable 
worlds brightening in the mingling rays of mellow 
light, without realizing an onward wafting of pure, 
beautiful, and heavenly emotions. 



336 OBJECTS OF BEAUTY 



CHAPTER II. 

EMOTIONS OF MORAL BEAUTY FROM ASSOCI- 
ATED OBJECTS. 

SECTION I. 

1. Emotions of moral beauty are natural to mind, 
and arise in connection with the moral powers. 2. A 
single object may be beautiful within itself, and capa- 
ble of giving origin to emotions of beauty, and if de- 
composed, each element or quality may cause an 
emotion of beauty. 3. Objects may become beautiful 
only by association. While listening to the full tones 
of spirited music, when unnatural semi-tones are 
sounded we experience an unpleasant emotion; but 
on hearing the same applauded by one in whose taste 
and judgment we have full confidence, then the asso- 
ciations of the effect in such a mind, and the other 
parts of the music, often create emotions of beauty. 
4. In walking down from the Temple walls, in Jeru- 
salem, to survey sad Gethsemane, though the ground, 
the lonely palm, the city and Mount of Olives, are all 
wreathed in clouds of gloom, or exist as mere thun- 
der-scathed sentinels of desolation, yet the associa- 
tion of the purity and love of Him who there once 
suffered to recover a revolted world from death, even 
the solitary rocks and waste places surrounding be- 



OBJECTS OF BEAUTY. 337 

come morally grand and lovely, exciting emotion- 
waves of moral beauty, filling the soul with boundless 
gratitude. 5. And on revisiting the place where the 
depressed and despairing spirit was first freed from 
moral death, realizing the joys of heavenly day, all 
surrounding objects associated in the remembrance of 
the event give origin to emotions of beauty and hap- 
piness. 

SECTION II. 

1. The capacity of the human mind to enjoy emo- 
tions caused by associated objects of beauty is exten- 
sive and of positive reality. Such associated objects 
form almost innumerable sources of pleasing emotions 
and joy, which are essential to true and enduring 
happiness. 2. Moral purity is not only an element 
of, but causes emotions of moral beauty. 3. Such 
purity, existing in moral beings, their lives, acts, and 
influences, and made known to us through the me- 
dium of the senses, give origin to emotions of beauty. 
4. Moral purity, as internally apprehended, realized, 
and felt, in connection with spiritual and holy influ- 
ences affecting our conscious being, create pure and 
sacred emotions of peace and happiness. 5. Emo- 
tions of moral beauty arising from associated objects, 
impart happiness as from thousands of combinations. 
Such emotions are inseparably connected with the 
soul made pure, whether in time or vast eternity. 

29 



338 EMOTIONS OF MORAL SUBLIMITY. 



CHAPTER III. 

EMOTIONS OF MOEAL SUBLIMITY. 
SECTION I. 

1. Emotions of moral sublimity refer to those 
motions or feelings of moral grandeur, elevated in 
character and consisting of a pleasing union of aston- 
ishment, awe, and gratitude in contemplating great 
realities and influences of pure moral excellence. 2. 
That which excites emotions of moral sublimity must 
be good and true. Waves gently undulating the 
placid surface of ocean may be called beautiful, but 
as increasing action swells them higher before the 
rising storm, the scene hightens into sublimity. So 
the moral emotions of the soul may rise into the full- 
ness of sublimity. 3. Fortitude in sustaining right, 
amid peril, danger, and death, creates emotions of 
moral sublimity. A certain princess about to be un- 
justly beheaded, a friend advanced, saying, " I will 
die in her place." This touched the feelings of the 
emperor, who caused both to be released. A noble- 
man remarked, "Did you see the emperor? was not 
that a great act saving your life?" She replied, "I 
saw no emperor, nor did I so much as think whether 
any emperor was present, I only saw and thought of 
that man, who said he would die for me." Such an 



EMOTIONS OF MORAL SUBLIMITY. 339 

act would give rise to emotions of moral sublimity. 
4. A calm and unyielding purpose to do good to 
friends and enemies, enkindles ennobling feelings 
morally grand and overwhelming. 5. But the perse- 
cuted and storm-tried Christian, driven from home, 
the graves of a loved ancestry, and all sacred associa- 
tions, yet dares to die on the road to duty, causes 
emotions of moral excellence. 6. We are capable of 
internal emotions of moral sublimity, in connection 
with the mind's states and acts, moved only by spir- 
itual influences, dwelling upon contemplated hap- 
piness. 

SECTION II. 

1. Knoivledge of emotions of moral sublimity de- 
pends much upon the moral condition of the heart. 
When the heart is pure and in the love of God, al- 
most every thing in the chain of moral and inert 
existences appears to glow with Divine goodness, and 
from them emotions can not be withheld. 2. An im- 
pure heart or conscience will realize perceptions fol- 
lowed by emotions, or feelings, which are fearful or 
of terrific sublimity. 3. But the soul filled with the 
indwelling peace of heaven can experience emotions 
of moral sublimity from all objects of grandeur, com- 
binations of facts, or elements bearing the impress of 
Divine goodness or moral worth. 



340 EMOTIONS OF THE LUDICROUS. 



CHAPTER IV. 

NATURE OF EMOTIONS OF THE LUDICROUS. 

SECTION I. 

1. Emotions of the ludicrous are not wholly moral 
emotions, yet they are closely connected with the 
distinctive condition of our moral powers. 2. They 
can not exist when the moral faculties are depressed 
with grief or vailed in clouds of gloom. They only 
exist when the conscience is free from remorse and 
the heart light, 3. Such emotions follow our percep- 
tion of something peculiar, or incongruous, in the 
saying, appearance, or person attracting attention. 
4. They may arise in connection with our internal 
thoughts and feelings, being wholly immaterial, or 
from what we witness in external objects — some pecu- 
liarity or unsuitableness. 5. Such emotions may arise 
with a cheerful state of mind or in playful delight, 
when some uncouthness suddenly discovered gives in- 
tense excitement. 6. They are involuntary when the 
mind is free from any expected excitement. The 
mortification of some sudden and uncouth failure in 
an eager effort at refined achievement, may fill the 
soul with emotions of the ludicrous. 7. Emotions of 
the ludicrous, properly guarded, are of practical util- 
ity. (1.) Lively emotions are important to the healthy 



> wit. ■ 341 

action of mental powers. (2.) Lively or cheerful feel- 
ings are essential to healthy action of the physical 
powers. (3.) The spirit of ridicule, improperly exer- 
cised, is revolting, but, if properly guarded, can oper- 
ate as one of the most effectual checks and remedies 
of thoughtless, inconsistent, and egotistic conduct. 
We need something to expel gloom and counteract 
feelings of despair. 

SECTION II. 

1. Though wit, in some respects, may resemble the 
nature of emotions of the ludicrous, yet it is more 
closely connected with the nature of genius, and to 
some extent included with the power of the under- 
standing. 2. It is the power of associating ideas in 
a new and unexpected manner. It excites the mind 
in connection with such associations, producing sur- 
prise joined with pleasure. 3. It is closely connected 
with the nature of humor, satire, irony, and burlesque. 
Wit has, when guarded, an important influence upon 
mental action; yet, if not restrained, dissipation is 
inevitable. 4. Humor is less vivid and poignant 
than wit; yet it is far more agreeable. The latter, 
directed against folly and egotism, often gives offense 
and excites resentment; while the former is agree- 
able, making us ashamed of our follies. 5. It is evi- 
dence of a pleasant disposition and kind heart. Its 
vividness and life-inspiring influence depends much 
upon the condition of the moral elements. When 
properly guarded, it has a happy influence upon the 



342 LEVITY. 

soul in sustaining an animated spirit of progression. 
6. Levity is connected with the lively emotions and 
feelings of the mind. But when the heart is sad or 
crushed with grief, it is suspended ; hence the state of 
the moral powers determines its vivacity. 7. It is an 
extravagance of mirthful emotions, or lightness of 
mind, which should always be governed by judgment 
and checked by moral restraint. 8. It not only tends 
to dissipation, but fickleness, inconstancy, and the ban- 
ishment of moral seriousness and w T orth. If not 
guarded, its extremes are followed by loss of confi- 
dence and gloom without hope. 



LANGUOR. 343 



CHAPTER V. 

LANGUOR. 
SECTION I. 

1. Languor, in its general acceptation, refers to 
lassitude or feebleness of both body and mind. 2. 
Intense and continued mental effort often over- 
powers and prostrates the nervous system, produc- 
ing languor in regard to physical and mental ac- 
tion. 3. But when the organs of the senses and 
nerves connected are enfeebled by disease mental ac- 
tion is often stupefied and imperfect. 4. Languor 
properly arises in connection w T ith the diseased or 
prostrated condition of the bodily powers, for all our 
conceptions of mind abstractly force the belief, that 
of and w T ithin itself there can be no such thing as 

spirit-languor. 

SECTION II. 

1. When we speak of languor as belonging to the 
manifestations of mind, we can not mean, that the 
essence of mind, uninfluenced by physical powers, is 
capable of immaterial loss or enfeebleness. 2. Then 
languor is caused by the peculiar state or diseased 
condition of the physical powers or organs of the 
senses through which mind acts. Beyond the grave 
the soul can have no languid emotion. 3. Languor 



344 LANGUOR. 

may serve as a prudent check to delusive or ill- 
founded joys, or of hope in regard to inaccessible 
objects of pursuit. 4. It may follow us down to 
death, but can not travel beyond. At the sound of 
the last trump, both soul and body will be free from 
such influence, whatever may be our condition in other 
points of real character. 



DIVISION SEVENTH 



CHAPTER I. 

PRIMARY EMOTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE 

EXISTENCE, ACTION, AND INFLUENCE 

OF THE INTELLECTUAL AND MO.RAL 

ELEMENTS OF MIND. 

SECTION I. 

1. Emotions of beauty are made known by conscious- 
ness, and are more fully tested when brought under the 
inspection of the mind. But they are so numerous we 
can only speak in regard to those most important. 

2. Objects of emotions may exist in the external 
world, or wholly within the operations of mind itself. 

3. Primary emotions exist in connection with intel- 
lectual and moral powers. 4. Emotions of beauty are 
always interesting, enlivening, and pleasing. They 
can not apply to unpleasant mental states of feel- 
ings, neither can the term beauty refer to any thing 
unpleasant. 5. We have conscious knowledge of emo- 
tions of beauty excited by external things, and are 
equally as conscious of emotions of beauty excited 
by internal spiritual influences. 6. Emotions change 
with our perceptions. Being subsequent to intellec- 
tions or internal conscious distinctions, and dependent 

345 



846 EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY, 

on such realities, they vary with our perceptions. 
Objects of a beautiful scenery may be intercepted, 
the relations of beauty disturbed, and the emotions 
become unpleasant. But they are perfectly restored 
when the obstructions are removed. 7. There are 
great varieties in objects and qualities calculated to 
excite emotions of beauty. And these within them- 
selves are called beautiful. Our feelings in regard 
to certain entities are indifferent, and there are other 
realities which excite decidedly-unpleasant sensations. 

SECTION II. 

1. A beautiful object possesses something within 
itself calculated to cause emotions of beauty, and 
from this fact we call them beautiful. Such objects 
are distinguished from others, and are known to differ 
from them by something within themselves, an inher- 
ent trait or original quality. 2. Some objects of 
beauty possess something like an awe of grandeur. 
The dawn of the far-spreading light of morn, the 
golden glow of the setting sun, the majesty of the 
silvery moon traveling in the heavens, together with 
millions of worlds, as bright sentinels bounding the 
Saharas of immensity, all are beautiful and move in 
the awe of grandeur. 3. But there is a milder and 
sweeter class of emotions, in regard to immediate ob- 
jects of beauty, composed of more brilliant qualities 
and finer texture. In looking out upon blooming 
flowers, waving forests, and verdant plains, we are 
excited by a different class of feelings. 4. The 



EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY. 347 

grounds or occasions of emotions of beauty have 
caused some diversity of opinion. Yet they have 
many sources or causes. (1.) Beauty connected with 
and wholly in the mind, is one and indivisible. (2.) 
Such emotions may be excited in the mind by other 
spiritual influences, or in connection with the impres- 
sions of spirit upon spirit. (3.) They may be caused 
by objects of the external world. It is absurd to say 
that in qualities and objects of beauty there is only 
" one common quality" which is the ground or cause 
of internal emotions. Beauty is not only in the per- 
ception of relation, and* of a fitness or utility, but is 
experienced in connection with these, while the inter- 
nal power knowing such facts may, in some way, re- 
ceive influences corresponding to the cause. 



348 EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY 



CHAPTER II. 

PRIMARY EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY CONNECTED 

WITH THE INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL 

ELEMENTS OF MIND. 

SECTION I. 

1. The mind is capable of emotions of beauty 
within itself, and are often experienced when no defi- 
nite cause is known. But the presence of a beautiful 
object excites pleasing emotions, strong or passive in 
proportion to the degree of beauty it contains. 2. 
But an object, beautiful within itself, may delight the 
mind at one time under certain circumstances, and at 
another time, and under different circumstances, would 
cause unpleasant emotions. The change may not be 
in the object so much as in the condition of the mind 
itself. 3. The falling cascade with its romantic scenery 
fills us with pleasing emotions. But if, while stand- 
ing upon the lofty bank of evergreen, a loved friend 
falls into the ruinous abyss below, ever afterward 
this same scenery would appear sad and gloomy, giv- 
ing rise to unpleasant emotions. 4. Though there be 
no identity or oneness in the almost endlessly-diversi- 
fied external causes of emotions of beauty, yet they 
affect one and the same internal power. 



EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY. 349 

SECTION II. 

1. We will now turn to the examination of objects 
which excite emotions of beauty, giving rise to almost 
numerous emotions and varying in condition, intensity, 
or passiveness. 2. Strong emotions are apt to arise 
in contemplating some material object. Mountains, 
valleys, groves, rivers, seas, and oceans, all excite in- 
tense emotions of beauty. They fill the soul as we 
look out upon the perfections of Deity. See him 
empurpling the east with the breaking light of the 
rising king of day, and wheeling the orb on which we 
live! Behold him throwing the mantle of darkness 
over me in the evening, and kindling the skies into 
radiance by unvailing suns and innumerable worlds ! 
We must feel as we see glowing tints in the flower, 
with shade melting into shade, infinitely above any 
combination of colors art can produce. 3. We feel 
emotions of beauty in contemplating the majesty of 
nature. From the summit of some lofty mountain 
watch the rising cloud, and observe the evening spread 
her gray and dusky mantle over the mellow features 
of the landscape, till lost in earth's cone of night. 
Our feelings arouse as the eye rests with delight on 
the stars as they break, one by one, through the in- 
creasing obscurity. What fountains of pleasure fill 
the soul as contemplation rises from the sweet flower 
in the valley to waving forests, and from the mighty 
globe to the glory of innumerable planets and burn- 
ing suns ! 4. That which has been called intrinsic 



350 EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY. 

beauty, exists in the forms of objects, and is essential 
to the very nature of their existence. (1.) Objects 
which are oval or circular are regarded as possessing 
original beauty. The surface of a ball has something 
interesting, and especially when there are many con- 
trasted of different magnitudes. (2.) There is beauty 
in circles, the orbicular form of the earth, together with 
that of the heavenly bodies, mingling in harmony, 
yet differing in size and appearance. (3.) There is 
intrinsic beauty in circular forms, or that w T hich is a 
curvature in form or action — the windings of the 
tender vine, the flowing stream or rolling river, the 
waving grain or bending forests, or the still more 
graceful curved of the w r eeping w 7 illow. If orators 
wish to have graceful, easy, and impressive gestures, 
let them imitate the curvatures of w r illow branches 
waving to an increasing breeze. (4.) There is beauty 
in motion. The sparkling brook and majestic river are 
beautiful, because their waters are restless, rolling on 
forever. Each flying bird, loitering cloud, running 
horse, and racing cars, together with rolling ocean 
waves, crowned with moving ships, bearing onward a 
mighty commerce, thrill and stir the soul with exciting 
emotions. 5. Elements of beauty are connected with 
reasoning. Feelings of pleasure and delight are ex- 
perienced in pursuing argumentation, or a perfect and 
unbroken train of thought. 6. The mathematician 
realizes pleasing delight in axioms, numbers, proposi- 
tions, and theorems. 7. We have pleasing emotions 
in tracing vivid lines of poetry, the living descriptions 



EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY, 351 

and boldness of thought can not fail to interest. 8. 
The painter admires the beauty in the appearance and 
execution of the picture, and feels an enkindled an- 
imation. 9. There is beauty in music, and every 
lover of sweet melody not only has emotions pleasing, 
but feels that such vary with the character of the 
music. There are any number of variations and de- 
grees in sounds, ranging from the natural, deep tones 
of the murmuring sea, to the mellow sweetness of the 
iEolian harp. 10. Beauty in sound is original with 
savages. It calms the rage of war and delights with 
pleasing emotions. 11. It is original with some kinds 
of brutes. It can not arise from association; never- 
theless, they are often tamed in the wild woods, and 
evince delight at the sound of music. 

SECTION III. 

1. Of objects called beautiful it is acknowledged 
that the intelligent beings of earth surpass all besides, 
and properly command a higher regard than other 
existences. An immortal being, with a refined intel- 
lect, pure heart, and neat appearance, always pos- 
sesses attractions, moral worth, and beauty, from 
which the approving feelings of the soul can neither 
be indifferent nor withheld. 2. Man in his proper 
character is not only noble and impressive in appear- 
ance, but gives origin to emotions of approval and 
admiration. The thought of that noble form, possess- 
ing an immortal spirit, capable of almost an endless 
research and knowledge, consecrated to the will of 



352 EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY. 

God, creates delight. 3. Such moral worth, char- 
acterizing and adorning the soul, and conditioning it 
with a calm, thoughtful, and agreeable disposition, to- 
gether with an unyielding determination to be right, 
and to act in accordance with the will of his Creator, 
and the true honor and dignity of his high calling 
and destiny, attracts the confidence and love of the 
intelligences of both earth and heaven. Dignified in 
purity of purpose, he adorns human nature, is a de- 
fense to the helpless, a counselor of safety, and a 
waylight to happiness. The heavenly serenity of his 
countenance with kind expression, his noble appear- 
ance and majestic movements possess intrinsic beauty. 
He is worthy the attractions, affections, and love so 
justly inspired and willingly bestowed. He should 
dare to be wise and good, carrying the confidence and 
affections, if possible, of gathering thousands to the 
acme of wisdom, the Cross of Christ, and the bright- 
ening hopes of eternal joys. 4. Correct mental anal- 
ysis evolves no evidence that the mind of woman, 
abstractly or within itself, is in any way naturally infe- 
rior to that of the other sex. The only difference is 
in the condition and character of its manifestations. 
Such modulations or conditioned action are influ- 
enced by the physical organs of the senses upon 
which mind is dependent, as there can be no natural 
defect in spirit itself. The opinion that there is such 
defect or weakness in the spiritual nature of the fe- 
male mind, lying back of any influence from the con- 
dition of the physical organs of sense, is contrary to 



EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY. 353 

all reliable facts in the nature of mind. 5. Woman 
of high mental and moral attainments is worthy the 
sacred confidence and pure regard of earthly intelli- 
gences. Of pious heart, generous in feeling and kind 
in spirit, with a love to promote the happiness of all 
within her influence, she is, in a moral light, beauti- 
ful, an angel of mercy, loved on earth and in heaven. 
Such attractions are increased in manifested cheerful- 
ness, sympathy, and love, as she administers relief to 
the aged, infirm, and dries the lonely orphan's tears. 
Of neat appearance, graceful in form and action, 
sympathetic, kind, affectionate, and confiding till death, 
a high and holy destiny awaits her. By general con- 
sent she is regarded as the most beautiful of God's 
creation on earth. True amiability of mind, the 
loveliness of a sweet and affectionate spirit, should 
always be sacred to faith and protection, and he who 
is reckless to either is an outlaw and unworthy of 
notice. 

30 



354 EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY 



CHAPTER III. 

SECONDARY EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY CON* 

NECTED WITH THE INTELLECTUAL AND 

MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND. 

SECTION I. 

1. Secondary emotions of beauty are not distinct 
in origin and nature from those we have just been de- 
scribing, but are regarded as more ulterior in intens- 
ity or influence. 2. We have conscious power to 
experience either class of emotions, and though in na- 
ture can not be defined, yet their existence must be 
admitted. They arise in connection with reasoning, 
fanciful descriptions, and the sweet melody of music. 
3. They do not arise in regard to all objects, for there 
are almost any variety calculated to produce disagree- 
able feelings. Those agreeable are called beautiful, 
but they may vary, as all persons are not affected 
alike ; hence their power to give origin to secondary 
emotions of beauty. 4. The beauty of forms may be 
very vivid and impressive; the simple or combined 
cause may exist in those more indistinct, or as faded 
traces of light. The glowing features which refresh 
innumerable waving flowers may imperceptibly im- 
press us with delight, but the peculiar forms of ob- 
jects, singly or in contrast, impart pleasing feelings 



EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY. 355 

of pleasure. 5. There is beauty in the contrast of 
straight and angular forms. Various winding, angu- 
lar, and serpentine forms fill the mind with peculiar 
feelings in common with general blendings of the 
mass. The delicate flower of the vale, or running 
vine at our feet, possesses interest and beauty. The 
oak which rises up before us in majestic form, spread- 
ing broad a green arch over our heads and waving its 
tall head on high, can cause lively admiration. 6. 
The changing seasons, in contrast, cause emotions of 
pleasure. Look out upon the world; see the wide- 
spread desolation of Winter. Old Boreas lets loose 
his northern car — fountains, streams, and rivers are 
chained with ice ; the surrounding hills and summits 
of distant mountains are brightly mantled with de- 
scending snow. Soon all is changed. The bland air 
of Spring and Summer blows gently on nature — for- 
ests wave in the emerald of smiling Summer. Then 
come the frosts, murky sky, and falling leaves of 
Autumn. 

SECTION II. 

1. The mathematician sees beauty in the form of 
the circle, the square, or the cubical and triangular. 
That which is useful in science and for practical pur- 
poses becomes beautiful from such considerations. 2. 
There is beauty connected with the various kinds of 
architecture. Each style has admirers ; but the blend- 
ing of the distinctive differences fills the mind with 
emotions calculated to interest and please. The walls, 
buildings, and streets of Jerusalem, though broken, 



356 EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY. 

gloomy with age and a thousand sad remembrances, 
yet such time-honored witnesses of the greatest 
events of earth render them morally grand and 
beautiful. 3. There is beauty in the relative exist- 
ence and blendings of colors. As innumerable varie- 
ties pass through the field of vision, we experience 
pleasing sensations. Though the j ' asure in behold- 
ing them appears intuitive, as the early notice of 
childhood will demonstrate, yet our love of colors 
may be so increased by cultivation. Color will gain 
the attention of a child, from intuitive inclination, 
while every other connected property, however good, 
will be unnoticed. 4. Beauty in colors is evidenced 
in the conduct and preferences of savage tribes. 
They try to appear in colors of artificial beauty, and 
wreathe crowns of taste and fame with flowers which 
bloom on the wild banks of distant murmuring brooks. 
It is innocent to cultivate a love for flowers, and right 
and wise to admire beauties of God's creation. The 
tendency of such love refines the condition and feel- 
ings of the heart. If we can not admire, with a pure 
heart, the innocent beauties of earth, we shall be illy 
prepared to feel at home amid the fadeless glories of 
heaven. 5. It has been stated that persons blind 
from their birth, on being suddenly restored to sight, 
have become more delighted with the colors of ob- 
jects than any other reality, and the effect is very 
invigorating. 6. There is beauty in motion. An ex- 
tended valley or plain of flowers, though motionless, 
fills the mind with pleasure ; but when they begin to 



EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY. 357 

wave to the passing breeze, the scene becomes beauti- 
ful and grand. The distant roar of a cascade may 
create secondary emotions, but they increase when we 
see a foaming sheet of water breaking out from the 
mountain summit and plunging into the depths below. 
The majesty of rolling clouds, yon waving forest of 
pine, with the flow of earth's mighty waters, all create 
feelings of delight. 

SECTION III. 

1. Our emotions of beauty are affected by the char- 
acter of motion. (1.) Motion in a direct line is 
pleasing, but not so free and natural as vibrations or 
undulations. The cycloidal flight of birds, the rock- 
ing ship under sail, together with the undulations of 
waves, or sheets of flame, impart pleasure. (2.) Reg- 
ular motion is more pleasant than that which is irreg- 
ular. For the latter creates extra mental effort, soon 
attended with weariness. (3.) Motion uniformly ac- 
celerated is very agreeable. A stone rolled from the 
summit of a mountain accumulates interest as its 
velocity increases. (4.) The agreeableness of motion 
varies with quickness and slowness; yet, in either 
case, if long continued, the interest abates. (5.) Con- 
tinued slowness of motion retards the natural ease and 
activity of our perceptions; hence, impatience and 
loss of interest follows. 2. Objects exciting emotions 
of beauty may be wholly intellectual. With all possi- 
ble interest connected with materiality, all inert nature 
is much like a beautiful corpse — the spirit fled. All the 



358 EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY, 

sweetness and beauty of the human countenance, if 
contemplated without the idea of a soul, would cause 
very slight emotions of beauty. But if the counte- 
nance expresses the presence of a rational soul, amia- 
ble, persevering, and full of intellectual light, it is 
regarded as beautiful, independent of its physical ap- 
pearance. 3. The mind's contemplations within itself 
of spiritual realities and influences give pleasing 
emotions. 4. Moral objects in the spiritual universe 
give internal pleasure. He who seeks and obtains a 
pure heart, is as conscious of the change as he can 
be of self-reality, and the emotions of happiness felt 
are beyond description. 5. The power of the soul to 
know the reality of pleasing emotions, is in the pri- 
mary elements of its being. This power and the 
knowledge of such emotions can not cease to be. 



ASSOCIATED OBJECTS OF BEAUTY. 359 



CHAPTER IV. 

ASSOCIATED OBJECTS OF BEAUTY IN THE 

PHYSICAL, SPIRITUAL, AND MORAL 

WORLDS. 

SECTION I. 

1. The material universe contains an innumerable 
variety of objects of beauty. The properties associ- 
ated in each compound may be beautiful in abstract 
entities, but far more delightful when blended to- 
gether. 2. A single sound in music has intrinsic 
beauty; but associated tones, skillfully played, pro- 
duce the most exciting emotions of pleasure. 3. A 
single color of the most beautiful flower possesses 
beauty ; but when the various hues and glowing tints 
are associated, we realize feelings of thrilling delight. 
4. The bright luster of a Spring morning, and the 
mellow radiance of a Summer evening, without the 
golden clouds, undulated earth, living trees, and 
blooming flowers, would fail to please. But our feel- 
ings riso higher as we associate the earth with the 
sun, moon, and stars, which fill the vast of infinity. 

SECTION II. 

1. The soul has internal power to know the reality 
of spiritual and physical entities. It looks out upon the 
beauties of nature by means of physical organs. The 



360 ASSOCIATED OBJECTS OF BEAUTY. 

latter, doomed to disease and decay, can add no power 
to the former, for we shall see when separated from 
them. 2. Intellectual facts in the mind are objects not 
only of contemplation, but cause pleasure, in regard to 
either simple thought or associated realities. 8. The 
mind has not only power within itself to enjoy truths 
stored in memory, but can force investigative thought 
into new fields of science and arrange beautiful facts, 
images, and plans, either plain or complicated, with 
continued delight. 4. Of nothing are we more con- 
scious than that we experience moral feelings or emo- 
tions of beauty. They can arise in connection with 
the influence exerted upon the mind by external 
moral agents, m their appearance, conduct, and move- 
ments. 5. A simple thought has some influence, but 
the contents of a letter from a friend have more. 
The contemplation of heaven, to the pure in heart, is 
overwhelming, but in adding an endless variety in 
scenery and influences, together with innumerable 
holy and happy beings, we are lost in wonder and 
praise. 6. If lost in a wilderness, and the arrival 
of midnight is made terrific by mingling elements of 
the passing storm, the conscious belief that an Infinite 
Power throws protection around us is agreeable. 7. 
The revelation of Almighty Goodness to our spirits 
gives happiness in prosperity or the wane of life. 
When the angry cloud throws its brow of night over 
the face of a troubled sea, and mountain waves roll on 
the highway of ruin, we feel that the Infinite Power 
controlling all things is our Father. 



EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY. 361 



CHAPTER V. 

PRIMARY EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY CON- 
NECTED WITH THE MENTAL AND MORAL 
ELEMENTS OF MIND. 

SECTION I. 

1. Emotions of sublimity are important to knowl- 
edge and happiness. We are naturally inclined and 
attached to things great and elevated. A sublime ob- 
ject or thought can affect us even to transport of 
feeling; and many such objects or thoughts associated 
impart still greater force. Physical, intellectual, and 
moral objects often cause emotions of sublimity, as 
they separately and suddenly break upon our percep- 
tion, independently of all trains of thought or any 
associating process. But this belongs more properly 
to purely-intellectual states and thoughts than to 
emotions. The latter do not rise in trains like 
thoughts, but governed by different laws. 2. Emo- 
tions of sublimity differ from those of beauty. The 
latter are always pleasant and agreeable, and charac- 
terized by gentleness, mildness, and sweet attractive- 
ness; but the former, with strong and overwhelming 
emotions of the sublime. The sweet waters of limpid 
streams meandering among the hills and through green 

groves are beautiful; the flowing river moves with 

81 



362 EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY. 

grandeur, but the pouring of its mighty current into 
the immensity of ocean gives origin .to emotions of 
sublimity; and such emotions are beyond description, 
as a world of waves rise up before us, rolling on for- 
ever. 3. An emotion of sublimity may be regarded 
as an excited arid elevated feeling, consisting of a 
union of astonishment and awe at the contemplation 
of great scenes and objects. 4. An orator may eas- 
ily carry his audience with vivid, beautiful, and thrill- 
ing descriptions. But when the internal fires of gen- 
ius begin to burn out in lofty sentiment, free and 
impressive with boldness of thought and description, 
then emotions of sublimity move the whole empire of 
spirit around him. 

SECTION II. 

1. Emotions of sublimity are the direct subjects of 
consciousness; though not clearly definable, yet we 
are not ignorant of their nature. (1.) The contem- 
plation of great hight causes emotions of sublimity. 
That vast mountain rising in massive form before us, 
lifting its nightless head far above the storm-cloud's 
path, or lightning vale of the thunder's home, com- 
mands every thought, exciting intense feelings of 
sublimity. (2.) The action and poiver of great objects 
create such emotions. While standing upon the banks 
of Niagara Falls the mind is startled in contempla- 
ting the rapidity and mighty power of the descending 
flood plunging into the abyss below. The trembling 
earth, rising cloud, foaming waves, with the thunder 



EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY. 363 

of its power, excite the soul with vivid and intense 
emotions of sublimity. (3.) They are originated by 
great depth. If, stationed upon the top of some lofty 
mountain, we look into the vast plain below, our feel- 
ings will be affected. And he who rides in his balloon 
through the heavens, can not look upon the vast globe 
rolling beneath without strong feelings of sublimity. 
2. They are caused by colors in terrific objects — the 
mingling hues of flame, smoke, and lava, amid the 
darkness of night. We are affected in looking upon 
the augmenting gloom and blackness of the rising 
storm. 3. There is sublimity in motion — the lapse 
of a mighty river overflowing its banks, or leaping 
down a precipice, the rapid travel of the hurricane 
with uplifted forests shaking the everlasting hills in 
its highway of desolation. 4. There is a sublimity in 
sound. The deep, solemn peals of the organ, the 
thunder of the cataract, the distant roar of high 
winds, and the perpetual tones of the murmuring sea, 
all waft emotions of sublimity over the soul. 



364 EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY 



CHAPTER VI. 

SECONDARY EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY CON- 
NECTED WITH THE INTELLECTUAL AND 
MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND. 

SECTION I. 

1. Primary emotions of sublimity arise almost en- 
tirely from natural susceptibility, and those called 
secondary, more properly, from association. The un- 
cultivated mind experiences primary emotions of the 
sublime, on witnessing the cloud and lightning of 
approaching storm; while the investigative intellect 
has secondary emotions from distant associated facts. 
2. We understand such secondary emotions to be 
caused by ulterior considerations, requiring a greater 
voluntary or intentional act of mind, and involves 
consideration and contrast in association. 3. A sim- 
ple sound may excite but little emotion, till its pecu- 
liar character recalls associations imparting intense 
feelings. The sound of a cannon can excite such 
emotions, to a limited extent; but when it calls up 
the victory of the battle-field, with all the associated 
facts of triumph, the feelings become strong and ex- 
citing. 

SECTION II. 

1. The appearance of a lone star, giving origin to 
emotions of sublimity, may be only slightly percepti- 



EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY. 365 

ble from original susceptibility ; but when other orbs 
are associated with it, till the whole heavens, filled 
with innumerable worlds, glow in the field of contem- 
plation, our feelings are vivid and intense. 2. The 
rumbling of a wagon often suggests the sublimity of 
thunder, clouds of darkness, livid lightning, and hast- 
ening rain. And the distant thunder brings to re- 
membrance the mighty earthquake, from which our 
feelings can not be withheld. 3. If standing on the 
top of Mount Sinai, such emotions might be slight ; 
but when we contemplate the Almighty, in infinite 
glory and majesty, descending the parting heavens 
on bending pavement of clouds mingled with fire, the 
earth shaking as the mountain is clothed with terror 
and death, the soul is overpowered with emotions of 
a scene so sublime. 



366 OBJECTS OF SUBLIMITY. 



CHAPTER VII. 

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY OBJECTS OF EMO- 
TIONS OF SUBLIMITY, INFLUENCING 
THE INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL 
STATES OF MIND. 

SECTION I. 

1. Primary objects of emotions of sublimity must 
be regarded as of sufficient importance to wake up 
and affect the natural susceptibility of the mind to 
vivid or intens'e feelings in regard to them. 2. There 
are objects originally sublime — vast extent, great 
hight or depth, with rapid motion or great power. A 
child will intuitively evidence feelings of awe and ad- 
miration when a primary object is suddenly presented, 
such as a house in flames at night. 3. Secondary ob- 
jects of sublimity affecting our intellectual states and 
causing emotions, may be regarded as very numerous, 
and enter into combinations and associations, so as to 
excite feelings of sublimity. 

SECTION II. 

1. There are primary objects giving origin to emo- 
tions of moral sublimity. Sympathy and benevolence 
under exciting and trying circumstances may cause 
feelings of moral sublimity. That man who has 



OBJECTS OF SUBLIMITY. 367 

pledged his life and services to right, and rather than 
deny his Lord, submits to the curling flames of mar- 
tyrdom, evidences moral worth and dignity, which can 
not fail moving the heart. 2. Objects of moral sub- 
limity may exist wholly in the mind. Spiritual influ- 
ences and simple trains of thought may so accumulate 
in meditation and contemplation as to excite us. 3. 
Secondary emotions of moral sublimity can be ex- 
cited by objects of various kinds. An extended no- 
tice and action of the mind, connected with a simple 
fact, may apprehend associated constellations of ma- 
jestic thoughts and sublime realities. 4. If the con- 
templation of an angel or a saint in the spirit-world 
moves the feelings of a pure heart, such feelings will 
increase as multiplied millions of such beings throng 
the field of the mind's view. But a greater scene 
opens, as we contemplate innumerable saints and an- 
gels gathering around the final Judge and great 
white throne, descending, with clouds of infinite glory, 
to the waking of the dead and renewing of the world. 



368 SPLENDOR, MAJESTY, AND GRANDEUR 



CHAPTER VIII. 

SPLENDOR, MAJESTY, AND GRANDEUR. 
SECTION I, 

1. Splendor refers the mind to the distinctive 
qualities, condition, or appearance of objects. That 
which is magnificent, of brilliant luster and great 
show of elegance, is splendid in consequence of its 
superior charms and attractions. 2. Our feelings are 
excited in contemplating, or reviewing the great and 
magnanimous acts of mighty Warriors, who from ne- 
cessity have saved peaceable cities, kingdoms, and 
empires, when all advantages appeared against them. 
3. The light of the rising sun, breaking along the 
hemisphere of night, possesses natural splendor, and 
our emotions correspond to the brilliancy of the 
scene. The mellow light of the setting sun, spread- 
ing on the horizon, and withdrawing from receding 
valleys, hills, and mountains, enraptures the mind. 
The golden clouds hung high and glowing around the 
descending king of day only add splendor to the 
scene. 4. We are capable of internal moral feelings 
under the approval of Divine Goodness, and in con- 
templating the splendor of that light which fills the 
moral universe. 



SPLENDOR, MAJESTY, AND GRANDEUR. 369 

SECTION II. 

1. Majesty is connected with greatness and dignity 
in the appearance of an object, and feelings of awe 
or reverence inspired in the mind of the beholder. 2. 
A great general, honored with the victories of many 
battle-fields in contending for pure liberty, graceful 
in motion, and of lofty air, neat in form and bold in 
appearance, is said to be majestic in nature and ac- 
tion. And when we associate such noble acts and 
achievements with the man, we can not contemplate 
them without distinct emotions in regard to the same. 
3. True dignity of character and elevation in honors, 
as those of a queen, king, or emperor, give rise to a 
peculiar class of feelings connected with majestic ob- 
jects. 4. The lofty blue sky, vaulting the heavens 
and filled with bright stars, is majestic, and enkindles 
feelings corresponding to the same. 5. In the moral 
world, while contemplating the lofty heavenly home of 
the just, the majesty of that Being who fills immens- 
ity with light and love, our emotions are intense. 

SECTION III. 

1. Grrandeur differs from the loftiness and awing 
boldness of majesty; is more agreeable and not so 
brilliant and vivid in its effects upon our feelings as 
influences connected with splendor. (1.) We experi- 
ence emotions of beauty as we watch the crystal 
fountain rolling over its pebbly bed and hastening 
from its banks enameled with flowers — now each drop 



370 SPLENDOR, MAJESTY, AND GRANDEUR. 

sparkles in the light of the sun, and then shaded with 
green foliage overhanging its onward course. (2.) And 
we have emotions of grandeur as the same stream deep- 
ens and expands into a mighty river, dividing strong 
empires — its banks ranged with verdant groves, fruitful 
hills and valleys, with almost innumerable villages and 
cities bestudding the winding borders of its opposing 
shores, while its silvery bosom bears the passing com- 
merce of nations. 3. But we have emotions of sub- 
limity as this majestic river rolls its mighty waters 
into the wide extent and depth of illimitable ocean, 
heaving and rocking in all the pride of natural inde- 
pendence, hanging its waves in the clouds of storm; 
now dashing the thunder of its strength against the 
distant shore, and then burying in its dark depths the 
rival navies of the world — the scene is overwhelming ; 
we are wrapped in emotions beyond description. 
There is moral grandeur in the pure achievements and 
attainments of moral agents, the life of holy song, and 
the stirring vigor of choral anthems, connected with 
the purity of Almighty Goodness. 



DIVISION EIGHTH. 



-♦♦♦- 



CHAPTER I. 

THE DESIEES. 
SECTION I. 

•1. A desire is a motion, passion, or excitement of 
the mind directed to some attainment or attracting 
object. It is the conscious feeling or uneasiness ex- 
perienced in want of an object believed to possess 
something pleasurable. 2. The power to desire arises 
in connection with original elements, otherwise they 
would be either accidents or inane; but we have con- 
scious power to know their real existence and dis- 
tinctive nature. 3. They are evidenced, not only in 
appetency, inclination, and craving, but in wishing for 
and coveting the possession and enjoyment of an ob- 
ject, with a greater or less degree of earnestness. 
4. Desires are so closely connected with the influence 
of affection, propensity, and appetite, that they can 
not be regarded as wholly abstract realities. Their 
distinctive character in origin and action is determined 
by conscious knowledge. 5. They have power and in- 
fluence to invoke mental action, but never can compel 
such action. 6. Desires are not ulterior in origin 

to emotions, and wholly dependent upon them. The 

371 



372 THE DESIRES. 

latter may become vivid and then subside; but the 
former, though often counteracted, remains strong 
and undiminished. 7. They are said to be voluntary 
when arising in connection with repeated examina- 
tions of objects, and in efforts to admire that which 
is beautiful, till it becomes attracting and we desire 
its possession. 8. They are wholly involuntary 
when arising either spontaneously or without any 
volitive mental effort. 

SECTION II. 

1. From the instinctive character of desire it is 
independent of any antecedent emotion as its cause. 
Desire for safety and food exists in the minds of 
brutes, and we can not say it is based only on emo- 
tions or voluntary mental states. 2. The character of 
desires evidence a definite permanency of their na- 
ture. Emotions may come and go as waves of the 
sea ; such action is violent, gentle, or gradual, in pro- 
portion to the degrees of strength in the affecting 
power. But desires are not subject to such changes ; 
they are strong and more abiding. 3. The effect of 
despair upon emotions and desires is evidence that 
the latter are too closely connected with intuition to 
originate only with emotions. The exile on some 
rocky isle of the sea, or mariner on a sinking ship, 
has strong and unyielding desires for life and to see 
his distant home and friends, while his emotions 
are in ruins. 4. Desires vary in degrees of strength. 
Such variations may arise, (1.) In connection with 



THE DESIRES. 373 

the degree or extent of our conscious want in regard 
to that which is desired. (2.) They may arise in 
connection with the degrees of vividness and strength 
in the action of the emotions. (3.) They arise in con- 
nection with the condition of the perception and under- 
standing. In proportion as we correctly perceive and 
understand an object of interest, may be the strength 
of desires. 5. Though they can not be said to truly 
exist without implying an object, yet the power of 
desires can be real without any object. They have 
power to excite us and induce action, but can never 
be the "motive state 7 ' of the mind. 6. Objects of 
pleasure are desired, but evil is gained by will. We 
may desire pleasure which will be followed by re- 
morse, but we can not desire a positive injury, only 
to deprecate a worse calamity, which is inevitable, if 
the less be not chosen. 7. The mind can become so. 
debased as to desire evil objects and advantages, only 
to gratify a malicious selfishness and revenge in 
regard to others. 



374 IMMEDIATE DESIRES. 



CHAPTER II. 

PRIMARY OE IMMEDIATE DESIKES. 
SECTION I. 

1. Primary or immediate desires are closely con- 
nected with mental states. They must be of self-ori- 
gin, or arise in connection with some other power. 
But it is clear that desire has its origin with the very 
elements of the soul. 2. Its power is in the mind, 
and its action .can be the object of consciousness, 
whether we are immediately conscious of the presence 
of a cause or not. 3. An instinctive desire, whether 
arising in the human mind or in the soul of the brute, 
must be regarded as primary. 

SECTION II. 

1. We desire to exist, and that such existence be 
perpetuated. This is experienced independently of 
any reference to either the hope or expectation of 
continued life. 2. Such desire is natural and spon- 
taneous, is almost universal, and we can not create its 
origin. 3. The desire of existence is intuitive, yet 
becoming stronger in meditating upon the bright 
hope and expectations which illume the future. 4. 
The preciousness of life attaches us to existence, and 
the danger of losing it gives origin to an additional 
tie of endearment. 



SECONDARY DESIRES. 375 



CHAPTER III. 

SECONDARY OR RETROSPECTIVE AND PRO- 
SPECTIVE DESIRES. 

SECTION I. 

1. Retrospective desires refer to past events or 
realities in some way. It is natural to desire that 
many things had been different, and we would recall 
them, if possible, to make changes for better and hap- 
pier results. The remembrance of our wicked acts is 
followed with a desire to have them changed. 2. 
Prospective desires refer to facts or events ranging 
the future. (1.) The desire of society is inseparably 
connected with the nature of our being. The con- 
stitutional existence of man evidences that Heaven 
formed and designed him for society. Such attach- 
ments to society exist, not only in his wants, affec- 
tionate relations of dependence, but by social and 
natural instincts and desires. It is not a result of 
education, but arises out of his essential nature, inde- 
pendent of either convenience or interest. (2.) There 
is an internal principle of social union, vivid and 
strong. We are the offspring of social ties; and had 
we been created without kind sympathies, this single 
fact would have been proof that God had not created 
us in mercy and did not intend our happiness. We 



376 SECONDARY DESIRES. 

instinctively sigh for the friendship, love, and com- 
munion of our fellow-beings. If exiled to a lonely 
death they are not destroyed. They live in the high- 
est degrees of virtue, and will not die in the lowest ex- 
tremes of vice. (3.) The desire of knoivledge is nat- 
ural. Heaven created us to know, and such inclina- 
tion can never be abated. It seeks all that may be 
known, involving the facts, variations, and grandeur 
of universal being ; then ranges the infinite field of 
possibilities and imagination. 

SECTION II. 

1. The desire of esteem belongs to human nature. 
It appears to # be a want of the soul, but should be 
guarded. It always causes a reciprocal action of 
kindness for kindness. Here is a power, which, if 
connected with pure motive, can mature from sim- 
ple kindness into respect, then into regard, affection, 
and the glow of confidence and devoted love. Our 
feelings can never be withheld from cherishing the 
wellbeing of those who love us and have our esteem. 
Could we be conscious that we had not the esteem of 
any, then our social existence would be without the 
light of hope, and suddenly would all happiness end. 
2. The desire of emulation is connected with the soul, 
and may be either good or bad. A wish to excel in 
the accomplishment of good, only increases happi- 
ness; but if for superiority, regardless of the rights 
and claims of others, it is selfish and unholy. The 
full throes of a sanctified ambition electrify mind, 



SECONDARY DESIRES. 377 

move the world, and would scale obstructing mount- 
ains of opposing impossibilities. 3. A desire of 
pleasure belongs to mind, and nothing not inconsist- 
ent with moral rectitude and purity has Heaven with- 
held from us. To the pure mind there is a universe 
of pure objects calculated to delight and please. 4. 
A desire of fame applies to mind, and in some way or 
degree is possessed by all. It is natural to wish the 
attention and regard of others. When free from self- 
ish and improper motives, the mind is quickened and 
roused to action. Unholy desires only gravitate to 
death ; but when pure, they inspire the soul with holy 
and lofty efforts to accomplish good. 5. The desire 
of glory is natural to mind, and is harmless in arriv- 
ing at distinction while we would carry all the world 
with us to superior excellence. But the moment we 
would detract from others, in order to rise, we are 
sinful and on the way to ruin. Such feelings differ 
from envy and jealousy. It is right to wish to excel 
by promoting the happiness of others. How just the 
remark, "It is much better to deserve distinction, 
without having it, than to have it without deserving 
it!" 6. The desire of power invests every human 
mind to some extent. We are naturally fond of in- 
fluence and wish to attract the attention and regard 
of others. It is as original with the slave as the king 
or conqueror of nations. Its inspiring utility is evi- 
denced in view of the vast amount of good it secures 
to our race, and the unbounded happiness it con- 
fers. But if misdirected or incumbered with vile 

32 



378 SECONDARY DESIRES. 

motives, ruin is the result. Thus poor mortality, as 
numbering cycles move on, is doomed to hopeless 
wretchedness. 



HOPE AND FEAR. 379 



CHAPTER IV. 

HOPE AND FEAR. 

SECTION I. 

1. Hope in the mind is a power capable of active 
influence, and possesses anxiety with solicitous look- 
ing to some good, accompanied with a slight expecta- 
tion of obtaining it, or faint belief that it may be 
obtained. 2. It is that which has power, and furnishes 
in the mind the ground of expectation, and promises 
such desired good or reality sought. 3. It is never 
retrospective, and can not extend to things in the past, 
but always looks to the future, and that which is sep- 
arate from the reality of self. It can not apply to 
possession or any fact connected with self-conscious- 
ness, without ceasing to exist, as faith and conscious 
knowledge embrace present possession. 4. It differs 
from wish and desire in that it implies some expecta- 
tion of obtaining the good sought; while desire may 
remain firm and unchanged without any expectation 
of obtaining its object. The latter may extend to 
past events, but hope can not. Hope always gives 
pleasure or joy; but desire may extend to that which 
causes the reverse. The latter may excite to an effort 
for impossibilities — the former can not. 5. Hope 
differs from faith. The latter embraces abiding pos- 



380 HOPE AND FEAR. 

session or conscious-felt and known facts, feelings, 
and influences in the soul; while the former can never 
apply to what we now possess or experience. If we 
hope for an object, we have it not; it is still in the 
future. 

SECTION II. 

1. Fear is a painful emotion or passion excited in 
the mind by the expectation of evil, or the apprehen- 
sion of impending danger. It is active when we feel 
a painful apprehension of impending calamities caus- 
ing solicitude, awe, or alarm. 2. Dread often follows 
fear, differing in the increased degrees of apprehend- 
ing alarm. And terror or fright are connected with 
a still more sudden, strong, and vivid apprehension 
of evil or danger. 3. Fear may be examined in two 
points of light. (1.) A filial fear involves pleasing 
obedience, in which a tender regard, affection, and 
love are connected with an awe declining every thing 
that would mar or offend. (2.) A slavish fear, if con- 
tinued, ends in dismay, terror, and death. Casual 
gleams of hope are as livid lightning in the turbid 
storm of midnight, leaving the scene in augmented 
darkness. 4. We may hope for some future good, but 
fear it is not to be obtained. It may be desired, but 
possession can be defeated by loss of confidence. 5. 
Fear involves two essential elements — the apprehen- 
sion of evil, and the wish or desire to avoid it. In 
this way it becomes a ground of safety in waking up 
the mind to a vivid sense of danger and in warning 
against evil. Yet it may be a medium of sorrow and 



HOPE AND FEAR. 381 

■wretchedness. 6. There appears to be a difference 
in the susceptibility of fear. Some are easily excited, 
while others remain unmoved. The former are always 
apprehending danger ; but the latter are apt to be in 
danger without being alarmed. An extreme in ex- 
cited passion, may suppress the voice of conscience 
and bewilder conformity to moral rectitude. 7. It 
causes the imagination to be too vivid, extravagant, 
and wild, and often produces prostration and despair. 



382 EXPECTATION AND ANTICIPATION. 



CHAPTER V. 

EXPECTATION, ANTICIPATION, CONFIDENCE, 
AND TKUST. 

SECTION I. 

1. The mind is said to be in a state of expectancy 
when we look to future events, believing that they 
will take place. (1.) Expectation differs from hope 
and desire. We can desire an impossibility, and hope 
for that which is almost impossible, but expectation 
is founded in conscious reasons which render or cause 
the probable event to be looked for with less inclina- 
tion to doubt. (2.) We can not desire evil; and hope 
can only be directed to some good ; while expectation 
can be directed to both good and evil, and may exist 
in connection with both hope and fear. 2. Anticipa- 
tion differs from expectation, involving a peculiar 
mental condition, or state, which assumes or is im- 
pressed with conviction of that which is coming to 
pass. 3. It is said to be & previous feeling or impres- 
sion of what is to take place. They may arise from 
casualties, but often appear spontaneous. 4. They 
are of immense value, and form a basis of protection 
in aiding to foresee evil and hide from it. 



CONFIDENCE AND TRUST. 383 

SECTION II. 

1. Confidence is a reliance in true and abiding real- 
ities, and is the mind's assurance. It may involve a 
belief in self-competency or power to accomplish de- 
sired results in opposition to distrust. (1.) It may 
be regarded as that in which belief rests, involving 
the reliance of others, and our dependence upon as- 
sociated truths. (2.) It should be guarded, or, con- 
nected with some constitutions, it may lead to boldness 
of an excessive character, both vain and reckless, if 
not egotistic presumption. But with proper restric- 
tions it is of incalculable value. 2. Trust differs 
from confidence in that it is more pointed, settled, and 
unyielding. The latter involves the idea of reliance 
upon associated facts tested; while the former con- 
centrating, fastens upon and holds some prominent 
good, or reality. 3. It takes hold of, or enters an 
approved object as part of the mind's possession and 
enjoyment. 4. The power to trust is in the mind. 
Such motion or action fastens upon the mercy of 
Heaven, while faith is present in realizing the influ- 
ence of spirit upon spirit in pardon, peace, and joy. 
It holds its object without inclination of release. 5. 
It may become a law of action ; and though false ob- 
jects, causing deep anguish, sorrow, and disappoint- 
ment, have to be torn away, yet the vastness of 
universal being, pure and holy, sustains and imparts 
happiness to the confiding soul. 



384 INSTINCTS 



CHAPTER VI. 

INSTINCTS. 
SECTION I. 

1. Instinct refers to that kind of motion, anima- 
tion, or excitement which belongs only to immaterial- 
ity. It is the natural inclination and spontaneous 
action of spirit, independent of all materiality. 2. 
The dead body of a brute has no more self-action or 
instinctive distinctions than a lump of clay, or rock 
slumbering in the mountain. But while living, it dif- 
fered in self-motion, natural inclination for suste- 
nance and comfort, with a knowledge of courses and 
sense of self-protection, together with power of choos- 
ing the best and quickest way of escape from danger* 
Therefore, instinct, in all orders of existences, is con- 
nected only with spirit, and clearly proves that brutes 
have souls with more than simple action. (1.) The 
brute breathes, the blood flows, and, on examination, 
we find the stomach has natural power to extract 
qualities and strength from food to supply the body ; 
this is called vital power. And though it acts natu- 
rally without mental effort, yet such active power can 
never take place where matter is not animated with a 
soul. This order of vital power is not called instinct- 
ive, but is below, though connected with the basis of 



INSTINCTS. 385 

an instinctive nature. (2.) Contemplate the whole 
animal frame in motion. It goes from place to place 
and from one desired object of food to another. It 
seeks out and chooses that which is suited to taste, 
and adapted, in nature and quality, to its stomach 
and nourishment, evidencing not only inclination, but 
power of distinction and choice. (3.) The degree 
of wisdom, activity, choice, comparison, care, and 
judgment, which some animals possess, is worthy of 
being called instinctive intelligence. 

SECTION II. 

1. Instincts in the human mind are not varied and 
so numerous as those connected with the brute. (1.) 
A little child, before it can reason, gives instinctive 
evidence of fear when falling, by throwing up its 
arms, and the agitated expression of its face. (2.) It 
instinctively seeks nourishment and receives the same 
without being taught. By the same power it gives 
evidence of pain or suffering. 2. The origin of ef- 
forts in self-preservation is instinctive. We instinct- 
ively repel the sudden blow of a robber, check our- 
selves from falling, and close the eyelids on near ap- 
proach of objects, before reason can come to our relief. 
3. We can experience instinctive resentment by imme- 
diate feelings in regard to the cause of affliction, and 
when reading of sudden and cruel tortures imposed 
upon a dear friend. A child naturally resents an in- 
jury when the cause is wholly inert. Signs of pain, 

joy, or sorrow are often instinctive evidences, and 

38 



386 INSTINCTS. 

excite corresponding emotions and action upon the 
part of beholders. They are natural, and designed to 
protect us, before reason can possibly come to our re- 
lief. They are a part of the mental constitution, and 
upon them we are dependent for safety. 4. The men- 
tal process of man differs from the spirit acts of the 
brute. When the former perceives objects, reason 
satisfies him in regard to such phenomena, and the 
judgment decides upon the same. But the brute, 
without reason and judgment, has an instinctive ap- 
prehension of that which is desirable or to be feared. 
The former often acts from natural inclination, and 
not from reason. The latter has instinctive action 
in connection with natural inclination, and not from 
reason. 5. The maritime navigator, with all his 
knowledge and skill, often becomes unsuccessful in 
reaching his desired destination, and, through tim- 
idity or want of knowing his position, becomes bewil- 
dered and lost at sea. But the migratory bird is tri- 
umphant. He bounds through trackless fields of air, 
spreads his wing to the rising breeze, encounters 
storms, passes seas, lakes, and lands unknown, and 
then returns without mistake or failure. 6. The wis- 
dom and skill of the bee and the ant evidence in- 
stinctive intelligence, in putting forth efforts to ac- 
complish certain results. 

SECTION III. 

1. Man is scientific and capable of almost bound- 
less knowledge. He can analyze the laws and nature 



INSTINCTS. 387 

of existences, forcing investigative thought in explor- 
ing hidden fields of natural truths. But the brute, 
without these, never seeks an explanation of what he 
sees. 2. Man is progressive by means of self-appli- 
cation and effort, gathering items from all objects 
around him ; but the brute has no power of self-prog- 
ress in knowledge. 3. Man is a moral agent, has a 
conscience admonishing of evil and influencing him to 
do right. But the brute has none of these ; his emo- 
tions give no evidence of gladness, happiness, or fear, 
as involved by moral relationship and rectitude ; yet 
they may have feelings varying with their temporal 
condition and kindness received. 4. Their action is 
both voluntary and involuntary. To say they have 
no liberty or exercise of will is absurd, but they are 
principally influenced by natural inclination. Some 
of them give evidence of comparison and judgment. 
5. Brute memory is without doubt. They who deny 
it say, " When the brute has been affected in a given 
manner in given circumstances, the same sensations 
are reproduced in him when he comes into similar cir- 
cumstances again, and hence the same actions are re- 
peated." But such "sensations" must be either 
mind or matter. If the latter, they can never be re- 
produced ; and if mind, they can not be reproduced 
by such "circumstantial" causes, unless they have 
power to know such causes are present and differ 
from all others. This would involve both memory 
and comparison. 



388 APPETITES. 



CHAPTER VII. 

APPETITES. 
SECTION I. 

1. Appetites arise in connection with certain feel- 
ings of uneasiness or want natural to the physical 
organization and spiritual self. Such feelings always 
precede appetites, the latter being a known maturity 
of the former. 2. They divide into two general 
heads — hunger and thirst. Yet there are branches 
differing both in character and origin. Though 
they arise in connection with the physical functions, 
yet they apply, to some extent, to the condition and 
states of the mind. 3. Hunger or desire for food 
arises in connection with the natural condition of the 
physical powers in want or craving demands. 4. 
Thirst, or desire for drink, is an uneasy necessity or 
demand, arising in the peculiar wants of our physical 
nature. 5. Though appetites arise in connection with 
bodily organization, yet they never take place with 
material elements or compounds in the entire absence 
of spirit. They are common both to man and brute. 
6. Action is intuitively connected with appetite. 
Hunger in an infant instinctively prompts seeking and 
receiving appropriate supplies. 



APPETITES. 389 



SECTION II 



1. Animals moved by hunger instinctively seek 
supplies, and of the proper kind and quality. If 
wearied, rest is an instinctive inclination. 2. Appe- 
tites are necessary to our preservation. They enable 
us to properly observe the laws of health, avoiding 
danger and even death. Reason and experience 
might give us knowledge of the necessity of food, 
but it remains only for appetite to give the time of 
eating, and the quality and quantity required. 3. 
Animals may have this information by nature, but it 
remains for instinct to guide them in choosing good 
from that which is poisonous, and direct them to that 
which they should take in health, as well as that they 
should use in sickness, or to counteract poison. 4. 
In its original or instinctive nature appetite is inno- 
cent. Aided by it we not only adapt elements to 
health, but detect that which produces affliction and 
death. 5. When an artificial appetite is acquired for 
inebriating liquors or intoxicating drugs, it is immoral 
and sinful. 6. A natural appetite, properly guarded, 
is very important in guiding to safety and the attain- 
ment of health. It is a source of great enjoyment 
and happiness. 7. It not only applies to the physical 
nature, but extends to that peculiar uneasiness called 
mental hunger or thirst for learning, or moral spirit- 
ual good. But when the mind is wholly abandoned 
to vitiated appetites and propensities, both body and 
soul are soon in ruins. 



390 TASTE 



CHAPTER VIII. 

TASTE CONSIDERED AS CONNECTED WITH 
OUR PHYSICAL, INTELLECTUAL, AND 
MORAL NATURES. 

SECTION I. 

1. Taste, as connected with our physical nature, is 
caused bv contact with material entities, and refers to 
the natural power of perceiving by means of the 
mouth, and experiencing certain sensations in conse- 
quence of something applied to the tongue. It is not 
only to taste or try, but to relish or have enjoyment. 
2. This implies an . intrinsic or connected, discrimin- 
ating or distinguishing power in regard to properties 
and qualities of objects, receiving the agreeable and 
pleasurable, and rejecting the disagreeable and per- 
nicious. 3. Taste is closely connected with the ap- 
petites, or the peculiar natural condition or want of 
the physical organs on the one hand, and the sensa- 
tions and affected states of the mind on the other. 
It was designed as a medium of relief to the one and 
of enjoyment to the other, and should only promote 

happiness. 

SECTION II. 

1. Intellectual taste is very extensive, and is the 
feeling or experiencing of sensations. It implies the 



TASTE. 391 

presence of perception, apprehension, and judgment. 
Connected with such feelings is the relishing of true 
excellences, and the discerning of beauty, symmetry, 
and grandeur. 2. It is the sensibility of the mind by 
which we cognize both the beauties and deformities of 
universal existences — a prelude power in receiving 
and of relishing pleasure from the former, and of ad- 
mitting suffering, pain, or sorrow from the latter. 3. 
It differs from mere feeling or quickness of feeling, 
yet is so closely connected that the absence of the 
latter would be fatal to the former. 4. There are 
degrees of taste, varying with different mental consti- 
tutions. That which is beautiful to one does not so 
appear to another. Taste, with some, is developed as 
a prominent feature connected with perception and 
quick discrimination, while others pass over fields of 
beauties almost wholly unaffected. Though it is nat- 
ural, yet it is capable of a high degree of cultivation 
in comparing pleasing or beautiful objects with those 
deformed. And in comparing objects we think beau- 
tiful, with those selected by others, our power of dis- 
crimination becomes more acute. 5. While taste, to 
some degree, is regarded as universal, and all minds 
with this endowment are affected by a great variety 
of objects, yet they do not recognize the same quality 
of beauty in the same object; neither are all con- 
scious of the same degree of emotion. 6. Three men 
travel through a section of country; one is delighted 
with the beauty of nature, another by the beauty or 
taste manifested in the improvements or works of art, 



392 TASTE. 

and the third with the cultivated taste and manners 
of the inhabitants. But all have conscious emotions 
with distinct differences, looking upon the darkening 
brow of the rising storm rapidly vaulting the heavens. 
Light in contrast with darkness, and clouds mingling 
in the lightning-flash, all vary our emotions and taste 
corresponding to such objects. 7. Taste varies with 
the same mind as we advance to old age. Gay or 
bright colors are pleasant and attracting to youth, 
causing vivid excitement. But our pleasure in age is 
derived from that which is more important, weighty, 
and grave. 8. It extends to objects exciting emo- 
tions of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity, yet differs 
from desires. It may extend to islands of ice upon 
rolling seas, glittering before the rising sun, or the 
descending flood of Niagara, yet we could not desire 

to own them. 

SECTION III. 

1. Colors examined separately involve the power 
of taste ; but the mingling hues of flowers or rain- 
bow excite intense feelings of delight. 2. Colors are 
not only beautiful, but in some instances possess 
grandeur and sublimity. The varying shades of liv- 
ing green spread over a thousand waving forests, or 
reflected from sun-lighted seas and oceans, together 
with vivid lightning-traces upon midnight darkness, 
all involve elements of beauty, grandeur, and sub- 
limity. 3. Symmetry can influence taste. There is 
something pleasing in the correct proportions of the 
several parts of a body to each other, with a conform- 



TASTE. 393 

ity of the members of the whole work in unison and 
harmony. 4. Form, uniformity, magnitude, and mo- 
tion, all influence the power of taste. Form involves 
endless diversity and variety. Uniformity extends 
regularity and harmony. Magnitude inspires with 
the idea of vastness, as sight ranges immense mount- 
ains, lifting their w T ild forms and lofty heads as if to 
gaze perpetually into the face of the sun-extended 
oceans, heaving and tossing in all the natural pride 
of unconquered independence : all cause emotions, 
with elements of beauty and grandeur. Motion is 
pleasing, if slow — quick motion is sublime. A train 
of cars in motion possesses elements of grandeur; 
but when at rest, the interest is abated. 5. Taste 
extends to causes of sound affecting the ear, and 
more abstractly to the beauty of sound within itself. 
It is beautiful, and taste is present in detecting the 
character and relation of tones. In this way discord 
is distinguished from concord. A mellow, soothing 
sound is beautiful ; but the sound of a cannon or peal 
of thunder awakens emotions of sublimity or fear. 

SECTION IV. 

1. Taste extends to immaterial objects and quali- 
ties. Interesting, beautiful, and lovely characteristics 
or traits of minds around us, excite pleasing feelings. 
Affection and kindness manifested by others toward 
us, always produce grateful emotions. 2. Vivid and 
correct displays of intellectual power, whether spoken 
or written, come under the rules of taste which har- 



394 TASTE. 

monize with the general feelings of mankind. 3. A 
correct taste is closely connected with the moral ele- 
ments of mind; and moral objects, together with the 
fitness and character of moral acts, come directly 
under its laws. 4. Taste differs from conscience. 
The former, in an important sense, is dependent upon 
and is influenced by the latter. Conscience decides 
upon right, or in regard to wrong. Taste directs the 
mind to that which is agreeable and pleasant. 5. It 
differs from imagination. By the latter we form con- 
ceptions, pictures, and combinations; and by the 
former we are led to decide upon the beauty, fitness, 
and utility. 6. It differs from moral emotions. The 
latter excites in regard to right or wrong — conformity 
or refusal to comply with rectitude. But the former 
merely cognizes fitness and beauty without reference 
to moral obligation. 7. Taste extends to the moral 
condition, feelings, and happiness of a pure soul, in 
contemplating eternal life. The spangled heavens 
above, the rolling earth beneath, flying clouds and 
changing seasons; the sound of the rain, murmur of 
the rill, and thunder of the cataract; the flight of 
armies, sweet songs of birds, or the wild scream of 
the eagle; the still home of the lily or the highway 
of the hurricane — all excite the mind with either 
pleasure or awe, pain or happiness. 



MUSCULAR ACTION. 395 



CHAPTER IX. 

RELATION OF MUSCULAR ACTION TO THE 
MENTAL AND MORAL POWERS OF MIND. 

SECTION I. 

1. Muscular action refers to those muscles in the 
physical system which are organs of motion, consist- 
ing of fibers or bundles of fibers delicately arranged. 
But their action is connected with and dependent on 
the mind. 2. Such action is instinctive, as we natu- 
rally flinch or draw back from sudden puncture, pain, 
or danger; yet it may be both involuntary and vol- 
untary. 3. Our hands can be trained to almost an 
endless variety of work which is not of instinctive 
skill. 4. The art of painting or writing requires a 
special training of the muscles, and the work when 
done varies in accordance with such education or 
habits, as well as taste or judgment. 5. Injuries 
may affect, or even suspend such action. If the 
spinal cord be broken, all below the injury must 

perish. 

SECTION Hi 

1. Muscular action may be of instinctive origin; 
yet it can not take place where there is no vitality or 
presence of mind. 2. Such action may be involun- 
tary or take place in regard to something outside of 



396 MUSCULAR ACTION. 

that in which the mind is wholly absorbed at the time. 
3. But such action is principally voluntary, or caused 
by the mandatory power of the will. 4. When vol- 
untary action accords with moral rectitude, it is harm- 
less; but when vile, we are sinful. 



DIVISION NINTH 



.«• 

CHAPTER I. 

PKOPENSITIES. 
SECTION I. 

1. Propensities refer to a great variety of mani- 
festations, inclinations, or influences connected with 
mental phenomena. A propensity is a natural turn 
or bent of mind, arising in connection with the exist- 
ence and action of the intellectual and moral pow- 
ers. 2. It has been called a natural bias or procliv- 
ity — an influence toward an object with an invoked 
readiness in regard to the same. But it may be re- 
garded as a proneness arising in the nature of mental 
states ; yet it is a natural inclination connected with 
mind of which we are conscious. 3. Propensi- 
ties may be divided into four different orders or 
classes. (1.) Natural propensities are spontaneous 
in origin and inseparably connected with mental ele- 
ments. We are conscious of such influences, and of 
the way the mind is affected by the same, but know 
very little of their essential nature. (2.) Acquired 
propensities appear to be educated, and are results of 
mental effort. When attention is turned repeatedly 

and long to an object, new influences often arise in 

397 



398 PROPENSITIES. 

connection with such mental action. (3.) Evil propen- 
sities are very common, and arise under the influence 
of a depraved nature; but they are increased with 
desire for, and advance in, crime. Natural pro- 
pensities to evil are restricted to the simple liberty of 
depravity in our first departure from innocence, while 
acquired strength or maturity leads to, and ends in, 
ruin, (4.) Pure moral propensities are inclined only 
to that which is right, or is in accordance with moral 
rectitude. They are connected with pure motive, a 
righteous conscience, and correct decisions of mind* 

SECTION II. 

1. Propensities differing from appetites are of higher 
order and of more importance, being less dependent 
upon the physical functions. They possess something 
of curiosity, sociality, self-preservation, and desire of 
knowledge and happiness. The idea of long life is 
pleasing, but that of annihilation is inexpressibly hor- 
rible. 2. We are intuitively prone to desire an im- 
mortality of happy existence, for no one could wish for 
more sorrow than he experiences at the present time. 
A natural inclination to appear respectable and share 
universal friendship, is common to man. 3. A natu- 
ral longing for life is both instinctive and voluntary. 
The origin of efforts to escape from sudden danger, 
the spreading of the hands to avoid falling, is in- 
stinctive, preceding any act of reason; but existing 
in connection with reason they are voluntary. 4. We 
have a propensive inclination to investigate truths and 



PROPENSITIES. 399 

acquire knowledge, and in regard to that which is 
truth the action of the mind can not be withheld. 
Curiosity is not only natural to, but excites to inves- 
tigative action with peculiar delight. 5. Curiosity in- 
spires action, ever adding new interest to investiga- 
tion, and is essential to thrilling and affecting oratory. 
The continued newness in which facts and figures are 
thrown together and presented, looms up in living 
vividness, and as with the wild grandeur of lofty 
mountain scenery, naturally excites as to what lies 
beyond. 6. Much of the fresh vividness of poetic 
effusions and descriptive romance, is connected with 
a desire to know the facts and beauty of nature, and 
we are naturally inclined to conform to that which we 
see and admire in others. 

SECTION III. 

1. We have a mental inclination to conform to the 
laws of taste, and there is something unseemly in vi- 
olating or neglecting them. The mind is naturally 
inclined to imitation, as is evidenced in the acts of 
children. There is almost an unconquerable disposition 
to follow in the steps of a beloved friend, and whether 
their instruction be good or bad, it is with great diffi- 
culty we can depart from it. 2. The mind is prone 
to adhere to the rules of common law, consisting of 
those maxims, sayings, and traditions generally re- 
ceived and gainsayed by none. Therefore the im- 
portance of correct early training, as the first facts 
and impressions received by the mind will bias its 



400 PROPENSITIES. 

action in some way for life. 3. An inclination to 
seek fame exists in the mind, and with proper checks 
serves to rouse the powers to action ; but if such- re- 
strictions are thrown off, the soul is soon wrecked 
on the strand of despair. 4. The proneness to self- 
esteem and desire of esteem are apt to increase. In 
nature they are innocent, but if indulged the mind is 
ruined. It is natural to love applause, but we should 
only wish to have the righteous and continued ap- 
proval of others. A desire of power may be natural 
or acquired. The former may be harmless, but the lat- 
ter vicious, having been cultivated with impure motive. 
6. We are naturally inclined to utter and love truth, 
and if this is ruled out of the soul, it is by impurity 
in some way. 7. The propensity to eat and sleep is 
natural, which should be indulged with thankfulness, 
but to indulge in extremes is injurious. 8. The mind 
is naturally disposed to friendship. We have an 
internal fondness for peace, and it is unnatural not to 
love sweet tones of music. Not satisfied with the 
present moment, we anxiously look for change. 
Watching the seasons of rolling years, we sigh for 
the fullness of coming joys. 



DIVISION TENTH 



—*+• 



CHAPTER I. 

THE FEELINGS. 
SECTION I. 

1. Feeling may be defined to be that power which 
belongs to, and is naturally connected with, original 
mental elements, capable of great sensibility. 2. 
Feelings may refer to the variety of ways in which 
such power may be affected, or to the distinctive dif- 
ferences in their nature or manifestations. They are 
not only the basis, but the origin of the passions. 3. 
They move, and such ability to act is proof of their 
power to affect and be affected. Then there is some- 
thing capable of being thus influenced, for non-exist- 
ence can not be affected in any way. Therefore, feel- 
ings, from their very nature, are essential to the exist- 
ence of the soul, and real knowledge of such reality. 
4. The poiver of feeling is original with mind, and is 
not only a susceptibility, but a sensibility inseparably 
connected with the existence and nature of mental 
elements, and without which we could have no real 
knowledge of self. 5. We can not say that self is 
real only as we consciously feel such existence to be 

true; and till then we can have no belief in such 

34 401 



402 THE FEELINGS. 

entity as positive. 6. If I experience pain or joy, it 
is only because I feel them ; and I am just as con- 
scious of the feelings as I can be of the emotion felt. 
Therefore, we have internal conscious power to feel 
self as real, and upon this depends the origin of such 

knowledge. 

SECTION II. 

1. The old scholastic and skeptical theory, that we 
arrive at a knowledge of self-existence from external 
facts affecting the organs of the senses, is false; un- 
less such objects have conscious being and power to 
impart to us, by self-action, a knowledge of our exist- 
ence; but this is impossible. 2. We must have an 
internal conscious knowledge of self before we can 
know any reality beyond. An object impressed upon 
the optic nerve may by the sensation imparted be felt 
as well as seen. All power to know external facts 
refers back to an internal feeling, intuition, or con- 
scious self-power of knowledge, 3. Feeling differs 
from perception: being the sense of, or is perceiving 
by the touch. Perception is in part dependent upon 
feeling, for sensation or feeling must be experienced 
in order to the origin of perceiving affecting causes. 
4. It differs in one respect from sensation. The lat- 
ter may follow affected organs of sense, or perception, 
and be dependent upon them ; but the power of feel- 
ing lies back of these, and is connected with the 
origin of such influences. 5. Feelings differ from 
affections, as the latter are more closely connected 
with emotions, may be caused by impingement, then 



THE FEELINGS. 403 

subside ; while feeling is essential in the origin of the 
knowledge of such influences. 6. Feeling differs from 
passion. The latter is no more than an intense ex- 
citement of the former, which may soon disappear, 
while the power of feeling is not diminished. 7. If 
we could contemplate a soul always destitute of feel- 
ing, it would be without knowledge, for the origin of 
knowledge can not arise only as we have conscious 
feeling of such reality. 8. Feeling exists in the 
origin of the known differences distinguishing the 
mental and moral states of mind. And by means of 
the same we are led to determine sensations in the 
physical system and as to what part is affected. By 
feeling we are led to determine between mental and 
moral joy. I positively know I am right only when I 
have conscience-feeling in regard to right. Otherwise 
we can have no certain knowledge as to when we have 
arrived at the standard of moral rectitude. 



404 BENEVOLENT FEELINGS. 



CHAPTER II. 

BENEVOLENT FEELINGS. 

SECTION I. 

1. Benevolent feelings refer to those classes con- 
ditioned with kindness and love to our race. When 
controlled by them, our efforts are to do good, relieve 
sufferings, and console the broken-hearted. How sweet 
the light of affection and love that spreads joy over 
the depressed and dying! 2. Such feelings are always 
connected with a pure moral nature. Vicious desires 
do not belong to a pure heart, for sin can only impart 
that which is sinful and destructive. 3. Feelings con- 
nected with the mental states are impure when the 
moral powers are evil, in condition and inclination; 
yet no element of mind is in self-nature evil. Its 
condition and moral relationship became so by either 
permitted or intentional alienation. 4. Feeling is not 
only, in one sense, the moral perceiving of the mind, 
but is a present, sensible, and experimental realiza- 
tion, which can not be dispensed with without destroy- 
ing all pure knowledge. A righteous soul is always 
filled with benevolent feelings; any heart destitute of 
them is impure, and, assuming to be righteous, is 
deceived and should awake to sudden alarm. The 



BENEVOLENT FEELINGS. 405 

power of Christianity can not dwell in an unfeel- 
ing and selfish heart. 

SECTION II. 

1. Though love be regarded as an emotion or affec- 
tion, yet these can not exist independent of feelings. 
The love of existence is interwoven with feelings of 
fondness, in which we prefer life to death. The love 
of self is connected with feelings which continue a 
natural preference for our position in society to do 
good and be respected. But egotism is connected 
with feelings of pride, ambition, and selfishness. 2. 
The last state of egotism is mental alienation or par- 
tial insanity. When self becomes the one idea of the 
mind, with feeling of great satisfaction and approval, 
danger is inevitable. The only certain remedy is to 
suppress the first appearing of such feelings and ap- 
peal to conscience and reason. 3. Love for our race 
exists in connection with benevolent feelings, which 
are irresistibly joined in the nature of our being and 
coextensive with the existence of mind itself. Such 
feelings may be destroyed by sinful acts; yet de- 
struction implies the reality of that which is capable 
of being destroyed. 4. Domestic love involves that 
of husband and w^ife, parents and children, and exists 
only in connection with benevolent feelings. To 
speak of love without these, is only to speak of self- 
ishness, which never can render the domestic circle 
happy. Magnanimous feelings must not only be cher- 
ished and cultivated, but sent abroad, far beyond the 



406 BENEVOLENT FEELINGS. 

material limits of the heart. A niggardly soul an- 
swers no purpose of Infinite Wisdom, not worthy of 
life, and disqualified for the future. As the love we 
have for each other is innate, therefore benevolent 
feelings are essential to our being. 5. We experience 
feelings of humility in which we possess humbleness 
of mind. And in a moral point of light such feelings 
are blended with lowliness of heart, assuming no self- 
claim, but realizing a deep sense of unworthiness and 
dependence in the sight of God. 6. Feelings of awe 
may extend to fear or terror; but in a moral sense 
they include filial fear mingled with admiration and 
reverence. And reverence inspires sensations of re- 
spect? and esteem, with emotions of veneration. 

SECTION III. 

1. Philanthropic feelings possess general benevo- 
lence, and are connected with the origin of good will 
toward all men. 2. Magnanimous feelings character- 
ize a great, honorable, and brave mind, seemingly dis- 
interested, and of elevated sentiment. 3. Patriotic 
feelings and love of country arise in connection with 
the welfare of the land of home, containing the graves 
of a beloved ancestry. 4. Feelings of friendship are 
natural to our being and are known to be real. And 
feelings of compassion refer to our capability and sens- 
itive suffering with others. 5. Piety refers to the 
condition and relation of the moral powers in which 
we have proper and pure feelings of veneration and 
reverence of the Supreme Being, with love of his 



BENEVOLENT FEELINGS. 407 

character. We know self to be real only because we 
feel such reality. This feeling, I or self, being spirit, 
is adapted to, and has as much power to realize the 
presence and influence of the Infinite Spirit, as it can 
have of self-reality. 6. It is natural for us to expe- 
rience feelings of gratitude or joy ; for a conscious 
difference between pleasant and unpleasant feelings 
can not be doubted. 7. Love of saints, of angels, and 
to God, involves distinct classes of feelings of which 
we are capable of knowing, and to doubt them is im- 
possible. The moral condition of our feelings de- 
pends upon the influence of Divine power over them. 
8. Correct feelings check every ambitious desire to 
lower the position of either angels or men. A pure 
heart can not wish to be less useful, but cheerfully 
desires the prosperity and success of all others. He 
who can not bear to see others rise and surpass him- 
self in doing good, must either change in feelings, or 
consent to descend, shorn of influence, to a gloomy 
death, While society suffers no essential loss. 



408 MALEVOLENT PEELINGS. 



CHAPTER III. 

MALEVOLENT FEELINGS. 

SECTION I. 

1. Malevolent feelings belong and enter into that 
disposition of mind called evil. An evil disposition 
in regard to others involves a certain condition of 
our mental nature. On becoming intensely excited we 
experience feelings of a malevolent character, made 
known to us by consciousness. 2. Dislike or disap- 
proval involves contrariety of feelings. This may 
take place from want of kindness, attention, or affec- 
tion. And it may be the result of some intentional 
act or wrong influence upon us. 3. Resentment is 
common to a depraved nature, and often takes place 
without thought; but such feelings may be increased 
or diminished under the power of the will. Instinct- 
ive resentment arises from a depraved nature before 
the affecting cause has been brought under the test of 
reason. 4. The moral character of resentment in- 
volves the degree of such sensitive dispositions. (1.) 
Intuitive resentment, before reason can be consulted, 
may be harmless if the w^hole mind, before such injury 
received, was peaceful and seeking the welfare of the 
cause or person offending. (2.) But all intentional 
resentment is wrong, unless some good to the parties 



MALEVOLENT FEELINGS. 409 

was intended with pure motive, and more good accom- 
plished by it than evil. 5. Resistance in regard to 
evil, and all evil, is not only right, but duty. The 
kindness of others should be resisted, if containing 
any thing of intended wrong. All efforts to harm us 
should be resisted; and when a malicious attack, 
wholly unprovoked, is made upon our life and peace- 
able escape impossible, we are justifiable in defending 
life, regardless of the fate of our foe. 

SECTION II. 

1. Hatred is wholly impious, and its highest degree 
of strength is criminal. Envy involves excited feel- 
ings at the prosperity of others, with hatred and de- 
structiveness. But gloom refers to heaviness, sorrow, 
or sadness of mind. 2. Anger is a violent passion ex- 
cited by some real or supposed injury. Stormy feel- 
ings of wrath, fury, indignation, and revenge, are im- 
moral and can be controlled. The susceptibility to 
become angry may serve ta wake the slumbering ener- 
gies from stupor, but should always be under moral 
restraint. 3. Jealousy is founded in feelings arising 
from a fear of rivalship, and is ruinous to peace and 
happiness wherever its desolating touch sweeps the 
chords of affection. 4. Pride arises in connection 
with feelings of inordinate self-esteem, a high and 
haughty opinion of self-superiority in accomplish- 
ments, beauty, talents, or wealth. Such feelings dis- 
qualify for usefulness and tend to ruin. (1.) Its 

higher degrees lead to insolent exultation and rude 

35 



410 MALEVOLENT FEELINGS. 

treatment of others. (2.) A modification of pride 
may cause us to speak only as of neatness or taste — 
the Summer's pride, pride of the lily, or pride of 
beauty. 5. Impatience includes feelings of uneasi- 
ness, sufferings, or restlessness. Peevishness refers 
to an unsettled or irritable disposition. Revenge pos- 
sesses greater intimations of maliciousness. 6. We 
are capable of feelings of remorse, in which the mind 
appears to experience keen pain or anguish excited 
by a sense of guilt. It is compunction of conscience 
for crimes committed, with but little hope of release or 
pardon. 7. The soul is capable of feelings of despair. 
This is realized in hopeless loss. 



SYMPATHY, ATTACHMENT, AND BELIEF. 411 



CHAPTER IV. 

EXISTENCE AND MORAL RELATION OF SYM- 
PATHY, ATTACHMENT, AND BELIEF. 

SECTION I. 

1. Sympathy may be regarded as that quality of 
mental disposition capable of being affected by the 
sad condition or sorrows of another, and involves feel- 
ings correspondent in kind, and, in some instances, in 
degree. 2. In another point of light it possesses and 
assumes a peculiar agreement of affections or inclina- 
tions, in which there is a conformity of natural tem- 
perament, causing persons to be pleased with one 
another, and feel an interest in each other's sufferings 
and triumphs. 3. The power of sympathy is insepa- 
rably connected with the moral elements, extending 
to involuntary sympathetic feelings on the sudden 
appearance of suffering. This power is intuitive, yet 
can be much increased by reason, association, and 
imagination. 4. It is not based upon imagination 
for existence, yet internal sympathetic feelings may 
be increased when we begin to imagine ourselves in 
the place of those who suffer. 5. The importance of 
sympathy is essential to commiseration, tenderness, 
and condolence — an angelic quality blending the hopes 
and happiness of our race. 



412 SYMPATHY, ATTACHMENT, AND BELIEF. 

SECTION II. 

1, The povjer of attachment is connected with moral 
elements of mind. We have conscious knowledge of 
its reality, and of its active power in binding heart to 
heart. 2. Vile attachment is realized in connection 
with the heart given up to wickedness. 3. True and 
pure attachment is essential to happiness, the har- 
mony of society and governments. 4. The power of 
belief is connected with the nature of mind. Without 
power to believe in realities, all certainty of knowl- 
edge is gone forever; but with it facts are received 
and known to be true. 5. It is not only a persuasion 
of, assent to, or declaration of truth upon the ground 
of evidence, but is a concluded persuasion of truth, 
and of that which should be done to fill the claims of 
religion. 6. It includes, to some degree, credence, 
trust, and confidence. 



PHYSICAL SENSATIONS. 413 



CHAPTER V. 

FEELINGS CONNECTED WITH THE PHYSICAL 

NATURE. 

SECTION I. 

1. When speaking of physical sensation or feeling 
we only refer to it as connected with a spiritual na- 
ture ; for all sensations and feelings are properly in 
the mind, though apparently in the nerves and mus- 
cles; yet all matter is inert. 2. The origin of our 
knowledge of physical self is connected with conscious 
feeling, and without this we can know nothing of ex- 
ternal facts. 3. If feeling is natural to mind, it is 
natural to our bodily existence so long as the soul is 
connected with it. 4. We know our physical nature 
exists from a conscious feeling of such reality, and 
this ends all unbelief. 

SECTION II. 

1. We have nervous and muscular sensitiveness or 
feeling, and as such is connected with the mind, then 
the soul has power to feel in regard to the origin of 
all knowledge. 2. The moral relation of feelings im- 
mediately connected with the nervous system or phys- 
ical nature, is determined by the purity or impurity 
of the heart and the intention of the mind. 3. Moral 



414 PHYSICAL SENSATIONS. 

accountability does not appear to extend to any minds 
but such as have reason, judgment, and conscience, 
and to some extent a correct exercise of the same. 
All rational beings are accountable. 4. When reason 
is paralyzed, thoughts suspended, and the judgment 
dethroned, the mind is deranged, and thought to be 
not accountable. 



THE PASSIONS. 415 



CHAPTER VI. 

THE PASSIONS— HOW RELATED TO THE 

PHYSICAL NATURE, THE MENTAL AND 

MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND. 

SECTION I. 

1. Passion is a sensitive impression or effect pro- 
duced by external objects or causes upon the body, or 
perceived by the mind through the medium of the 
senses. 2. The term passions includes much that be- 
longs to feelings, with variations corresponding to the 
different kinds of influences called passions, together 
with their degrees of strength. 3. It is a suscepti- 
bility of influences or impressions from external causes 
affecting the mind; and in another point of light is 
a sensitive feeling or sensible excitement from im- 
pressions, which arise often very hastily and with 
great intensity of action. 4. It differs from feelings 
in violent agitation, acting without consideration or 
judgment in regard to injuries received. Feeling is 
natural to mind and abiding, while passion may soon 
subside. 5. Physical elements, abstractly, possess 
no passion in any way. We often hear persons speak 
of " animal passions or propensities/' as though inert- 
ness could possess these ! All such influences belong 
to, and are part of, mind, the purity or impurity of 



416 THE PASSIONS. 

which must be charged to the heart and conscience. 
Though their origin may be realized in connection 
with them, yet such passion belongs to immateriality, 
so that no impurity can take place in regard to them, 
morally, unless willingly granted by the moral pow- 
ers. 6. All kinds of dissipation, both of the mental 
and physical natures, deviating from moral rectitude, 
begin in the heart. So apologizing for crime, charg- 
ing the natural physical disposition or propensities 
with such responsibility, is absurd. With the moral 
condition of the heart voluntary action must corre- 
spond. 

SECTION II. 

1. Passion, as connected with the mental elements, 
may be increased. And in proportion as the brain 
and nerves become very sensitive, mental action is 
increased. Such physical organs, if taxed too much, 
are in danger of increasing sensitiveness till paraly- 
sis ensues, then mental alienation or insanity is apt 
to be the result. 2. A modification of passion is re- 
garded as pleasing and healthful. It tends to enliven 
and invigorate, as pleasing objects of bearuty rise up 
before us, or make up scenes of far-spreading grand- 
eur. 3. When we speak of passions interwoven with 
the moral powers, we not only acknowledge their en- 
tity, but are led to classify them as either good or 
bad. They are not only harmless when in conformity 
with propriety and moral rectitude, but pure if the 
heart is holy. 4. When either theologians or philoso- 
phers speak of "Divine truths," in religious excite- 



THE PASSIONS. 417 

ments, " working only on the vulgar passions, causing 
many to profess religion/' they either speak of that 
of which they are profoundly ignorant, or have inten- 
tionally failed to examine the nature and laws of 
mind. Vulgar passions are pure when the heart 
attains true purity. Divine truths can not affect them 
without first moving the conscience or heart. All 
true reformation must begin in the moral nature of 
the soul. (1.) It will not do to say that such "truths" 
must first affect the physical powers in order to excite 
the passions. (2.) For then the passions must have 
self-power to determine on a partial reform. This 
conclusion is inevitable and perfectly absurd. 5. All 
the passions and propensities are subject to the voice 
of conscience, flow out from it, and without its con- 
sent and action can never reform in whole or in part. 



DIVISION ELEVENTH. 



-♦♦♦- 



CHAPTER I. 

THE AFFECTIONS. 
SECTION I. 

1. Affections refer to and involve a state of being 
affected. This sensitive change conditioning the mind 
is made known by consciousness. 2. The mind is 
capable of affecting, affection, or of being affected. It 
can originate action, and in connection with this, feel- 
ing and affection are inseparable. This internal 
world of distinctive changes can fill the mind with 
either unutterable joys or sadness. 3. We can be 
affected by physical realities or influences within and 
beyond the identity of self. 4. Affections differ from 
disposition. The former refer more properly to the 
activity of certain mental tendencies, while the latter 
to the manner of certain inclinations as completed or 
conformed to uniformity. 5. They differ from pas- 
sion involving the motion or gradual change of the 
mind, while the other is suddenly excited. 6. They 
differ from emotion ; w T hen once formed are not easily 
broken or diminished, while the latter may arise and 
diminish like waves of the sea. 7. They differ from 
418 



THE AFFECTIONS. 419 

desires in distinctive variations of a higher and more 
pleasing position in our esteem. 

SECTION II. 

1. Natural affection applies to thai which is con- 
nected with our essential being and of generous or 
humane character in counter-distinction with any- 
thing like selfishness of sensibility, calmly extending 
to the welfare of our race. 2. The mind is said to be 
affected mentally, when such elements are moved or 
excited in some way by surrounding objects adapted 
to intellectual action. We have evidence of this in 
tracing the different branches of learning. 3. Beauty 
affects the mind as we look out upon wide and far- 
spreading scenery filled with beautiful objects, vary- 
ing in qualities and contrasted excellences. And ob- 
jects of grandeur and sublimity only add vigor to 
our feelings. 4. We are capable of moral affections 
referring to influences in connection with the moral 
nature, in which we are conscious of the difference 
between right and wrong. 5. We are not only af- 
fected by our condition in innocence, but are influ- 
enced by the moral condition and acts of those living 
holy lives around us ; the presence of saints or the 
thought of angels enkindles new joys. 6. We are 
inspired while contemplating the pure and holy state 
and associations of coming eternity. 



420 PURE AFFECTIONS. 



CHAPTER II. 

PURE AFFECTIONS HARMONIZING WITH 
MORAL PURITY AND RECTITUDE. 

SECTION I. 

1. The affections imply, not only a power capable 
of moving or of being excited, but involve the dis- 
tinguishing character as to purity or impurity. 2. Of 
nothing are we more conscious than that we can be 
affected in regard to the perpetuity of self-existence 
and happiness, and we can not withhold our feelings 
from desired possession and enjoyment of the same. 
3. Our affection for mankind is innate or natural, but 
is capable of cultivation and of degrees. (1.) In re- 
gard to natural things, a vast variety of objects may 
skirt the field of vision — we have no affection for 
some, but others are very desirable. (2.) Acquired 
affections arise in connection with continued attention 
to objects, till something interesting attracts the 
mind. 4. Parental affection is original in a natural 
disposition or feeling dependent on the principle of 
love which parents possess for their offspring. Thus 
influenced they have good will for and cherish their 
children with protection and care, and efforts to pre- 
serve their natural lives should never suppress the 
fond desire to conform them to the will of God, and 



PURE AFFECTIONS. 421 

train them for happy immortality. 5. Maternal af- 
fection, though naturally mild, is sacred and unyield- 
ing. Its vital flame glows through life, and continues 
burning in the soul amid the mourning drapery of the 
dark valley and shadow of death. 6. The affection of 
children for their parents, though natural, depends 
very much upon the love extended to them in early 
life by their parents. Yet sons or daughters who 
abandon, despise, and abuse their parents, are un- 
worthy of life, and death w r ould be revolting. But if 
parents, by intention or neglect, permit a child to 
form a dislike or hatred for them, they must not feel 
disappointed if abandoned to want and suffering in 
old age. It is natural to love our parents, and feel 
unutterable grief when the cold hand of death gathers 
them to the grave. Still the love of a faithful child 
pursues the flight of such spirits, and sighs for the 
associations of a bright immortality. 7. They are 
clearly involuntary, often realized before w r ill-action 
is real, though they may be cultivated to some extent. 
8. Voluntary affection can not be called original, but 
arises in connection with volitive attention to objects, 
till something becomes attractive. 

SECTION II. 

1. We are naturally inclined to stronger affections 
in regard to consanguineous persons, than those of 
foreign nations. 2. Filial affection is not so strong 
as that of parental. The latter is universal, intense, 
and undying, while the former is natural, though not 



422 PURE AFFECTIONS. 

so intense, but is universally experienced where the 
heart is ruled by moral principle. 3. Fraternal affec- 
tions involve the attachment of brothers, which is 
natural. Family association may tend to strengthen 
such feelings, but can not implant them in our nature. 
4. Secondary affections may arise in connection with 
associated objects, yet they are based upon the im- 
planted power of affections. 5. Domestic affections 
refer to the home circle, where many endearing in- 
terests unite. Home is sweet. Consecrated to holy 
feelings and tender regard, it is the dearest spot on 
earth. Happiness at home is an unbounded source 
of consolation. With such retreat, the maddening 
fury of earth is unheeded, though breaking in thun- 
der-peals all around us. But if home-confidence, cra- 
dled in storms, is rocked by the violence of internal 
restlessness or rage, life is imbittered, hope flies, and 
despair often invokes death and the night of the 
tomb. The moral character of such influences is sus- 
tained and continued by the purity of the heart. The 
offspring of every domestic circle should always be 
dedicated to the will of Heaven. 6. Voluntary affec- 
tions take place in connection with continued atten- 
tion to some object or objects. But involuntary 
affections are natural, existing in connection with in- 
stinctive powers. 7. They may be created by kind- 
ness. And affections of friendship differ from any 
thing of hatred. 8. They may exist in regard to 
pity, being instinctive in origin, amiable, and virtuous. 
The same is true of affections of sympathy. All such 



PURE AFFECTIONS. 423 

influences enter into the minds of the great and good. 
9. Affections of gratitude, as well as those caused by 
sudden deliverance from death, include emotions of 
delight and joy, combined with a desire of good toward 
the cause of such deliverance. 



424 EVIL AFFECTIONS. 



CHAPTER III. 

EVIL AFFECTIONS, OR THOSE DEVIATING 
FROM MORAL PURITY AND RECTITUDE. 

SECTION I. 

1. Affections are pure or impure, corresponding to 
the moral or immoral condition of the heart. They 
are regarded as pure in their instinctive origin, or 
when conformed to the dictates of an enlightened and 
correct conscience. But when the heart willingly 
indulges in evil the affections are alienated and im- 
pure. 2. Resentment is a departure from right. 
Self-protection is allowable, but the returning of evil 
for evil is sinful. 3. Instinctive resentment has been re- 
garded as innocent, from the fact that it arises sud- 
denly and acts without thought or reflection. Such 
action within itself is wrong, and the question of 
guilt turns upon whether the mind has been properly 
disciplined and guarded against injury continuously. 
The power of such resentment, as implanted in the 
mind, is useful as a source of immediate protection, 
though unguarded action may be wrong while the in- 
tention was good. 4. To say that " instinctive resent- 
ment has no moral character " is absurd, unless it is 
distinct from and superior to mind. But it belongs 
to mind which has moral character, and can not be 
regarded as superior. 5. Involuntary resentment 



EVIL AFFECTIONS. 425 

refers to that which is instinctive in origin. This is 
called harmless, but should be guarded. 6. Volun- 
tary resentment is evil, as it takes into the account 
not only the sufferings inflicted, but the intention of 
the agent. If good can not be intended to both par- 
ties the act is wrong. 7. Anger is a violent affection 
or passion excited by some real or supposed cause, 
usually involving a propensity to take vengeance or 
obtain satisfaction of the offender. It may increase 
to indignation, rage, or wrath. Such excess of feel- 
ing is wrong, and tends to the destruction of both 
body and mind. It is harmless only when free from 
any violation of right. (1.) Excessive anger renders 
the judgment incapable of deciding according to the 
weight of testimony, the purity or impurity of the 
offender's motive, together with the degree of intended 
wrong. (2.) It is liable to deceive us, exciting per- 
ceptions of things which never existed. (3.) The ex- 
istence of the power to become angry or aroused in 
resisting evil, with pure intention to injure no one, but 
to put down sin and rescue the offenders, may be 
called harmless. 

SECTION II. 

1. Anger in nature is not a selfish passion, but 
may become such by continued efforts. Being a nat- 
ural mental affection, it appears to have been designed 
to excite to vigorous self-defense in emergencies and 
lettered attainment. 2. It includes elements of be- 

nevolence, interesting us in the defense of others when 

36 



426 EVIL AFFECTIONS. 

injured or cruelly abused. Such influences, within 
proper limits and only exerted in securing the gen- 
eral good, are not only allowable but praiseworthy. 
It appears that Heaven has armed the bosom of every 
man with such feelings to be prudently exercised in 
correcting evil and wrong, and without them individ- 
uals and society would be almost without protection. 
A thunderbolt in the hands of a crowd without nerve 
or power to launch it would be bereft of dreaded 
power. 3. This excitement in others or the masses, 
by injury sustained upon the part of some one, or a 
feeble minority, is more properly styled indignation, 
being an element of sympathetic character. 4. This 
affection becomes evil when abused or misdirected. 
It may be too sudden, violent, and blind. If contin- 
ued too long it degenerates into malice. The remedy 
is to cultivate kind feelings for all, and especially 
our enemies. 5. JEnvy is a peculiar kind of affection 
which often takes place in contemplating the superi- 
ority of those superior to self. It is too hateful to 
allow further description. All such influences fall 
like mildew upon the freshness of the rose. 6. Ha- 
tred, being enmity or ill-will, is ruinous to self and 
others, and can only be harmless when indulged 
against sin as an abstract reality. 7. Jealousy in- 
volves a painful emotion caused by some loved object, 
arising out of a feeling or suspicion of rivalship. It 
is often attended with an evil desire toward the object 
of love, if there is any evidence that others may be 
preferred. It is supported by egotism and love of 



EVIL AFFECTIONS. 427 

fame. It ranges from simple distrust to unkindness 
and violence. 8. Revenge involves a desire to return 
injury for injury, and often leads in deliberate and 
premeditated plans of crime. 9. Fear can only be 
regarded as evil, when we yield to loss of confidence, 
give up to despair, contented to die, inactive as to 
duty, and risk the consequences of the future, with- 
out an effort to inquire after and do that which is 
right. 10. Malice may be regarded as extreme and 
fixed enmity of heart, disposed to afflict and injure 
others without a cause. The soul is miserable within 
itself, and unworthy the confidence of any being 
whatever. 

SECTION III . 

1. The disordered action of the affections may be 
caused in different ways. (1.) Natural defects in the 
organs of sense influence the correctness of mental 
states and feelings. (2.) The influence of disease 
often destroys the capability of being affected in a 
uniform way, and mental states are apt to change 
with the increase of debilitation. (3.) The effect of a 
blow or fall often changes the character of mental 
manifestations. Age can not change the nature of 
mental elements, but affects their manifestations. 2. 
An unhealthy nervous constitution influences the 
character of mental action. If reason is suspended 
or the judgment biased our feelings vary. 3. Neat- 
ness and cleanliness, with chaste mental sentiment and 
purity of purpose, have a happy effect in correcting 
such disordered action of the affections. 



428 love 



CHAPTER IV. 

LOVE. 

SECTION I. 

1. The poiver to love is connected with the sensi- 
tive, natural susceptibilities and elements of the soul. 
This power is realized in the mind's peculiar action 
in regard to beauty and worth of any kind. 2. It 
has been called an affection, which is true in one 
sense ; but affection has no power of self-origin. If 
the cause of such affection be pure, attracting beauty 
or worth, the origin of such motion is sustained to a 
certain extent by the power of love, which is more 
closely identified with our inherent mental nature. 3. 
Love is frequently called an emotion, but is stronger, 
more abiding, and extends to the very nature of the 
moral constitution. The one may arise and subside, 
while the other continues. Emotion is without any 
element of desire; but an unyielding desire for an 
object loved will continue while its attractions remain 
without change. 4. It is the susceptibility and capa- 
bility of mind to be excited and moved by beauty and 
worth, differing from mere affection by involving 
strong desire. 5. It is opposed to dislike and hatred, 
pure and sacred within its self-nature. It appears to 
have been intended to be holy, and inspiring to the 



love. 429 

mind, and without it happiness would be in ruins. 6. 
It involves a fondness for, or attachment to our coun- 
try, the land of a beloved ancestry and containing the 
graves of friends departed. 

SECTION II.- 

1. Love between the sexes has been regarded as a 
" compound affection, consisting of esteem, benevo- 
lence, and animal desire." Though it may have an 
element in, or influence with these, yet we can not 
regard them as correctly analyzing its true nature. 
It is an implanted power, natural to the essential ele- 
ments of the soul. 2. It enters into the basis of be- 
nevolence, in which we possess a disposition to kindly 
esteem others, and accompanied with a desire to pro- 
mote their happiness. Friendship is dependent upon 
it, otherwise we could not bestow kindness in any 
way upon an object of hatred, as a spontaneous act 
of the heart, unaided by the power of Christianity. 
3. It supports tenderness of heart and feelings. In 
proportion as such power is diminished, dislike or 
hatred is apt to be increased, and the latter can never 
form a basis of kindness. 4. Delight and joy can not 
arise in any heart destitute of love ; and in propor- 
tion as we love purity and pure objects is happiness 
increased. 5. Parental love of children is often so 
manifested as to prove its implanted nature, and in 
many instances operates instinctively. This is evi- 
dent when it acts before reason and without premed- 
itated purpose. Such action is involuntary, and is 



430 LOVE. 

voluntary when arising with deliberate attention and 
processes of reasoning. 6. Love for the human race 
is implanted and natural. We are naturally either 
wholly indifferent to the welfare of our fellow-beings, 
or have natural care and regard for them, which can 
only arise from this basis. 

SECTION III. 

1. It may be said to be innate, from the universal 
conduct of nations, found in their certain rules and 
laws securing mutual union, happiness, and protection. 
This springs out of love for each other. It lives and 
glows in the light of science, civilization, and religion. 
There is no cloud on heathen mountains so dark as to 
hide all traits* of natural affection and love. 2. Man 
is created with power to love his Creator, of which he 
has conscious knowledge. If any love not God, it is 
by reason of sin. If he is love, which truth is evi- 
denced in universal being, and man was created in the 
image of his Maker, then he was so typed, originally, 
to the Divine Goodness as to possess the principle of 
love. It is naturally in our power to love God, and 
to refuse is unnatural and sinful. A pure heart not 
only loves God, but loves angels, and all that is holy 
in time and the coming vast of eternity. The oppo- 
sites of love and hope are hatred and remorse. 3. 
It is capable of degrees and modifications, increasing 
from regard to friendship, and from fond to fixed 
feelings of devoted attachment. The diversity ex- 
tends not only to degree, but to kind. Love in 



LOVE. 431 

friendship varies from that of relations or country. 
4. It is complexed in nature, involving assumed excel- 
lences in that which is loved, with a desire of good to 
the same. When confident our affections are justly 
and worthily bestowed, the emotion is strong, delight- 
ful, and exalted. 5. It appears to proceed with per- 
ception and pleasurable sensations, and can not be 
selfish. 6. The happy results of this affection, in 
every form of government and social organizations, 
embracing the casualties of individual fortune and 
destiny of nations, are of the utmost importance. It 
is implanted in the soul, and tends to unite with ties 
of sacred regard and happiness the whole world, and 
reflects the beneficence of a merciful Creator. 



DIVISION TWELFTH. 



-♦♦*- 



CHAPTER I. 

NATURE AND POWER OF CONSCIENCE IN 
THE KNOWLEDGE OF MORAL DISTINC- 
TIONS AND MORAL OBLIGATIONS. 

SECTION I. 

1. Having defined conscience in another place, we 
wish to add something more upon its nature and 
power in the knowledge of moral distinctions and 
obligations. 2. It appears to rule the moral elements 
of the soul, and is a primary power in the origin of 
the knowledge of moral distinctions and obligation, 
which, by the will, is brought under the inspection of 
the mind. 3. In Revelation it is appealed to as that 
faculty which, by the assistance of Divine Grace, sees 
at one and the same time. (1.) Our own tempers, 
dispositions, propensities, and lives; the real nature 
and quality of our feelings, thoughts, words, and ac- 
tions. (2.) It is regarded as the rule whereby we are 
to be directed, having superior, if not exclusive, 
power to dictate in regard to right or wrong. 4. 
Heaven appears to have bestowed upon it the power 
of perceiving in reference to moral agreement or dis- 
agreement. (1.) It is a faculty entering into the 
432 



CONSCIENCE AND OBLIGATION. 433 

knowledge of self, discerning, both in general and in 
particular, tempers, feelings, thoughts, and actions. 
(2.) It is a knowledge of the moral rule of duty — 
our appeal in doubt, and ground of happiness in de- 
liverance. 

SECTION II. 

1. A correct conscience implies a knowledge that 
all our thoughts and acts conform to the will of 
Heaven, as contained in Revelation. 2. A good con- 
science possesses a sacred awe in adhering to the will 
of Heaven, and an internal satisfaction and pleasure 
in regard to the same. 3. Some of the Greek fathers 
said, " Conscience is a Divine principle, and is by God 
himself implanted in our souls." Though subject to 
spiritual influences and holy impressions, yet it can 
not be a Divine principle in nature. 4. The term 
conscience, compounded of con, together or with, and 
scio, to know, evidences its province in knowledge or 
in influencing, convincing, or dictating. 5. A right- 
eous conscience is, through infinite mercy, acquitted 
of guilt, and willingly conformed to moral obligation 
and rectitude. 6. A bad or evil conscience implies 
the connected presence and influence of guilt, with 
alienated propensities. 7. A tender conscience is 
realized under the mild influence and light of Divine 
Grace moving us to duty and happiness. 8. A dark- 
ened or hardened conscience refers to the condition of 
our moral nature when the light and peace of Heaven 
is withdrawn, and the feelings become indifferent or 

vicious. 9. A seared conscience belongs to the soul 

37 



434 CONSCIENCE AND OBLIGATION. 

abandoned to crime and ruin. This moral principle 
should always be kept pure, ever mellowing the feel- 
ings of the heart under the radiance of the Cross. 



THE SENSIBILITIES. 435 



CHAPTER II. 

EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF THE SENSI- 
BILITIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE 
PHYSICAL, MENTAL, AND 
MORAL ELEMENTS. 

SECTION I. 

1. Sensibility is a susceptibility of impressions or 
peculiar power capable of being affected and extend- 
ing to the physical organs of the senses. It is not 
feeling exclusively, but, being easily affected, gives 
origin to sensations or feelings which may be increased 
or prolonged. 2. Sensibility, when applied to the 
physical nature, does not convey the idea that matter 
has such susceptibility, but we are simply referred to 
the delicate or exquisite acuteness of the physical or- 
gans of the senses, where sensations appear to arise. 
3. Though feeling is immediately connected with sen- 
sibility, yet the latter may be called the susceptible 
power, and the former such power in action. The 
impression upon the sensibility may subside, while 
feeling may be prolonged, increased, or varied. 

SECTION II. 

1. Sensibility as connected with the mental ele- 
ments refers to the peculiar power of our spiritual 



436 THE SENSIBILITIES. 

nature susceptible of impressions, which can exist 
either with or without any connected materiality. 2. 
We have seen that sensibility differs from feeling. 
Capability to act when affected differs from action ex- 
perienced. Yet with this power of feeling is the 
known origin that affection has taken place, but such 
impression must precede it. 3. Sensibility connected 
with the moral element of the soul, refers us, not only 
to the susceptibility of impressions, but to our con- 
scious power in distinguishing moral influences from 
those which are purely mental, whether of internal 
or external origin. 4. Words spoken, or that which 
we read, may appeal to our moral nature and stir the 
emotions. 5. The extent of such affection varies 
with different constitutions. The feelings may be 
saddened or excited with joy. Now we laugh — in a 
moment weep; now lively with hope, but immedi- 
ately filled with despair. 



FEELINGS OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 437 



CHAPTER III. 

EXISTENCE OF FEELINGS OF MORAL OBLI- 
GATION. 

SECTION I. 

1. The power of feeling is essential to mind, not 
only extending to the organs of sense, but to affected 
motion experienced in the soul. 2. Moral feelings 
arise in connection with moral elements, and make 
their appeal to conscience. 3. Feelings of moral 
obligation possess a sense of binding force or power, 
with reference to action and right. They differ from 
those of approval and disapproval — the latter refer- 
ring to the agreement or disagreement of conscience, 
sanctioned by the judgment ; the former looks more to 
requirement and penalty in regard to actions. 4. We 
have only to appeal to consciousness in order to know 
both the existence and nature of obligatory feelings, 
experiencing a peculiar restraint in reference to what 
ought or ought not to be done. 5. It is not true that 
" moral sensibilities" is conscience; neither is it con- 
stituted of "moral emotions and feelings of moral ob- 
ligation." These arise in connection with the moral 
nature, and imply such existing power capable of sup- 
porting them and giving their moral distinctions, as 
they can not create their own being and character. 



438 FEELINGS OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 

6. Moral obligation is evidenced in conscious convic- 
tions of duty; also from our desires, hopes, and fears 
in regard to right. 7. We can act, from a sense of 
moral duty, independently of self-interest, in securing 
the welfare and happiness of even our enemies, and 
feel that we have done right. 

SECTION II. 

1. The care of man for his fellow-man, and our 
race in general, appears natural, and evolves a con- 
scious, realized sense of obligation. 2. Such feelings 
arise with our conscious care for the moral condition 
and safety of self and others, that no one be lost. 3. 
In an important sense such obligatory feelings are 
universal. The rules and laws of nations involve an 
important element of care for the security and safety 
of the people. The words and language of leading 
spirits in different ages of the world and under vari- 
ous forms of government, indicate deep, heart-felt 
regard for truth and right. 



OBLIGATORY FEELINGS. 439 



CHAPTER IV. 

NATURE AND D ISTINCTION OF OBLIGATORY 

FEELINGS. 

SECTION I. 

1. Feelings of obligation are simple in experience, 
but undefinable in nature. We have origin to the 
knowledge of feelings only by feeling. The power to 
feel, and of feeling, is essential to mind. Could it be 
wholly without such power, it would be either matter 
or non-existence. 2. I know the existence of self 
only because I feel it to be real — myself and not an- 
other. Consciousness of the feeling I or self equals 
the certainty of the emotion felt. It enters into the 
basis of consciousness. 3. Moral obligatory feelings 
refer to the peculiar character of some contrasted 
with others. They may possess modulations or de- 
grees, from slight to strong inducement, and from im- 
perfect to perfect obligation. 

SECTION II. 

1. They are authoritative in regard to that which 
should be done, yet proper action may be intention- 
ally withheld. We can feel no conscious moral obli- 
gation to do wrong. And that which is conferred by 
Divine Goodness can impose no wrong, and can not 



440 OBLIGATORY PEELINGS, 

mislead us. 2. They differ from moral approval and 
disapproval. The latter may arise suddenly and re- 
tire, while the former continues so long as we feel 
such obligation upon us. 3. Such feelings involve a 
sense of obligation and duty in regard to self, others, 
and the boundless future. 



ACTION OF MORAL FEELINGS. 441 



CHAPTER V. 

UNIFORMITY OF ACTION IN THE MORAL 
FEELINGS— HOW CONDITIONED. 

SECTION I. 

1. Uniformity in the action of moral feelings con- 
forms principally to the power and influence of con- 
science, which has much to do in conditioning the 
distinctions in the character of feelings. 2. Such 
uniformity of action implies the existence of some 
law or court capable of influence and decisions, not 
exclusively intellectual, but properly belonging to the 
decisions of our moral nature. 3. The first law of 
this court is found in principle, to which our moral 
nature is inclined to adhere. A heart without prin- 
ciple is only prepared to do mischief. 4. In con- 
science is the associated power of uniformity — the 
grand center of monitory moral power, arranged by 
Infinite Wisdom; to and from which, aided by the 
heart, ebb and flow the moral pulsations of our world. 
Here is the basis of moral action moving the empire 
of spirit in all parts of the globe. Its voice is the 
same, whether uttered in Christendom or some silvan 
shade of heathenism — in the valley or on the mount- 
ain, upon the wide waste of ocean or nature's distant, 
wildest shore. 5. The nature of conscience evidences 



442 ACTION OF MORAL FEELINGS. 

not only its co-natural power in constituting the soul, 
but is realized in the character of uniform action. Its 
variations in decisions can not take place in regard to 
the reality of self, nor of purity. 6. The variations 
of such decisions are not only allowable from self- 
nature, but are real, and may occur in one and the 
same mind. They may arise in connection with a 
moral proposition, involving many varying facts. The 
first one may influence and effect a decision, but the 
weight of other truths may cause a decision varying 
from the first, and all the facts may vary a third de- 
cision, while the moral principle is unchanged. 

SECTION II. 

1. Differences in intellectual powers may vary such 
decisions. A moral question or duty, under certain 
circumstances, may by one be regarded as right, while 
another believes it wrong. The actions may differ 
while motive in both is pure. One is influenced often 
by ulterior facts, while another looks only to the pres- 
ent time. 2. Conscience within itself, as a moral prin- 
ciple, changes not, yet we can be so influenced by 
facts as to vary action. Degrees in knowledge may 
vary moral action and not change such internal na- 
ture. 3. Feelings and decisions change with the force 
and character of minds. The force of one is compar- 
ison ; a second, accuracy of judgment ; while a third 
has memory. All these tend to vary action, and we 
are left to the correctness of the moral powers for 
real satisfaction. 4. The intention and moral action 



ACTION OF MORAL FEELINGS. 443 

of a heathen may be harmless, compared with an en- 
lightened mind, being only guided by the light of 
nature. 5. The doctrine that " our moral nature is 
always changing, and that conscience is wholly a crea- 
ture of education/' is false. Education can not orig- 
inate that which is to be taught; then there must be 
something capable of being educated, and we have 
seen that the moral nature can not change within 
itself. 6. In the whole race of man conscience has 
spontaneous dictation, and, un trammeled by other pow- 
ers, is inclined to conform to right. All experience 
feelings in regard to right and wrong. It tells us of 
loss sustained, prompts to worship universally, and 
leads us to sigh for peace, rest, and immortality. 



444 VARIATIONS OF JUDGMENT 



CHAPTER VI. 

RELATION OF THE JUDGMENT TO OUR MORAL 
NATURE— HOW VARIED. 

SECTION I. 

1. Though conscience in nature can not change, 
yet the judgment often varies in regard to moral real- 
ities. The former may be trammeled by ulterior influ- 
ences, but is unchanged in nature. The latter is 
influenced by other mental powers and the great 
diversity of facts brought under consideration, some 
hastily examined, and others overlooked or valued too 
highly. 2.* Men vary in judgment about the same 
thing. One decides against certain moral govern- 
ments, having detected some features in them very 
defective and tolerating evil. The second approves 
of the same, as they accomplish an incalculable 
amount of good; yet both are equally opposed to 
evil. 3. Objectors say if conscience were real, evil 
would be universally condemned; yet falsehood, with 
some nations, is not punished ; and with others, theft 
is not criminal. This is no proof that conscience is 
inactive, but that the judgment is improperly influ- 
enced in regard to proper decisions. 4. The fact that 
heathens can be taught the value of property, the dif- 
ference between right and wrong, is evidence of a 



VARIATIONS OF JUDGMENT. 445 

moral nature. The mind naturally revolts at the idea 
of assassination. The first murderous act is attended 
with unspeakable horror, but this subsides as con- 
science becomes subdued by increased crime. And 
the heart must become hardened before such crime 
can be committed, which evidences departure from its 
first acuteness, and alienation of judgment. 5. All 
cruel acts are advanced to by degrees, which is in vio- 
lation to the moral checks upon us, being overruled 
by the propensities and incorrect judgment. 

SECTION II. 

1. The cruel laws of nations are results of minds 
removed from original righteousness. They arise 
with blinded judgment, and do not flow from inno- 
cent, pure hearts. If there were no moral nature, old 
sinners would always have been so, as there could be 
no innocence from which to depart. 2. Almost aban- 
doned sinners retain some conscious feeling. Thieves 
and robbers evidence kindness among themselves, 
and take care of each other in extreme sufferings. 
Pledges made are kept inviolate. 3. All savage tribes 
have forms of worship, wholly the promptings of 
conscience, but the judgment is at fault in carrying 
out rules of right. 4. The mass of mankind are not 
lawless offenders. There is a moral influence, to 
some extent, connected with the councils and intel- 
lectual march of earth's millions. And without it 
the whole world would be a scene of blood and car- 
nage. Speculative theories may vary the judgment, 



446 VARIATIONS OF JUDGMENT. 

but the moral nature is uniform. 5. The judgment 
of Christians may vary on doctrines, while the moral 
feelings and purpose are uniform and abiding. 6. 
The associations of early life often vary the judg- 
ment. That which is learned first has great force in 
controlling the judgment, but can not destroy the 
moral nature. 



DIVISION THIRTEENTH 



>♦♦*- 



CHAPTER I. 

MORAL RECTITUDE, 
SECTION I. 

1. Moral rectitude embraces correctness or tight- 
ness of principle. And principle refers to the nature 
of intuitive power as conditioned by the influence of 
conscience, when the mind is self-possessed or con- 
templating good or bad results, connected with which 
we feel a sense of right. 2. It leads us to inquire as 
to what is right God has a nature changeless from 
all eternity. Being absolute in perfection and holi- 
ness, is intrinsically right. Any change from what 
he is would be evil. Whatever he approves is right, 
and whatever he disapproves is wrong. As we ad- 
here to the light of his Spirit and become restored to 
his moral image, we instinctively approve that which 
he approves, and disapprove such things as he disap- 
proves. With this condition of intuition we experi- 
ence convictions of good and evil, right and wrong. 
3. It extends to practice. The thought or influence 
in the origin of action must arise in connection with 
this internal basis and conform to the righteousness 

of external laws, whether human or Divine, and must 

447 



448 MORAL RECTITUDE, 

be in exact agreement with truth, and to the utter ex- 
clusion of error or falsehood. 4. The rules for 
moral conduct harmonize with a conscious sense of 
purity, and correspond with the correctness of exter- 
nal truths and righteous laws. 5. The mind's satis- 
faction in regard to uprightness must agree with and 
conform to the principles of honesty and justice. 
6. Integrity refers to that abiding fixedness which 
holds the mind to uniformity of purpose and purity 
of motive. 7. Honesty involves an upright disposi- 
tion and moral rectitude of heart, conforming to jus- 
tice and pure principles of truth. 

SECTION II. 

1. A true standard of rectitude exists in connec- 
tion with the power to know right and wrong. We 
approve or disapprove certain actions, feeling the dif- 
ference between right and wrong. 2. Moral rectitude 
is evidenced in the common conformity and action of 
all minds. An individual mind is inclined to form 
ideas, rules, and laws, distinguishing between right 
and wrong. The masses naturally harmonize and 
unite upon general rules and principles, discrimina- 
ting between good and bad. 3. This is evidenced in 
the nature and arrangement of the laws of nations. 
4. It extends to retvards and punishments, entering 
into the condition of our feelings in regard to the 
propriety of approval or disapproval, acquittal or pun- 
ishment. 5. It enters into the government of the 
Supreme Being. He is just and righteous. The 



MORAL RECTITUDE. 449 

doctrine that Deity " has taken the ground, not only 
that the principles of rectitude are eternal and immu- 
table, but that he himself, with all his transcendent 
excellences, is amenable, and desires to be considered 
amenable to them," is incorrect and very unfortunate 
language. It implies that he is amenable or con- 
trolled by rectitude or law superior to himself. He 
who would limit the absolute existence, perfect and 
infinite attributes of the great First Cause, would do 
well to turn back to first principles and be satisfied 
to profess humble attainments. 

38 



450 MORAL DISTINCTIONS 



CHAPTER II. 

MORAL DISTINCTIONS. 
SECTION I. 

1. Though distinction is the act of separating or 
distinguishing, yet differences are often very appar- 
ent in realities causing mental action. The power to 
know moral distinctions begins with the moral nature 
by which we approve or disapprove. 2. The potver 
of knowing right from wrong can not originate with 
the senses. It is not an object of either tangibility or 
sight. 3. That moral distinctions, in every respect, 
" are immutable," is incorrect. No immutability of 
right or righteousness can exist as inherent and limit- 
less in mind fallen. 4. Our moral nature, under 
grace and a sense of righteousness, can determine on 
that which is correct, but in self-nature there can be 
no positive law of immutable moral distinctions. But 
the mind always possesses the power of moral distinc- 
tions or of arriving at that which is correct in its con- 
stitutional being and relationship. This is not of infi- 
nite law in the necessity of things. 5. Immutability 
belongs to Deity, but is not the law of the human 
mind nor the moral condition of the soul. 



MORAL DISTINCTIONS. 451 

SECTION II. 

1. Heaven gave us conscience with intuitive con- 
victions of right, capable of disapproving evil. This 
guide, originally intended to be true, may be stultified 
or varied by degrees of crime. But so long as con- 
science exists it has some power to approve right and 
disapprove wrong. 2. The power of approval and 
disapproval appears to be essential to the existence 
of the moral nature. Without this, if we could have 
moral decisions, they would be either accidental or 
ruinous. But to attribute such power to know moral 
distinctions to an " immutable law in the infinite ne- 
cessity of things," to which both man and Deity " are 
amenable," is not only beyond the field of philosoph- 
ical inquiries, but ends in conjectural confusion. 3. 
An effort to prove an immutable law in the necessity 
of things, asserted that Deity can not will wrong 
right nor right wrong; hence the distinction has been 
settled by an " anterior immutable law of necessity." 
Then such necessity being anterior to any volitions 
of Deity must be superior to him. This is not only 
materialism, but atheism in the worst form. 4. The 
origin of our knowledge of right and wrong appears 
to be instinctive, as the mind often acts correctly be- 
fore reason can be called into action. 



452 DISORDERED MORAL ACTION. 



CHAPTER III. 

DISORDERED ACTION OF THE MORAL 

POWERS. 

SECTION I. 

1. The moral nature has power to discriminate 
and approve or disapprove in regard to right and 
wrong, but may be so overwhelmed by sin and evil pro- 
pensities as to crush its vivacity, yet without wholly 
destroying moral dictation. 2. With the moral na- 
ture wholly depraved and removed from Divine mercy 
and restraints, we are not capable of desiring the 
society of holy saints or angels, either on earth or in 
heaven. We might desire relief and approve right, 
but to desire moral change would be doubtful, when 
the soul would be incapable of hope. 3. Moral de- 
rangement takes place when the moral nature is over- 
whelmed by vicious purposes and acts, and the voice 
of conscience unheeded. 4. Disordered action is af- 
fected by various causes calculated to hush or repress 
the remonstrances of conscience, which, if withdrawn 
from moral desire or hope of happiness, must live in 
the certainty of self, right and wrong. To say that 
conscience can be " annihilated" by sin, is impossible, 
so long as the soul has immateriality and immortality. 
Even devils have knowledge of good and evil, without 



DISORDERED MORAL ACTION. 453 

hope of relief. 5. Such action is voluntary when 
wrong is intended. The moral powers may, and often 
do, yield to the action of the will and force of the pro- 
pensities. The mind loses sight of vicious results till 
the remonstrances of conscience are almost unnoticed. 
A life filled with heinous crimes is the result of re- 
peated efforts from slight offenses to those of dark 
deeds of horror or death. If conscience could be an- 
nihilated by sin, and such sinner could be converted, 
he could not be repossessed with kind feelings or love 
for Heaven or his race. 

SECTION II. 

1. Involuntary disordered moral action takes place 
when principle and admonitions of conscience are re- 
garded with reckless indifference, while evil propens- 
ities and emotions carry us into neglect of duty and 
unintentional crime. 2. Such action is natural when 
resulting from imperfect mental organization or insan- 
ity. The doctrine that we can come into the world 
"without a conscience," as readily as to exist without 
" reason," is absurd. The inactivity of conscience in 
some instances, has been attributed to a species of 
moral insanity, in which its vigor has been suppressed. 
3. In all grades of insanity the action of conscience 
is more uniform than any other faculty. Such supe- 
riority is the bestowment of Infinite Wisdom, upon 
which shines most successfully the guiding light of 
Heaven. 4. We are morally accountable for all 
wicked acts, even though conscience should, at the 



454 DISORDERED MORAL ACTION. 

time, appear withdrawn, provided our vicious course 
in life tended to stupefy and render such moral remon- 
strances inactive. 5. We are accountable for all acts 
committed in the absence of reason, when knowingly 
or intentionally we destroy reason, as in drunkenness 
or fits of delirium tremens. By placing ourselves in 
a condition to do wrong, together with the act, we are 
guilty as though possessed of reason. 6. In propor- 
tion as the mind becomes insane, without intentional 
effort, our moral accountability is ameliorated. But 
all efforts to clear criminals upon the ground of insan- 
ity without positive and well-defined mental ruin, 
only aggravates the claims of the moral law which 
holds them guilty unto the decisions of the great day. 



MOKAL ACTION VARIED. 455 



CHAPTER IV. 

THE ACTION OF OUR MORAL NATURE VARIED 

BY THE DISORDERED INFLUENCE OF THE 

APPETITES AND PROPENSITIES. 

SECTION I. 

1. Disordered action of the appetites influences 
and varies the action of the moral powers, but can not 
totally destroy any essential element of their exist- 
ence. They continue to strengthen by repeated in- 
dulgence, and though the remonstrance of conscience 
and decisions of the judgment are opposed, yet there 
is a yielding, and we begin to seek for something jus- 
tifying such indulgence. 2. Appetite, when vitiated, 
wars more successfully against judgment and our con- 
scious sense of propriety and right, than any disposi- 
tion or propensity. The sight of the eye may be 
overcome, the sense of hearing may be avoided, and 
the love of sport and gambling can be subdued, but a 
false or vitiated appetite, in some instances, can not 
be destroyed. 3. The drunkard may abstain from 
intoxication, but his appetite is only slumbering, and 
may awake, rending all hope of success. 4. The in- 
dulgence of an inordinate appetite leads to disease, 
and can affect the whole system so as to produce in- 
sanitv. The resolves of an inebriate often broken, 



456 MORAL ACTION VARIED. 

result in loss of confidence and ruin. 5. The social 
propensity may affect moral action. If deprived of 
society, and especially those loved, the anxiety and 
intense misery ensuing, in many cases, have created 
disease and mental alienation, in which former objects 
of love are hated and scorned with revengeful madness. 

SECTION II. 

1. Love of home, when disappointed, frequently 
produces derangement of our moral feelings, and so 
intense may such desires become as to be followed 
by disease, mental alienation, and death. 2. The 
principle of self-preservation may be varied or weak- 
ened by repeated trials or disappointments. That 
which induces melancholy often contributes to dimin- 
ishing the desire of life. 3. The possessory principle 
may be improperly influenced, and in proportion as 
the miser accumulates wealth is his covetousness in- 
creased. Soon all thought is absorbed in money, 
gain, and how to save from loss. 4. The possessory 
principle resulting in theft or stealing, is neither con- 
genital nor constitutional, unless such is of natural 
necessity or infinite law. If so, such minds are in- 
capable of blame or punishment. 5. Disordered ac- 
tion takes place in regard to self-preservation. Un- 
der the natural desire of continued existence we begin 
to multiply supposed dangers till the mind becomes 
filled with terror, causing physical prostration and 
disease. 6. The principle of veracity may be varied. 
The moral powers may have always been repressed, 



MORAL ACTION VARIED. 457 

the judgment and memory defective, which will cause 

confused action in narrating correctly. 7. Love of 

esteem exalts self, but depreciates worth in others. 

39 



458 IMITATION 



CHAPTER V. 

IMITATION. 

SECTION I. 

1. The mind is possessed with an internal disposi- 
tion or principle, giving origin to imitation. There is 
a natural inclination to imitate those we admire. We 
are attracted by the intellectual gifts and attainments 
of those whose reach of thought and gaze of fire 
kindles new interest as the mind investigates extended 
fields of science. All laudable, great, and mighty 
mental acts naturally inspire assimilation. 2. Ambi- 
tion causes inclinations to imitate great and noble 
acts ; but care should be exercised or ruin is inevita- 
ble. 3. Moral imitation refers to the action of the 
moral powers and connected disposition to conform 
to rectitude qualifying elements of happiness. It is 
involved not only in a conscious relation to right, but 
to the great First Cause, in which we feel interested 
in that which is innocent, magnanimous, and honora- 
ble. 4. All objects of moral beauty are calculated to 
gain our attention, and instill desires of assimilation in 
some way. However opposed by malevolent feelings, 
yet we experience a rising preference for purity, and 
to acknowledge and honor the right. 5. In recalling 
the past, we experience great satisfaction in having 



IMITATION. 459 

imitated perfections which were just and approved of 
conscience and heaven. And in contemplating the 
future, we can not resist the desire to conform to 
truth, that we may be happy. 

SECTION II. 

1. Sympathetic imitation may extend to the feel- 
ings of many persons, involving the influence of 
spirit upon spirit, under peculiar and intense excite- 
ment, in which one is affected by the condition of 
others. 2. The countenance and feelings change with 
circumstances. In looking upon a mirthful or sad 
face, our feelings and expression naturally change 
correspondingly. The mangled form of one just 
fallen from an upper window creates involuntary sad- 
ness. 3. The same is true of children; if one be- 
comes sad and weeps, those associated often become 
affected and weep. 4. The shout of victory on the 
field of battle fills the whole army with joy. But the 
signal to surrender spreads universal dismay. The 
cloud of despair arching the commander's brow soon 
gathers upon the feelings of battling warriors. Loss 
of confidence yields to the thunders of an advancing 
foe. 5. We are apt to imitate the defects of orators 
first. If great men have uncouth expressions or ac- 
tions, natural or from habit, they are often copied by 
those who admire such illustrious giants in knowledge, 
while their. excellences are not imitated. 



460 SPIRITUALISM 



CHAPTER VI. 

SPIRITUALISM. 
SECTION I. 

1. Spiritualism, though not a mental element, be- 
longs to mind, is opposed to materialism, and once 
taught that all existences are spirit. We have seen 
the absurdity of materialism, and that all realities are 
spirit or soul is equally untrue. 2. Spinoza, near 
the middle of the seventeenth century, attempted the 
reconciliation of these extremes, by assuming only 
one substance in nature, and that the same was endued 
with an infinite variety of attributes, embracing solid- 
ity, extension, and cogitation; and that all bodies in 
the universe are modifications of this one substance ; 
that all souls of men are modifications of the same; 
and that God is an infinitely-perfect Being — cause of 
all things ; yet there is but one being or nature, how- 
ever endlessly diversified in distinctions. Such ab- 
surdity is atheism, and needs no comment. 3. In pro- 
portion as the mind is withdrawn from the physical 
organs of sense, is its action perfected. By so far as 
diseased bodily organs tend to inertness, is mind tram- 
meled in action. 4. But modern spiritualism is of 
extensive application, embracing the power of spirit 
to affect spirit, either directly or by means of physical 



SPIRITUALISM. 461 

organs. The living converse with the dead. From 
the nature and relation of spirit to matter, if a de- 
parted soul can not move the organs of its own dead 
body to communicate with us, how can it have power 
to move the inert powers of another medium already 
in the possession of a spiritual nature? All such af- 
firmations are averse to the nature and laws of mind 
and matter, and are absurd. Our physical natures can 
not be mediums for the departed, unless such spirits 
first move our spirits to act in conveying their 
thoughts, then our minds must first receive such 
thoughts before they can be made known. 5. From 
the natural adaptation and moral fitness of things, a 
holy message from a holy world can never come to us 
through vile or impure mediums. Deity does not em- 
ploy wicked persons as mediums of his mercy and 
pleasure ; neither can saint or angel use such agen- 
cies. Therefore, the unrighteous heart, if capable of 
being a medium, or physical organs connected with it, 
they can only be used by unholy beings of the spirit- 
world, and we have a right to reject their messages. 
6. It appears that finite spirits may be moved by the 
influence of Satanic power, performing feats of a 
miraculous character; but all such are denounced 
by Divine authority. 

SECTION II. 

1. The Scriptures furnish examples of spiritual in- 
fluences, but they are always characterized as either 
good or bad, right or wrong. All such influences, 



462 SPIRITUALISM. 

approved of God, are holy; and those unholy, are 
condemned. 2. Necromancy is the art of revealing 
coming events by pretended communication with the 
dead. This practice arose in Egypt, the mother of 
occult sciences, and was carried by the Israelites 
through all the East. Whether conversing with the 
dead is true or false, was unsettled in past ages. If 
true, it was grounded upon diabolical agencies and 
denounced by the law of God with the penalty of 
death. " A man or a woman that hath a familiar 
spirit, or that is a wizard, shall surely be put to 
death." Persons under the influence of their demon 
w T ere said to become greatly inflated, giving answers 
in frenzy. As souls have been possessed with 
devils, we know not how far we may place ourselves 
under their power. 3. Soothsaying was distinguished 
from prophecy in assuming power to foretell future 
events without Divine aid or authority, which, if true, 
can only be evil. 4. Astrology, though mystified by 
the Chaldeans and Egyptians, embraced nothing more 
than assumed science of foretelling events by the sit- 
uation and influence of the stars. 5. ^Enchantment 
embraced fascinations, charms, or spells, in order to 
deceive, which is opposed to every idea of right and 
purity. 6. Magic, as practiced by the magicians, was 
of the spirit of Python, claiming nothing of higher 
purity. Moses punished them with death. Daniel 
speaks of them among the Chaldeans, as averse to 
righteousness, evidently founded on imposture and 
devilism. 



SPIRITUALISM. 463 

SECTION III. 

1. Witchcraft is a supernatural power, which per- 
sons were supposed to obtain in compact with Satan. 
It was not till God had forsaken Saul, that he resorted 
to the Witch of Endor, one of the very class he had 
been legally destroying throughout the whole land. 
Bewildered in. apostasy, he desired first to see the 
Lord's prophet. The pythoness, in calling Samuel, 
doubtless expected only her familiar spirit, as she was 
more astonished than Saul at what she saw ; not re- 
garding it as the prophet, she exclaimed, " I saw gods 
ascending out of the earth." It appears that the Lord, 
at that time, saw fit to send Samuel, not in obedience 
to, but contrary to her expectation, to tell Saul his 
awful fate. 2. This power, in the sixteenth and sev- 
enteenth centuries, in Europe, yielded to the alche- 
mists, who claimed to turn base metals into silver and 
fine gold, saying that Satan is a friend to every one 
wishing to be skilled in the occult arts. 3. Demon- 
ology, in the same way, must be regarded as the basis 
of such spiritual influences and acts, not approved by 
Heaven. Though the magicians of Egypt, by enchant- 
ment, appeared to turn rods into serpents, yet it was 
opposed to the order and will of Deity. 4. That kind 
of spiritualism in which the Spirit of God influences 
and renews our spirits to a life of righteousness, is 
beyond the possibility of doubt. But confidence in 
the influence and communications of finite spirits with 
each other, can only safely exist where the medium is 
holy or desiring to conform to rectitude and purity, 



464 GENIUS 



CHAPTER VII. 

GENIUS. 
SECTION I. 

1. Genius may be regarded as a peculiar structure 
of mind, natural and essential to every intellect inves- 
tigating science and successful in lettered attainment. 
It has been called a natural disposition or bent of 
mind which belongs, in some degree, to all rational 
beings, qualifying them for a peculiar or specific work. 
2. It is a peculiar natural susceptibility, power, or apt- 
itude for a particular study or branch of science, 
quickening the mind with energy and vividness. It 
imparts a love for the intricate and mysterious, and 
inspires a determination to conquer. It is an active 
strength developing uncommon manifestations of in- 
tellectual power, and particularly that of investiga- 
tion. 3. It naturally gives condition, disposition, and 
character to mind, in which it loves activity, pene- 
trates and explores hidden fields of science. Its in- 
ternal fires kindle as we range universal facts, ever 
attracted by the displays of infinite skill and wisdom. 
As the travel of a star thought sweeps the rising fu- 
ture, still onward, as with seraphic reach of percep- 
tion and gaze of fire, peering into the mysterious vast 
of coming eternity. 4. It is closely connected with 



GENIUS. 465 

originality. The latter embraces the basis or realities, 
while the former leads to an examination of them, in 
which arises the apprehension of distinctions and force 
in knowledge. The latter furnishes materials or facts, 
but genius carries them to the court of inspection and 
investigation, evolving new features of pleasing discov- 
ery. 5. Primary or absolute originality belongs only 
to Deity. He created all matter and mind in which 
arises every idea and thought. Finities may change, 
but can neither create nor annihilate the smallest 
atom. We may change or pervert ideas, but can not 
make them; yet genius renders investigation delight- 
ful. 6. The vast universe is the great source of ideas 
created by Infinite Wisdom, and only such can we 
know, but can use ideas which have or have not been 
possessed by other finite minds, and such be called 
original. The examination of these causes the inter- 
nal fires of genius to glow, sending out to every men- 
tal capability thrills of delight. 

SECTION II. 

1. Grenius is involved in the origin and perfecting 
of investigations and inventions. Mind inspired by 
it dares to be wise and useful. Put out its fires and 
intellectual effort is paralyzed. Its pulsations shake 
a slumbering world, waking fondest expectancy, 
while thought ranges universal truths with pleasing 
imperishability. 2. It is present in decomposing and 
recombining in the alteration of the relation and prop- 
erties of realities, giving new applications when dis- 



466 GENIUS. 

coveries are made. 3. It not only aids in the dis- 
crimination and suitable arrangement of facts, but 
produces mental animation. This depends upon the 
interest felt or inspired by genius. It exerts a favor- 
able influence upon memory in fixing the attention 
upon every desired fact. 4. Imagination receives 
aid from the strength of genius in exciting mental 
action. It exerts a favorable influence upon the 
judgment, penetrating facts, and evolving their rela- 
tive importance. 5. It is almost indispensable to true 
eloquence, conferring clearness of thought and ex- 
pression. It excites the orator in clearly compre- 
hending and enforcing the truths of his message. 



DIVISION FOURTEENTH. 



CHAPTER I. 

MORAL EDUCATION. 
SECTION I. 

1. The term education implies something capable of 
being instructed, and that such entity belongs to and is 
natural to mind. We are informed or enlightened by 
receiving principles of the arts, science, morals, and 
religion. 2. Mental education refers to the cultivation 
of the intellectual powers, and moral education to the 
cultivation of the moral elements of mind. The former 
is essential in acquiring knowledge, and the latter is 
indispensable to usefulness and true happiness. The 
former without the latter only capacitates the soul for 
increasing shades of crime and ruin. 3. The mind, 
with high intellectual culture, and pure moral powers, 
controlled by the will of God, is a star burning in the 
moral firmament, attracting and fadeless. 4. In pro- 
portion as we adhere to the intimations of the moral 
elements and dictates of conscience, we are apt to be 
biased and directed to right in opposition to wrong. 
They can discriminate and be influenced by good and 
bad, but will be ever occupied by either right or evil. 

5. Education may be said to begin with the first 

467 



468 MORAL EDUCATION. 

rational notice of a child, and synchronizing with 
such notice, it naturally detects something of the dif- 
ference between smiles of parental approval and 
frowning expressions of disapproval. The former 
affects a consciousness of peace, love, and rising intu- 
itions of right, while the latter saddens the feelings 
and affects consciousness of dissatisfaction or wrong. 
6. As the faith of the parent is received for the 
child while incapable of knowing right from wrong, 
there is no period of such existence when it should 
not be wholly consecrated to the will of God, and 
that without reserve forever. This, followed by cor- 
rect moral training, confiding in the faithfulness of 
Heaven to save our offspring, would not fail, and 
universally adopted, earth's teeming millions would 
soon proclaim the millennium arrived. 

SECTION II. 

1. Perceptive action is first, but immediately suc- 
cessive is sensitive action. The latter may develop 
or mature more rapidly than the former. Youthful 
persons properly instructed have a clearer sense of 
moral obligation and duty, than of scientific truths at 
the same age. An early disregard to such conscious 
sense of right is the beginning of ruin. 2. It is the 
desecration and departure of the moral powers and 
intention which constitutes the vagabond and lawless 
transgressor. The present and future happiness of 
the soul depends upon the cultivation of the moral 
powers, conforming them to the will of God, and is 



MORAL EDUCATION. 469 

more essential than intellectual education. 3. The 
first truths imparted to youthful minds should be 
moral and religious. That which is first learned is 
last forgotten, and those facts received during the 
first ten years of life, generally give direction and 
character to our being. Parents often weep over 
their offspring ruined, when half the concern and 
care at the right time w r ould have saved them. 4. 
Moral education must include instruction in reference 
to the existence and character of the Supreme Being, 
and those religious duties we owe to him, to ourselves 
and one another. Without moral susceptibility and 
religious discipline thrones would fall, governments 
dissolve, and the whole earth present continued scenes 
of blood and carnage. 5. The highest state of man 
consists in his purity as a moral being. He must 
look to this in preparing for temporal usefulness and 
happiness in the coming future. The longings of the 
soul dissatisfied with earthly things soar beyond the 
scenes of sensible things, finding no object filling such 
capacity till resting in the contemplation of Deity. 
6. Our only safety is in constantly watching over and 
investigating the character of our intellectual and 
moral condition, guarding our feelings, desires, attach- 
ments, and our antipathies. Moral purity must con- 
trol the heart. Without this the mind may range the 
highest attainments in science, measure the earth, 
silently step the zodiac, travel with the stars, and 
shout to the varying flight of distant rolling worlds. 
Yet, without God in the soul all is but loss. 7. With- 



470 MORAL EDUCATION. 

out moral influence and power the faculties are 
wrecked and soul ruined. It is the moral nature that 
gives origin to ideas of right, obligation, and duty, 
harmonizing warring elements affecting the throes of 
the great heart. It invokes the will to mighty con- 
flict, evil is overruled, and devils fly. The first per- 
ception or idea of right possessed by a little child, in 
moral worth, surpasses angels fallen. The latter, 
though understanding the mysteries of heaven and 
earth, the history of created worlds, and obtained all 
knowledge, yet without a sense of right to guide in 
purity, love, and happiness, all would sink into insig- 
nificance. 8. How painful to contemplate a man de- 
prived of vision, hearing, or action ; but still more 
awful to watch the retiring of reason and memory, 
yet we can love such an object. But if self-govern- 
ment is gone," the light of conscience extinct, and all 
power to love right, men, angels, and God wholly de- 
stroyed, though the intellect kindle with the brilliancy 
of a thousand suns, the soul is lost. But vivid 
thought, with true moral purity, outstrips the light- 
ning, compasses space, scales heaven, fathoms hell, 
and fills the soul with holy and blissful emotions. 



WELL-BALANCED POWERS. 471 



CHAPTER II. 

WELL-BALANCED INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL 
POWERS OF MIND. 

SECTION I. 

1. Well-balanced intellectual and moral elements 
of mind, refer to the perfectness of their essential 
existence and relative activity or force in manifesta- 
tion. 2. As the physical organs change the action of 
the different powers of mind often vary, as in youth 
and age, sickness and health. 3. The wisest and 
safest man is he whose mind is well-balanced in the 
proper exercise of all its faculties, and not so in- 
tensely as to paralyze any of the organs on which 
manifestations depend. 4. The succession of our 
thoughts should be guarded with exactness, and con- 
trolled with an intention to conquer. 5. Our entire 
attention should be devoted to the single object under 
consideration, but when weariness begins we should 
in that moment turn to some other fact. 

SECTION II. 

1. There are classes of objects involving purely-in- 
tellectual action, in which beauty, sublimity, and 
grandeur excite an eager reach of thought and de- 
lightful range of facts, without reading the presence 



472 WELL-BALANCED POWERS. 

of Infinite Goodness and Wisdom. 2. Moral facts 
support the devout mind, while holy emotions inspire 
confidence, love, and praise. Though outer worlds 
glow in the light of unending sublimity, the world 
within outvies them all, centered in life and enjoy- 
ment without restriction. 3. We should be careful to 
call into action all the faculties of the soul ; each one in 
its proper office and force of power allowed by natural 
being and endowment. 4. To become perfect, the 
mind must know and love purity, and that God is the 
center and circumference of all knowledge, and our 
souls should rest in him. Every ray of moral and 
scientific light traced upward and downward, toward 
the unchanging north or distant south, farthest east 
or remotest west, proves there is but one infinite full- 
ness — the Eternal One. 



THE SOUL. 473 



CHAPTER III. 

THE SOUL. 
SECTION I. 

1. The doctrine of the soul was regarded by some 
schools of antiquity as embodying more than mind; 
the latter comprehending mere faculties of thought, 
reason, and power of knowledge, while the former in- 
volved the idea of the entire spiritual nature. It is 
spirit in essence, not subject to age or annihilation; 
the oneness of mind and soul distinct from the body, 
and imperishable. 2. It is the vital part or power of 
existence; thinks, reasons, and constitutes man a 
moral, intellectual, and immortal being, capable of the 
glorious government of God. 3. In considering the 
soul, we assume that every human being possesses a 
conviction and consciousness, of which we can not 
rid ourselves, that the sentient principle within is 
real, one and indivisible. We can not resist the per- 
suasion of self-reality and absolute individuality, op- 
posed to all ulterior facts and every thing like plural- 
ity, an uncompromising sense of unalterable oneness. 
This felt unity is contradictory to any possible suppo- 
sition that feeling and thought owe their existence 
and character to multiplied thousands of varying par- 
ticles, with different affinities toward each other, and 

40 



474 THE SOUL. 

coexisting in the same body. 4. As all portions of 
matter are infinitely divisible, and as each must hold 
an independent existence in all compounds, then 
thought and feeling, results of these, must be infi- 
nitely divisible, tangible, and extended. Our feel- 
ings would be made up of lines, circles, triangles, and 
squares ; and as all things must conform to the laws 
of materiality, each element of mind must be as di- 
visible and destructible as matter. 5. If the soul be 
a result of either material entities or laws, it must 
conform to the condition of relative particles and the 
composition of thought. This would compel our con- 
templation of the same to stumble at every step upon 
the monstrous and absurd. A feeling would have 
form, weight, and extension. We would meet with 
the half of a belief, the quarter of a doubt, the tenth 
part of an idea, a square hope, an angular action, a 
conic feeling, the north corner of a feeling, a circu- 
lar remembrance, or the south-west corner of an emo- 
tion. As foolish as this may appear, nevertheless 
mind must conform to the nature of matter if it is 
causative. But if mind is a mere accident of material 
organization, it has only a relative and no absolute 
existence. 

SECTION II. 

1. The term life may be applied to the growth of 
rocks, the maturing of the coral, or advance of pet- 
rifactions, which is the first law of motion in matter, 
differing from that of impinging influences. But it 
is without sensitive or instinctive action. 2. It has 



THE SOUL. 475 

been assumed that the instinct and sensitiveness of 
vegetable life indicates as much contrivance as that 
of animals, and if instinct be referred to mind in the 
latter it must in the former. Vegetable life is inani- 
mate, without sensitive feelings, and different from 
that of animals. 3. Arguments against the spiritual 
nature or soul, have been founded upon the acknowl- 
edged instinct and sagacity of the brute creation. 
But reason in man and instinct in animals differ in 
sources, character, and nature. The former must be 
guided by judgment, which involves apprehension and 
contrast, and extends to the present, past, and future. 
The latter is a feeling in nature, founded in aptitudes 
or inclinations. 4. If mind is a mere accident, then 
virtue and vice are accidents, incapable of rewards or 
punishment; man is a machine, and such accidents 
bear no relationship to him. 5. We are positive that 
no part of the physical nature is essential to con- 
sciousness. The loss of parts or members of such 
nature can not diminish consciousness of self. We 
intuitively and irresistibly feel an internal power 
which neither time nor death can destroy. 



476 the soul's immortality. 



CHAPTER IV. 

EVIDENCES OF THE SOUL'S IMMORTALITY. 

SECTION I. 

1. The doctrine of the soul's immortality is full of 
interest, and never fails to excite with fondest hope, 
attracting vivid and pleasing inquiries. The idea of 
annihilation is horrible. He who holds such belief 
becomes a fearful spectacle to his race, his society is 
avoided, and his deportment and spirit is cold, unkind, 
and heartless. ( His home appears shaded with gloom, 
and the winds of heaven passing over his grave sing 
requiems of doleful despair. 2. The soul, in original 
nature, is independent of the changes and accidents 
of matter. It is the great immaterial source, the im- 
perishable fountain of feeling, thought, emotion, and 
knowledge. A simple, uncompounded essence, it re- 
ceived from God the elements of incorruptibility, and 
its constituted being is immortality. 3. In the crea- 
tion of the soul Deity either intended its immortality 
or that, at some epoch subsequent, it should cease to 
be. If the latter be true, then it is mortal and must 
cease to exist; for such purposes in its creation are 
changeless. 



the soul's immortality. 477 

section ii. 

1. But if God purposed in its creation life forever, 
then it is naturally, essentially, and necessarily im- 
mortal ; for such purpose, in this respect, is the law 
of its being, and, extending to immortality, secures its 
indestructibility. 2. The creation, nature, powers, 
relations, and internal aspirings of the soul, in which 
it anxiously moves to the future, and struggles for 
greater liberty, knowledge, and bliss, all impress us 
of an open door to coming boundlessness, and an infi- 
nite perspective of being. 3. A deep, conscious con- 
viction and feeling, unobstructedly force the persua- 
sion of our immortality. This feeling appears to have 
naturally possessed the soul in every nation and con- 
dition of man. 4. Heathen nations, beneath murky 
skies of confusion, with all their superstition and 
prejudice, give evidence of a conviction and longing 
for life in the future. Such feelings are always offer- 
ing homage to virtue, and hopes of happiness unend- 
ing. 5. The vast capacities, boundless desires, and 
great improvements of the soul evidence its adapta- 
tion to, and the reality of being where all can be 
satisfied. We feel a dissatisfaction with the present 
time and state, and desire a suitable preparation that 
we may avoid every thing like disappointment in 
eternity. 



478 the soul's value 



CHAPTER V. 

EVIDENCES OF THE SOUL'S VALUE. 
SECTION I. 

1. All evidence favors the doctrine of the souVs 
immortality. An act of omnipotence was necessary 
to create it, and nothing less than the same power 
can cause its non-existence. 2. By intuition and 
consciousness we are impressed of its indestructibility. 
We feel and knozv that we are immortal. Nature 
never gravitates to naught. Her intuitive lessons, 
aside and apart from sin and its influence, are imper- 
ishable truth. 3. It is the soul that tests the truth- 
fulness and power of revealed religion, in conforma- 
tion of the religion of nature. In the latter it reads 
the revelation of a God, and by the former experi- 
ences his presence and approval. So full is the bur- 
den of testimony, that to be an atheist implies a pre- 
vious qualification of being a fool. 4. Its value is 
increased by original feelings and notions of virtue. 
We experience an involuntary and indefinable drifting 
to moral preferences and rectitude. 5. It has con- 
templative and active powers, understanding, con- 
science and the will, suggestion, thought, and feeling, 
all indispensable to knowledge, and without these 
what is man? 6. It is the ivorld of thought within 



the soul's value. 479 

that presents elements, affinities, and relations, stupen- 
dous in wisdom and worth, and powerful in action 
and appeal. It contemplates the higher principles of 
our destiny, resolves knowledge into constituent 
parts, tracing to original sources, and evolves the fact 
that the laws of mind, to some extent, become the laws 
of every science. 

SECTION II. 

1. The influence of thought upon language is found 
in the nature and laws of mind, a knowledge of 
which being necessary to the best systems of rhetoric 
and logic known. 2. Taste evidences the value of 
mind. The importance of the rippling rill is lost as 
the soul surveys the mighty Ganges or Amazon, roll- 
ing a broad wave through cities, plains, forests, hills, 
and mountains, bearing a mighty commerce to the 
heaving bosom of ocean independence. In the mind 
arises the contrast between the bird sporting in the 
bower, and the eagle now spreading his wing to the 
hastening storm — then burning in the sun. 3. Mind 
gives value to special and national laws ; and without 
this, the management of the world is a failure, and 
millions of our race have been doomed to hopeless 
wretchedness. It is the only real wealth of nations. 
4. The value of the soul is supported by the fact that 
intellectual and moral resources are our principal and 
most boundless store of enjoyment. It is the wealth 
of the beggar and the triumph of the mighty. 5. Its 
value is implied from the fact that the neglect of 
proper mental and moral culture did for cycles of 



480 the soul's value. 

ages rob man of both liberty and happiness. But 
when genius awoke from the slumber of more than a 
thousand years, despotism began to vanish at the 
coming tread of indignant millions. Enlightened by 
Revelation, it threw radiance over the empire of spirit, 
linking our energies to the improvement of this world 
and the happy reversions of life eternal. 6. The 
value of the soul is exalted, when all other orders of 
earth are contrasted with its active elaborations of 
thought. Enter this interior temple of nature; range 
the scenes of unrivaled magnificence; look upon the 
conscious altars, covered with light, and the sacred 
curtain woven by the finger of God, with indwelling 
aspirations ftfr a holy immortality; and mind absorbs 
all thought, carrying accumulating knowledge that 
would weigh down the inert bosom of a thousand Ju- 
piters. 7. The soul is above valuation. Its salvation 
embraces self, and to be lost is the ruin of ourselves. 
It has interested heaven from all eternity. For thou- 
sands of years mercy has pleaded our cause. Earth has 
rolled her boundless resources to supply our wants; 
and hell exerts all its fiendish toil for our destruction. 
8. If it was great to speak a world from naught, but 
greater to redeem, how shall we weigh its value? 
Creation is by the word of power, but redemption 
involved the highest gift of Almighty Goodness; price 
all price beyond. 9. Nature, at the crucifixion, gave 
evidence of the soul's value, in consternation and inver- 
sion of her laws — the darkened heavens, shaking 
earth, rending vail, the breaking rocks and rising dead. 



IMPORTANCE OF STUDYING MIND. 481 



CHAPTER VI. 

IMPORTANCE OF STUDYING THE NATURE AND 

POWERS OF THE SOUL, AS THE GREAT 

AND SUPERIOR SCIENCE. 

SECTION I. 

1. Mind is the science of our being, and all knowl- 
edge in regard to the works of art and nature is in- 
debted to this study. And it gives tact, keenness of 
perception, laying bare the great field of thought. It 
brings to view the elements of the moral universe. 
By the condition of the world within, the central 
source of distinction is the character of outward ac- 
tion. 2. The study of mind seeks knowledge of every 
element of being, and if its powers be unknown, how 
shall the wants of our spiritual being be supplied? 
Every correct system of education must embrace 
physical, intellectual, and moral discipline. 3. This 
study discovers the foundation elements of natural re- 
ligion, which appears in the existence, beauty, and 
design of nature. 4. Man is intuitively instructed 
from self and his Creator. He receives it through 
the works of creation, the ever-unfolding wisdom of 
Providence and never-failing goodness. 

SECTION II. 

1. The study of mind is not properly esteemed by 

the masses. Many capable of stepping an unexplored 

41 



482 IMPORTANCE OF STUDYING MIND. 

zodiac, tracing worlds rolling on high, and of throwing 
burning thought upon the plain of endless life, all 
alive with the approach of heaven, turn away wholly 
absorbed in the fight of two chickens, or the fleetness 
of two mules contending in a race. 2. In proportion 
as mental culture is neglected, despotism is extended. 
Often when the latter was not intended, fetters have 
been riveted upon the people and unborn generations 
crushed by misguided rulers, intending good but not 
knowing how it should be attained. 3. It is mental 
and moral improvement that gives liberty and stability 
to government, otherwise cannons, fleets, and armies, 
with extended seas or lofty Alps, must forever fail. 
4. Philosophical genius refers directly to the study of 
our intellectual and moral powers. A total neglect is 
connected with a mind weak or in ruins. The mind 
must think in the right way, and upon true and pure 
subjects, in order to be wise and good. It must be 
able to turn in upon itself without disgust, and find 
there the vivid activity and pure objects for which we 
were created. 



MIND AND BODY. 483 



CHAPTER VII. 

MUTUAL RELATION OF PSYCHOLOGY AND 
ANTHROPOLOGY, EVOLVING THE CON- 
DITION AND CHARACTER OF 
THE SOUL IN TIME. 

SECTION I. 

1. It is impossible to define the mysterious ties 
uniting the soul and body. But we can not deny the 
fact that spirit and matter compose our real being. 
2. These two natures influence each other, and either 
can be affected by the other. The bodily organs 
should be perfect and in vigorous health, in order to 
correct mental action. 3. Natural defects often con- 
stitute idiots, and frequently trammel correct reason- 
ing. 4. A paralysis of the delicate nerves connected 
and sympathizing with the brain, often destroys cor- 
rect mental action. 5. Disease or general debility 
will affect the mind in some way, and often to mental 

alienation. 

SECTION II. 

1. The mind exerts a very strong influence over 
the body. A uniform, cheerful, and happy class of 
feelings will contribute to the vigor and health of the 
body. 2. A troubled, depressed, or gloomy class of 
feelings, or wretched state of mind, will impair the 
health and bring us to a premature grave. 3. The 



484 MIND AND BODY. 

remorse of the murderer will hastily devour his ener- 
gies and terminate life. 4. We are comforted in the 
belief that all minds deprived of reason in this life 
will be rational on leaving the body. 5. All idiots 
will be sane and happy in heaven, as their innocence 
banishes all doubt in regard to their future joy. 



IMPORTANCE OF MORAL CULTURE. 485 



CHAPTER VIII. 

CULTIVATION OF THE MORAL POWERS, WITH 

THE SOUL'S CONFORMITY TO THE WILL 

OF GOD, MORE IMPORTANT THAN ONLY 

INTELLECTUAL IMPROVEMENT. 

SECTION I. 

1. The soul is preeminently endued with con- 
science and various moral powers. The innocence and 
purity of these are essential to virtuous life and con- 
tinued happiness. 2. Religion does not destroy any 
faculty nor create new ones ; but adoption by grace 
changes the moral condition and relation of the soul 
to its Creator in light, peace, and joy. 3. Though we 
could grasp all scientific knowledge, and command an 
angel's thoughts, if we love not God, neither adhere 
to truth and rectitude, the soul is only capacitated for 
deeper degrees of unending remorse. 4. All history 
proves that where moral suasion rules the people, and 
virtue is honored, there is peace and happiness. But 
where moral influences are rejected, mind is vicious 
and the world mad. Each morning breath is burdened 
with groans, and the evening dew is blood. True joy 
can never be derived from the shock of battle or shout 
of arms. 

SECTION II. 

1. In studying the nature and office of the moral 
powers, we are impressed and convinced of the com- 



486 IMPORTANCE OF MORAL CULTURE. 

mon nature and proper equality of our race. We can 
not resist the conviction, that all men are equal in 
their origin, relations, dependence, dissolution, and 
immortality ; and that the various shades, formations, 
and divisions of society are mere accidents of being, 
and exist essentially extrinsic of original nature. 2. 
We are taught both by religion and philosophy, that 
all classes of our race have one Father, who created 
us for usefulness and happiness. 3. This study will 
enable us to perceive and expel the evils of supersti- 
tion and skepticism. It qualifies us to penetrate all 
sources of error, whether political, philosophical, or 
religious. Our highest emotions and love must be 
given to Him who is able to save. 4. It is moral cul- 
tivation that renders mind useful, elevates the world, 
and saves the soul. And without it, law is powerless, 
resolution exists in frenzy, and the whole moral heav- 
ens are hung in mourning. 



THE SOUL IN TEMPORAL DEATH. 487 



CHAPTER IX. 

THE SOUL— HOW AFFECTED BY TEMPORAL 
DISEASE AND DEATH. 

SECTION I. 

1. We have seen that diseased physical organs af- 
fect mental action. Almost the first lesson should be 
to study how to promote health. The neglect of one 
item often aifects and maddens the whole system. 
An impure quality of food or water received into the 
stomach, sends impure chyle to the vena cava, vitia- 
ting the nature of the blood, which, on being pumped 
by the heart to the brain, affects the whole cerebral 
mass. The connected nerves influence the whole sys- 
tem ; we fall sick ; the mind becomes flighty and acts 
imperfectly. 2. The soul in its intellectual, sensitive, 
and moral nature becomes sympathetically affected by 
reason of its connection with diseased bodily powers. 
3. We can only expect perfect mental action when 
free from fallen earthly fetters. 

SECTION II. 

1. The death of the body takes place in the sepa- 
ration of the soul from it. The delicate ties and affin- 
ity uniting the two natures being sundered, the body 
becomes decomposed, without any annihilation of its 



488 THE SOUL IN TEMPORAL DEATH. 

essential elements, till the sound of the last trump 
calls it up a " spiritual body." 2. The identity of the 
soul and its power of action and knowledge, appear 
undisturbed in such separation; but our being is not 
entire till soul and body are united again. 3. Tern- 
foral death appears to have no annihilating pow r er 
over the soul or its elements. 



THE SOUL IN ETERNITY. 489 



CHAPTER X. 

THE SOUL IN ETEKNITY. 

SECTION I. 

1. Reason, unaided by Revelation, can only follow 
in the wake of life's brief journey, and leaning upon 
the tomb, is silent. When all such efforts end, Rev- 
elation points out the travel of the soul beyond, en- 
tering the opening future. Upon it our helplessness 
hangs wholly dependent for the certainty of immor- 
tality, the reality of heaven, and the character and 
happiness of the redeemed. 2. We naturally desire 
to contemplate the existence and character of the soul 
in eternity. We may reason from the nature and 
analysis of mind, but all positive certainty is found in 
the revealed will of God to man. 3. We are led to 
contemplate the soul on leaving the body as being 
naturally perfect, whether it has become morally so or 
not. All its susceptibilities and powers are imperish- 
able and wholly untrammeled by matter. 4. All items 
of knowledge ever stored in memory are imperishable, 
as we have no proof that any entity can ever cease 
to be. Fading facts, or traces of immaterialities, will 
be retained and live with the reality of the essence 
upon which they were impressed or written. But the 
remembrance of evil can not annoy the soul saved 



490 THE SOUL IN ETERNITY. 

from all such impurity. 5. Memory being immortal, 
however varied or trammeled with materiality, every 
fact impressed upon such immaterial essence never 
can be erased, as finity has no power of annihilation. 

SECTION II, 

1. Perception can never die. As its power, by 
means of physical organs, is wholly of and within the 
mind, it must of necessity exist unimpaired in spir- 
itual vividness, separated from the body. 2. The 
power of vision and hearing belongs to mind, and must 
continue with it, disembodied. 3. Feeling and emo- 
tions are of mind, and must continue as long as such 
existence shall endure. 4. We are induced to believe 
that on the dissolution of the body, the soul is per- 
fected in development and power of action. It is un- 
fettered on the highway of light and knowledge. 5. 
A world of meaning might fail to describe the immortal 
throes, the lofty capacity and ability of the soul to 
know, act, and progress in knowledge when free and 
happy in eternity. Heaven in tears, all worlds in 
mourning, may fail to make known to us the full sor- 
rows of the soul lost forever. 

SECTION III. 

1. A pure soul departing from earth enters not a 
world of dark conjecture or doubt, but of reality, 
beauty, and happiness. Heaven is adapted to man 
and calculated to fill every holy desire; as infinite 
perfection could not be -otherwise. 2. Spirit must 



THE SOUL IN ETERNITY. 491 

have spiritual sight or perception of spirits. We 
shall see our friends and know them in that bright 
world. Mingled feelings of joy kindle as we look to 
the extended domain, rolling river, the beautiful city, 
and waving trees of life. 3. We shall know the re- 
deemed. Apostles knew Moses and Elias on the 
Mount, though they had lived in previous ages. The 
rich man knew Abraham and Lazarus. It is reason- 
able to believe that the very inspiration of heaven will 
reveal the names of those we knew in time, and all 
the inhabitants of that blessed world. 4. The whole 
family of Christ in heaven will be morally one, in 
heart, mind, and will. As He is one, so must the re- 
deemed be one, in union, perfectly according with his 
will and decisions, even against friends who have re- 
jected salvation, and can not give us pain, as our wills 
and approval will be perfectly absorbed and united in 
our Savior. What he does will be right and in perfect 
harmony with purity and happiness. 5. It appears 
that all the redeemed in heaven have but one circle, 
class, or union. The idea of orders, grades, and de- 
grees, as taught by Swedenborg, is contrary to all our 
conceptions of the nature and character of heaven. 
If there are grades, circles, and orders, then naturally 
follows preferences, classification, separations, divi- 
sions, and discord. The very moment the union of 
heaven is broken, it ceases to be heaven. So long as 
Christ is one and indivisible, his family will constitute 
one union in perfect happiness forever. 



492 THE SOUL IN ETERNITY. 

SECTION IV. 

1. By so far as one soul may have done and suffered 
more for Christ and his cause than another, the Lord 
may bestow upon him more in quantity but not in 
quality or kind, while each one will enjoy a complete 
fullness. 2. It would seem that the love of the saints 
will be uniform. We can do no more than love our 
pa-rents perfectly and with all the soul ; then it is do- 
ing them no injustice if we love every other soul 
saved in the same way. 3. As Christ is one and his 
children are united in him, will not our love for the 
saints be conformed to, and conditioned by his love 
for each one saved through his mercy? If so, how 
can there be natural preferences or partiality? If 
any contemplate superiority, let him be careful lest he 
fail entering that holy world. 4. The life of the soul 
in the future is eternal. It is imperishable; and 
though material worlds cease to be, it will live on, 
light and joy increasing. If permitted to travel out 
amid distant creations of Deity, it is neither re- 
stricted by time nor limited in happiness. 5. The 
heart kindles with unearthly fire as we would summon 
every power trying to contemplate the soul perfect in 
heaven. 0, eternity ! thought stupendous, great, and 
glorious ! home of earth's redeemed ! Hail, happy 
millions, saved by grace, enter with triumphant ac- 
claim, prolonged in the exchanging shout of worlds ! 



INDEX. 



-++• 



REFERRING TO EACH DIVISION, AND ARRANGED AS 
A BASIS OF QUESTIONS FOR TEACHERS. 



.♦. 

INTRODUCTION 

TSICAL AND MENTAL SCIENC 
CLAIMS OF MATERIALISM EXAMINED. 

SECTION I. 

Page. 

1. Man an existent. Can he doubt self-reality ? 5 

2. Universal being composed of spirit and matter — is knowledge 

restricted to these? 5 

3. His liberty of action 5 

4. His being indestructible 6 

5. Matter decomposed, not annihilated 6 

SECTION II. 

1. Man of spirit and matter — not annihilated by death 6 

2. Spirit, animation or life 7 

3. The soul intellectual, and power of reason 7 

4. It is spirit — indivisible 7 

5. It is immortal — vivid in action 7 

SECTION III. 

1. Matter distinct from mind, in property 7 

2. Matter inanimate — when? 7 

3. It is inanimate, separated from mind 8 

SECTION IV. 

1. Mind not matter — its internal power 8 

2. Its power to act without matter 8 

3. To what the term, mind, applies 8 

4. The essence of mind 8 

5. Difficulty in proving essence of mind 9 

SECTION V. 

1. Knowledge from reasoning and intuition — preference 9 

2. We feel power within not material 9 

3. Matter can not recall the past or contemplate the future 10 

4. Principle of thought not matter — how varied 10 

493 



494 INDEX, 



SECTION VI. 

Pagb, 

1. Matter not mind— how differing 11 

2. Inactivity and tendency to rest 11 

3. Essence difficult to define 11 

4. Idea of materialists incorrect 12 

5. Inertness lias no knowledge of self ' 12 

6. Atoms moved bylaws of attraction and resistance 12 

7. Non-existence more reasonable than only materialism 12 

SECTION VII. 

1. If the soul be matter, it thinks — what of all matter? 13 

2. All matter cogitative 13 

3. Mind a function of the brain — the result , 13 

4. Mind — how affected by diseases of brain 14 

S E CTION VIII. 

1. Mind independent of matter — how? , 14 

2. If matter can think, and mind is matter, what the result? 14 

3. Materialists immortal — how? 15 

4. Material thinking eternal — how? 15 

5. Matter without emotions — how? 15 

6. Self not changed with matter in knowledge 15 

7. Knowledge of the past impossible — how? 16 

SECTION IX. 

1. Mind distinct from matter — how dependent ? 16 

2. The body indestructible— why ? 16 

3. No evidence of the annihilation of any thing 17 

4. Decay of the bocly no evidence of annihilation 17 

SECTION X . 

1. Probable eternity of matter as to the future 17 

2. The soul superior to matter — how? 18 

3. The feeling of soul — how affected? 18 

4. Matter with primary causation — how absurd? 19 

5. Motion of particles impossible — cogitation absurd 19 

6. No action of matter can cause cogitation 20 

7. Union of elements to think impossible- — how? 20 



SECTION XI. 

1. Matter has no power to reflect beyond self 21 

2. It can not correct appearances 21 

3. Man feels power to change 21 

4. The soul not a faculty of the body 22 

5. It is incapable of annihilation 22 

6. No evidence that any thing will cease to be 22 

7. Conscious action — how influenced 22 

SECTION XII. 

1. The soul's conscious knowledge of self 23 

2. High moral obligations upon us 23 

3. The object of mental cultivation 23 

4. Reasonableness of atheists believing Christianity 24 

5. Matter belongs to physical science 24 



INDEX. 495 

PART I. 

ELEMENTS OF MIND 

WHICH LIE AT THE FOUNDATION OF MENTAL ACTION. 



DIVISION FIRST. 
CHAPTER I. 

PRELIMINARY ARGUMENT. 

SECTION I. 

Page. 

1. Mind, spiritual in nature and unending in duration 29 

2. Mental elements the origin of mental action 29 

3. Elements the origin of moral action 29 

SECTION II. 

1. Powers at the origin of moral feelings — moral elements 29 

2. "Without elements there can be no science 30 

CHAPTER II. 

INTELLECTUAL OR MENTAL POWERS. 
SECTION I. 

1. Various orders of mind 31 

2. Inferior orders — how conditioned? 31 

SECTIO N II. 

1. Matter without sensation or motion 31 

2. What of instinct in different orders ? — imperishability 31 

CHAPTER III. 

OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE 

OF THE HUMAN MIND. 

SECTION I. 

1. Mind— how denned? 33 

2. Not constituted by thought or feeling— what is it? 33 

3. Knowledge of self arises from intuition and demonstration 33 

4. What is the primary knowledge of mind's existence? 34 

5. Difference between primary and secondary properties 34 

6. Knowledge of mind not only by motion 34 

7. The cause of mind beyond our inquiries 34 

8. Its essence unknown 34 

SECTION II. 

1. Error of Mr. Stewart. What is his mistake ? 34 

2. What of axioms in mathematics and mind ? 35 



496 INDEX 



Pagk 

3. How do we know self-evident truths? > 36 

4. Axioms of mind have knowledge of self 36 

CHAPTER IV. 

EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND. 
SECTION I. 

1. Inquiries of mental phenomena embrace properties, not essence.... 37 

2. Threefold division of mind. (1.) Mental elements. (2.) Moral 

elements. (3.) Manifestations 37 

3. The acts of mind. (1.) Duties to God. (2.) Duties to ourselves. 

(3.) Duties to one another 37 

s ECTIO N II. 

1. Improper order in philosophy — what is wrong? 38 

2. Inherent power to know 38 

CHAPTER V. 

SENSATION. 
SECTION I. 

1. Sensation defined 39 

2. How it may arise 39 

3. It can not be separated from mind — why not? 39 

SECTION II. 

1. How is it feeling by external objects? 40 

2. How internal — wjiat causes it? 40 

3. It is not the appearance of objects 40 

4. Mysterious connection with physical organs 40 

5. Its connection with mental elements 40 

CHAPTER VI. 

SENSE. 
SECTION I. 

1. Sense defined — relation to existences and qualities 42 

2. Relation to the change of organs and to sensation 42 

3. How is it succeeded by sensations 42 

SECTION II. 

1. What it apprehends — how? 42 

2. Simple state spontaneous — what of action? 42 

3. How it is the perception of the senses 42 

4. How the discernment of the senses « 43 

CHAPTER VII. 

THE SENSES. 
SECTION I. 

1. The senses defined — power of the same 44 

2. Connection of the senses with the organs, mysterious 44 

3. Wholly dependent on the senses for knowledge of external things. 44 



INDEX. 497 



SECTION II. 

Pagk. 

1. How far dependent upon the senses for knowledge 44 

2. Importance of the senses for knowledge of external things 45 

3. The loss of this power can not destroy mind 45 

4. The order of the five senses — not abstracted from the organs 45 

CHAPTER VIII. 

THE SENSE OF SMELL. 

SECTION I. 

1. Organ of smell defined 46 

2. Sense of smell connected with the nerves 46 

3. Substance of the nerves — their sensitiveness 46 

4. The nerves and sense not the same 46 

SECTION II. 

1. How sensations are received 47 

2. Knowledge eluded — how corrected? 47 

3. How classify sensations 47 

4. Influence upon life and health 48 

5. How such sensations are produced 48 

SECTION III. 

1. " Perceptions of smell " incorrect 48 

2. How sense of smell is affected 48 

3. We have perception of the objects of smell 49 

CHAPTER IX. 

THE SENSE OF TASTE. 
S E CTION I. 

1. The organs of taste 50 

2. Origin of the sense of taste 50 

3. Connection of sense and sensations of taste 50 

4. Corresponding to the object 50 

5. Affect not corresponding absurd 51 

6. The mind affected as to causation 51 

SE CTION II. 

1. Modifications of taste — how affected? 51 

2. Properties originating such sensations 51 

3. State of mind referring to the cause of action 51 

CHAPTER X. 

THE SENSE OF HEAEING. 
SECTION I. 

1. Organ of sound defined 52 

2. Sense of hearing defined 52 

3. Sensations of hearing — how realized? 52 

SECTION II. 

1. Variations of sensations of sound innumerable 53 

2. The cause of such sensations 53 

42 



498 INDEX. 

3. Knowledge of simple sounds not intuitive 54 

4. How we tell the direction of sound 54 

SECTION III. 

1. How to gain the direction to objects of sound 54 

2. To locate objects of sound . 54 

3. To determine the direction of sound 55 

4. Importance of the sense of hearing 55 

CHAPTER XI. 

THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 
SECTION I. 

1. Organ of touch defined — extensiveness 57 

2. It is more extensive than other senses — how? 57 

3. Its nature — how conditioned? 57 

4. Its office — but connection with nerves undefinable 57 

SECTION II. 

1. Its variations differ from other senses •. 58 

2. Character of impressions from external objects 58 

3. Origin of feeling corresponding with the cause 58 

4. Knowledge from this source only, imperfect 59 

5. With touch is the origin of the knowledge of temperature 59 

6. It is not the idea of the fact but is causative 59 

SECTION III. 

1. "We know heat aqd cold to exist — how defined? 59 

2. Error of philosophers 60 

3. Office of sense and sensation in receiving facts 60 

CHAPTER XII. 

THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 
SECTION I. 

1. The eye the organ of sight — how arranged? 61 

2. The retina — arrangement and office 61 

3. Its importance to happiness — its power 62 

SECTION II. 

1. Internal structure of the eye — location — evidence of wisdom 62 

2. Sense of sight in the optic nerve 63 

3. Objects seen and felt 63 

4. This sense, how awakened 63 

5. "Perceptions of sight" incorrect 63 

SECTION III. 

1. Color, cause of sensations of sight — how distinguished? 64 

2. Colors vary with objects of sight , 64 

3. Light reflected awakens sensations — how is mind affected? 64 

SECTION iv. 

1. Sight modified — how? 65 

2. Knowledge by sight — how conditioned? 65 

3. Knowledge of color from the sense of sight — how conditioned? 66 



INDEX. 499 



SECTION V. 

Pace. 

1. Idea of extension — how far dependent on sight 66 

2. How affected by colors and light — primary object seen 67 

3. Such knowledge — how limited 67 

SECTION VI. 

1. Visible extension — how received 68 

2. Judging of magnitude — on what dependent 68 

3. Effect of pure atmosphere 68 

4. Perception of distance — how gained 69 

5. How far is it intuitive? 69 



CHAPTER XIII. 

PEIMAEY AND SECONDARY S IT E C E S OF KNOWL- 
EDGE. 

SECTION I. 

1. The senses secondary source of knowledge — what a direct or pri- 

mary source? 70 

2. Self-motion belongs to spirit — what is its power? 70 

3. Senses secondary source of knowledge — how regarded by many... 71 

4. They can not give perfect knowledge 71 

SECTION II. 

1. Spirit incapable of deception 71 

2. Reliance on the senses is found in consciousness 71 

3. A skeptic's delusion 72 



DIVISION SECOND. 
CHAPTER I. 

PERCEPTION. 

SECTION I. 

1. Perception defined 73 

2. Relation of sensation and perception — what is the office of each ?... 73 

3. Perception successive to sensation 73 

4. Mystery of perception as sequel to impressions received 74 

SECTION II. 

1. Perception, voluntary act of mind 74 

2. Sensation not necessarily followed by perception 74 

3. When is it involuntary? 75 

4. Voluntary perception 75 

SECTION III. 

1. Perception acquaints us with external things 75 

2. Perception of primary properties differs from sensation 76 

3. How sensation differs from perception 76 

4. Perception of difference in primary and secondary properties 76 



500 INDEX. 



CHAPTER II. 

FALSE PERCEPTION. 

SE CTION I. 

Page. 

1. When false perception takes place 77 

2. May arise with the organs of sense 77 

3. They exist in changes of mental states 77 

4. They arise connected with disordered organs 77 

SECTION II. . 

1. How perception may be corrected 78 

2. By comparing perceptions with those of other persons 78 

3. By exercise of judgment 78 

4. How they may be corrected in reference to objects 78 

CHAPTER III. 

PERCEPTION AS CONNECTED WITH SMELL, TASTE, 
HEARING, TOUCH, AND SIGHT. 

SECTION I. 

1. Perceptions in regard to smell 79 

2. Old view of sensations renders perceptions accidental 79 

3. Connection between sensations and perceptions — important cases.. 79 

SECTION II. 

1. Perceptions connected with taste 80 

2. Habit in relation to taste 80 

3. Law of habit with wine-dealers 80 

4. Direction of perception — how dependent 81 

SECTION III. 

1. Perception in regard to hearing 81 

2. How affected by strong and weak sensations 81 

3. Effect of habit— perception of the blind 81 

4. When perception maybe accidental 82 

SECTION IV. 

1. Perception and touch — how increased 82 

2. Power of blind persons 82 

3. Knowledge of that which affects touch arises with sensation 82 

SECTION V. 

1. Perception and sight — what of expansion and distance? 82 

2. Inclination of axis of vision — the effect 83 

3. Distance intuitive with children 83 

4. Habit in regard to distance — what of mariners? 83 



INDEX. 501 

DIVISION THIRD. 

CHAPTER I. 

OTJB KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEFINITE AND CONTIN- 
GENT PHENOMENA OF THOUGHT. 

SECTION I. 

Page. 

1. Thoughts and feelings not all of the phenomena of mind 85 

2. Existence and nature of thought 85 

3. What is thought?— different orders? 85 

SECTION II. 

1. It is real and expresses action 86 

2. If separated from mind it is non-existence 86 

3. Importance of thought — action and great results 86 

CHAPTER II. 

IDEAS. 
SECTION I. 

1. Idea defined — where does it exist? 87 

2. How do ideas vary? 87 

3. Ideas of materiality contingent 87 

4. When they are relative 87 

5. Ideas of duration absolute 87 

SECTION II. 

1. Ideas of space necessary or absolute 87 

2. When ideas of space absolute 88 

3. Idea of space implies absence of limitation 88 

4. Idea of space and cause necessary 88 

CHAPTER III. 

POWER OF KNOWLEDGE WITHOUT TESTIMONY. 

SECTION I. 

1. What may primary elements of mind be called? 89 

2. Axioms can not be proved true — how received? 89 

3. Primary elements of mind — how known? 89 

SECTION II. 

1. Knowledge of primary elements — how gained? 90 

2. Power to know self-reality with them 90 

3. With them is the origin of the power to know external things 90 

CHAPTER IV. 

KNOWLEDGE FEOM TESTIMONY. 
SECTIO N I. 

1. Intuitive power to arrive at facts from testimony 91 

2. Testimony defined 91 



502 INDEX. 

Page. 

3. Belief in external facts — what of weak and ignorant minds? 91 

4. If limited in views, we rely on experience 92 

SECTION II. 

1. Influence of facts upon well-regulated minds 92 

2. We can arrive at a knowledge of facts — how? 92 

3. Infidelity rejects testimony — how? 93 

4. Greater faith to believe in miracles 93 

5. What is a miracle? 93 

6. Divine Revelation a miraculous gift — what does it establish ?....,... 93 

SECTION III. 

1. How infidels adhere to the regular course of nature 94 

2. What is Mr. Hume's celebrated argument against Christ's resur- 

rection — how incorrect? 94 

3. The doctrine of his resurrection true 95 



DIVISION FOURTH. 
CHAPTER, I. 

CONCEPTION. 
SECTION I . 

1. How conception exists 96 

2. Conception defined 96 

3. Conception of ideas, images, and sentiments — how conditioned?... 96 

SECTION II. 

1. How differ from sensations and perceptions? 96 

2. It differs from memory 97 

3. It is not confined to impressions of past time 97 

CHAPTER II. 

MEMORY. 
SECTIO N I. 

1. Memory defined — what is remembrance ? 98 

2. Memory contains and retains ideas and facts — when voluntary, 

what is it?....' 98 

3. To what is its nature and power closely connected? 99 

4. What follows thinking of an object of memory? 99 

5. Remembering past objects — how are perceptions recalled? 99 

6. Suggestion connected with remembering facts 99 

7. It is a department of association 99 

8. Imagination dependent on memory 99 

SECTION II. 

1. Original difference in the power of memory 99 

2. Memory founded upon analogy 100 

3. Embraced in memory. (1.) Sensitive impression of certain men- 

tal state. (2.) Involuntary recurring of impressions. (3.) In- 
voluntary recurrence of some previous existent 100 

4. It implies suggestion, conception, and perception 101 



INDEX. 503 



SECTI ON III. 

Page. 

1. Local memory defined 101 

2. It contributes to knowledge and belief of truth 101 

3. Degrees in power of memory 101 

4. Philosophic memory — what it embraces 102 

SECTION IV. 

1. A ready memory 102 

2. Retentive memory connected with philosophic 102 

3. Artificial memory cultivated 102 

4. Efficient memory retains facts 103 

SECTION V. 

1. Decline of memory in the aged 103 

2. It is dependent on perception 103 

3. Weak by defects in attention 103 

4. Memory in the aged not destroyed 104 

5. We must trust memory 104 

6. Should be exercised only with that most important fact 104 

7. Should receive objects to be remembered in natural order 104 

CHAPTER III. 

REMEMBRANCE, RECOLLECTION, AND THE DURA- 
TION OF MEMORY. 
SECTION I. 

1. Remembrance defined 105 

2. Implies occurring of facts spontaneously 105 

3. Ease in remembering dependent on tenacity in reception 105 

SECTION II. 

1. Recollection defined 105 

2. It differs from remembrance 105 

3. Recollection — when voluntary? 106 

4. Relation in memory, remembrance, and recollection 106 

SECTION III. 

1. Duration of memory evidenced in recalling past acts 106 

2. Unexpected recurring of past thoughts and feelings 106 

3. How memory is affected by physical organs 107 

4. How injuries of the head or brain affect memory. Example 107 

5. How affections of body influence memory. Examples 107 

6. What the effect is when the mind is in a state of coma 108 

7. First truths learned, last forgotten 108 

8. Memory will command all it ever possessed, in the day of judgment 108 

CHAPTER IV. 

ATTENTION. 
SECTION I. 

1. What is attention? 109 

2. Attention defined by general consent 109 

3. It is a real faculty 109 

4. It can not result from other faculties 109 



504 INDEX. 

Pagk. 

5. It is an original power 109 

6. It expresses not only a state, but action — relation to perception... 109 

S ECTION II. 

1. "When attention is voluntary 110 

2. When it is involuntary 110 

3. Successful attention — how conditioned ? 110 

4. Memory dependent on attention 110 

5. Attention first affected by disease 110 

6. Effect of fever, intemperance, and age — is this annihilation? Ill 

CHAPTER V. 

ASSOCIATION. 
SECTION I. 

1. Power of association in the mind 112 

2. The act of associating — how conditioned? 112 

3. When it is voluntary 112 

4. It is principally involuntary 112 

SECTION II. 

1. Error of philosophers. Power of associating lies back of the act. 113 

2. The acting power is in the mind 113 

3. It is furnished with materials in regard to cause and effect 113 

SECTION III. 

1. Related objects suggest facts for association 114 

2. Resemblance aids association 114 

3. Contrast contributes to association 114 

4. It is aided by the law of contiguity of time and place 114 

5. When natural association takes place 114 

SECTION IV. 

1. Calling up of facts — when voluntary? 115 

2. Associations recur involuntary 115 

3. Casual associations — how formed? 115 

4. Recurring facts connected with localities 115 

5. Strong impressions connected with localities 116 

SECTION V. 

1. Intentional association — volitive 116 

2. How exercised to aid memory 116 

3. Its use in regard to the truth of Christianity against infidelity... 116 

4. How dependent upon human testimony 117 

5. Testimony strengthened by the commemorative rites 117 

6. Such association frees us from doubt as to truth 118 

SECTION VI. 

1. Law or laws, used by philosophers, improper 118 

2. Truths may suggest each other 118 

3. How association varies 118 

4. It varies with the strength and energy of emotions 119 

5. How affected by the lapse of time 119 

6. Mental association under volition 119 

7. When they are under indirect volition 120 



INDEX. 505 



SECTION VII. 

Page. 

1. Influence of association upon correct taste 120 

2. Ideas of fashion vary with association 121 

3. Taste, how influenced "by common and honorable persons 121 

4. Dreadful tendency of improper associations 121 

5. The tendency of correct associations 122 

6. Principles and associations correctly fixed, essential to success... 122 



DIVISION FIFTH. 

CHAPTER I. 

MENTAL STATES. 
SECTION I. 

1. Simple mental state defined 123 

2. Two or more elements render it complex 123 

3. Simple mental states, known but undefinable 123 

4. Belief in and reliance on them without doubt 123 

5. They precede those of complex character 123 

SECTION II. 

1. Complex states — how conditioned? 124 

2. Many thoughts unite in the soul 124 

3. Complex states in reference to external facts 124 

4. They exist with external objects differing from abstract elements. 124 

5. Complex states result from internal influences 125 

CHAPTER II. 

ABSTRACTION. 

SECTION I. 

1. Abstraction defined , 126 

2. It gives us command of many objects 126 

3. It may arise with detected resemblance and difference 126 

4. Mental operations in abstracting facts 127 

5. How we may have particular abstract ideas 127 

SECTION II. 

1. General abstraction applies to classification — when? 128 

2. It applies to almost innumerable classes of objects. 128 

3. Process of abstraction essential 128 

4. How affected by disease 128 

CHAPTER III. 

IMAGINATION. 
SECTION I. 

1. Imagination defined 130 

2. It is not an ulterior element 130 

3. It is closely connected with the understanding 130 

4. It extends to apprehending and contemplating 13}. 

43 



506 INDEX. 

Pag*: 

5. It influences mental states 131 

6. It leads in blending elements 132 

SECTION II. 

1. When imagination is involuntary 132 

2. Intentional imagination involves artificial combinations 132 

3. Fictions dependent on imagination 132 

4. Productions of imagination conform to the moral character of . 

authors 132 

5. When they are evil — what the result? 132 

6. It differs from fancy 132 

7. It differs from admiration 133 

8. It differs from fiction — how? 133 

9. It differs from bombast — how? 133 

SECTION III. 

1. Imagination differs from burlesque 134 

2. It differs from sarcasm 134 

3. Sympathy not wholly dependent on imagination 134 

4. When imagination can indulge in fiction uninjured 134 

5. Influence of fiction injurious..., 135 

6. Utility and importance of imagination 135 

7. Its importance in description 135 

8. Its activity essential to oratory 135 

9. Painting and poetry dependent on it 136 

10. The sculptor dependent on it. So are admirers of his work 136 

S ECTION IV. 

1. How it may be improved 136 

2. How affected*by disease 136 

3. It is liable to mislead 136 

4. It may lead to deception— in what way?..'. 136 

5. Love of fiction when too strong, dangerous — how? 137 



DIVISION SIXTH. 
CHAPTER I. 

INTELLECTUAL STATES OF EXTERNAL OEIGIN AND 

INTELLECTUAL STATES OF INTEENAL OEIGIN. 

SECTIO N I. 

1. Incorrect position of philosophers , 138 

2. Intellectual states of external origin incorrect 138 

2r. Impossibility of such external states 138 

4. No element of mind can be external in origin 139 

5. Absurdity of external mental states 139 

SECTION II. 

1. There are intellectual states of internal origin 139 

2. The origin of all knowledge is in the mind 139 

3. The most ulterior origin of knowledge is with the senses 140 

4. Sensation is followed by a new mental state 140 

5. Simple thoughts and ideas within the soul 140 



INDEX. 507 



CHAPTER II. 

SUGGESTION. 

SECTION I. 

Page. 

1. Suggestion defined 141 

2. Simple suggestion natural 141 

3. Notion of self real. Independent of the senses 141 

4. Self-existence not tested by the senses 141 

5. Origin of the idea of mind independent of the senses 142 

6. Origin of the idea of personal identity original with the soul 142 

SECTION II. 

1. Suggestion — when involuntary? 142 

2. When it is voluntary 142 

3. Origin of the idea of materiality 142 

4. Origin of the idea of motion dependent on suggestion 143 

5. Dependence upon suggestion for origin of the idea of motion 143 

SECTION III. 

1. Origin of the idea of time connected with suggestion 143 

2. Duration measured, called time — what is it unmeasured? 144 

3. Origin of the idea of space intuitive 144 

4. Resemblance ulterior law of suggestion 144 

5. Action of suggestion aided by contrast 144 

6. Extremes of conditions suggest their opposites 145 

7. It takes place when thinking of cotemporaneous existences 145 

8. Its activity depends upon the habit of exercise 145 

CHAPTER III. 

BELATIVE SUGGESTION. 
SE CTION I. 

1. Suggestion defined 146 

2. Mind affected — in what way? 146 

3. Influences of relation — how arise? 146 

4. How affected by terms of correlative character 147 

SECTION II. 

1. Relative suggestion not dependent on the senses 147 

2. Action of senses in regard to hope, love, joy 147 

3. The extent of this power 148 

4. Perfection of the soul disembodied 148 

CHAPTER IV. 

THE JUDGMENT. 
SECTION I. 

1. Real existence of the judgment 149 

2. What is the judgment? 149 

3. Further defined. 149 

4. Not only the act, but the power of judging 149 

5. Its origin is not of education 150 

6. It determines and finishes action 150 



508 INDEX. 



SECTION II. 

, Page. 

1. When naturally defective attended with uncertainty 150 

2. It presupposes the understanding 151 

3. Condition of the understanding and judgment 151 

4. It is closely connected with reason — how related? 151 

SECTION III. 

1. It attends to agreement or disagreement of things 152 

2. Truthfulness of axioms hased upon it 152 

3. Important to physician's success 152 

4. Decisions — how dependent on it? . 152 

SECTION IV. 

1! It differs from the understanding 153 

2. Closely connected with suggestion 153 

3. It differs from relative suggestion 154 

4. Importance of correct judgment 154 



DIVISION SEVENTH. 
CHAPTER I. 

SEASON. 

SECTION I. 

1. Reason defined 156 

2. Its power 156 

3. Ratiocination — how established? 156 

4. Reason, a power and action 157 

5. It differs from the understanding 157 

SECTION II. 

1. Its power in the mind 157 

2. Intuitive facts and self-evident truths not tested by it 157 

3. Self-evident truths divided. (1.) Those which lie at the founda- 

tion of mind. (2.) Those appertaining to external things 158 

4. Intuitive principles the origin of knowledge 158 

5. With these is. the origin of the knowledge of self 158 

SECTION III. 

1. With this power is confidence in uniformity of nature's laws.... 159 

2. Confidence in uniformity of phenomena gives origin to the idea 

of causation 159 

3. Universal confidence in truths — how with those denying them?... 160 

4. Ground of skeptic's belief 160 

5. Difference between argumentation and mere action 161 

6. Reason differs from consciousness 161 

7. It differs from the power of the senses 162 

8. It differs from the judgment 162 

9. It differs from the understanding 162 

10. With this power is convictions of right and wrong 162 

11. With it arise ideas of the beautiful and sublime 162 



INDEX. 509 



CHAPTER II. 

REASONING. 

SECTION I. 

Page. 

1. Reasoning defined 164 

2. It is destructive to atheism 164 

3. The two modes of argumentation — what are they? 164 

SECTION II. 

1. Non-existence of First Cause impossible 165 

2. All his essence and attributes self-existing 165 

3. All his attributes unoriginated — why? 165 

4. He must exist every-where — why? 166 

SECTION III. 

1. He must be precisely the same in every place 167 

2. Can not be materiality 167 

3. What if matter and motion were eternal? 167 

4. Such being possesses inlinite wisdom and power 168 

5. Existence of more than one such being impossible — why? 168 

6. His acts are not arbitrary or of necessity 168 

7. Omnipotence does not necessitate his knowledge 169 

8. True object of man's creation 169 

SECTION IV. 

1. What is the second mode of reasoning ? 169 

2. Creation proves his existence 170 

3. The heavens declare his being and power 170 

4. Earthly existences appeal to the same as true 170 

5. Order of providence proves his reality 170 

6. Evidences in life, sleep, vision, and muscular action 171 

7. Evidence in the circulation of the blood — how? 171 

SECTION V. 

1. Evidence in the motion of the heart 172 

2. Cause of the motion of the blood disproved. (1.) How apply 

stimulus? (2.) What of the contractions ? 172 

3. Unwearied action of the heart 172 

4. Relations of reason and reasoning 173 

5. Reasoning, a certain source of knowledge 173 

SECTION VI. 

1. Effect, the object of reasoning 174 

2. What is reasoning a priori? 174 

3. Reasoning a posteriori — how different? 174 

4. Three things necessary to reasoning. (1.) Correct premises. (2.) 

All added truths must be correct. (3.) Caution in building the 
argument , 175 

5. Correct reasoning depends upon attention and judgment 175 

SECTION VII. 

1. Mathematical reasoning denned 175 

2. How dependent upon intuitive power 176 

3. All knowledge dependent upon primary elements of mind 176 

4. Mental and moral reasoning worthy of all confidence 176 

5. Character of demonstrative reasoning 176 



510 INDEX. 

Page. 

6. Investigative reasoning defined 176 

7. When false investigative reasoning takes place.. 177 

8. False reasoning can 'take place. (1.) In assuming a proposi- 

tion. (2.) By confusing each step. (3.) Wrong beginning of 
argument. (4.) By petitio principii. (5.) By assuming a prin- 
ciple 177 

(6.) Arises in sophistical use of terms 178 

9. Influenced properly 178 

10. Prejudice affects it 178 



DIVISION EIGHTH. 
CHAPTER I. 

DREAMING. 
SECTION I. 

1. Dreaming defined 179 

2. Wholly involuntary 179 

3. Common to all persons , 179 

4. Mental dreaming 179 

5. Such mental states not to be depended on 180 

6. Caused by physical debility 180 

SECTION II. 

1. No fixed law of conformity 180 

2. New facts may arise in dreams 181 

3. Conceptions of length of time 181 

4. They are not confined to old conceptions 181 

5. Cause of them unknown 181 

CHAPTER II. 

CLAIRVOYANCE. 
SECTION I. 

1. It does not properly belong to this work 182 

2. Clairvoyance defined 182 

3. Attributed to mesmeric state 182 

4. Not common to mind 182 

S ECTION II. 

1. How unaccountable in nature 183 

2. How far true 183 

3. It is natural to some constitutions 183 

4. When innocent 184 

CHAPTER III. 

SOMNAMBULISM. 
SECTION I. 

1. What is somnambulism? 185 

2. It differs from dreaming 185 

3. Knowledge of talking in sleep 185 

4. Such talking the first degrees of somnambulism 186 



INDEX. 511 



SECTION II. 

Pack. 

1. It differs from dreaming ]86 

2. Muscles powerless in sleep active in the former 187 

3. Absence of fear 187 

4. Effect of paroxysms 187 

5. Unconsciousness of some persons 187 

6. Effect of somnambulency 188 

7. Spirit has sight 188 

8. Mind is ever active 188 

CHAPTER IV. 

MESMERISM. 
SECTION I. 

1. Mesmerism denned 189 

2. The act of mesmerizing not a new discovery 189 

3. Its relation to somnambulism — how natural? 189 

4. Who are capable of being mesmerized 190 

5. Some wholly unconscious when thus influenced — how affected by 

will? 190 

SECTION II. 

1. Phrenology not established by mesmerism 190 

2. Can they be affected by will? 191 

3. Effort to counteract muscular position 191 

4. Others unconscious will converse 191 

5. Natural mystery < 192 

CHAPTER V. 

PHRENOLOGY. 

SECTION I. 

1. What is the basis of phrenology? 193 

2. Outlines true, but physiognomy more to be depended upon 193 

3. Important points to be settled 193 

4. Truths necessary to constitute it a science 194 

5. That which must be true or settled — what difficulty mentioned? 194 

6. The brain the organ, the faculties must be settled 194 

7. The skull-bone not mental development 194 

8. Formation of the skull and brain 195 

9. Lobes of the brain and mental powers 195 

SECTION II. 

1. Lobes must connect with the skull — how? 195 

2. Agreement of philosophers 196 

3. Mind wholly dependent on materiality for action, untrue 196 

4. Pvesults in materialism and annihilation 196 

5. Power of material organs 196 

6. Effect of injuries on the head 197 

7. Brain diseased — examples 197 

8. Brain removed — examples 198 

9. Fracture of skull— how affected ? 198 

10. These facts beyond the claims of phrenology — apology offered... 198 

11. General principles only true 198 



512 INDEX. 

DIVISION NINTH. 
CHAPTER I. 

REFLECTION. 
SECTI ON I. 

PaGK. 

1. Reflection defined 199 

2. Thoughts thrown back upon themselves 199 

3. When involuntary? 199 

4. When voluntary? 199 

5. Connected with reason and remembering 199 

SECTION II. 

1. Exercise of reflection calls other powers into action 200 

2. Connected with these arises internal convictions 200 

3. Convictions of realities 200 

4. With reflection is conviction of truths , 200 

5. Its importance avoiding danger 200 

CHAPTER II. 

APPARITIONS. 
SECTION I. 

1. Nature and character of apparitions 201 

2. Caused by disease 201 

SECTION II. 

1. The retina— how affected? 201 

2. Internal excitement — its powers and influence 201 

CHAPTER III. 

SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 
SECTION I. 

1. Spectral illusions defined 203 

2. An instance given 203 

3. Images of persons which seem to appear — examples 203 

4. Admonition of death 204 

SECTION II. 

1. Effect of nyctalopia 204 

2. Influence of epileptic fits 205 

3. Influence of febrile diseases — case given 205 

4. Effect of highly-excited imagination 205 

5. Uncertainty of knowledge by the senses 206 

CHAPTER IV. 

SPIRIT-RAPPING. 
SECTION I. 

1. Effect of necromancy 207 

2. Spirit-rapping a delusion 207 

3. Uncertain knowledge of mediums 207 

4. Pvighteousness of such claims 208 

5. That spirits can reveal facts is either true or false 208 



INDEX. 513 

Page. 

6. If of God— the object 209 

7. Righteous messages must have pure mediums 209 

8. The character of such messages 209 

SECTION II. 

1. Our suspicion if the tidings are impure 209 

2. Right to reject if from Satan 209 

3. Forced to believe in demonology . 210 

4. Design in referring to this subject 210 

CHAPTER V. 

EXCITED CONCEPTIONS BOEDEEINGON INSANITY. 

SECTIO N I. 

1. What are excited conceptions bordering on insanity ? 211 

2. A strong mind connected with weak nerves 211 

3. Defects by disease or effort 211 

4. Effect of general debility 211 

SECTION II. 

1. Mind of itself incapable of such conceptions 212 

2. The effect of joy 212 

3. Effect of grief or despair 212 

4. Effect of physical organs 212 

5. Effect of febrile influences 212 

CHAPTER VI. 

PAETIAL INSANITY. 
SECTION I. 

1. Effect of partial insanity 214 

2. When partially insane 214 

3. Variations of mind 215 

4. Affection of faculties 215 

SECTION II. 

1. Influence of insanity on the judgment 215 

2. It may be connected with original suggestion 215 

3. Power of association may act imperfectly 215 

4. Sensations may deceive us 216 

CHAPTER VII. 

TOTAL INSANITY. 
SECTION I. 

1. What constitutes insanity? 217 

2. The work of insanity 217 

3. Power of mental action may cease — how? 217 

4. Influence of one impression 217 

5. The character of mania 218 

6. Hallucinations of a maniac 218 

7. Common characteristics of maniacs 218 

8. Total insanity 219 



514 INDEX 



SECTION II. 

Page. 

1. Hallucinations suspended and revived again 219 

2. Modulations accounted for 220 

3. Character of the insanity of the maniac 220 

4. General character of derangement — death revolting 220 

5. Another character vicious 221 

CHAPTER VIII. 

INSANITY — MELANCHOLIA. 
SECTION I . 

1. Insanity — melancholia defined 222 

2. It differs from mania 222 

3. Differs in regard to suicide 223 

4. Not committed by maniacs... 223 

5. Melancholia leads to suicide ■. 223 

6. Such crime is of choice 223 

7. The self-murder has some reason 224 

8. Proof that such persons are not totally insane 224 

9. Knowledge of its criminality 224 

SECTION II. 

1. Hallucination under melancholia 225 

2. Intention of suicide abandoned 226 

3. Total derangement is lost to suicide 226 

4. Hallucination to commit murder 226 

CHAPTER IX. 

IDIOCY. 
SECTI ON I. 

1. Idiocy defined 228 

2. Character of fatuity 228 

3. Orders of criticism 228 

4. A higher class 229 

5. An idiot always so 229 

6. It is incurable in this life 229 

7. The mind abstractly sane — sane in the future 229 

SECTION II. 

1. Influence of bodily organs over memory 230 

2. Influence overhearing 230 

3. Influence over sight 231 

4. Cause of idiocy wholly of materiality 231 

5. If caused by sin the soul will be happy in the future 231 



DIVISION TENTH. 

CHAPTER I. 

INTERNAL ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 
SECTION I. 

1. The soul has knowledge within itself 232 

2. Power of knowledge connected with intuition 232 



INDEX. 515 



Page. 

3. Primary power of knowledge mental 233 

4. Knowledge from the senses secondary 233 

5. Apprehension connected with immaterial essence 233 

SECTION II. 

1. Knowledge by the senses internal in origin 233 

2. Internal origin of ideas defined 234 

3. Primary origin connected with intuition 234 

4. Extended to complex ideas 234 



CHAPTER II. 

THEDOCTEINE OF PSYCHOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY 

CONTRASTED IN THE EXAMINATION OF THAT 

WHICH EESEIBLES MIND IN BRUTES. 

SECTION I. 

1. Introductory statement 235 

2. Inactive and expansive matter 235 

3. Life of timber or vegetation in graded scale 236 

4. Animated life... 236 

5. Superadded power of brutes 237 

SECTION II. 

1. Brutes differ from inert matter 237 

2. They have power of self-action 237 

3. Power of senses 237 

4. Instinct is mind 237 

5. Volition in animal action 237 

6. Brutes have knowledge of courses 23S 

7. The horse and dog know by sight and hearing 238 

8. They have something of comparison — examples , 238 

SECTION III. 

1. Powers of man differ from the brute 239 

2. The human mind scientific 239 

3. Capable of progressive improvement 239 

4. Self-consciousness essential to knowledge 240 

5. Man a moral agent — how different? 240 

SECTION IV. 

1. The dog capable of being taught 240 

2. Animals learned to dance — error of philosophers 240 

3. Recollection of the horse — example 241 

4. Meaning of the Hebrew term ruach— -how extended? 241 

5. The spirit of brutes immortal 241 

6. Condition of brutes before the fall of man — what of the future ? 242 

7. They were not made to be annihilated 242 

CHAPTER III. 

INTUITIONS. 

SECTION I. 

1. Mature of intuitions 243 

2. Origin of such power 243 



516 INDEX. 

Page. 

3. Intuition faculties 243 

4. Reciprocal relations 243 

5. How ideas arise 244 

6. Simple ideas arise without classification 244 

7. General ideas — how arise? 244 

SECTION II. 

1. Nature of spontaneous action 244 

2. When they are apprehended 244 

3. "With these is the conviction of self 245 

4. Nature of the knowledge of self 245 

CHAPTER IV. 

C M M N-S ENSE, 
SECTION I. 

1. Common-sense defined 246 

2. Immediate decision of reason 246 

3. Mental affirmations — how common to all mind? 246 

4. Common-sense not a faculty of mind ? 246 

5. It commences with real affirmations of mind 247 

6. It involves a general understanding of facts 247 

SECTION II. 

1. It is affirmations common to all minds — what of the reverse? 247 

2. Guides, in correct investigations 247 

3. It is indispensable to a well-regulated mind....... 247 



DIVISION ELEVENTH. 
CHAPTER I. 

VOLITION. 
SECTION I. 

1. Volition defined 249 

2. Act of willing and determined choice 249 

3. Prominent error — how incorrect? 249 

4. Volition, self-freedom 249 

5. Power of volition either true or false 250 

6. Error of philosophers — how absurd? 250 

7. Volition is more than simple action 250 

8. It is an internal power 250 

SECTION II. 

1. Volitions differ from volition 250 

2. True nature mysterious 251 

3. It exists with or without an object c... 251 

4. It is dependent on an object, without one it ceases to be 251 

5. Its existence is not wholly in other elements 251 

6. Its existence real 252 

7. It exists without belief in possibilities 252 

8. It differs from volitive action 252 



INDEX. 517 



SECTION III. 

Page, 

1. Volition and desire not the same 252 

2. Difference tested by consciousness 253 

3. It differs from desire in sudden chance — in what respect? 253 

4. If of necessity it acted, we would have no standard of morality... 254 

5. How are we led by motive ? 254 

SECTION IV. 

1. It has various degrees of strength 255 

2. Degrees apply to force of action 255 

3. Volition differs from feeling 255 

4. It extends self-action of body and mind 255 

5. It embraces more than mere action 255 

6. It differs from choice — in what way? 256 

7. It has power to act or refuse action 256 

SECTION V. 

1. Volition is anterior to choice » 256 

2. Antecedent volitive power with an alternative choosing 257 

3. Choosing is free 257 

4. It is either free or bound — if the latter, what the result? 257 

5. False proposition of philosophers 258 

6. Motive can invoke nothing more 258 

7. Motive proves preexisting volition 258 

8. Volitions spontaneous — how? 259 

SECTION VI. 

1. Motive can not control the Divine Mind — error of Drs. Edwards 

and Upham 259 

2. Such views lead to materialism 260 

3. Motive can not govern volition » 260 

4. Motive and choice can not govern volition 260 

5. Action free from consciousness 261 

6. Established from consciousness of accountability 261 

SE CTIO N V II . 

1. More conscious of voluntary choosing than of the objects of choice 262 

2. Resolving to act according to motive after it is discovered 263 

3. Self-preservation strongest motive 263 

4. Law of motive-necessity contrary to consciousness 263 

5. We are conscious of power to amend past acts could they be re- 

called 264 

6. We are conscious of right and wrong in others or we could not 

judge them 264 

SECTION VIII. 

1. Conscious liberty evident in regard to present time 264 

2. Error of philosophers 264 

3. Ground of accountability — how conditioned? 265 

4. Naturally possessed of volition 265 

5. Error of Mr. Stewart 265 

6. Volition is more than action 266 

7. Error of Mr. Upham 266 

8. Volition and the will not distinct mental powers. (1.) Volition 

refers to natural liberty. (2.) Will refers to the same power 
fully manifested 266 



518 INDEX 



CHAPTER II. 

THE WILL. 

SECTION I. 

Page. 

1. The will defined 267 

2. Its nature liberty-power 267 

3. It has determining power 267 

4. Is closely connected with the judgment — how? 267 

5. The understanding can not control the will 267 

6. Relation of reason to the will 268 

SECTION II. 

1. Error of philosophers as to order objected to — how wrong? 268 

2. Relation of the will to other faculties 268 

3. Feeling, thinking, and willing distinct — in what way? 268 

4. The ground of objection to the error of " laws of the will " 269 

5. Philosophers can not by this refer to material laws 269 

6. Certainly they do not refer it to Deity 269 

7. They can not refer to any other faculty 269 

SECTION III. 

1. " Laws of the will," as used by philosophers, incorrect 269 

2. The will is governed by its own action 270 

3. Absurdity of contingent action of the will, as used by them 270 

4. If mind has self-action the condition is freedom 270 

5. Error of Mr. Upham and others that the "will has its laws pre- 

liminary to that of its freedom " 270 

6. Error of Mr. Upham that " will is subject to laws and prelimi- 

nary fact" 271 

7. Error of that freedom is only to act according to necessity 271 

8. Sophistical positions of philosophers trammeling the will. Exam- 

ine them 271 

SECTION IV. 

1. The will may be influenced by desire 272 

2. Voluntary and involuntary desires.. 272 

3. Will not controlled by choice 273 

4. Nature of choice implies possibility of a different selection 273 

5. Choice either free or bound 273 

6. It can not control the will 274 

section v. 

1. Mr. Upham's position that will is governed by motive — how in- 

correct? 274 

2. What is motive? 274 

3. To govern will it must act anterior to it 274 

4. Object of motive governs the will 275 

5. Absurdity of motive governing the mind of man and Deity. Mr. 

Upham's statement. Motive over all beings 275 

6. Motive in the Divine Mind is subordinate to volitions — how ?... 275 

7. Our knowledge of spirit-knowledge not of infinite necessity 276 

8. Motive has no power to control volitions 276 

9. Will determined by the greatest good — error of Mr. Edwards... 277 
10. The will untrammeled, a matter of consciousness — what evidence ? 277 



INDEX. 519 

CHAPTER III. 

LIBERTY OF THE WILL. 

SECTION I. 

Page. 

1. Term " free will " objectionable — what is will? 279 

2. It is subject only to the law of self-liberty 279 

3. Doctrine of liberty established by consciousness 280 

4. Will can act contrary to motive or refuse action 280 

5. Laws of the will absurd — it knows no law but liberty 280 

6. I may determine to act and suspend it at pleasure 280 

7. All efforts to sustain fatality is reasoning in a circle 280 

SECTION II. 

1. Spirit of dependence can not exist without liberty 281 

2. Necessity can not mellow the feelings of the heart 281 

3. Deity can not execute the laws of infinite fate 281 

4. Man could only be created and exist in freedom 282 

SECTION III. 

1. Difference between liberty and power 282 

2. Freedom of the will evidenced from self-preservation 283 

3. Self-determining power of the will 283 

4. Freedom to act according to fate. Error of Mr. Upham 284 

5. Sophistry and error of Mr. Edwards against the will determining 

the will 284 

SECTION IV. 

1. The superior power of the will 285 

2. True ground of offense in the sight of God 285 

3. Xo offense only connected with voluntariness 285 

4. The will possesses mandatory power 285 

5. The will presides over the mind 285 

6. Error in confounding will with the sensibilities 285 

7. Evidence of freedom in that we can will impossibilities 286 

8. Such is the will, free liberty-power 286 



520 INDEX, 

PART II. 

ELEMENTS OF MIND 

WHICH LIE AT THE FOUNDATION OF MORAL ACTION. 



DIVISION FIRST. 

CHAPTER I. 

MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND. 

SECTION I. 

Pagb. 

1. Analysis of Moral Elements of Mind — how differing from the 

first part? 291 

2. The second part defines moral elements — what of their charac- 

ter? 291 

SECTION II. 

1. Correct understanding of intellectual and moral elements import- 

ant 291 

2. Study of mind the great science of earth 292 

CHAPTER II. 

REAL EXISTENCE OF MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND. 

SECTION I. 

1. Moral powers real 293 

2. Such existences evidenced in childhood 293 

SECTION II. 

1. Conscious belief in moral faculties .' 293 

2. Revelation appeals to the moral nature 293 

3. They exist — evidenced in the requirements of Deity 294 

CHAPTER III. 

NATURE OF THE MORAL POWERS. 
SECTION I. 

1. Nature and condition of moral faculties 295 

2. Moral nature evidenced by pure or impure motive 295 

3. Evidenced in the harmony and peace of governments 295 

4. Evidenced in our capability of feelings of joy or sorrow 295 

SECTION II. 

1. Moral powers relative to the whole mind. (1,) Refers to rela- 
tive claims of the two classes. (2.) Direction of mental action 
and of moral action , 29§ 



INDEX, 521 

DIVISION SECOND. 
CHAPTER I. 

CONSCIENCE. 

SECTION I. Page . 

1. Conscience a primary power 297 

2. A power in knowing self 297 

3. Knowledge of external facts — how traced to this faculty ? 297 

4. How belief is affected by it 297 

5. Scripture evidence of conscience. 297 

6. Positive existence of our moral nature 298 

7. Scripture descriptions of the nature and power of conscience.... 298 

SECTION II. 

1. Belief in the existence and power of conscience 298 

2. Its superior independence 298 

3. High jurisdiction by general concurrence 299 

CHAPTER II. 

CONSTITUTIONAL AND RELATIVE LAWS OF CON- 
SCIENCE. 
SECTION I. 

1. Conscience does not say what is right or wrong anterior to self.. 300 

2. Does not settle the origin of the law of self-being 300 

3. It decides on right and wrong in regard to self 300 

4. Assumes as settled the principles of moral rectitude 300 

5. Its law leads in deciding on self-right or wrong 300 

6. It is a law to man 300 

7. It should be guided by the will of Heaven 301 

SECTION II. 

1. Conscience not a power — error of a great mind 301 

2. Self-power and intuitive right 301 

3. Conscience — conception 301 

4. Conscience — perception 301 

5. Moral condition and ulterior laws of conscience. (1.) A right 

conscience. (2.) A pure conscience. (3.) Character of such 

conscience 302 

6. When it is evil 302 

7. When seared 302 

CHAPTER III. 

CONSCIOUSNESS. 
SECTION I. 

1. Relation of conscience and consciousness 303 

2. Consciousness is conscience in action 303 

3. Internal sense or decision 303 

4. When called perception 303 

5. Consciousness independent of proof 303 

6. How it is sustained 304 

7. It is self-recognition 304 

44 



522 INDEX. 



Page. 

8. Self-consciousness implies, (1.) Inherent knowledge of self. 

(2.) What its subjects. (3.) Objects of ulterior knowledge.... 304 

SECTION II. 

1. Conditioned by spontaneous law 304 

2. Not a result of other faculties 304 

3. In it is decisive power in regard to mental phenomena 304 

4. Origin of the knowledge of personal identity 305 

5. It has direct respect to the present 305 

6. Error — it is not a second source of knowledge 305 

7. Degrees of belief connected with consciousness, and intuitive 305 

8. Contrasted feelings prove the identity of self 306 

SECTION III. 

1. It is a primary source of knowledge. (1.) Source. (2.) Source. 

(3.) Source 306 

2. It is the test of all moral and religious feelings 306 

3. Truthfulness of a heart-felt religion 306 

4. Importance of moral purity 307 

CHAPTER IV. 

THE HE AET . 

SECTION I. 

1. The heart material and spiritual 308 

2. Character of the physical heart 308 

3. Unweariedness — how relative? 308 

4. The heart not an element of mind 308 

5. Its nature and condition...., 308 

6. Its power — how influenced? (1.) By the judgment. (2.) The 

will. (3.) By memory 309 

S ECTIO N II. 

1. It is influenced by moral elements of mind. (1.) By conscience. 

(2.) Relation to evil and good. (3.) Its action influenced by 

love 309 

2. Scripture testimony and descriptions of the heart 310 

3. Depraved heart 310 

4. Hardness of heart... 310 

5. Pure heart 310 

SECTION III. 

1. It is the central power of the soul 310 

2. Restrained — how checked? 311 

3. True eloquence never connected with an unfeeling heart 311 

4. It bears up the burden of the soul 311 

5. It should always be ruled by love 311 



DIVISION THIRD. 

CHAPTER I. 

INTERNAL MORAL POWER IN THE ORIGIN OF 

KNOWLEDGE. 

SECTION I. 

1. Original powers possess knowledge of self 312 

2. Natural power of such elements 312 



INDEX. 523 

Page. 

3. Primary mental and moral powers 312 

4. Moral elements important 312 

SECTION II. 

1. Conscience — how connected with origin of knowledge 312 

2. Nature and essence of such faculties 313 

3. Internal ideas — how they arise 313 

CHAPTER II. 

THE SOUL HAS ONLY THEEE GENEEAL SOURCES OF 

KNOWLEDGE: 1. INHEEENT. 2. DIEECT. 

3. ULTEEIOE. 

SECTION I. 

1. Inherent knowledge defined 314 

2. Power and origin of knowledge 314 

3. How identified 314 

SECTION II. 

1. Knowledge direct defined 314 

2. Capability of spirit to move spirit 314 

3. The soul has spiritual perception and sight 315 

4. Knowledge immaterial in nature. 315 

SECTION III. 

1. Knowledge by means of the senses imperfect 315 

2. Such organs no power to act — how deceptious « 315 

3. The soul's active power 315 

CHAPTER III. 

EELATIVE CLAIMS OF CHEISTIANITY AND INFI- 
DELITY—HOW TESTED BY THE MOEAL ELE- 
MENTS OF MIND — OEIGIN OF BELIEF. 

SECTION I. 

1. Such claims tested by moral powers 316 

2. Infidelity either true or false 316 

3. Consistent infidelity must be such always in nature 316 

SECTION II. 

1. Three general classes of evidence of the truth of Christianity. 

(1.) External. (2.) Internal. (3.) Experimental 316 

CHAPTER IV. 

EELATIVE CLAIMS OF CHEISTIANITY AND INFI- 
DELITY — EVIDENCE OF SPIEITUAL INFLUENCE 
AND PAEDON — CONSCIOUS KNOWLEDGE DE- 
EIVED FEOM THEEE SOUECES: 1. INHEE- 
ENT. 2. DIEECT. 3. ULTEEIOE. 

SECTION I. 

1. Inherent knowledge — how defined? 318 

2. Consciousness, relation, and power 318 

3. Feeling— how known? »»*.*. 318 



524 INDEX. 



SECTION II. Pagk 

1. Knowledge direct — evidence of spirit with spirit. (1.) Spirit 

adapted to spirit. (2.) Conscious of spiritual change.. 319 

2. Ulterior or third source of knowledge by physical organs. (1.) 

Inertness deceptious. (2.) By paralysis or disease, not so of 
spirit 319 



DIVISION FOURTH. 
CHAPTER I. 

CONDITION AND PECULIAE STATES OF THE 

MOEAL NATURE OF MIND. 

SECTION I. 

1. Unchanging purposes of God in regard to the soul 320 

2. Conscience at the foundation of the moral constitution..... 320 

3. Faith natural to our nature. (1.) Faith of credence. (2.) Faith 

of reliance. (3.) Faith of assurance 320 

SECTION II. 

1. Moral dreaming defined 321 

2. Mental dreaming accidental 321 

3. Moral dreaming — how true? 321 

4. Such impressions — how from God ? 321 

CHAPTER II. 

RELATION OF THE WILL TO THE MORAL NATURE. 

SECTION I. 

1. Relation of the will to other faculties 322 

2. Term will implies freedom — what if bound? 322 

3. Liberty in the fall of man. (1.) The act after foreknowledge. 

(2.) The act and foreknowledge one in essence. (3.) The act 
before foreknowledge 322 

SECTION II. 

1. Decree after foreknowledge impossible , 323 

2. The decree and foreknowledge not one in essence 323 

3. Such decree could not precede foreknowledge 323 

4. Angels appear to have been created with self-liberty 324 

5. Liberty essential to the existence of intellectual man 324 

6. Liberty natural to the soul 324 



DIVISION FIFTH. 
CHAPTER I. 

PRIMARY EMOTIONS IMMEDIATELY CONNECTED 
WITH THE MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND. 

SECTION I. 

1. Emotions defined 325 

2. Connection with elements 325 



INDEX. 525 



3. Conscience extends to the basis of emotions 325 

4. Emotions differ from desires 325 

5. Nature as arising between action of mind and sense of rectitude. 326 

SECTION II. 

1. Character of moral emotions — how changed? 326 

2. The order of succession. (1.) Mental states. (2.) Emotions. 

(3.) Desires 326 

CHAPTER II. 

PRIMARY MORAL EMOTIONS, OR EMOTIONS OP 
MORAL APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL. 

SECTION I . 

1. Primary moral emotions 327 

2. Origin of emotions of approval and disapproval 327 

3. That there are no emotions but approval and disapproval absurd. 327 

4. When experienced. (1.) In regard to objects of the external 

world. (2.) Spiritual perception 327 

5. Error in regard to perceptions 327 

6. Error — emotions not the basis of moral rectitude 328 

SECTION II. 

1. Moral emotions — how changed? 328 

2. Conscience — perception — how conditioned? 328 

3. It gives law to emotions 328 

4. Absurdity of Mr. Upham 328 

5. Acts of kindness approved 329 

6. Vicious acts — how rejected? 329 

CHAPTER III. 

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY OBJECTS OF MORAL 
APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL. 

SECTION I . 

1. Objects of such emotions moral agents. (1.) Such agents power 

of self-action. (2.) Have self-cogitation. (3.) Have a moral 
nature 330 

2. Only such have knowledge of moral action........ 330 

S ECTION II. 

1. Secondary objects embrace, (1.) All objects of self-action. (2.) 
Deportment. (3.) Expressions spoken. (4.) Sentiments writ- 
ten 331 

CHAPTER IV. 

SIMPLE PRIMARY MORAL EMOTIONS. 
SECTION I. 
1. Simple emotions numerous. (1.) Joy. (2.) Strength. (3.) Re- 
gard. (4.) Revenge. (5.) Surprise. (6.) Astonishment 332 

SECTION II. 

1. Emotions of melancholy. (1.) Dissatisfaction. (2.) Distrust. 

(3.) Depression 333 



526 INDEX. 

Pagb. 

2. Sorrow — when experienced? 333 

3. Grief — when arises? 333 

4. Dissatisfaction — how originated? 333 

5. When emotions of displeasure arise 333 

6. "When those of disgust 333 

7. Character of those of wonder 333 

8. Emotions of delight 333 

9. Gladness denned . 333 

10. Character of those of modesty 333 

11. When we experience emotions of shame 333 



DIVISION SIXTH. 
CHAPTER I. 

SECONDAEY MOEAL EMOTIONS. 
SECTION I. 

1. Emotions of moral beauty — how conditioned? 334 

2. Error — moral emotions are natural 334 

3. Objects of such emotions may exist in the mind's states 334 

4. Affections of moral beauty imply a negative 334 

5. Perceptions excite happiness 334 

6. Such emotions are connected with perceptions of virtue 334 

7. Contemplating pure acts gives origin to such emotions 334 

SECTION II. 

1. The contemplation of angels — how affected? .'... 335 

2. Moral beauty made known by moral emotions., 335 

3. Such emotions a fountain of joy 335 

4. Experienced in contemplating the character of Deity. (1.) By 

internal perception. (2.) Divine Goodness impressed in cre- 
ation 335 

CHAPTER II. 

EMOTIONS OF MOEAL BEAUTY FEOM ASSOCIATED 

OBJECTS. 

SECTION I. 

1. Emotions of moral beauty natural 336 

2. A single object beautiful 336 

3. Objects beautiful by association 336 

4. How they arise amid scenes at Jerusalem , 336 

5. Feelings on revisiting the place of our reform in life 337 

SECTION II. 

1. The mind's capacity to enjoy emotions from associated objects.. 337 

2. Moral purity an element of such emotions .". 337 

3. Such purity in moral beings 337 

4. Moral purity apprehends internally 337 

5. Extent of emotions of moral beauty 337 



INDEX. 527 



CHAPTER III. 

EMOTIONS OF MORAL SUBLIMITY. 

SECTION I. 

Page. 

1. Emotions of moral sublimity defined 338 

2. Character of that which excites such emotions 338 

3. Fortitude in sustaining right — example 338 

4. Unyielding purpose to do good 339 

5. Example of a persecuted Christian 339 

6. How capable of internal feelings ? 339 

SECTION II. 

1. Knowledge of such emotions dependent on the heart 339 

2. Character of emotions connected with a bad heart 339 

3. Character of emotions of purity 339 

CHAPTER IV. 

NATURE OF EMOTIONS OF THE LUDICEOUS. 
SECTION I. 

1. Such emotions not wholly moral in origin 340 

2. Can not exist when moral faculties are depressed 340 

3. Their character 340 

4. They may arise with our thoughts 340 

5. They arise with a cheerful state of mind 340 

6. When involuntary 340 

7. Such emotions properly guarded. (1.) How important 340 

(2.) How essential to health. (3.) If not guarded, revolting. 341 

SECTION II. 

1. Wit defined 341 

2. Its character 341 

3. Closely connected with humor 341 

4. Humor less poignant than wit 341 

5. The former evidence of a pleasant disposition 341 

6. Character of levity 342 

7. Extravagance of mirthful emotions 342 

8. It tends to dissipation 342 

CHAPTER V. 

LANGUOR. 
SECTION I. 

1. What it refers to 343 

2. Influence of intense and continued mental effort 343 

3. How affected by the organs of sense 343 

4. It arises in connection with disease 343 

SECTION II. 

1. It is not the essence of mind 343 

2. Caused by diseased physical powers 343 

3. How it is a check 343 

4. It is limited to this life 344 



528 INDEX 



DIVISION SEVENTH. 

CHAPTER I. 

PEIMAET EMOTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE EX- 
ISTENCE, ACTION, AND INFLUENCE OF 
THE INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL 
ELEMENTS OF MIND. 

SECTION I. 

Page. 

1. Emotions of beauty primary 345 

2. How objects of emotions may exist 345 

3. Relation of primary emotions 345 

4. Emotions of beauty always interesting 345 

5. Conscious knowledge of such emotions.... 345 

6. Emotions change with perceptions 345 

7. Emotions change with great varieties and qualities in objects... 346 

SECTION II. 

1. Influence of beautiful objects 346 

2. Some objects possess an awe of grandeur 346 

3. A milder class of emotions 346 

4. The grounds of emotions of beauty. (1.) Beauty — when indi- 

visible? (2.) Excited by spiritual influences. (3.) Caused by 

external objects — an absurdity met ; 347 

CHAPTER II. 

PEIMAEY EMQTIONS OF BEAUTY CONNECTED WITH 
THE INTELLECTUAL AND MOEAL ELE- 
MENTS OF MIND. 

SECTION I. 

1. Emotions of beauty within the mind 348 

2. The mind — how influenced by objects of beauty? 348 

3. Influence of a falling cascade 348 

4. The same power affected by various objects 348 

SECTION II. 

1. Examination of objects of beauty 349 

2. How strong emotions arise 349 

3. They arise in contemplating the majesty of nature 349 

4. Character of intrinsic beauty 349 

(1.) Oval objects. (2.) Circles. (3.) Circular forms or action. 
(4.) Beauty in motion. 350 

5. Beauty in reasoning 350 

6. Beauty in axioms and propositions 350 

7. Beauty connected with poetry 350 

8. Beauty in a picture 351 

9. Beauty in music 351 

10. Beauty in sound 351 

11. It is original with some brutes 351 

SECTION III. 

1. Intellectual beings surpass all earthly objects of beauty 351 

2. Man an object of beauty 351 



INDEX. 529 

Pagk, 

3. Beautiful characterized with moral worth 352 

4. Woman equal to man in essence of intellectual being. 352 

5. Woman of high moral attainments worthy of confidence — an ob- 

ject of beauty by general consent 353 

CHAPTER III. 

SECONDARY EMOTIONS OP BEAUTY CONNECTED 

WITH THE INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL 

ELEMENTS OF MIND. 

SECTION I. 

1. Secondary emotions of beauty 354 

2. We can experience two classes 354 

3. Objects producing unpleasant emotions 354 

4. Beauty of forms 354 

5. Contrast of straight and angular forms 355 

6. Effect of changing seasons 355 

SECTION II. 

1. Beauty in the form of circle, square, and cubical 355 

2. Each style in architecture — how connected with beauty? 355 

3. Beauty in colors 356 

4. Beauty in colors evidenced by the conduct of savages 356 

5. Effect upon persons restored to sight 356 

6. Contrasted beauty in motion 356 

SECTION III. 

1. Emotions of beauty affected by the character of motion. (1.) Mo- 

tion in a direct line. (2.) Regular motion. (3.) Uniform ac- 
celerated. (4.) Quickness and slowness. (5.) Slowness of 

motion 357 

2. Objects of beauty may be intellectual 357 

3. They arise in the mind 358 

4. Caused by moral objects 358 

5. Power to know pleasing emotions 358 

CHAPTER IV. 

ASSOCIATED OBJECTS OF BEAUTY IN THE PHYS- 
ICAL, SPIRITUAL, AND MORAL WORLDS. 

SECTION I. 

1. Material objects of beauty 359 

2. A single sound has intrinsic beauty 359 

3. A single color has intrinsic beauty 359 

4. Bright luster of morning — when beautiful? 359 

SECTION II. 

1. The soul's power to know facts 359 

2. Intellectual facts cause pleasure 360 

3. Power to force investigation 360 

4. Truth of moral feelings 360 

5. Contrasted truths 360 

6. Infinite protection in trial 360 

7. Almighty goodness gives pleasure , 360 

45 



530 INDEX. 

CHAPTER V. 

PRIMAEY EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY CONNECTED 

WITH THE MENTAL AND MOEAL 

ELEMENTS OF MIND. 

SECTION I . Pagk. 

1. Emotions of sublimity important 361 

2. They differ from those of beauty , 361 

3. Character of emotions of sublimity 362 

4. Effect in oratory , 362 

SECTION II. 

1. Such emotions objects of consciousness. (1.) In contemplating 

great hight. (2.) Influence of great objects and power 362 

(3.) Great depth . x . 363 

2. Caused by colors in terrific objects 363 

3. Sublimity of motion 363 

4. Sublimity in sound 363 

CHAPTER VI. 

SECONDAEY EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY CONNECTED 

WITH THE INTELLECTUAL AND MOEAL 

ELEMENTS OF MIND. 

SECTION I . 

1. Difference between primary and secondary emotions of sublimity. 364 

2. Secondary emotions — how caused? 364 

3. How caused by sound? 364 

SECTION II. 

1. In contrast of star with worlds 364 

2. Caused by rumbling sounds 365 

3. If on Mount Sinai — how affected ? 365 

CHAP T E R Y II . 

PEIMAEY AND SECONDAEY OBJECTS OF EMO- 
TIONS OF SUBLIMITY INFLUENCING THE 
INTELLECTUAL AND MOEAL 
STATES OF MIND. 
SECTION I. 

1. Primary objects — importance 366 

2. Contrasted objects of sublimity 366 

3. Secondary objects of sublimity 366 

SECTION II. 

1. Primary objects of emotions of moral sublimity 366 

2. They may exist wholly in the mind 367 

3. Causes of secondary emotions 367 

4. In contemplating an angel in contrast 367 

CHAPTER VIII. 

SPLENDOR, MAJESTY, AND GRANDEUR. 
SECTION I 

1. Splendor denned 368 

2. Caused in contemplating great acts 368 



INDEX. 531 

Pagk. 

3. Natural splendor 368 

4. Internal moral feelings 368 

SECTION II. 

1. Majesty defined 369 

2. Illustrated 369 

3. Dignity and honor 369 

4. Influence in looking abroad upon the heavens 369 

5. In the moral world 369 

SECTION III. 

1. Grandeur defined. (1.) Emotions defined 369 

(2.) Of grandeur. (3.) Of sublimity 370 



DIVISION EIGHTH. 

CHAPTER I. 

THE DESIRES. 
SECTION I. 

1. Desire defined 371 

2. Its origin 371 

3. Their existence and character 371 

4. Connection with other powers 371 

5. Can not command action 371 

6. They are not ulterior to emotions 371 

7. When voluntary? 372 

8. When involuntary? 372 

SECTION II. 

1. Instinctive character of desires 372 

2. Definite permanencv of nature 372 

3. Effect of despair.....'. 372 

4. Desires vary in degrees of strength. (1.) With degree of want. 

(2.) With vividness of emotions. (3.) With perception 372 

5. Imply an object — but "are not motive " 373 

6. Objects of pleasure only desired 373 

7. Evil not desired 373 

CHAPTER II. 

PRIMARY OR IMMEDIATE DESIRES. 
SECTION I. 

1. Primary or immediate desires .. 374 

2. Its power 374 

3. Character of instinctive desire , 374 

s ECTION II. 

1. Desire of existence 374 

2. Such desire natural and spontaneous 374 

3. Character of intuitive desire 374 

4. Preciousness of life — how we are attached.*. 374 



532 INDEX 



CHAPTER III. 

SECONDAEY OR E E TE O S P E C T I V E AND PROSPECT- 
IVE DESIRES. 

SECTION I . 

Page. 

1. Retrospective desires defined 375 

2. Prospective desires — how extended ? (1.) Desire of society. (2.) 

Social principle. (3.) Desire of knowledge natural 375 

SECTION II. 

1. Desire of esteem 376 

2. Desire of emulation 376 

3. Desire of pleasure 377 

4. Desire of fame 377 

5. Desire of glory 377 

6. Desire of power . 377 

CHAPTER IV. 

HOPE AND FEAR. 

SECTION I. 

1. Hope defined 379 

2. Further defined 379 

3. It is never retrospective 379 

4. It differs from wish and desire 379 

5. It differs from faith 379 

SECTION II. 

1. Nature of fear 380 

2. Dread defined 380 

3. Fear extends, (1.) To filial fear. (2.) Slavish fear 380 

4. Condition of hope 380 

5. Fear involves apprehension of and desire to avoid evil 380 

6. Difference in susceptibility of fear 381 

7. It affects the imagination 381 

CHAPTER V. 

EXPECTATION, ANTICIPATION, CONFIDENCE, AND 

TRUST. 

SECTION I. 

1. The mind in state of expectancy. (1.) Expectation differs from 

hope. (2.) We may expect both good and evil. 382 

2. Anticipation differs from expectation 382 

3. Previous feeling of what is to take place 382 

4. Their importance 382 

SECTION II. 

1. Confidence defined. (1.) Basis of belief. (2.) How of value ?.. 383 

2. Trust differs from confidence 383 

3. It enters on approved objects .' 383 

4. Trust in regard to mercy 383 

5. It is a law of action , 383 



INDEX. 533 

CHAPTER VI. 

INSTINCTS. 

SECTION I . p ArB 

1. Instinct defined 384 

2. The body dead without it. (1.) The condition of brute existence. 

(2.) Power of knowledge. (3.) Degree of wisdom 384 

SECTION II. 

1. Instincts in the human mind compared with the brute. (1.) 

With a child. (2.) Seeks nourishment 385 

2. Origin of self-preservation... 385 

3. Instinctive resentment 385 

4. Mental process — how conditioned ? 386 

5. Wisdom of birds 386 

6. Wisdom of the bee and ant 386 

SECTION III. 

1. Man scientific contrasted with the brute 386 

2. Man progressive — brute is not 387 

3. Man moral agent — brute with it 387 

4. Voluntary and involuntary 387 

5. Brute memory — error of Mr. Upham 387 

CHAPTER VII. 

APPETITES. 
SECTION I. 

1. Appetites defined 388 

2. Divided into hunger and thirst 388 

3. Origin of hunger 388 

4. Origin of thirst 388 

5. Origin of appetites not without spirit 388 

6. Action intuitive with appetite 388 

SECTION II . 

1. Animals instinctively move with hunger. 389 

2. Appetites necessary to preservation 389 

3. Power of instinct in choice 389 

4. Appetite — when innocent? 389 

5. Appetite for intoxication immoral 389 

6. Natural appetite important 389 

7. Applied to mind and body 389 

CHAPTER VIII. 

TASTE CONSIDERED AS CONNECTED WITH OTJE 

PHYSICAL, INTELLECTUAL, AND 

MORAL NATURES. 

SECTION I . 

1. Taste as connected with physical nature 390 

2. Intrinsic discrimination 390 

3. Taste as connected with appetites 390 

SECTION II. 

1. Intellectual taste defined 390 

2. A sensibility of mind 391 



534 INDEX 



3. Differs from feeling 391 

4. Degrees of taste — how varied? 391 

5. Taste — how universal? 391 

6. Illustrated 391 

7. It varies with youth and age 392 

8. It differs from desires 392 

SECTION III. 

1. Colors involve the power of taste 392 

2. They are beautiful, grand, and sublime 392 

3. Influence of symmetry 392 

4. Influence of uniformity, magnitude, and motion 393 

5. It extends to sound 393 

SECTION IV. 

1. It extends to immaterial objects 393 

2. Extend to intellectual action..... 393 

3. Correct taste connected with moral elements 394 

4. It differs from conscience 394 

5. It differs from imagination 394 

6. It differs from moral emotions 394 

7. It extends to moral feelings 394 

CHAPTER IX. 

RELATION OF MUSCULAR ACTION TO THE MENTAL 

AND MORAL POWERS OF MIND. 

SECTION I. 

1. Muscular action defined 395 

2. Such action instinctive 395 

3. Action of the hands , 395 

4. Action in painting or writing 395 

5. Influences of injuries 395 

SECTION II. 

1. Muscular action instinctive in origin 395 

2. When involuntary 395 

3. When voluntary..' 396 

4. When such action is harmless 396 



DIVISION NINTH. 
CHAPTER I. 

PROPENSITIES. 
SECTION I. 

1. Propensities defined 397 

2. Called natural bias 397 

3. They may be divided. (1.) Natural. (2.) Acquired. (3.) Evil. 

(4.) Pure propensities 397 

S ECTION II. 

1. They differ from appetites 398 

2. Condition of intuitive proneness 398 



INDEX. 535 

Park. 

3. Character of natural longing for life 398 

4. Inclination to investigate truths 398 

5. Curiosity inspires action 399 

6. A desire for romance 399 

SECTION III. 

1. Mental inclination to conform to taste 399 

2. Prone to adhere to common law 399 

3. Inclination to seek fame 400 

4. Proneness to self-esteem 400 

5. Desire of power 400 

6. Naturally inclined to utter truth 400 

7. Propensity to eat and sleep 400 

8. Naturally disposed to friendship 400 



DIVISION TENTH. 
CHAPTER I. 

THE FEELINGS. 
SECTION I. 

1. Feelings denned 401 

2. Variation of such power 401 

3. Power of such motion 401 

4. Power of feeling original with mind 401 

5. Conscious feeling in knowing self 401 

6. Only method of knowing pain or joy 402 

SECTION II. 

1. Old scholastic theory absurd 402 

2. Conscious knowledge of self is first 402 

3. Feelings differ from perception 402 

4. It differs from sensation 402 

5. Feelings differ from affections 402 

6. It differs from passion 403 

7. Knowledge — how dependent upon feeling? 403 

8. It extends to the difference in mental and moral states 403 

CHAPTER II. 

BENEVOLENT FEELINGS. 
SECTION I. 

1. To what benevolent feelings refer 404 

2. Such feelings always connected with pure moral nature 404 

3. When feelings are impure 404 

4. Further definition of feelings 404 

SECTION II. 

1. Love an emotion not independent of feelings 405 

2. Egotism mental alienation 405 

3. Love for our race connected with benevolent feelings 405 

4. Relation of domestic love 405 

5. Feelings of humility real 406 

6. Feeling of awe extends to fear 406 



536 INDEX. 



SECTION III. Pagb 

1. Character of philanthropic feelings 406 

2. Magnanimous feelings 406 

3. Love of country 406 

4. Feelings of friendship 406 

5. Piety refers to condition of moral powers 406 

6. Feelings of gratitude or joy 407 

7. Nature — the love of saints and angels 407 

8. Nature of correct feelings 407 

CHAPTER III. 

MALEVOLENT FEELINGS. 
SECTION I . 

1. Malevolent feelings defined 408 

2. Feelings of dislike 408 

3. Relation and nature of resentment 408 

4. Moral character of resentment. (1.) Intuitive resentment. (2.) 

Intentional resentment is wrong 408 

5. Resistance to evil right 409 

SECTION II. 

1. Hatred wholly impious 409 

2. Anger — how conditioned?.... 409 

3. Jealousy always desolating 409 

4. Pride ruinous — how modified? (1.) Higher degrees insolent. 

(2.) A modification of taste 409 

5. Impatience 410 

6. Feelings of remorse « 410 

7. Feelings of despair , 410 

CHAPTER IV. 

EXISTENCE AND MORAL RELATION OF SYMPA- 
THY, ATTACHMENT, AND BELIEF. 
SECTION I. 

1. Sympathy defined 411 

2. Further illustrated 411 

3. Such power connected with moral nature 411 

4. Not based on imagination 411 

5. Its importance 411 

SECTION II . 

1. Attachment defined 412 

2. Nature of vile attachment 412 

3. Pure attachment 412 

4. Power of belief defined 412 

5. Persuasion and declaration of truth 412 

6. It includes credence, trust, and confidence 412 

CHAPTER V. 
FEELINGS CONNECTED WITH THE PHYSICAL 

NATURE. 
SECTION I. 

1. Nature of physical sensation 413 

2. Origin of the knowledge of physical self 413 



INDEX. 537 

Page. 

3. Bodily feelings dependent 413 

4. Knowledge of physical nature — how tested? 413 

SECTION II. 

1. Muscular sensitiveness 413 

2. Moral relation of feeling 413 

3. Moral accountability 413 

4. The mind insane 414 

CHAPTER VI. 

THE PASSIONS — HOW RELATED TO THE PHYS- 
ICAL NATURE, THE MENTAL AND MORAL 
ELEMENTS OF MIND. 

SECTION I. 

1. Passion denned 415 

2. Passion includes much of feeling 415 

3. Further illustration 415 

4. It differs from feelings 415 

5. Physical elements without passion 415 

6. All dissipation begins in the heart 416 

SECTION II. 

1. Passion — how conditioned? 416 

2. Modification healthful 416 

3. Passion distinguished 416 

4L Error of divines and philosophers. (1.) Divine truth. (2.) Pas- 
sions have self-power 416 

5. Conscience rules 417 



DIVISION ELEVENTH. 

CHAPTER I. 

THE AFFECTIONS. 

SECTION I. 

1. Affections defined 418 

2. Further illustration 418 

3. Effect of materialities 418 

4. They differ from disposition 418 

5. They differ from passion 418 

6. They differ from emotion 418 

7. They differ from desires 418 

S ECTION II. 

1. Natural affection — how conditioned ? 419 

2. How affected mentally? 419 

3. Beauty affects the mind 419 

4. Moral affections 419 

5. Affected by innocence 419 

6. Inspired in contemplations 419 

46 



538 INDEX. 

CHAPTER II. 

PURE AFFECTIONS HARMONIZINGWITH MORAL 
PURITY AND RECTITUDE. 

SECTION I. Pagb 

1. Affections — what they imply? 420 

2. Affected in regard to self-perpetuity 420 

3. Affection innate or natural. (1.) Natural things. (2.) Acquired 

affections 420 

4. Parental affection natural 420 

5. Maternal affection 421 

.6. Affection of children 421 

7. When involuntary 421 

8. When voluntary 421 

SECTION II. 

1. Affection of consanguinity 421 

2. Filial affection 421 

3. Fraternal affection 422 

4. Secondary affections 422 

5. Domestic affections 422 

6. Voluntary affections — when involuntary ? 422 

7. Created by kindness . 422 

8. Exist in regard to piety 422 

9. Affections of gratitude 423 

CHAPTER III. 

EVIL AFFECTIONS, OR THOSE DEVIATING FROM 

MORAL PURITY AND RECTITUDE. 

SECTION I. 

1. Affections — when pure or impure? ..~ 424 

2. Eesentment 424 

3. Instinctive resentment 424 

4. An absurdity of philosophers 424 

5. Involuntary resentment 424 

6. Voluntary resentment 425 

7. Anger — when harmless? (1.) Excessive. (2.) Deceptive. (3.) 

When allowable ? 425 

SECTION II. 

1. Anger not selfish in nature 425 

2. Includes elements of benevolence 425 

3. When it is indignation 426 

4. When it is evil 426 

5. Envy 426 

6. Hatred 426 

7. Jealousy 426 

8. Revenge 427 

9. Fear 427 

10. Malice , 427 

SECTION III. 

1. Disordered action of affections. (1.) Natural defects. (2.) Dis- 

ease. (3.) Effect of a wound 427 

2. Unhealthy nerves 427 

3. Neatness— happy influence 427 



INDEX. 539 



CHAPTER IV. 

LOVE. 

SECTION I. 

Page. 

1. Power to love 428 

2. Called an affection — how different? 428 

3. Differs from emotion 428 

4. Susceptibility of being moved by beauty 428 

5. It is opposed to dislike 428 

6. Fondness of country 429 

s ECTION II. 

1. Love between the sexes — error of philosophers 429 

2. It enters into the basis of benevolence 429 

3. Supports tenderness of heart 429 

4. Delight and joy 429 

5. Parental love 429 

6. Love of our race 430 

SECTION III. 

1. When innate 430 

2. Love to the Creator 430 

3. Degrees and modifications 430 

4. Complexed in nature 431 

5. Proceeds with perception 431 

6. Happy results 431 



DIVISION TWE L PTH. 

CHAPTER I. 

NATURE AND POWER OF CONSCIENCE IN THE 

KNOWLEDGE OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS 

AND MORAL OBLIGATIONS. 

SECTION I . 

1. Power of conscience in the knowledge of moral distinctions 432 

2. Power to rule moral elements 432 

3. Evidence of revelation. (1.) Our tempers. (2.) Rule of right 

and wrong 432 

4. Power of moral agreement and disagreement. (1.) Faculty in 

knowledge of self. (2.) Knowledge of moral rule of duty 432 

SECTION II. 

1. "What is a correct conscience? 433 

2. Good conscience 433 

3. Philosophy of Greek fathers 433 

4. Term conscience defined 433 

5. Righteous conscience 433 

6. Bad or evil conscience 433 

7. Tender conscience 433 

8. Darkened or hardened conscience 433 

9. A seared conscience.... 433 



540 INDEX. 

CHAPTER II. 

EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF THE SENSIBILITIES 
IN CONNECTION WITH THE PHYSICAL, MEN- 
TAL, AND MOEAL ELEMENTS, 

SECTION I. Pagk 

1. Sensibility defined 435 

2. When applied to the physical nature 435 

3. Relation of feeling and susceptibility 435 

SECTION II. 

1. Sensibility as connected with the mental elements 435 

2. Sensibility differs from feeling 436 

3. Further definition 436 

4. Words spoken or written 436 

5. Extent of such affection 436 

C HAPTER III. 

EXISTENCE OF FEELINGS OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 

SECTIO N I. 

1. Feeling is essential to mind ,... 437 

2. How moral feelings arise 437 

3. Character of feelings of moral obligation 437 

4. Appeal to consciousness in reality of both 437 

5. Moral sensibilities is not conscience — error of philosophers 437 

6. Moral obligation evidenced in conscious convictions. 438 

7. We can act from sense of duty 438 

SECTION II. 

1. Our care for each other proves such obligation 438 

2. Such feelings arise in our moral care for self 438 

3. Such feelings — how universal? t 438 

CHAPTER IV. 

NATTJEE AND DISTINCTION OF OBLIGATORY 

FEELINGS. 

SECTION I . 

1. Feelings of obligation simple in experience, but undefinable 439 

2. Self-existence known by feeling 439 

3. Moral obligatory feelings — how conditioned? 439 

SECTION II. 

1. They are authoritative as to what should be done 439 

2. They differ from moral approval and disapproval 440 

3. Such feelings involve a sense of obligation 440 

CHAPTER V. 

UNIFORMITY OFACTION IN THE MOEAL FEEL- 
INGS — HOW CONDITIONED? 



SECTION I . 
1. Uniformity in the action of such feelings influenced by con- 



science. 



441 



INDEX. 541 

Pagz. 

2. Such uniformity of action implies controlling power 441 

3. First law found in principle 441 

4. In conscience is associated power of uniformity 441 

5. Nature of conscience in the soul 442 

6. Variations allowable 442 

SECTION II. 

1. Difference in intellectual powers varying decisions 442 

2. Conscience in moral self — changeless 442 

3. Feelings change with character 442 

4. Intention and moral action of heathen harmless — when? 443 

5. Error of philosophers that moral nature is always changing 443 

6. Spontaneous dictation of conscience 443 

CHAPTER VI. 

RELATION OF THE JUDGMENT TO OUR MORAL 
NATURE — HOW VARIED? 

SECTION I. 

1. Judgment varies — can not conscience? 444 

2. Men vary in judgment 444 

3. Objectors to conscience in error 444 

4. Evidence drawn from heathens 444 

5. All cruelty advanced to by degrees 445 

SECTION II. 

1. Origin of cruel laws 445 

2. Conscious feelings retained by thieves and robbers 445 

3. All savage tribes inclined to worship 445 

4. The mass of mankind not lawless offenders 445 

5. Christians may vary in doctrine 446 



DIVISION THIRTEENTH. 

CHAPTER I. 

MORAL RECTITUDE. 
SECTION I . 

1. Moral rectitude defined 447 

2. What is right? 447 

3. It extends to practice 447 

4. Rules of moral conduct 448 

5. The mind's satisfaction in moral conduct 448 

6. Character of integrity 448 

7. Honesty includes uprightness 448 

SECTION II. 

1. True standard of rectitude 448 

2. Rectitude evidenced in common conformity 448 

3. Evidenced in the arrangements of laws of nations 448 

4. Extends to rewards and punishments 448 

5. Enters into the government of the Supreme Being — error of Mr. 

Upham 448 



542 INDEX 



CHAPTER II. 

MORAL DISTINCTIONS. 

SECTION I. Pagb 

1. Moral distinctions defined 450 

2. Power of knowing right from wrong 450 

3. Such distinctions immutable incorrect 450 

4. Determining power of moral nature 450 

5. Immutability belongs to Deity 450 

SECTION II. 

1. Intuitive convictions of right 451 

2. Approval and disapproval essential — error of philosophers 451 

3. Error of necessitarians 451 

4. Instinctive power 451 

CHAPTER III. 

DISOEDEEED ACTION OF THE MOEAL POWEKS. 

SECTION I. 

1. Moral nature with discrimination 452 

2. Moral nature depraved 452 

3. Moral derangement 452 

4. Disordered action — how realized? 452 

5. When such action is voluntary 453 

SECTION II. 

1. Involuntary disordered moral action 453 

2. When such action" is natural 453 

3. Uniform action of conscience in insanity 453 

4. When morally accountable 453 

5. Acts in absence of reason 454 

6. Insanity without our effort 454 

CHAPTER IV. 

THE ACTION OF OUR MOEAL NATURE VARIED 

BY THE DISORDERED INFLUENCE OF THE 

APPETITES AND PROPENSITIES. 

SECTION I. 

1. Effect of disordered appetites 455 

2. Effect of vitiated appetites 455 

3. Appetite of a drunkard 455 

4. Inordinate appetite 455 

5. Influence of the social propensity 456 

SECTION II. 

1. Love of home, disappointed 456 

2. Desire of life — how weakened? ; 456 

3. Possessory principle — how influenced? 456 

4. Such principle — when vile? 456 

5. Disordered action in self-preservation 456 

6. Veracity — how varied? 456 

7. Results of love of esteem 457 



INDEX. 543 



CHAPTER V. 

IMITATION. 

SECTION I. 

Page. 

1. Imitation defined 458 

2. Originates with ambition 458 

3. Moral imitation defined 458 

4. All objects of moral beauty — how they influence ? 458 

5. Effect of recalling past experience 458 

SECTION II. 

1. Sympathetic imitation 459 

2. Change of feelings 459 

3. Such feelings among children 459 

4. Effect of the shout of victory 459 

5. We apt to imitate defects 459 

CHAPTER VI, 

SPIRITUALISM. 

SECTION I . 

1. Spiritualism defined ., 460 

2. Views of Spinoza — how absurd? r 460 

3. Action of mind abstracted ... t . 460 

4. Modern spiritualism f 460 

5. How inconsistent? , 461 

6. Satanic power 461 

SECTION II. 

1. Scripture evidences , 461 

2. Necromancy 462 

3. Soothsaying 462 

4. Astrology 462 

5. Enchantment 462 

6. Magic 462 

SECTION III. 

1. Witchcraft 463 

2. Connected with alchemists 463 

3. Demonology , 463 

4. True spiritualism 463 

CHAPTER VII. 

GENIUS. 
SECTION I. 

1. Genius defined 464 

2. A peculiar susceptibility 464 

3. Its natural tendency 464 

4. Closely connected with originality 465 

5. Absolute originality 465 

6. The work of genius , 465 

SECTION II. 

1. Genius is involved in investigations 465 

2. Present in decomposing and recombining...... ......... ,,,.,. 465 



544 INDEX. 

Pag*. 

3. Discrimination and mental animation — how dependent? 466 

4. Imagination influenced by it 466 

5. Indispensable to true eloquence 466 



DIVISION FOURTEENTH. 
CHAPTER I. 

MORAL EDUCATION. 
SECTION I. 

1. What implied by moral education 467 

2. Mental education 467 

3. Intellectual culture 467 

4. How connected with the moral nature 467 

5. Early beginning of education 467 

6. Faith of a parent for the child 468 

SECTION II. 

1. Perceptive action 468 

2. What constitutes the vagabond? 468 

3. First truths most important 469 

4. Moral education — how conditioned? 469 

5. Purity the highest state of man . 469 

6. Ground of safety , 469 

7. Without moral influence we are ruined 470 

8. Retiring of conscience painful , 470 

CHAPTER II. 

WELL-BALANCED INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL 

POWERS. 

SECTION I. 

1. Well-balanced powers — how conditioned? 471 

2. Change of physical powers 471 

3. Wisest and safest minds 471 

4. Manner of succession of thoughts 471 

5. Character of attention 471 

SECTION II. 

1. Objects of intellectual action 471 

2. Influence of moral facts * 472 

3. All our faculties should be exercised 472 

4. We must know and love purity 472 

CHAPTER III. 

THE SOUL. 
SECTION I. 

1. The doctrine of the soul 473 

2. Vital power of existence 473 

3. Idea of the soul as real 473 

4. Matter infinitely divisible 474 

5. The soul not a result of matter — how conformed? 474 



INDEX. 545 



SECTION II. 

Pagb. 

1. Term life — how applied ? 474 

2. Instinct of vegetable life 474 

3. Arguments against the soul 475 

4. What if mind is a mere accident 475 

5. Physical nature is not consciousness 475 

CHAPTER IV. 

EVIDENCES OF THE SOUL'S IMMORTALITY. 
SECTION I. 

1. The soul's immortality 476 

2. The soul's original nature 476 

3. The design of Deity 476 

S ECTION II. 

1. If God purposed its unending life ? 477 

2. Inclinations of the soul 477 

3. Conscious conviction of immortality 477 

4. Such conviction among heathen nations 477 

5. Vast capacities and desires 477 

CHAPTER V. 

EVIDENCES OF THE SOUL'S VALUE. 
SECTION I. 

1. The soul immortal 478 

2. Intuitive impressions of continued life 478 

3. How the truthfulness of religion is tested 478 

4. Its value — how increased? 478 

5. Character of its action 478 

6. It is a world of thought within 478 

SECTION II. 

1. Influence of thought upon language 479 

2. Taste evidences its value 479 

3. It gives value to laws — how? 479 

4. Its value further established 479 

5. Its value — how implied? 479 

6. Its value exalted in contrast 480 

7. It is above value 480 

8. Great in creation 480 

9. Its value evidenced in the solemnity of the crucifixion 480 

CHAPTER VI. 

IMPORTANCE OF STUDYING THE NATURE AND 

POWERS OF THE SOUL AS THE GREAT 

AND SUPERIOR SCIENCE. 

SECTION I. 

1. Mind the science of our being 481 

2. Its study seeks knowledge of every element of being 481 

3. It discovers the foundation elements of natural religion 481 

4. Man intuitively instructed 481 



546 INDEX. 



• SECTION II. 

Page. 

1. Study of mind not properly appreciated 481 

2. As mental culture is neglected, despotism increases 482 

3. It is mental improvement gives stability to government 482 

4. Philosophical genius 482 

CHAPTER VII. 

MUTUAL RELATION OF PSYCHOLOGY AND AN- 
THROPOLOGY, EVOLVING THE CONDITION AND 
CHARACTER OF THE SOUL IN TIME. 
SECTION I. 

1. Mysterious ties uniting soul and body 483 

2. Laws of nature influence each other 483 

3. Influence of defects 483 

4. Paralysis of nerves 483 

5. Disease and debility 483 

SECTION II. 

1. Influence of mind over the body.. 483 

2. Influence of trouble 483 

3. Remorse of the murderer 483 

4. All minds rational in eternity 484 

5. Idiots sane in the future 484 

CHAP TER VIII . 

CULTIVATION OF THE MORAL POWERS WITH THE 
SOUL'S CONFORMITY TO THE WILL OF GOD 
MORE IMPORTANT THAN ONLY INTEL- 
LECTUAL IMPROVEMENT. 
SECTION I. 

1. The soul endued 485 

2. Effect of religion 485 

3. Importance of love to God 485 

4. Moral suasion — how indispensable ? 485 

SECTION II. 

1. Conviction in this study 485 

2. How taught? 486 

3. Expels evil influences 486 

4. Importance of guarding the moral powers 486 

CHAPTER IX. 

THE SOUL — HOW AFFECTED BY TEMPORAL DIS- 
EASE AND DEATH. 
SECTION I. 

1. How the mind is affected 487 

2. How the soul is sympathetically affected 487 

3. Perfect mental action 487 

SECTION II. 

1. The death of the body 487 

2. Identity of the soul 488 

3. No annihilation 488 



INDEX. 547 

CHAPTER X. 

THE SOUL IN ETEKNITY. 

SECTION I. 

Pack. 

1. Reason and revelation 489 

2. Desire to contemplate the soul in the future 489 

3. The soul perfect leaving the body 489 

4. All items of knowledge 489 

5. Memory immortal 490 

SECTION II. 

1. Perception immortal 490 

2. Vision perpetual 490 

3. Feeling, condition unending 490 

4. Soul perfected 490 

5. Its salvation or loss 490 

SECTION III. 

1. Its condition leaving earth 490 

2. Spiritual sight and perception 491 

3. Its knowledge 491 

4. Oneness in heaven 491 

5. One circle or class 491 

SECTION IV. 

1. Its rewards 492 

2. Love uniform 492 

3. Further argument 492 

4. Its life eternal 492 

5. Unbounded joy , 492 



THE END 



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